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Abstract
In the English criminal justice system, magistrates may bail a defendant
unconditionally, with conditions, or remand a defendant in custody, whenever a case is
adjourned. In three studies, magistrates' remand decision making was investigated using
the technique of judgement analysis and the simple heuristics approach, within the
framework of social judgement theory. The decisions made by individual magistrates on
hypothetical cases, and by benches on real cases were examined. It was found that there
were few inter-correlations among the cues presented in court, and often some
information was lacking. In such cases, some magistrates bailed unconditionally.
Decisions were generally made rapidly. Magistrates' decisions could be better described
and predicted by the non-compensatory fast and frugal, Matching Heuristic, than by
either of two linear compensatory integration models. According to the Matching
Heuristic, magistrates searched through a small amount of the available information,
and based their decisions on one cue. While some used legal cues as contained in the
law on bail, others used defendant and crime control related cues. However, magistrates
did not report the "extra-legal" cues as being influential. When granting conditional
bail, magistrates typically imposed a condition of residence. Most magistrates
demonstrated some degree of inconsistency in their decisions, and all showed
disagreement from the modal response on some cases. Bail information schemes did not
affect magistrates' decisions, although they did increase their post-decisional
confidence. In fact, all magistrates were highly confident in their decisions. Although
there were some differences in the performance of magistrates located in metropolitan
and provincial courts, there were few differences between lay and stipendiary
magistrates, and more and less experienced magistrates. In sum, magistrates' behaviour
did not conform to the principles of due process, and so intervention is required. Finally,
it is recommended that social judgement theorists consider using simple heuristics in
future research.
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Overview of Thesis
This thesis is organised into six chapters. The first chapter provides a review of the
judgement domain to be investigated, namely English magistrates' remand decision
making. The second chapter presents a review of social judgement theory, the technique
of judgement analysis, and the simple heuristics approach, which will be used to
investigate magistrates' decisions. At the end of each of these chapters is a list of
research questions that have emerged from the preceding reviews and that will be
addressed in the research presented in this thesis. The three empirical studies are
presented in chapters three to five. Finally, a general discussion of the limitations,
generality, and the implications of the findings of the present research is provided in
chapter six.
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1. THE ENGLISH MAGISTRACY AND REMAND DECISIONS
In the United Kingdom there are three separate criminal justice systems in
England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Although legislation passed by
parliament may be applicable to all three systems, each is characterised by its own
distinct procedures and professional agencies. The research presented in this thesis was
conducted in England and Wales (hereafter referred to as the English system).
This chapter is organised into seven sections. In the first section, I describe the
characteristics of the English system. In particular, I emphasise the significance of the
magistracy. Working in magistrates' courts, magistrates make decisions on the vast
majority of criminal cases. I discuss the appointment, training and the demographic
make-up of magistrates, and refer to literature that evaluates their skills as decision
makers. I also provide a brief summary of the historical development of the magistracy.
In the second section, I introduce the remand decision that is made by magistrates. This
is one of the most frequent decisions made in the English system. I evaluate the impact
of this decision upon the lives of the defendants and their families, the English prison
system and the general public. In the third section, I summarise the legislation that
governs the remand decision making process in the English system. I also provide a
brief analysis of the events that led to the development of this legislation. In the fourth
section, I review the conditions under which magistrates must apply the legislation
when making their remand decisions. The conditions include the way in which
information is presented in the courtroom, its availability and usefulness, the implicit
time pressure involved when making decisions, and the nature of the feedback provided
to magistrates regarding the quality of their decisions. In the fifth section, I describe the
crime control and due process models that are often used by criminologists as
theoretical frameworks to evaluate legal decisions. The relative contribution of these
two models to the remand decision making process in the English system is also
assessed. In the penultimate section, which makes up half of the present chapter, I
review past research on magistrates' remand decision making. This research bears upon
a number of issues, namely the information that magistrates use to make their remand
decisions, the conditions which they attach if they decide to release a defendant on
conditional bail, the extent of disagreement among courts in remand decisions made on
similar cases, and the effectiveness of the bail information scheme policy initiative. I
detail the method and findings of the past studies, and critically evaluate them. In the
last section, I summarise the key points of the chapter. I then draw conclusions as to the
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main research questions that have emerged, and that will be empirically examined in
this thesis.
1.1. Magistrates in the English Criminal Justice System
1.1.1. History of the magistracy. When discussing the magistracy, Darbyshire
(1997a) concluded that "like everything else in the English legal (non-) system, there is
not a shred of principle or thinking behind our weird hierarchy of decision-makers. We
have just arrived at it through history and expediency" (p. 641). The role of justices of
the peace (or the magistracy) can be traced back to 1195 when King Richard I declared
that "four knights in every hundred were to take an oath from all men over fifteen years
of age to aid in keeping the peace" (Skyrme, 1979, p. 1). Later, the Justice of the Peace
Act 1361 stipulated that a handful of noblemen in each county representing the crown
would be responsible for detecting, arresting and punishing people who broke the law or
rioted, and enabled these representatives to take surety of good behaviour. Justices of
the peace also had considerable administrative duties such as controlling labour laws,
and were responsible for local government throughout England and Wales.
Nowadays, these "lay" magistrates are seen as a cheap way of administering
justice. The fact that they work in small groups suggests that a few heads are better than
one, and that they can regulate one another's behaviour. It is also assumed that their ties
with the local community will make the public amenable to the punishments meted out
by their peers. Finally, it is hoped that their put-time work pattern will enable them to
approach cases afresh.
Although lay magistrates were considered to be effective in performing their
duties, it became clear in the early 18 th
 century that there was widespread corruption
among those working in metropolitan areas, London in particular. Therefore, a small
number of "stipendiary" magistrates, who were legally qualified, were appointed to
work as paid professionals in these areas (Skyrme, 1979).
During the 1800s magistrates' administrative duties were reduced. Their police
duties were replaced by the introduction of the police force and their local government
powers were transferred to locally democratically elected government bodies.
Magistrates' judicial functions (both criminal and civil) however, were extended.
Although since 1362 magistrates met four times a year at what were called
Quarter Sessions, for a long time they had also sat without a jury in ones and twos,
outside Quarter Sessions. This was due to the practical necessity of coping with
increasing caseloads and the difficulty of gathering magistrates at Quarter sessions.
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During the 16 th
 century these extra meetings were formalised and called Petty Sessions.
The powers of summary jurisdiction were conferred upon these meetings and
eventually, the Petty Sessions Act 1849 called them courts.
1.1.2. The magistrates' court. Currently, there are approximately 600
magistrates' courts. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, these courts lie at the heart of the
English system.' These courts, varying in the number of magistrates and the frequency
of sittings, serve the justice needs of the local community. Defendants aged 18 years or
over are dealt with in the adult magistrates' court and defendants aged under 18 years
are dealt with by magistrates in the youth courts. All criminal cases appear in the
magistrates' court at some point during their proceedings. Magistrates can, amongst
other things, try and pass sentences to summary offences, which are mostly minor (e.g.,
shop lifting). 2
 They will however, refer very serious (indictable) offences such as
murder to the crown court for trial and sentence by judge and jury. Other offences that
are triable either-way such as aggravated bodily harm may be tried in either court, at the
request of the defendant or the magistrates. At present the magistracy deals with
approximately 98% of all criminal cases from start to finish (Lord Chancellor's
Department, 1999c), and in 1998 this represented nearly two million completed
proceedings (Home Office, 1999a, 1999b).
Proceedings are conducted in open court and can be observed from the public
gallery. A defendant is located in the witness box. The defendant appears before the
court either after being summonsed or after being charged by the police, on allegations
of an offence having been committed. The defence solicitor sits in the defence benches.
The duty solicitor scheme means that defendants, who have not already obtained a
solicitor, can choose to be represented by a solicitor on duty at the court. A prosecutor,
who usually represents the crown prosecution service (CPS), sits on the prosecution
bench. Prior to the introduction of this service in 1985, the police was largely
responsible for prosecuting crime. It is typical for the same prosecutor to deal with most
of the cases appearing in a particular courtroom on one day. Facing the public gallery,
the defendant, defence and prosecution solicitors, are a court clerk (also known as clerk
to the justices) and a bench of magistrates. The clerk sits in front of the bench and
manages the administration of each sitting, and advises the bench as to matters of law
The Justices of the Peace Act 1979 lays out rules regarding the organisation of the courts, and the
Magistrates' Court Act 1980 contains rules regarding their jurisdiction (i.e., offences committed in the
local area) and powers. The Lord Chancellor's Department took over full management of the magistracy
in 1992, which before this date it shared with the Home Office.
2 Appeals against decisions made in the magistrates' courts are dealt with by the crown court or high
court.
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appeals from magistrates' courts
HOUSE OF LORDS
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and High Court (also Scotland
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and procedure. However, the magistrates preside over the proceedings and they are
solely responsible for making the decisions.
Figure 1.1. The court structure in England and Wales (adapted from Lord
Chancellor's Department, 1999c)
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1.1.3. Lay and stipendiary magistrates. At the 1st of January 1999, there were 30,260
lay magistrates, 93 full-time stipendiary magistrates and 104 acting stipendiaries (Lord
Chancellor's Department, 1999c). In line with their history, lay magistrates are
members of the local community who perform judicial duties on a part-time, unpaid
basis. 3
 They sit in court for a minimum of 26 half days a year (e.g., a morning or
afternoon every one or two weeks). They are not required to have any formal legal
qualifications, although they are expected to possess "six key qualities", namely, good
character, understanding and communication, social awareness, maturity and sound
temperament, sound judgement, and commitment and reliability (Lord Chancellor's
Department, 1999a, p. 1). They usually hear cases and make decisions as a bench of two
or three (including a chairperson who is elected by secret ballot each year). The
chairperson presides over the proceedings and speaks for the bench, but has no greater
power than his or her colleagues.
Unlike their lay counterparts, stipendiary magistrates perform judicial duties on
a full-time, paid basis. They sit in courts as designated by the Lord Chancellor and
nearly half of them sit in courts located in the London area (Lord Chancellor's
Department, 1999b). Stipendiaries are required to have a formal legal qualification and
have typically practised law for a number of years (Lord Chancellor's Department,
1999a). In addition, they should have the following skills and abilities: intellectual and
analytical ability, sound judgement, decisiveness, communication skills and authority,
and the following personal qualities: integrity, fairness, understanding of people and
society, maturity and sound temperament, courtesy and humanity, and commitment
(Lord Chancellor's Department, 1999d). Stipendiary magistrates usually hear cases and
make decisions alone, and may also be expected to hear prolonged cases and those that
hinge on complicated legislation (Lord Chancellor's Department, 1999a, 1999b).
Lay magistrates receive some training before sitting on the bench and they
continue to be trained throughout their service. 4
 In the first year of appointment, they
undergo induction and basic training courses that cover issues such as rules of court
procedure, current legislation, sentencing powers and options, decision making and
communication skills (see e.g., Miles & Thomson, 1992; Middlesex Commission Area,
1996). Training also includes visits to prisons and other courts. Additional training is
undertaken at regular periods thereafter. Specialist training is also provided, for
3 They are however, reimbursed for travel expenses, subsistence and financial loss incurred due to
performance of their duties (Lord Chancellor's Department, 1999b).
4 Training is largely organised by the Judicial Studies Board and is administered by the clerk to the
justices.
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example, to those who chair the bench. Winfield (1984) however, comments that
magistrates do not receive any training on some important points such as punishment
and treatment until after they begin working.
Stipendiary magistrates will undergo two years experience as acting
stipendiaries. During this training period they assist in the work of the magistrates'
court, thereby receiving work experience directly related to the tasks that will be
undertaken by a full-time stipendiary (Lord Chancellor's Department, 1999a, 1999b).
Lay magistrates are appointed by the Lord Chancellor (or the Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster in Manchester, Liverpool and Lancashire). Approximately 100
advisory committees appointed by the Chancellor recommend prospective magistrates,
who may be either self nominated or nominated by others. 5
 Stipendiary magistrates are
appointed by the Queen, on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor (Lord
Chancellor's Department, 1999b, 1999c). They are usually selected from the ranks of
practising barristers and solicitors. Approximately 1,500 lay magistrates and a handful
of stipendiary magistrates are appointed each year (Lord Chancellor's Department,
1999c).
The magistracy has often been criticised for being unrepresentative of the local
community it serves and the defendants who appear before them, in terms of race, age,
social class and political persuasion (e.g., Baldwin, 1976; Darbyshire, 1997b; Gifford,
1984; King & May, 1985). Statistics on the demographic make-up of the lay magistracy
are closely guarded, however, some reports state that 98% are white, 78% are over 40
years old, most are from the middle social classes, and 41% vote conservative (see e.g.,
Darbyshire, 1997b). A noteworthy exception is that a balance in terms of sex has been
achieved because 49% are female (Lord Chancellor's Department, 1999c). This does
not hold for stipendiary magistrates as currently, only 17% are female. In addition, 4%
of stipendiary magistrates are from an ethnic minority group. Thirty-seven percent of
stipendiaries were barristers, and the remainder were solicitors (Judicial Group, personal
communication, 2000). Such unrepresentativeness has fuelled concerns about biases and
prejudicial attitudes influencing magistrates' decisions (e.g., Brown, 1991). The British
Crime Survey interviewed a representative sample of 7,462 people (from different
5 Posts are also advertised. The youngest age at which people can be recruited is 27 years, although
appointments are usually made to those aged between 40 and 55 years (Lord Chancellor's Department,
1999a). People working in (or who have worked in the past, or who are closely related to someone who is
or has worked) the police force, other criminal justice agencies, the armed forces, or as a member of
Parliament, are all ineligible. The applicant is normally interviewed twice. The names of members (except
the secretary) of the committees are kept secret although recently there have been moves to include
members of the local community. The secrecy surrounding selection procedures has often been criticised
(e.g., Darbyshire, 1997a; King & May, 1985).
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households) aged over 16 in 1998 and found that 61% thought magistrates were "out of
touch" with what "ordinary" people think, and 17% believed that magistrates were
doing a "poor" job (Mattinson & Mirrlees-Black, 2000a, 2000b).6
It has been shown that stipendiary magistrates work faster than lay magistrates,
presumably because they do not need to consult with others (e.g., Ernst & Young, 1999;
Seago, Walker, & Wall, 1995). Although the evidence is largely lacking, it is believed
that lay and stipendiary magistrates also differ in performance (e.g., Sanders, 2000;
Winfield, 1974). 7
 The little evidence that exists shows that lay magistrates are more
lenient in their sentencing than stipendiary magistrates (e.g., Diamond, 1990;
Hedderman & Moxon, 1992). Studies of remand decision making show that stipendiary
magistrates are more "probing" (Burrows, 1994), that they are more likely to disagree
with the prosecution request, and that they are more likely to remand defendants in
custody (Hucklesby, 1997b). These findings may however, be partly due to the fact that
stipendiary magistrates deal with more serious and complicated cases. Some studies
have failed to find a significant difference in the remand decisions made by the two
types of magistrate (Doherty & East, 1985; King, 1971). The fact that lay magistrates
work on a sporadic basis while stipendiary magistrates work on a full-time basis makes
it reasonable to assume that their may be differences in the consistency of their
decisions. No research has tested this hypothesis, however. Whatever the similarities
and differences are in the performance of lay and stipendiary magistrates, it is clear that
they play a crucial role in the English system.
1.2. Remand Decisions in the English Criminal Justice System
The remand decision (also known as the bail decision) is one of the most
frequent decisions made by magistrates.
1.2.1. The remand decision. After the police arrest and charge a suspect, they
must decide what to do with him or her until the suspect's first appearance at court,
usually the next morning. 8
 Similarly, when the proceedings in a case are adjourned
(postponed) at court, magistrates must decide what to do with the defendant until the
6 The 1996 British Crime Survey reported slightly higher figures, 63%, and 21%, respectively, in their
sample of 16,348 people (Hough & Roberts, 1998a, 1998b).
7 In order to remedy this, the government has recently commissioned research on the differences in
performance of lay and stipendiary magistrates, the results of which are to be reported in September 2000
(Lord Chancellor's Department, 1999c).8 In some cases the police may summonses a defendant to court rather than charge him or her. Usually,
only relatively minor offences are summonsed and so these are more likely to be bailed by magistrates
(Jones, 1985). There has however, been a decline in the use of summons (Home Office, 2000b). In 1998,
45% of those appearing at magistrates' court had been arrested and charged by the police (Home Office,
1999a).
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proceedings are resumed. Both the police and magistrates have three options. Suspects
(in the case of the police decision) or defendants may be:
(a) remanded on unconditional bail, so they are allowed to "go free",
(b) remanded on conditional bail, meaning that they are required for example, to
reside at a particular residence or abide by a curfew, 9
 or
(c) remanded in custody, meaning that they are held in police cells (in the case
of a police decision to remand in custody) or in prison.
At court, proceedings may be adjourned at any time. Whittaker, Mackie, Lewis
and Ponikiewski (1997) collected data over a four to six week period on 4,577 hearings
in 25 courts where an adjournment was requested. There were significant differences in
adjournment rates between courts and amongst different categories of offence. Overall,
the average number of adjournments per case was between 0.7 to 2.1 and in 54% of
cases adjournments were requested because the case was not ready to proceed to trial
(e.g., because the defence was not fully prepared). Other reasons for adjournments
included the need to gather more information, the defendant's failure to appear at court
and the date for trial being set in the future or at Crown Court. In 1998, the average
length of an adjournment was 26 days (Home Office, 1999a), and magistrates made a
remand decision on 30% of all those proceeded against at magistrates' court. Of these,
85% were bailed (unconditionally or conditionally) and 15% were remanded in custody
(Home Office, 1999a).
1.2.2. Impact of remand decisions. The remand decision has significant
consequences for defendants, their families, the penal system and the general public.
King (1971) states that "magistrates in general pay insufficient attention and give
insufficient weight to the possible detrimental effects of detaining a defendant in
custody" (p. 84). Evidence suggests that compared to their bailed counterparts,
defendants who are remanded in custody are more likely to lose their homes because
defendants may be unable to pay the rent or mortgage (e.g., Davis, 1971; Hammond,
1988; King, 1971; Williams, Nooney, & Ray, 1987; Winfield, 1984). Few employers
will tolerate employees spending a spell in prison and so defendants remanded in
custody are more likely to lose their jobs (e.g., Hammond, 1988; King, 1971; Williams
et al., 1987; Winfield, 1984). Imprisonment is socially stigmatising and defendants
9 The police were given the power to attach conditions to bail in the Criminal Justice and Public Order
Act 1994.
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remanded in custody are more likely to suffer loss of reputation (e.g., King, 1971;
Winfield, 1984). Prison visits for remand prisoners are limited in frequency and
duration, and they are expensive in terms of travel costs and time, thus defendants
remanded in custody are more likely to suffer deterioration in family ties (e.g.,
Hammond, 1988; King, 1971; Williams et al., 1987; Winfield, 1984).
Other consequences for the defendant include the future outcome of his or her
case. Evidence suggests that defendants who are remanded in custody are more likely to
plead guilty than their bailed counterparts (e.g., Bottomley, 1970; Bottoms & McClean,
1976; Davis, 1971). They are also less likely to be acquitted (e.g., Bottomley, 1970;
Bottoms & McClean, 1976; Davis, 1971; Simon & Weatheritt, 1974).1° Finally, they are
more likely to receive a custodial sentence upon conviction (e.g., Bottomley, 1970;
Bottoms & McClean, 1976; Davis, 1971; Gibson, 1970 cited in Bottomley, 1973;
Hedderman, 1991; Jones, 1985; Simon & Weatheritt, 1974). For example, Davis (1971)
found that in a 1967 sub-sample of 191 defendants matched for age, offence, previous
convictions and residence, 88% of the defendants who were remanded in custody
pleaded guilty, compared to 69% of those bailed. Verdicts had been passed on 41 of the
defendants in the matched sample and it was revealed that 14% of defendants remanded
in custody were acquitted, compared to 47% of their bailed counterparts. Finally,
sentence had been passed on 178 of the defendants in the matched sample and it was
found that 69% of defendants remanded in custody received a custodial sentence,
compared to 51% of bailed defendants.
The prison statistics for England and Wales in 1998 show that of those
remanded in custody, 23% of males and 20% of females were subsequently acquitted,
46% of males and 33% of females received a custodial sentence, and 26% of males and
40% of females received a non-custodial sentence (Home Office, 1999b). 11 The
criminal statistics for England and Wales show that in 1998, 81% of those remanded in
custody, awaiting trial at the crown court, eventually pleaded guilty, compared to 64%
of their bailed counterparts (Home Office, 2000b). 12
 Furthermore, 79% of the former
group received a custodial sentence while only 40% of the latter did so. Fifty-two
percent of those remanded in custody, awaiting trial at the crown court who did not
plead guilty were acquitted, compared 63% of their bailed counterparts. Seventy-seven
percent of those who were tried in the magistrates' court and were remanded in custody
10 Unlike many other countries such as France, Hungary and Sweden, England does not compensate
individuals for wrongful arrests, as revealed in terms of acquittals (Winfield, 1984).
II These are provisional figures and so don't add up to 100%.
12 The criminal statistics state that the figures are under recorded.
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while awaiting sentence in the crown court, received a custodial sentence, and only 44%
of their bailed counterparts also did so. Finally, 42% of those who were remanded in
custody at either the magistrates' court or crown court were sentenced to custody and
22% were acquitted, whereas only 8% of those who were bailed (unconditionally or
conditionally) were given a custodial sentence and 29% were acquitted.
The findings reporting on the impact of the remand decision upon the outcome
of the case, may partly be explained by the fact that defendants plead guilty to avoid
time spent in custody awaiting trial; they are convicted because of the practical
difficulties they face in preparing a successful defence while in custody; and they
receive a custodial sentence to justify a custodial remand. However, the above studies
(with the exception of Davis, 1971) are largely based on correlational data. Therefore, it
is also possible that later decisions are influenced by factors similarly influencing the
remand decision such as the nature and seriousness of the offence the defendant is
charged with.
Remand prisoners place a burden upon the penal system and the public purse.
Each prison place costs around £25,000 a year (costs estimated for 1998 to 1999)
(White, 1999). In 1998, remand prisoners constituted 19% of the total prison population
and 65% of the 12,570 remand prisoners were untried (Home Office, 1999b). Thirty-
three per cent of remand prisoners (34% of untried prisoners) spent from three months
to over a year in prison (Home Office, 1999b; White, 1999).13
In prison, remand prisoners are often neglected because the philosophy of
imprisonment states that prisons are for convicted prisoners. Indeed, prison rule 1 states
that "the purpose of the training and treatment of convicted prisoners shall be to
encourage and assist them to lead a good and useful life" (Prison Rules, 1964 cited in
Morgan & Jones, 1992, p. 49). Remand prisoners are typically held in local prisons that
are near courts in cities and towns. 14 These prisons are overcrowded and are
characterised by impoverished regimes (Home Office, 1992; King & McDermott, 1989;
King & Morgan, 1976; Morgan, 1989, 1994; Morgan & Jones, 1992; Windlesharn,
1988). Remand prisoners sometimes have to share cells and may remain locked in their
cells for a large part of the day because of the lack of sufficient activities such as work,
education and gym, and they may have infrequent visiting opportunities (HM
Inspectorate of Prisons, 1999). Lord Justice Woolf and Judge Tummin (1991) referred
13 The average time spent in custody for untried males was 47 days and 38 days for convicted
unsentenced males, and 34 days for untried females and 30 days for convicted unsentenced females
(Home Office, 1999b).
4 These prisons also hold prisoners convicted and sentenced for a whole range of crimes.
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to poor prison conditions when they explained why so many remand prisoners
participated in the prison riots in 1990. Although a specific set of rules (Casale &
Plotkinoff, 1990) and a model regime (HM Prison Service, 1992) were developed for
remand prisoners, Morgan (1994) argues that little has changed.
It is perhaps also not surprising that the poor living conditions coupled with the
uncertainty of not knowing what the future holds has made it more likely for remand
prisoners than any other prison group, to kill themselves whilst in prison (HM
Inspectorate of Prisons, 1999). In 1999, 64% (58) of the self-inflicted deaths amongst
the prison population in England and Wales were by remand prisoners (including 41
untried prisoners and 17 convicted but unsentenced prisoners) (Suicide Awareness
Support Unit, 2000). Moreover, the number of self-inflicted deaths by remand prisoners
have risen over the past decade (from 28 in 1990) (Suicide Awareness Support Unit,
2000).
Although maybe not as harsh as the impact of a remand in custody, the impact
upon a defendant of a remand on conditional bail is noteworthy. It has been argued that
attaching conditions to bail such as reporting to the police station, residing at a specific
address or keeping curfew do not effectively prevent offending, interference with
witnesses or absconding but do curtail a defendant's liberty and interfere with his or her
life (Block, 1990; Corre, 1986; Raine & Willson, 1994, 1995b). Indeed, Raine and
Willson (1994, 1995b) reported that magistrates often impose conditions because they
will structure the defendant's life or will give the defendant a taste of punishment.
The decision to remand a defendant on bail (conditional or unconditional) has an
impact upon the general public too. If too many of the "wrong" defendants were
released the general public would be the victims of offending on bail. Studies define
offending on bail as the number of people arrested, or charged, or convicted of an
offence committed while on bail (Henderson & Nichols, 1992). This means that studies
using different definitions will report different figures. Nevertheless, the rate of
offending on bail reported by any study is likely to be an underestimation because the
figure is based on crimes reported to the police or detected by the police (Morgan,
1992). Studies conducted by the police report that from 23% (Northumbria Police,
1991) to 34% (Brookes, 1991) of suspects were on bail at the time of arrest, and that
from 12% (Ennis & Nichols, 1991) to 17% (Northumbria Police, 1991) of bailed
defendants were convicted of offences committed while on bail. A study by the Home
Office reported that 10% of defendants were convicted of offences committed while on
bail (cited in Henderson & Nichols, 1992). Despite difficulties in comparisons across
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studies due to the differences in the defendants sampled and the definitions and
measurement of offending, Morgan (1992) reviewed the above studies and concluded
that 10% of defendants granted bail in England and Wales (excluding London) and 17%
in London were found guilty of offences committed while on bail. 15
 More recently,
Brown (1998) has reported higher figures of offending on bail in Greater Manchester
and Northumbria, namely 24% (12% were on police bail and 15% were on court bail).
Nine percent of his sample had offended while on bail more than once. However, this
study adopted a broad definition of offending on bail and included a sample of juvenile
defendants, who have a higher rate of offending on bail (Brown, 1998).
In fact, concern over the impact of the remand decision (Bottomley, 1970;
Bottoms & McClean, 1976; Davis, 1971; King, 1971; Simon & Weatheritt, 1974) was
one of the sources of impetus for the introduction of legislation specifically governing
the whole remand decision making process in England and Wales.
1.3. The Law Governing Magistrates' Remand Decisions
1.3.1. Antecedents to the Bail Act 1976. The Bail Act 1976 came into force on
the 17th of April 1978 (reproduced in Cavadino & Gibson, 1993). 16
 Prior to this Act,
the 1967 Criminal Justice Act contained some guidance for how remand decisions
should be made. It stated that bail should be granted except in certain circumstances
such as if the offence is imprisonable, the defendant failed to comply with bail
conditions in the past, is charged with an offence committed while on bail, has no fixed
abode, has committed an offence involving indecency, violence or firearms and where
detention is necessary for the defendant's own protection.
Second, at the time, in addition to the concerns over the impact of remand
decisions, there were also concerns with the rising prison population and the remand
population in particular. Robertshaw (1983) for instance, notes that the prison remand
population increased by 157% between 1964 to 1974. It had been hoped that the
provisions regarding bail contained in the Criminal Justice Act 1967 would be sufficient
to lead to a reduction in the number of remands in custody (Corre, 1986; Simon &
Weatheritt, 1974; Robertshaw, 1983). These hopes however, were not fulfilled (King,
1971), and Bottoms and McClean (1976) explained this in terms of the complexity of
the 1967 Act and the difficulty encountered in its implementation.
15 The situation has not altered much. In 1978 the national rate of offending on bail was 9%, and 12% in
London (Home Office, 1981).
16 The first law on bail, which stood for over five centuries, was contained in the Statute of Westminster
of 1275 (see Home Office, 1974).
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Third, there were concerns about the information used by magistrates to make a
remand decision. Research into magistrates' remand decision making revealed that
although magistrates attended to cues such as the nature and seriousness of the offence
(King, 1971; Simon & Weatheritt, 1974) and previous convictions (Bottoms &
McClean, 1976; Davis, 1971; Simon & Weatheritt, 1974) that were deemed relevant to
the decision, they also relied upon other cues such as age (Davis, 1971; Simon &
Weatheritt, 1974) and gender (Simon & Weatheritt, 1974) that were considered
irrelevant, "extra-legal" cues. It had also been observed that the police objected to bail
on grounds that it would, amongst other things, impede police inquiries and create a risk
of offending on bail (Bottomley, 1970; Zander, 1967). This caused concern about
magistrates' reliance upon crime control related cues, such as the police request
regarding the remand decision (Bottoms & McClean, 1976; Bottomley, 1970, 1973;
King, 1971; Zander, 1967) and the prior police remand decision (Bottoms & McClean,
1976; Bottomley, 1970, 1973; Simon & Weatheritt, 1974). In fact, some studies scored
defendants on an objective scale originally developed by the Vera Institute in America
and which was used to objectively determine the risk of a defendant absconding (Ares,
Rankin, & Sturz, 1963). Here, information about a defendant's community ties is scored
and a recommendation for bail is made on this basis. It was found that more defendants
were qualified to be released on bail than actually had been (Bottomley, 1970; Davis,
1971; Simon & Weatheritt, 1974). For instance, 85% of the 241 defendants remanded in
custody in Davis' (1971) sample were actually judged to be "good" bail risks according
to the criteria.
Fourth, there was evidence of variation in bail and custody rates among courts
(Bottoms & McClean, 1976; Bottomley, 1970, 1973; King, 1971). For instance,
Bottomley (1970) found that defendants appearing before magistrates sitting in one
urban court were more likely to be remanded in custody than defendants appearing
before magistrates in the two rural courts that he studied during 1964-1965. King (1971)
observed differences in the number of cases granted conditional bail in courts located in
five different areas.
Fifth, studies also commented upon the paucity of information available to
magistrates when they made their remand decisions (Bottomley, 1970; King, 1971;
Simon & Weatheritt, 1974; Zander, 1967, 1971). Bottomley (1970) for example, found
that in 28% of the 171 remand hearings he observed during 1964-1967, no information
about the defendant or the offence was provided to magistrates. This was mostly in
cases either where there was no objection to magistrates granting bail or there was no
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application for bail after an objection had been made. King (1971) observed that
magistrates in 23 courts located in cities in England in 1970/71, made a decision with
only the information regarding the charge against the defendant in over 50% of the 1001
cases in his sample. Information about the defendant's community ties was given in
only 35% of cases, and "it was usually sparse and rather vague in nature" (King, 1971,
p. 91).
Sixth, it was revealed that very few defendants were legally represented at
remand hearings and that such defence representation was related to positive outcomes
for the defendants being bailed (Bottoms & McClean, 1976; Davis, 1971; King, 1971;
Zander, 1967). For example, only 20% of King's (1971) sample were legally
represented at their first court appearance. Zander (1967) found that 66 of the 93
defendants in his sample were not represented and only 20% of these were bailed
compared to 41% of the represented defendants.
Finally, studies documented the speed with which remand decisions were made
(King, 1971; Zander, 1967). King (1971) reported that in 879 cases in his sample the
average duration of a remand hearing in 843 cases was three minutes. The duration
exceeded five minutes in only 20% of cases.
It was no surprise therefore, that Zander (1967) concluded that "the present
system governing the determination of bail applications requires reform" (p. 142).
Critics such as King (1971) and Zander (1967) made numerous proposals for change.
These included declaring bail as a right, using bail information schemes that collect
information on the defendant's community ties and present them to the court, issuing
instructions or guidelines to magistrates for making bail decisions, and only remanding
in custody when it is likely that the defendant would be given a custodial sentence upon
conviction.
In light of this situation, the goverment set up a working party to review the
bail practice and procedures in magistrates' courts in England and Wales. The working
party considered the findings of previous research and gathered information from
meetings with organisations such as the Magistrates' Association and the Justices'
Clerks' Society, before making their recommendations for change (Home Office, 1974).
The recommendations included setting up a standard procedure with information
presented on a standard form; a presumption in favour of bail before conviction; giving
reasons for refusing bail; making absconding on bail an offence; providing information
about the defendant's community ties in the form of bail information schemes; and
establishing more bail hostels. The Working Party also recommended maintaining the
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existing practice of refusing bail to prevent absconding, offending on bail and
interfering with witnesses. Not all of the recommendations were taken up in
development of the Bail Act 1976 and it was criticised. For instance, one government
minister commented: "I do not welcome any legislation which will not remedy positive
evil or do positive good. We spend too much of our time churning out legislation which
will not achieve very much" (cited in King, 1981, p. 136).
1.3.2. The Bail Act 1976. The provisions contained in the Bail Act 1976 do not
depart much from previous guidelines. Section 4 of the Bail Act 1976 provides a
general right to bail for unconvicted defendants, and convicted defendants awaiting a
pre-sentence report. There are however, several statutory exceptions to the right to bail.
The court may nevertheless, still grant bail at its discretion when there are grounds for
finding an exception to the right.
Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Act lists four grounds for denying bail to defendants
accused or convicted of non-imprisonable offences such as careless driving. Bail may
be denied if the defendant has failed to surrender to court when previously bailed and
the court believes the defendant may do so again; for the defendant's own protection, if
the defendant is already serving a sentence in custody; or if the defendant has been
arrested for absconding or breaking conditions of bail (part 2, Schedule 1, paragraphs 2
to 5 of the Bail Act 1976).
Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Act sets out eight grounds for denying bail to
defendants accused or convicted of imprisonable offences such as theft. It is stated that
bail may be denied if the court is "satisfied that there are substantial grounds for
believing" that the defendant would fail to surrender, offend, or interfere with
witnesses/obstruct justice, if released on bail (part 1, Schedule 1, paragraph 2 of the Bail
Act 1976). Furthermore, defendants may be kept in custody for their own protection, if
they are already serving a sentence in custody, if they have been arrested for absconding
or breaking conditions of bail, if there has not been enough time to obtain sufficient
information to inform a decision, and if it would be otherwise impractical to make pre-
sentence reports (part 1, Schedule 1, paragraphs 3 to 7 of the Bail Act 1976).
In order to judge whether there are exceptions to the right to bail in terms of
failing to surrender, offending while on bail or interfering with witnesses/obstructing
justice, the Bail Act 1976 states that:
the court shall have regard to such of the following considerations as appear to it
to be relevant.....-
(a) the nature and seriousness of the offence or default (and the probable method
of dealing with the defendant for it),
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(b) the character, antecedents, associations and community ties of the defendant,
(c) the defendant's record as respects the fulfilment of his obligations under
previous grants of bail in criminal proceedings,
(d) except in the case of a defendant whose case is adjourned for inquiries or a
report, the strength of the evidence of his having committed the offence or
having defaulted,
as well as to any others which appear to be relevant (part 1, Schedule 1,
paragraph 9 of the Bail Act 1976).
Thus, essentially, the Act is silent on exactly what information should be used and how
that information should be weighted and integrated when magistrates make a remand
decision.
Before deciding to remand in custody, the court must decide whether one or
more conditions could be attached to bail that would prevent the defendant from
absconding, offending on bail, or interfering with witnesses/obstructing justice (part 1,
Schedule 1, paragraph 2 of the Act; section 3 of the Bail Act 1976). /7
 Conditions may
also be attached to ensure that defendants make themselves available for reports,
comply with the rules of a bail hostel, and if accused of murder, that they undergo a
medical examination with regard to their mental condition (section 3, subsection 6 of
the Bail Act 1976).
Conditions that do not meet these aims may be unlawful (Block, 1990). It must
be possible for the defendant to be able to comply with the condition imposed and the
condition must be enforceable (Cone & Wolchover, 1999 cited in Law Commission,
1999). Conditions may not be imposed for all the reasons for which bail may be denied
(e.g., for a defendant's own protection). "Substantial grounds for believing" are
necessary for refusing bail, but conditions may be imposed if the risk of failing to
surrender etc is "a real and not fanciful risk" (Cone, 1989).
Defendants may also be bailed on a surety, where a third party agrees to pay the
court a sum of money (which should not be set unfairly high) if the defendant absconds
(section 8 of the Bail Act 1976). 18
 A defendant may be required to deposit a security
(money) with the court until next appearance at court (section 3, subsection 5 of the Bail
Act 1976). These two conditions apply equally to defendants charged with non-
imprisonable and imprisonable offences.
The court is required to record and provide the defendant with reasons for
denying bail or attaching conditions to bail (section 5, subsections 1 to 4 of the Bail Act
17 Schedule 1, paragraph 8, sub-paragraph 2 essentially duplicates section 3.
18 The suitability of a surety may be assessed through considering his or her finances, character, previous
convictions, and proximity (including relational and physical) to the defendant (section 8, subsection 2 of
the Bail Act 1976).
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1976). Conversely, if the court grants bail in cases of murder (including attempted),
manslaughter and rape (including attempted), it must state and record the reasons for its
decision (part 1, Schedule 1, paragraph 9A of the Bail Act 1976).
A remand in custody decision must be accompanied by the exception to the right
to bail and the reason for its application. For example, a remand in custody may be
stated as follows: "you are refused bail in this case because we feel that there are
substantial grounds for believing that if released on bail you would fail to surrender to
custody, and in reaching our decision we have had regard to your record as respects the
fulfilment of your obligations under previous grants of bail in criminal proceedings"
(Moore, 1997, p. 458). A remand on conditional bail may be stated as follows: "The
court grants bail in this case. You will be released with a duty to surrender to the
custody of this court on (date) at (time). The bail will be subject to the following
conditions... You are to report at police station between the hours of and on (specify
days). The court considers it is necessary to impose the condition(s) to prevent you
failing to surrender to custody" (Moore, 1997, p. 458). Appendix A contains copies of
two bail forms on which the bail decision is recorded (taken in 1998 from Camberwell
Green magistrates' court and Haringey magistrates' court).
However, researchers have commented that the grounds for decisions is not
always clearly articulated (e.g., Raine & Willson, 1994). Moreover, this way of
justifying a particular decision is not foolproof. White (1985) states that "it would be a
poor clerk who could not formulate a reason falling within the terms of the Act and it
would be a foolish magistrate who insisted on recording a personal prejudice as the
reasons for the decision" (p. 84). Even if all of the magistrates on the bench agree that a
defendant should be treated punitively, they may do so for different reasons. The
perfunctory nature of the reasons stated in open court is insufficient for highlighting
these differences in reason. It has also been found that the bail form given to the
defendant at the end of each hearing is an unreadable carbon copy, with illegible writing
and the use of legal jargon makes it difficult to comprehend (Raine & Wilson, 1994,
1995b). Furthermore, it is not always given to defendants (Zander, 1979).
Once a remand decision is made, a certificate recording that a fully argued bail
application has been heard is issued to the defendant. If bail is denied, the court must
reconsider the question of bail at subsequent hearings (part 2A, Schedule 1 of the Bail
Act 1976). A defendant is allowed two fully argued bail applications. The defendant
must make a fully argued bail application at the next appearance in court after the time
when he or she was last denied bail. Any further applications will be heard at the courts
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discretion, or if the defence can bring new information to light (section 5, subsection 6A
and 6B, and part 2A of Schedule 1 of the Bail Act 1976). This originally afforded the
court discretion as to whether more than two bail applications were heard and whether
the same information was considered again. However, this was strictly and
controversially interpreted by justices at the Nottingham court as defendants being
allowed only two full applications and any further applications if they could prove new
information relevant had come to light (R v Nottingham Justices, ex p Davis [1980] QB
38 cited in Cavadino & Gibson, 1993; Hayes, 1981). Although different courts
interpreted the statute differently (see e.g., Brink & Stone, 1988; Lydiate, 1987) the
Nottingham justices case was influentia1.19
In general, magistrates can only remand a defendant on bail or in custody for up
to eight days. This period may vary depending on the reason for the adjournment. For
example, a remand on bail may be longer if adjourning during trial. There are however,
limits to the length of a remand in custody awaiting trial, and these limits differ
depending upon the offence. The limit is 70 days for triable-either way offences and 56
days for summary offences remanded in custody pending trial, by a magistrates' court
(Sprack, 1992). 20
 A defendant may be in custody longer during trial (whereupon a
defendant may receive a non-custodial sentence).
The court may ask if the defendant consents to further remand decisions being
made in his or her absence. Courts can remand in absence if the defendant is on bail, or
if the defendant is in custody and cannot attend court due to illness for example
(McClean, Morrish, & Greenhill, 1996; Moore, 1997; Sprack, 1992).
Once bailed, a defendant must surrender to the court at the specified time, date
and place. Failure to surrender without an acceptable reason is a summary offence of
absconding on bail and is punishable by imprisonment (section 6 of the Bail Act 1976).
According to the criminal statistics, 12% of those bailed in England and Wales in 1998
failed to subsequently appear at court, and 45,000 defendants were prosecuted for this
offence (Home Office, 2000b). This reflects a rise from 1997. Although failure to
comply with a condition of bail is not in itself an offence, a defendant may be re-
arrested and bought before the court, and bail may consequently be withheld or
conditions attached or varied. Raine and Willson (1994, 1995b) found that 44.80% of
19 Section 154 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 attempted to amend this situation, so that bail should be
considered for defendants who are remanded in custody. At the next hearing following the decision to
remand them in custody defendants can put forward the same arguments in favour of bail, and after this
the court need not hear arguments it has heard before.
20 These time limits may be extended if the court feels there is a good reason to do so (section 22(3) of the
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985).
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their sample of 1,050 defendants reported not complying with the conditions imposed.
Finally, if the defendant was granted bail with a surety, and subsequently absconds, then
the surety must pay the sum agreed upon (section 9 of the Bail Act 1976).
Since its introduction the Act has been subject to numerous revisions. Revisions
to the Bail Act 1976 have so far been made by sections 153 to 155 of the Criminal
Justice Act 1988 (reproduced in Emmins & Scanlan, 1988), Bail (Amendment) Act
1993 (reproduced in Cavadino & Gibson, 1993), Sections 25 to 30 and Schedule 3 to
the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (reproduced in Wasik & Taylor, 1995),
and sections 54 to 56 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (reproduced in Card & Ward,
1998).21
Section 153 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 requires the court to provide a
justification for granting bail to defendants accused of murder (including attempted),
manslaughter, rape (including attempted). Section 155 enables magistrates to remand in
custody for more than eight days. The Bail (Amendment) Act 1993 gives the
prosecution the right to appeal to the crown court against a decision to grant bail to
defendants charged with or convicted of an offence punishable by a 5 year or more
prison sentence, or of taking a conveyance without authority and aggravated vehicle-
taking. An appeal can only be made if the prosecution had objected to bail. Upon
notification of an appeal, the bailed defendant is immediately remanded in custody.
Legal commentators argued that "this is contrary to the notion of 'due process'
operating at the pre-trial stage, which emphasises the presumption of 'innocence until
proven guilty', that it "undermines the power of magistrates.. .to make the ultimate
remand decision and shifts it to the prosecution", and will lead to further delays and
costs (e.g., Hucklesby, 1993, p. 233, 234).
Section 25 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 denies the right to
bail to defendants charged with or convicted of murder (including attempted),
manslaughter, rape (including attempted), and who have previously been convicted of
such offences. Bail may be granted in only "exceptional circumstances which justify it."
Section 26 denies the right to bail to defendants accused or convicted of an offence
while on bail. 22
 Section 30 enables the prosecution to ask the court to reconsider a grant
of bail to defendants accused of a non-summary offence, on the basis that new relevant
information can be presented that was not available at the time of the previous decision.
21 It is likely that further revisions will be made when the Human Rights Act 1998 requires English law to
conform to the European Convention on Human Rights in October 2000 (Law Commission, 1999;
Uglow, Cheney, Dickson, & Fitzpatrick, 1998).
22 Sections 27 to 29 pertain to police remand decision making.
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Finally, section 54 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 has widened the net for
the imposition of conditions. Any defendant may be asked to provide a security
(money) before being released on bail and the court may impose a condition that the
defendant must see a defence representative before the next court appearance. Section
55 grants the court power to declare an immediate forfeiture of a recognisance where a
defendant fails to surrender to court and summon the surety to court in order to explain
why he or she should not pay. Although section 56 returns the power of discretion to the
court to grant bail to defendants charged with or convicted of murder (including
attempted), manslaughter, rape (including attempted), the onus is upon the defendant to
show that there are exceptional reasons for not remanding him or her in custody.
1.4. Other Characteristics of the Magistrates' Remand Decision Making Task
In practice, magistrates' remand decision making is not only affected by the law,
but is also subject to constraints by other features of the decision making task. These
include the order of information presentation, the availability and quality of
information, opportunities to learn from the task, and time pressure.
1.4.1. Court procedure and order of information presentation. There are no
statutory rules of procedure governing remand proceedings in magistrates' courts.
Lydiate (1987) argues that this situation has resulted in individual courts developing
their own procedures and practices. A remand procedure that is commonly described in
texts (e.g., Moore, 1997; Sprack, 1992) is as follows: The prosecution or defence may
apply to the court for an adjournment. Alternatively, the court may require an
adjournment. If the magistrates grant the adjournment, they then ask the prosecution if
there is an objection to bail. The prosecution will put forward any reasons for an
exception to the right to bail or will request that conditions be attached to bail. On rare
occasions a police officer may be called as a witness. The defence will then attempt to
counter these objections. The defendant need not be present in court, but if so, he or she
may be asked by the defence or the magistrates to contribute to the proceedings. It has
been observed however, that the defendant's contribution is usually nothing more than
verification of his or her name, date of birth and address (Hucklesby, 1996). The
prosecution will then have the opportunity to reply to the defence. Even if the
prosecution does not object to bail, or both the prosecution and defence agree to
conditional bail or a remand in custody, the court must make a decision in an
independent manner, by weighing up the information, and assessing it in accordance
with the Bail Act 1976.
33
Although discrete pieces of information may be presented in any order by the
prosecution or the defence, some information such as the nature and seriousness of the
offence a defendant is charged with will tend to precede other information such as his or
her previous convictions. Nevertheless, the order in which information is presented to
magistrates may affect the information they use to make their remand decisions.
1.4.2. Availability of information. As in research conducted before the
introduction of the Bail Act 1976, later studies have documented the lack of information
available to magistrates when they make remand decisions (Burrows, 1994; Doherty &
East, 1985; East & Doherty, 1984; Hucklesby, 1996; Morgan & Henderson, 1998;
Zander, 1979). In the courtroom, information may be made available to magistrates
from a variety of sources. The courtsheet that lists the cases to be heard on a particular
day contains written information regarding the defendant's name, address, date of birth
and gender, how he or she came to court (e.g. arrest), the category, seriousness and
number of charges against the defendant, the date, time, location and victim of the
offences, and the monetary cost of the crime where applicable, the maximum sentence if
convicted, the defendant's plea, the number of previous adjournments and the previous
court decision if any, the defence representative, and the circumstance of the present
adjournment (e.g. adjourn for trial). The information on the courtsheet may be
supplemented with further information provided by the prosecution, the defence and the
defendant. This additional information may include information such as the defendant's
previous convictions.
Burrows (1994) reported that courts often receive incomplete information
regarding the defendant's previous convictions. Zander (1979) noted that in 56% of the
cases in his sample, none of the information explicitly verbally referred to in the Bail
Act 1976 (e.g., the nature and seriousness of the offence) was mentioned in court.
However, he did not have access to written documents that may have been available to
magistrates. More recently, Hucklesby (1996) observed that additional information to
that contained in the courtsheet was provided in only one third of her sample of 1,524
cases heard in three courts in Wales between April and July 1991. Moreover, in 41% of
these cases the additional information was of limited breadth because it covered only
one aspect of the case (e.g., bail record). 23
 No verbal information was provided to the
magistrates and no discussion took place in cases where the defence applied for bail in
the absence of objections from the prosecution. Information about the offence the
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defendant was charged with was most commonly presented. When information about
the defendant's community ties was presented, it was usually pertaining to residence.
Hucklesby's (1996) quantitative findings were buttressed by findings from her
questionnaire and interview surveys of 60 professional court participants, including
magistrates.24
It is also evident that the police or prosecution often do not provide reasons for
why they oppose bail and request a remand in custody (East & Doherty, 1984;
Hucklesby, 1996). East and Doherty (1984) observed that the police failed to give any
reasons for their request 12% of the time. This figure was greater in Hucklesby's (1996)
study, where she noted that the prosecution provided a rationale for their request only
12% of the time. Magistrates were seen to be unquestioning as they rarely asked for
reasons, or for evidence supporting the reasons (e.g., the evidence that the defendant
may offend on bail) (East & Doherty, 1984; Zander, 1979). Moreover, Morgan (1994)
observed that magistrates did not seek information in 96% of the cases where the
prosecution did not make any recommendation regarding the remand decision. Others
have found a similar lack of information seeking behaviour in magistrates in
uncontested cases (Burrows, 1994; Hucklesby, 1996). Information seeking behaviour
differs between lay and stipendiary magistrates. Studies have found that the latter are
more probing and ask prosecutors to give reasons for their request (Burrows, 1994).
Burrows (1994) notes that the discrepancy between lay and stipendiary magistrates is
supported by the fact that stipendiary magistrates have a greater tendency to remand in
custody until further information is gathered to inform a decision. Morgan and
Henderson (1998) asked magistrates if they thought the information they were given in
court when making a remand decision, was unreliable or deficient. Magistrates
responded yes in 12% of 1,000 cases in 1993 cases and 900 cases in 1994. They stated
that they would have liked further information in 8% of these cases in 1993 and 1994.
In both years, magistrates more often wanted further information on the previous
23 Hucklesby (1996) had organised additional information into 24 categories which were then summarised
as either offence related, bail history, community ties, other defendant related information and court
factors.
24 When examining the source of the information, Hucklesby (1996) found that in half of the cases where
additional information was provided, the prosecution was often the source. The prosecution and defence
tended to provide additional information on different topics. The former tended to provide information
regarding the offence and previous convictions, whereas the latter tended to provide information about the
defendant's personal circumstances and community ties. (The defence provided information regarding the
offending related issues in order to negate the prosecutions objections to bail.) Indeed, the defence
provided additional information of greater breadth than the prosecution. Finally, when the defendant
provided information, it was mostly concerning plea, or a simple verification of his or her name, age and
address.
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convictions, current offence, residence, other charges, reasons for any previous remand
decision either by the police or court, in this order.
The provision of information is particularly important because the law on bail
states that insufficient information is a ground for a remand in custody (until further
information has been gathered). In 1988, Bail Information Schemes (BIS) were
introduced in England and Wales to collect, verify and provide information to the court
(via the prosecution) regarding a defendant's community ties. Community ties
information is considered important in determining whether a defendant is likely to
abscond because it is believed that a defendant tied to the local area will have much to
lose if he or she absconds. Studies evaluating these schemes have found that some
defendants are diverted from custody when magistrates are provided with community
ties information (e.g., Lloyd, 1992; Stone, 1988). Thus, it seems likely that providing
more information would lead to fewer punitive decisions.
1.4.3. Usefulness of information. When information is available, magistrates do
not know how useful different information is in predicting whether a defendant if bailed
unconditionally will abscond, offend or interfere with witnesses. Few attempts have
been made to measure the relative predictive validity of different pieces of information
(e.g., Morgan & Henderson, 1998), and these have not been done in any comprehensive
way. For instance, Morgan and Henderson (1998) solely investigated the factors
associated with higher rates of offending on bail and did not study absconding or
interfering with witnesses/obstructing justice.
However, even if data were gathered, it would at best provide only a partial
measure of the objective predictive validity of the information. This is because it would
never be known how many defendants who were remanded in custody would have
offended if they had not been imprisoned. The two groups (bailed defendants and
defendants remanded in custody) differ in many ways and so generalisations cannot be
made from one sample to the other. Furthermore, although it is relatively easy to
discover if a bailed defendant failed to surrender to custody, it is impossible to measure
exactly how many defendants who were released on bail actually offended or interfered
with witnesses/obstructed justice. Crimes and obstructions of justice may not be
detected, or if detected, may not be reported, and some crimes may not be recorded
(Maguire, 1994). In order to overcome these difficulties, defendants could be asked to
self-report crimes and obstructions as is done in other self-report research on crime
(e.g., West & Farrington, 1973). However, self-reports may be unreliable due to
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problems with remembering and they may also be invalid due to respondents providing
socially desirable responses or responses that will not incriminate them.
Magistrates may learn the usefulness of different pieces of information from
informal sources such as the media's coverage of offending by defendants on bail.
However, these sources are prone to bias and error.
1.4.4. Feedback of outcomes. An informal way of establishing the relative
predictive validity of different pieces of information is for magistrates themselves to
gather outcome feedback after having made a remand decision on a case. For example,
they may recognise a defendant whom they bailed unconditionally on the defendant's
return to court after being charged with committing an offence while on bail. This
method is thus prone to bias and is peculiar to an individual. However, the fact that lay
magistrates only sit in court on a part-time basis means that many such defendants will
not be recognised on re-appearance because the magistrates themselves will not be in
court on that day.
In the English system, there is no formal procedure for providing magistrates
with outcome feedback. Although learning from outcome feedback and experience
alone is difficult (Brehmer, 1980; Klayman, 1988), magistrates currently do not know if
they made an appropriate decision and this may restrict their ability to learn whether
they are using the right information in the right way. Therefore, it is likely that there
may not be any differences in the performance of more and less experienced
magistrates.
1.4.5. Caseload and time pressure. 25 Despite the lack of time limits for making
decisions on a case being presented, magistrates may implicitly feel that they are
working under time pressure due to the high daily caseload. Although over the past
three decades the average duration of a remand hearing has increased slightly (e.g.,
since King, 1971), magistrates nevertheless make remand decisions rapidly (Doherty &
East, 1985; Zander, 1979). Based upon observations of 261 remand hearings conducted
in 18 London courts on one day in October 1978, Zander (1979) reported that 47% of
cases were dealt with in one to two minutes. Unsurprisingly, magistrates took longer to
make a remand decision on cases where the police objected to bail being granted.
Doherty and East (1985) recorded the duration of 209 remand hearings in a court in
Wales between August 1981 and January 1982 involving defendants who had been
25 Possible explanations for the speed of remand decisions include that professional court participants are
known to one another and a "camaraderie" leads to many non-adversarial proceedings (e.g., Doherty &
East, 1985; Brink & Stone, 1988; Hucklesby, 1996, 1997a), and sometimes even to bail bargaining
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charged. Sixty-two percent lasted less than two minutes and 96% lasted less than 10
minutes. Although the decisions to remand in custody took longer, there were cases that
nevertheless lasted less than two minutes. The implicit feeling of time pressure and the
subsequent speed with which magistrates make their remand decisions may affect their
decision making strategies. Finally, decisions are made quicker when there are no
objections to bail (Morgan & Henderson, 1998; Zander, 1979) and when defendants do
not apply for bail (Brink & Stone, 1988).
1.5. Regulating the Remand Decision
It is clear from what has been discussed above that when making a remand
decision, magistrates must consider the ramifications of their decisions for both the
individual defendant and for society. They must work within the legal guidelines and
the constraints of the task. Various theoretical frameworks have been developed to help
describe, explain and evaluate the manner in which legal decisions are generally made
and how the criminal justice system operates (see e.g., Bottoms & McClean, 1976;
Davies, Croall, & Tryer, 1995; Griffiths, 1970; King, 1981; Packer, 1968).26
1.5.1. Ideal practice. Packer's (1968) due process and crime control models are
by far the most widely known both inside and outside the criminal justice system. These
two models make a statement regarding the function of the criminal justice system and
the goals and roles of the agencies operating within the system. Both models represent
ideal types or in Packer's (1968) terms "normative" models that lie on two opposite
ends of a continuum (p. 153).
The crime control model minimises the adversarial aspect of the judicial
process. The function of the justice system is to repress crime, and a failure in
controlling crime would result in public disorder. The law abiding society who are the
victims of crime need to be protected from deviant individuals. There are only limited
resources available for dealing with crime. Thus, there is an emphasis upon efficiency
and a high rate of detection and conviction is ensured through speed and finality. Speed
can be achieved by adopting informal and uniform practices. "Facts can be established
more quickly through interrogation in a police station than through the formal process
of examination and cross-examination...Routine, stereotyped procedures are
between the prosecution and defence (Burrows, 1994; Hucklesby, 1996, 1997a). The evidence on this
issue is however, limited.
26 The specific models are: Packer's (1968) due process model and crime control model. King's (1981)
medical model, bureaucratic model, status passage model and power model, Bottoms and McClean's
(1976) liberal bureaucratic, Griffiths' (1970) family model, and the just desserts model described by
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essential.. .The model.. .must be an administrative, almost managerial model" (Packer,
1968, p. 159). Thus, the system is like an "assembly-line conveyor belt" where
individuals are screened at each stage (Packer, 1968, p. 159). Those that are probably
innocent are filtered out early in the process by the police. The remainder are either
expected to plead guilty or are then rushed through to conviction in court by
prosecutors. There is thus a presumption of guilt. Finality is achieved through
minimising opportunities for challenge. Errors, which are defined in terms of acquittals
or successful appeals, are redefined as due to a technicality, thus maintaining faith in the
police and prosecution. Finally, as a deterrent, the whole experience is supposed to be
unpleasant for the defendant.
By contrast, the due process model places the adversarial aspect at the centre of
the justice process. The police may be unreliable and prone to errors in their gathering
of the facts, not simply for self-serving reasons, but also because witnesses may not
accurately recall events for example. Therefore, an "obstacle course" is placed along the
process, and there is "an insistence on formal, adjudicative, adversary fact-finding
processes in which the factual case against the accused is publicly heard by an impartial
tribunal and is evaluated only after the accused has had a full opportunity to discredit
the case against him" (Packer, 1968, p. 163-164). The due process model "resembles a
factory that has to devote a substantial part of its input to quality control" and so the
manner in which cases are dealt with is deemed more important than quantity of cases
dealt with (Packer, 1968, p. 165). Factual guilt is set aside for the notion of legal guilt.
For instance, cases must be dealt with by the court that has the power to deal with it, in
an appropriate venue, within a limited period of time, and the defendant cannot be tried
for the same case twice and may plead insanity. Rules govern police powers and the
admissibility of evidence, there is a presumption of innocence and the burden of proof is
placed upon the prosecution. Defendants have the right to a defence solicitor, and they
must be treated equally. A conviction of guilt can only be upheld if the case has been
dealt with according to the procedural guidelines. As an acknowledgement of the
fallibility of the system, there are opportunities to re-open a case. Thus, the police and
prosecution are made aware of the need to adhere to rules, as otherwise factually guilty
defendants will go free. The rule abiding behaviour of the system acts as an exemplar to
the public, who should also abide by the law. Finally, the due process model aims to
control the power of the state against an individual.
Davies, Croall and Tryer (1995). King (1981) states the system is best described by some features of a
number of these models, rather than by any one model.
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In all of the above it is evident that legal decision making is not necessarily
related to discovering the truth or making the "correct" decision. For instance, a trial
does not establish whether the defendant is innocent of the offence he or she has been
charged with, but whether the evidence is sufficient, beyond reasonable doubt, to
establish guilt. Similarly, a successful appeal against conviction does not establish the
defendant's innocence; it merely states that the correct procedures were not adhered to.
The remand decision making task is probabilistic. The question of whether or
not a defendant would offend if released on bail cannot be perfectly predicted by the
information available (e.g., the seriousness of the offence the defendant is charged
with). Thus, there are two types of error that could result: type I error and type II error.
The former is also known as a false positive, so that an innocent defendant would be
convicted, and the latter is known as a false negative, so that a guilty defendant would
be acquitted. The inverse relationship between the two types of errors means for
example, that minimising the probability of making a type I error maximises the
probability of making a type II error. The due process model tips the balance in favour
of the individual citizen's right to liberty, thus minimising a type I error, whereas the
crime control model tips the balance in favour of the public's right to be protected, thus
minimising a type II error. In other words, the crime control model prioritises the
conviction of the guilty, at the risk of also convicting the innocent, while the due
process model prioritises the acquittal of the innocent at the expense of also acquitting
the guilty. King (1981) notes that the social function of the crime control model is to
meet out punishment and by contrast the due process model functions to serve justice.
In the Hobson case, Holroyd J declared that "it is a maxim of English law that
ten guilty men should escape rather than one innocent man should suffer" (1823 1 Lew
CC 261 cited in Sanders & Young, 1994, p. 3). Although the rhetoric of English law is
that it is more important that an innocent defendant should be protected from wrongful
conviction than a guilty defendant be convicted, Sanders and Young (1994) point out
that the Government's proposals for the working of the justice system do not make
reference to the importance of acquitting the innocent. Moreover, judges have in some
instances stated that type I and type II errors should be weighted equally.
Although pre-trial decisions, such as the decision to remand before trial lack
regulation, due process ideals are often recommended as ways to regulate such
decisions (e.g., Galligan, 1987). King (1981) notes that in the due process model
magistrates are impartial adjudicators between the prosecution who represents the state
and the defence who represents the individual, and both parties are considered equal.
40
All of the court participants must adhere to formal rules of procedure. Magistrates for
example, must carefully examine all of the evidence, and treat individuals fairly,
impartially and without bias.
1.5.2. Crime control and due process in the remand process. When
discussing the principles of crime control and due process, Packer (1968) illustrated
how these could manifest themselves in the remand process. According to the crime
control model, the defendant, although at the pre-trial stage, is nevertheless considered a
criminal and treated as such. Bailing the defendant increases the chances of him or her
absconding and re-offending. Indeed, as Packer (1968) notes, a short period in custody
pre-trial is a "useful reminder that crime does not pay" and it can act as a deterrent (p.
212). The defendant is more likely to enter a guilty plea if he or she is in custody pre-
trial. Finally, "if pre-trial detention is to be mitigated for some people, it ought to be
done explicitly for the purpose of promoting the efficiency of the criminal process
rather than for the purpose of adhering to some abstract notion of a 'right' to pre-trial
liberty" (Packer, 1968, p. 214).
The due process model does not consider the defendant a criminal at the pre-trial
stage. It is recognised that pre-trial custody would impede the preparation of an
effective defence and may result in personal hardships for the defendant and his or her
family. In addition, guilty pleas entered because the defendant wishes to end his or her
pre-trial custody are to be avoided. Thus, the defendant should be allowed to go free
until he or she is convicted. If there are concerns that the defendant may abscond before
trial, alternatives to custody such as penalties for non-appearance and requirements of
surety or security should be used. In cases where it is considered that the defendant may
interfere with witnesses or obstruct the course of justice if released on bail, alternatives
to pre-trial custody should be considered. For example, conditions could be attached to
bail. "Essentially, a hearing for the setting of bail must be a fact-finding process"
(Packer, 1968, p. 216). If there is insufficient information, the defendant should be set
free. Procedures for appeal against a remand decision should be made available to the
defendant. A defendant should not be held in custody pre-trial either for punishment or
as a measure to prevent him or her from committing further offences. Objective
procedures should be employed to determine if a defendant is dangerous and these
defendants should be dealt with accordingly.
Although the Bail Act 1976 contains due process and crime control principles, it
also affords magistrates much discretion in which of these principles is enforced, and
how they are enforced. The training given to magistrates on the topic of remand
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decision making does not differentiate between crime control and due process and does
not structure their discretion (e.g., Miles & Thomson, 1992). Some critics argue that the
remand decision is predominately concerned with crime control (Bottoms & McClean,
1976; Hinchliffe, 1992; Hucklesby, 1993, 1996; Jenard, 1992; Jones, 1988; King, 1981;
Sanders & Young, 1994; Robertshaw, 1983). For instance, pre-trial custody maybe
considered as punishment. It also reflects concern with crime control because it ensures
a defendant appears for trial, does not offend and does not obstruct justice. It also
reduces the defendant's opportunity to prepare an effective defence and his or her
decision to plead not guilty. A remand in custody may also lead to a reduced chance of
acquittal and a greater chance of a punitive sentence (e.g., Davis, 1971). Crime control
principles are reflected in the three main grounds for refusing bail (e.g., remanding a
defendant in custody because he or she is dangerous seems contradictory to the
presumption of innocence). Defendants are remanded in custody where there is
insufficient information on which to base a remand decision. The whole remand
experience is unpleasant and has negative consequences for the defendant. Finally, there
is no compensation for defendants who were remanded in custody but later acquitted or
who are successful in their appeal against a decision to remand in custody. This
indicates that the system does not recognise or admit to its errors. Critics also argue that
the revisions to the Act have essentially served to further restrict a defendant's right to
bail, thus reinforcing the notion of crime control contained in the original Act (e.g.,
Hucklesby, 1993; Hinchliffe, 1992).
1.6. Review of Research on Magistrates' Remand Decisions After the Bail Act 1976
Past research on magistrates' remand decision making before and after the Bail
Act 1976 has predominantly been conducted by criminologists. I have found no
published psychological research on this topic. Criminological researchers have adopted
sociological methods such as observations of remand hearings in the courtroom,
analyses of court registers and criminal statistics, and questionnaires and interview
surveys of magistrates as well as other court participants (e.g., Hucklesby, 1996). The
large majority of studies have tended to focus on remand decisions made in the adult
magistrates' courts.27
1.6.1. Cues used to make remand decisions. Although the Act permits
magistrates to use any cues that "appear to be relevant", "legal" cues may be
27 It is evident that remand decisions made in the adult courts are not completely comparable with the
decisions made by magistrates in the youth courts (see e.g., Cavadino & Gibson, 1993).
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distinguished from "extra-legal" cues. Legal cues are defined as those explicitly referred
to in the Bail Act 1976 and extra-legal cues refer to defendant related cues such as age,
gender and race, and crime control related cues such as the police remand decision and
the prosecution request. This legal/extra-legal dichotomy is well established (Nagel,
1983). In theory, extra-legal cues are considered to be both socially and professionally
undesirable influences upon legal decisions. Past research has studied the relative
effects of these legal and extra-legal cues on magistrates' remand decisions.
Influence of legal cues. There is evidence to suggest that magistrates' remand
decisions are influenced by legal cues such as the nature and seriousness of offence the
defendant is charged with (Doherty & East, 1985; Jones, 1985; Hucklesby, 1996;
Morgan & Henderson, 1998), the defendant's previous convictions (Hucklesby, 1996),
past bail record (Hucklesby, 1996; Morgan & Henderson, 1998), and the strength of his
or her community ties (Doherty & East, 1985; Hucklesby, 1996). These four sets of
findings shall be discussed in turn.
First, Jones (1985) analysed the official criminal statistics on 222,000 remand
decisions made at first court appearance on defendants charged and summonsed with
triable-either way or indictable offences in 1980. Using multivariate statistics, he found
that defendants charged with indictable offences were more likely to be remanded in
custody than those charged with triable-either way offences. There were also variations
according to the nature of the offence. For example, defendants charged with motoring
offences were the least likely to be remanded in custody, whereas those charged with
sexual offences were the most likely to be so. Doherty and East (1985) found that in
their total sample of 496 cases, those involving burglary were significantly less likely to
be bailed than other offences taken together, and those involving more than £100 were
less likely to be bailed. Hucklesby (1996) reported that the average custody rate was
13% for all types of offences in her sample (which included 1,524 observed remand
decisions and 2,069 decisions recorded in court registers) from three courts. The rate
was significantly greater for defendants charged with breaking and entering, and lower
for those charged with motoring offences and property damage offences. Finally,
Morgan and Henderson (1998) collected data on 3,955 remand decisions made in five
courts over three months in 1993 and three months in 1994. They found that defendants
charged with more serious offences were more likely to be remanded in custody than
those charged with less serious offences. 28
 However, Morgan (1994) did not find any
28 The category of more serious offences included burglary, robbery, grievous bodily harm, indictable and
triable either-way sex offences and drug trafficking (Morgan & Henderson, 1998).
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difference in the custody rate for different type of offences. She conducted an •
observational study of 277 cases at first appearance in five courts over a week during
January 1993, and found that the defendants remanded in custody were charged with a
variety of offences ranging from violence, through theft, to drugs.
Second, it has also been found that defendants with previous convictions had a
significantly higher custody rate than those with no previous convictions (Hucklesby,
1996), especially when the previous convictions led to a past custodial sentence
(Morgan & Henderson, 1998). Third, defendants with a poor bail record had a higher
custody rate than those with a good bail record (Hucklesby, 1996) or no bail record
(Morgan & Henderson, 1998). Fourth, evidence suggests that defendants living outside
the geographical area in which the court was situated (Hucklesby, 1996), and those with
no fixed abode were significantly more likely to be remanded in custody than their
counterparts living in the area and with a fixed address (Doherty & East, 1985;
Hucklesby, 1996; Morgan & Henderson, 1998). In addition, Morgan and Henderson
(1998) reported that of defendants who had a fixed address, those who were
unemployed, with either a previous custodial sentence or bail history were more likely
than their employed counterparts to be remanded in custody.
Influence of extra-legal cues. Although researchers have little evidence for the
direct effect of age upon magistrates' remand decisions (Brown & HuIlin, 1993;
Doherty & East, 1985; Morgan & Henderson, 1998), it has been reported that
magistrates' remand decisions are influenced by other extra-legal cues. 29
 These include
gender, race, police remand decision and prosecution request (Doherty & East, 1985;
East & Doherty, 1984; Eaton, 1987; Fitzgerald, 1993; Hood, 1992; Hucklesby, 1996,
1997a; Jones, 1985; Morgan, 1994; Morgan & Henderson, 1998; Voakes & Fowler,
1989; Walker, 1989; Zander, 1979). Each of these will be discussed in turn.
With regard to gender, it has been found that females were significantly less
likely to be remanded in custody than males (Doherty & East, 1985; Jones, 1985;
Morgan & Henderson, 1998), even after accounting for differences in offence and
previous convictions (Hucklesby, 1996). It should be noted however, that the effect
reported by Doherty and East (1985) may be partly explained by the greater number of
police objections to bail for male defendants and the greater seriousness of their
offences. Brown and Hullin (1993) did not find a significant effect of gender. Eaton
(1987) argues that the influence of gender upon magistrates' remand decisions is more
29 Jones (1985) reported that the trend to remand males in custody as their aged increased was the reverse
for women.
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complex than a simple comparison between males and females. Using eight case studies
of three male and five female defendants observed in court between 1980 and 1981, she
described how magistrates' decisions served to reinforce traditional gender roles.
Married women with children and married, employed men, occupy roles involving a
high degree of social control, namely within the family and the workplace, respectively.
Thus, magistrates can choose between the formal control of the prison system when
remanding these defendants in custody or the informal social controls. These informal
controls are perceived as being absent for unmarried mothers and unemployed men, and
so such defendants are more likely to be treated punitively.
Research examining the influence of race on magistrates' remand decisions
differentiates between different ethnic groups, such as Afro-Caribbean, Asian and
white. Asians have the lowest remand in custody rate (Fitzgerald, 1993; MacLeod, 1990
unpublished cited in Fitzgerald, 1993). However, the number of defendants who are
Asian is small and this has sometimes created difficulties in gathering sufficient data for
meaningful analysis (Brown & Hullin, 1993). Researchers have thus tended to compare
the remand decisions made on Afro-Caribbean and white defendants. It is clear that
compared to their proportion in the general population, Afro-Caribbean defendants are
over-represented in the prison remand population (Fitzgerald, 1993; Walker, 1989).
From another perspective, it is also true that of those defendants who are given a
custodial sentence upon conviction, Afro-Caribbean defendants are more likely than
white defendants to also have been remanded in custody; even after controlling for
factors such as offence (Fitzgerald, 1993). Hood (1992) controlled for offence and a
whole host of other legally relevant factors, and concluded that Afro-Caribbean
defendants were significantly more likely to be remanded in custody. Although their
findings do not bear upon the effects of race and a decision to remand in custody,
Voakes and Fowler (1989) did not find any association between magistrates' decisions
to grant bail (unconditional and conditional) and the defendant's race. In their study,
Brown and Hullin (1993) noted the ethnic appearance of 496 defendants appearing in
court over six months in 1989. There was no significant difference in the remand
decisions made on Afro-Caribbean and white defendants, who were similar in terms of
age, gender, employment, previous convictions, nature and seriousness of the offence,
past record of absconding and the judged likelihood of them offending. 3° However, for
defendants who were given conditional bail, Afro-Caribbean defendants were
significantly more likely to be told not to enter certain areas. It should be noted that all
30 The last three variables were statistically controlled.
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of the 496 cases involved applications for bail that were being contested by the •
prosecution, and this may explain the disparity between Brown and Hullin's (1993)
findings and those of Walker (1989) for example, whose sample also included
uncontested hearings.
The significant effect of crime control related cues on magistrates' remand
decisions has also been documented (Doherty & East, 1985; East & Doherty, 1984;
Hucklesby, 1997a; Jones, 1985; Morgan, 1994; Morgan & Henderson, 1998). Jones
(1985) found that the majority of cases granted bail (unconditionally or conditionally)
by magistrates, also had been granted bail by the police, and the majority of cases
remanded in custody by magistrates also had been remanded in custody by the police.
Morgan (1994) reported that magistrates granted bail in 99% of the cases in which the
police had done so. Hucklesby (1997a) reported that in her study, of the 145 defendants
who had been released on police bail, 99% were subsequently bailed by magistrates.
Furthermore, magistrates bailed only 60% of the 132 defendants who had been
remanded in custody by the police. Of the 2,115 defendants granted police bail in
Morgan and Henderson's (1998) sample, over 99% were also granted bail by
magistrates, whereas only 61% of the 1,552 defendants remanded in custody by police
were granted bail by magistrates. By comparison, Doherty and East (1985) observed
that magistrates bailed a significantly high proportion (71%) of defendants whom the
police had remanded in custody.
Studies have also commented on the effect of the police or prosecution request
on magistrates' remand decisions (Doherty & East, 1985; East & Doherty, 1984;
Hucklesby, 1996, 1997a; Morgan, 1994; Morgan & Henderson, 1998; Zander, 1979).
East and Doherty (1984) found that in 69% of the 88 cases in their sample where the
police objected to bail, magistrates remanded the defendant in custody, whereas
magistrates decided to bail 90% of the 408 cases where there was no police objection to
bail (see also Doherty & East, 1985). Thus, in contested cases, magistrates were
significantly more likely to agree with the police request than the defence request. The
effect of the police request was moderated by whether or not the defence actively sought
bail, because magistrates bailed defendants in spite of police objections in around a
third of the cases when the defence also sought bail (Doherty & East, 1985). Since the
introduction of the CPS, the police request has been replaced by the prosecution request.
Nevertheless, the prosecution often relies upon police information about the case and
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the defendant, when making a request.31 Morgan (1994) found that the court granted the
prosecution's request in 80% of cases. Hucklesby (1996, 1997a) reported that
magistrates agreed with the prosecution request 95% of the time. Similarly, Morgan and
Henderson (1998) found that magistrates granted bail in 99% of cases where the
prosecution did not object to bail, and magistrates agreed with the prosecution request
for conditional bail 89% of the time and for a remand in custody 75% of the time.
It could be argued that rather than being directly influenced by the police
remand decision or the prosecution request, the above findings may reflect an indirect
influence. Magistrates may be using information that is similarly used by these two
crime control agencies. Hucklesby (1997a) however, argues that this explanation is
unlikely because magistrates often have only limited information available to them,
which they assess quickly, and other court participants have reported that the
prosecution is influential. In addition, the fact that bail information schemes provide
information gathered about a defendant's community ties to the prosecution rather than
directly to the court suggests that the prosecution request is influential.
Some studies have also revealed that defence representation may not be very
influential in magistrates' remand decision making (Doherty & East, 1985; Eaton, 1987;
Hucklesby, 1997b; Zander, 1979). 32
 Doherty and East (1985) reported that 88% of the
cases in their sample were legally represented. (This high figure can be explained by the
fact that a duty solicitor scheme operated in the courts they studied.) It was found that
the defence actively sought bail in only 22% of the 434 legally represented cases, and
bail was granted in half of these. There was a significant difference in the decisions
made on defendants who were represented and those who were not, as the latter were
more likely to be granted bail. Zander (1979) also reported similar findings. In addition,
Doherty and East (1985) found that magistrates were significantly more likely to agree
with the police request than the defence request, in the cases where the defence applied
for bail in the face of police objections. Hucklesby's (1996) qualitative data suggested
that compared to the information presented to magistrates by the prosecution which was
perceived as "factual", the defence information was perceived as "unverified and
sometimes of little, if any, relevance to the case" (p. 224). Hucklesby (1996) also
observed that defence representatives perceived their task as negating the objections put
forward by the prosecution, and they were often involved in negotiations with the
31 The introduction of bail information schemes aimed to reduce the prosecution's reliance upon the
police when making a request (Stone, 1988).
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prosecution, or bail bargaining, before the bail hearing. In her study, Eaton (1987) found
that defence solicitors were unwilling or unable to put forward strong applications for
bail in cases where defendants had no family ties. Moreover, research has highlighted
how defence solicitors do not want to waste their limited bail applications by putting
forward a risky application on the first appearance and so forfeiting the defendant's
opportunity to apply for bail in the future (Brink & Stone, 1988; Hucklesby, 1996).
Doherty and East (1985) also noted that often the defence did not make any statement as
to bail because the right to bail according to the Bail Act 1976 applied, and that
sometimes the Nottingham Justices' principle obstructed applications. Indeed,
Hucklesby (1997b) observed that the defence sought bail in just over half of the 229
cases where the prosecution requested a remand in custody, and most of these were at
first appearance.
Criticisms of past research on cue use. Although there are exceptions, the
findings of past criminological research on the cues that influence magistrates' remand
decisions are generally consistent. This is perhaps surprising considering that studies
differed in terms of the courts, magistrates and cases sampled, the method and date of
data collection, and the technique of data analysis. Nonetheless, the studies may be
criticised on methodological grounds, and their findings may therefore be unreliable.
First, although the studies conducted by criminologists have high external
validity because they are based on real cases, some studies do not control for the inter-
correlations that may exist between variables, either at the design or analysis stage of
research (East & Doherty, 1984; Doherty & East, 1985; Eaton, 1987; Hucklesby, 1996,
1997b; Morgan, 1994; Morgan & Henderson, 1998; Zander, 1979). In fact, they do not
routinely report the size of cue inter-correlations. This means that the effect of one
variable such as race cannot be discerned independently of the effect of another variable
such as offence. Hucklesby (1996) for example, concluded that the prosecution request
was a "very influential" cue, but she did not statistically disentangle the relationship
between the prosecution request and other factors such as offence (p. 134). Doherty and
East (1985) could not make a conclusion regarding the effect of gender on magistrates'
remand decisions because in their sample, gender was correlated with seriousness of the
offence. Some studies make conclusions about causal relationships from correlational
analyses. For example, under a section headed "influences on the remand decision",
Hucklesby (1996) reported a series of correlational analyses between factors such as the
32 Although it may seem reasonable for magistrates to base their remand decisions on the prosecution or
defence requests, these requests should only be used as information alongside other information such as
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prosecution request and the magistrates' decision. In addition, some studies do not
employ inferential statistics to test claims that there are differences between groups in
terms of the remand decisions made (e.g., Eaton, 1987; Morgan & Henderson, 1998).
Second, some studies do not control for the information available to magistrates,
and so they can at best only speculate as to the information attended to when
magistrates made a remand decision (Jones, 1985; Hucklesby, 1996, 1997b; Morgan &
Henderson, 1998). For instance, Jones (1985) conducted an analysis of the official
statistics on remand decisions and concluded that the police bail decision was the "most
significant" cue (p. 116). He failed to point out that this information may not have been
available to magistrates when they made their decision. As pointed out earlier,
magistrates often do not have such information available to them (e.g., Zander, 1979).
The studies that involved observations of bail hearings may have only collected data on
the oral and non-verbal information presented to magistrates, and not on any written
information that was available to magistrates (Doherty & East, 1985; East & Doherty,
1984; Eaton, 1987; Hucklesby, 1996, 1997b; Morgan, 1994; Zander, 1979). For
instance, this is likely to be the true for Zander's (1979) study where law students
conducted observations from the public gallery.
Third, studies focusing on real cases face problems of obtaining a large enough
sample of a relatively infrequent event (e.g., Brown & Hullin, 1993; Doherty & East,
1985; Morgan & Henderson, 1998). For instance, Brown and Hullin (1993) found that
only 14 defendants in their sample of 496 were Asian, and this prevented them from
comparing this small sample with two much larger samples of white and Afro-
Caribbean defendants. Other studies nevertheless made conclusions based on small
samples. Eaton (1987) for instance, referred to eight cases observed (i.e., three men and
five women) to support her conclusions regarding the effect of gender roles on
magistrates' remand decisions.
Fourth, with the exception of a few (Doherty & East, 1985; East & Doherty,
1984; Hucklesby, 1997b; Morgan, 1994), most studies do not point out whether the
decisions were made by lay or stipendiary magistrates. Moreover, studies do not report
how the courts and magistrates were sampled. Studies often involve only a small sample
of courts (Brown & Hullin, 1993; Doherty & East, 1985; East & Doherty, 1984; Eaton,
1987; Hucklesby, 1996, 1997b; Morgan, 1994; Morgan & Henderson, 1998). For
instance, Brown & Hullin's (1993) findings on the effect of race on magistrates' remand
decisions was based on the decisions made in one court. There is evidence to suggest
the defendant's previous convictions.
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that lay and stipendiary magistrates (Burrows, 1994; Hucklesby, 1997b) and magistrates
working in different courts may differ in their practices (Hucklesby, 1997a). The fact
that the criminological studies aggregate the decisions made over different magistrates
and benches also means that individual differences are obscured.
Finally, when considering cue use, all of the studies reviewed here differentiate a
decision to bail (unconditional and conditional) from a decision to remand in custody.
The three categories are rarely analysed separately. Although this distinction reflects the
tone of the Bail Act 1976, there is some evidence to suggest that this is not how
magistrates perceive the categorisation in practice. For example, in their study of
conditional bail, Raine and Willson (1994) found that bail conditions were perceived as
being on the mid-point of a continuum between unconditional bail and remand in
custody. Alternatively, it may be reasonable to group together the decisions to bail
conditionally and to remand in custody, and consider them separate from the decision to
bail unconditionally. A decision to attach conditions to bail or to remand a defendant in
custody both require action on the part of the justice system. One may expect the cues
used to make a punitive decision, which categorises the former group, to be more
similar than those used to inform a non-punitive decision.
1.6.2. Conditions attached to bail. Although conditional bail is a decision more
frequently made by magistrates, than the decision to remand a defendant in custody,
there is relatively little past criminological research on the conditions attached to bail.
Many of the studies reviewed above did not examine the type and number of conditions
imposed, where conditional bail was granted (with the exception of Brown & Hullin,
1993; East & Doherty, 1984; Morgan, 1994; Morgan & Henderson, 1998; Zander,
1979).
Conditions may be perceived and experienced by the defendant as punitive.
Conditional bail may also bring others, such as family members who may act as a surety
for good behaviour and the police to whom the defendant may have to report daily,
actively into the remand process. According to the Bail Act 1976, conditions may be
imposed if they, amongst other things, would prevent the defendant from absconding,
offending on bail or interfering with witnesses/obstructing justice. It may thus be
necessary to impose several different conditions because each may be appropriate for
preventing different behaviours. The conditions imposed must however, also be
practicable and enforceable (Cone & Wolchover, 1999 cited in Law Commission,
1999).
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Although in theory courts may impose any condition, Block (1990) states that
magistrates are not very "creative" in their choice of conditions (p. 83).
	
small
range of conditions imposed in practice include: Producing a surety or security (surety),
residing at specified address (residence), residing at a bail hostel and abiding by its rules
(hostel), periodically reporting to the police station (reporting), abiding by a curfew
order (curfew), not contacting specified people such as co-defendants and witnesses (not
contact), not entering a specified area (boundary), and surrendering a passport
(passport) (Block, 1990; Raine & Willson, 1994).
In his study, Zander (1979) concluded that "the courts are using conditions on
bail much more frequently than in the past" (p. 110). Conditions were attached to bail in
34% of the 216 cases that were bailed. On average 1.2 conditions were imposed. The
condition of reporting was imposed in over half (38) of the cases. This was followed by
residence (19), boundary (10), not contact (8), passport (7) and curfew (4).34
Defendants were asked for a security or surety in only 27 cases in which bail was
granted. East and Doherty (1984) reported that 38% of the 396 defendants in their
sample who were bailed, had conditions attached to their bail. On average 1.75
conditions were imposed. Reporting was imposed in 50% of cases, followed by curfew
(42%), residence (41%), boundary and not contact (36%) and passport (5%)• 35 In
Morgan's (1994) sample, 18% of 277 defendants were given conditional bail. One
condition was imposed in 23 cases, two in 20 cases, three in eight cases and four
conditions were imposed in two cases. A condition of residence was imposed in the
majority (79%) of cases, followed by boundary or not contact (45%), reporting (21%),
curfew (19%) and surety (6%). 36 Residence was usually combined with other conditions
in cases where more than one condition was imposed. More recently, Morgan and
Henderson (1998) found that 26% of the 3,667 defendants were given conditional bail
in their sample. Seventy-two percent were given a condition of residence, 41% of not
contact, 28% of boundary, 20% of curfew, 18% of reporting, 6% of surety and 3% of
passport.
33 It is quite common that defence solicitors may suggest conditions in order to counter a prosecution
opposition to bail altogether (Burrows, 1994; Raine & Willson, 1994, 1995b). "Many magistrates and
other practitioners acknowledged that sometimes the Bench simply 'rubber stamped' a package of
conditions that had been agreed in advance by the prosecution and defence" (Raine & Willson, 1994, p.
15, 1995b).
34 The other conditions imposed were to obtain a medical report in one case and a driving ban in another
case (Zander, 1979).
35 The other conditions imposed in 2% of East and Doherty's (1984) cases required the defendant to
attend a hospital.
36 Other conditions were imposed in 8% of cases (Morgan, 1994).
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Finally, in a study specifically designed to address the issue of conditional bail
Raine and Willson (1994, 1995b) conducted interviews with court participants including
magistrates. They also collected data on 1,050 decisions from records of five courts that
were known to vary in their use of conditional bail (Home Office, 1989), between
October and November 1993. It was found that residence was imposed most frequently
(i.e., 78.5% of the time). This was followed by not contact (46%), boundary (28.1%),
curfew (21.1%), reporting (17.4%), hostel (4.1%), surety/security (3.7%), passport
(3%), and other conditions such as a driving ban (2.6%). 37 On average, two conditions
were attached to bail. There were no significant correlations between the number and
type of conditions attached and the seriousness of the offence, age and gender of the
defendant.
The rationale for imposing certain conditions seems clear. For instance, surety,
residence, hostel, reporting and passport may be imposed to prevent absconding,
whereas curfew and boundary may be imposed to prevent offending, and not contact
may be imposed to prevent interference with witnesses. Raine and Willson (1995a) have
grouped conditions according those that are defined in terms as "locating" (e.g.,
reporting, surety/security, passport, residence, hostel), "containing" (e.g., curfew),
"banning" (e.g., driving), and "bounding" (e.g., boundary, not contact) (p. 576).
Conditions may also be classified according to the degree of their perceived impact
upon crime control and their ease of enforceability (Raine & Willson, 1994, 1995b).
However, as Block (1990) points out, conditions may not be effective in their intention.
It is easy to think of a situation where a defendant may offend during the time outside a
curfew. A defendant may obtain a new passport and then abscond, or may abscond after
reporting to the police station. To summarise, Block (1990) argues that "most of the
time conditions of bail cannot deliver" (p. 84).
Raine and Willson (1994, 1995b) did not find a significant correlation for each
of the five courts, between the type of condition attached and the reasons cited for
imposing them. Raine and Willson's (1994, 1995b) qualitative findings support the
view that the use of conditional bail is complex and not fully in line with the Bail Act
1976. For example, conditional bail was used for a number of reasons, including the
need to reduce prison overcrowding, deterrence, punishment, to add structure to the
defendants life and to satisfy both the defence and prosecution simultaneously. Cone
(1989) also notes that often conditions are attached as a compromise between the
37 Here, boundary includes the 23.8% of cases where defendants were to keep away from a specific
address and the 4.3% that involved exclusion from the city centre or neighbourhood (Raine & Willson,
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prosecution and defence requests. The penalty function of conditional bail in particular
has been well recognised by researchers (e.g., Block, 1990; Burrows, 1994; Corre,
1989; Raine & Willson, 1994, 1995b). Block (1990) argues that conditions "are all too
often made by justices who want to grant bail but who do not wish to appear too soft, or
do not want the defendant to think he has got bail too easily, or who want to make some
concession to a prosecutor who has opposed bail" (p. 84).
In sum, conditional bail is a popular alternative to unconditional bail or a
remand in custody. A comparison across studies fails to provide a general pattern in the
use of conditions, although it does show that residence is the most commonly imposed
condition, and that often more than one condition is imposed. Relatively little is known
about the effect of legal and extra-legal factors on the conditions imposed.
1.6.3. Disagreement in remand decisions. 38 It may not be unreasonable to
expect a group as homogenous as the magistracy to make the same remand decisions on
like cases. Indeed, researchers have suggested that magistrates do not like to disagree
with a decision made by a previous bench on a prior adjournment in the same case
(Burrows, 1994; Doherty & East, 1985). The evidence however, suggests otherwise,
and criminological researchers have commented upon the extent of disagreement among
magistrates' remand decisions. As an indication of disagreement, they have pointed to
the differences in bail and custody rates among courts that cannot be fully explained by
the differences in the cases presented (Jones, 1985; Home Office, 1987; Hucklesby,
1996, 1997b; Morgan & Henderson, 1998; Raine & Willson, 1994, 1995b).
A Home Office (1987) study of remand decisions made between 1980 to 1986
found that there were considerable variations in the custody rates among areas. For
instance, the rate per 1,000 indictable offences was 313 for the Bournemouth area and
26 for Wakefield. One possible explanation for these variations is that there were also
differences among areas in the proportion of defendants summonsed rather than
charged. Jones (1985) found large variations in custody rates among courts located in
different police force areas, for example, from below 10% in Bedfordshire and over
30% in Dorset. Using a loglinear analysis, he found that the police remand decision,
offence category and police force could account for a significant proportion, but not all,
of the variance across areas. The police remand decision was the most influential
1994, 1995b).
38 In the present thesis, the term disagreement is used to describe what criminologists often call
inconsistencies or variations in decisions made among magistrates or courts. In the psychological
literature reviewed in the next chapter, inconsistency refers to intra-individual behaviour, while
disagreement refers to inter-individual behaviour. In this sense, the term disagreement best describes the
criminological findings.
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predictor of variance across areas . 39 Other factors such as the defendant's age and
gender, and whether the defendant came to court as a result of a summons or charge,
accounted for a negligible proportion of the variance across areas.
After an analysis of the court records from three courts, Hucklesby (1996,
1997b) reported that two of the courts had a remand in custody rate of 9%, which varied
greatly from a 25% rate recorded in the third court. These variations existed despite the
fact there were no significant differences among the courts in terms of the cases
presented (i.e., defendants' address, age, gender, the offence he or she was charged with
and whether the adjournment was before or after conviction). The observational data
collected from these courts did however suggest that there were some differences
among courts in terms of the defendants' bail record and previous convictions, and the
prosecution request. The prosecution was more likely to request a remand in custody in
the court with the higher custody rate, and Hucklesby (1996, 1997a, 1997b) had
concluded that the prosecution request had a significant influence on magistrates'
remand decisions.4°
A Home Office (1989) study found significant differences in the proportion of
cases that were granted conditional bail in 60 magistrates' courts (cited in Raine &
Willson, 1994). This finding was confirmed by Raine and Willson (1994, 1995b) who
reported a variation among their five courts, in the frequency with which conditional
bail was granted (i.e., 46.3% in one court and 61.7% in another court). Finally, they also
found that the courts disagreed as to the conditions to be attached to bail, in cases where
conditional bail was granted. For instance, the variation among the courts when
imposing residence as a condition of bail was from 65.4% to 88.4%.
Criminologists propose that differences in "court culture" may account for
disagreement in decisions among courts (e.g., Hucklesby, 1997a). Hucklesby (1997a)
defines court culture as "a set of informal norms which are mediated through the
working relationships of the various participants" (p. 130). She explained the difference
in the remand decisions made by the courts in her 1996 study in terms of the differences
in the practice of the prosecution and the number of bail applications in these courts.
The "court culture" explanation however, cannot account for differences in the
decisions made by magistrates working in the same court.
39 Some areas were not influenced at all, some were influenced by the police decisions to remand in
custody, and others were influenced by the police decisions to bail.
40 In further analysis of this data, Hucklesby (1997b) argues that variations can be explained by "court
culture", which is defined as "a set of informal norms which are mediated through the working
relationships of the various participants" (p. 130).
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In sum, past criminological research based on an analysis of real cases, indicates
that magistrates and courts disagree as to the remand decision to be made on similar
cases. However, the fact that the cases are similar, but not the same, precludes
concluding that the criminological research has found evidence of true disagreement. A
stronger test is needed. Moreover, the criminologists' explanation for disagreement,
namely the concept of court culture, says little about the characteristics of the individual
decision makers that may underlie the formation of different informal norms among
courts. Perhaps more importantly, the concept of court culture cannot explain the
disagreement found among individuals working within the same court. Finally, although
research pre-dating the Bail Act 1976 found evidence for differences in the practices of
urban and rural courts (e.g., Bottomley, 1970), it is not known if this is true today.
1.6.4. Effectiveness of bail information schemes. As mentioned earlier, the
report of the government working party that led to the development of the Bail Act
1976, also recommended that information about a defendant's community ties should be
made available to the court on a standard form, by what are now called bail information
schemes (BIS) (Home Office, 1974). Research had revealed that often there was
insufficient information about the defendant on which to base a remand decision
(Bottomley, 1970; King, 1971; Simon & Weatheritt, 1974; Zander, 1967, 1971). It was
believed that the likelihood of a defendant absconding could be predicted by the degree
and nature of his or her community ties, for example, by whether or not the defendant
had a fixed address, a spouse or dependants, and a job or educational commitment
(Home Office, 1974).
BISs originated in the U.S. In 1961, the Manhattan Bail Project, which was
organised by the Vera Institute of Justice, was the first pilot scheme to be set up (Ares et
al., 1963). 41
 Structured interviews were conducted with defendants arriving in the court
cells prior to their court appearance. Defendants charged with serious offences and
those with previous convictions were excluded. Information was gathered on five
factors, so as to decide whether the defendant was a good bail risk (i.e., the defendant
had a present residence and employment, relatives in the New York area with whom the
defendant was in contact, no previous convictions, and evidence of long term residence
in New York). The information was then verified and scored on a fixed scale. A
recommendation was made to the court, the prosecution and defence, concerning the
defendant's suitability for bail. Suitable defendants could be released on their own
41 The project was later renamed the New York Release on Recognizances Project and expanded to other
areas such as Washington DC (Home Office, 1974).
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recognisance without need for a bail bond. 42 See Appendix B for a copy of the standard
form and scoring scheme used in the Manhattan project, and a copy of the form
recommended by the Home Office (1974). The Manhattan scheme was evaluated over
the first year. This involved assigning defendants randomly to the experimental group,
for whom a recommendation was conveyed to the court, or the control group, for whom
the recommendation was suppressed. It was found that 60% of the experimental group
were bailed compared to only 14% of the control group, and only three defendants in
the experimental group absconded (Ares et al., 1963).
In 1975, the Inner London Probation and After-Care Service, as it was then
called, teamed up with the Vera Institute, to set up a pilot BIS in Camberwell Green
magistrates' court (Pearce & Smith, 1976). This scheme targeted defendants remanded
in custody overnight by the police, after arrest, who were awaiting first appearance at
court the next morning, and who were also likely to be remanded in custody by the
court. Probation officers interviewed defendants and gathered information on their
community ties. This information was then verified (if possible) via telephones and
visits, and recorded on a bail information sheet. Only positive information was provided
because BISs aim to divert defendants from custody. If negative information was
discovered a bail information sheet would not be produced. Copies of the sheet were
then given to the defence representative (or the defendant if he or she was not legally
represented), the police (prosecution) and the court. The sheet did not contain a
recommendation regarding bail from the probation officer. Rather, the BIS was
considered "an aid to the court in making the most responsible and fully-informed
decision possible" (Pearce & Smith, 1976, p. 4).
After the first year, the scheme had dealt with 1,150 defendants. A quantitative
evaluation of the success of the scheme was not considered feasible. Perhaps
unconvincingly, Pearce and Smith (1976) claimed that this was because observed
changes in magistrates' decisions may in fact be due to the presence of the scheme
rather than the information provided; other factors such as changes in the seriousness of
the offences defendants were charged with could affect the findings; the past court
records would not enable reliable pre-post measures; and the number of cases in the
scheme were still too few. However, it was noted that magistrates reported finding the
information useful, that the police withdrew objections to bail after the information was
42 Bail in the U.S. differs from that in the English system. In the U.S., the bail decision is in theory based
solely on the risk of a defendant absconding. Bail is set at a certain monetary level and the defendant must
raise the amount before release. However, in practice, if there are concerns that the defendant may offend
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provided, and the number of contested bail cases had risen. On this basis alone, Pearce
and Smith (1976) concluded that the provision of information on community ties
"seems to encourage more frequent granting of bail at first appearance, and there are no
indications that those thus bailed are increasing the rate at which defendants abscond or
commit further offences" (p. 48).
Although BISs were developed in some other courts, these were largely
uncommented upon. The initiative did not gain wide support (King, 1981) and
consequently the initiative was abandoned after a few years. 43 Nevertheless, BISs were
re-established in the late 1980s. The Home Office funded a proposal by the Association
of Chief Officers of Probation (ACOP) to pilot BISs (ACOP, 1986). 44 A Home Office
circular No. 25 (1988) entitled Bail stated that defendant related information was
required early in the proceedings to avert unnecessary remands in custody. The schemes
only deal with defendants until their second appearance at court, thus creating a
manageable daily workload. The schemes collect and verify information that would be
in favour of bail. All information is written on a standard self-carbonated form, copies
of which are presented to the prosecution and defence. A copy of a bail information
sheet in presented in Appendix B. The information is not provided to the court because
it may give a false impression that the probation service recommends bail in some cases
and not others where the scheme has not been involved. Negative information is not
presented, and the current offence is not discussed. It should be noted that the probation
officers have much discretion when operating a BIS, in terms of for example, the
selection of cases, the content of the interview and the information collected, verified
and presented.
Recent evaluations of BISs. In 1987, BISs were piloted in eight courts
throughout England and were evaluated after their first year by Stone (1988), with the
help of the Vera Institute. 45 The staff operating the schemes recorded details of the
for example, bail may be set very high. Consequently, professional bail bondsmen have emerged. They
put up the money after the defendant pays a premium.
43 Reasons for the waning enthusiasm included the fact that probation officers were being less frequently
used in courts; there was a belief that the Bail Act 1976 would be sufficient to reduce remands in custody;
duty solicitors were introduced; the size of the remand population was considered to be moderate; and
there was a lack of organisation regarding what information should be collected, in what form and for
whom (Godson & Mitchell, 1991).
44 The renewed interest can be first explained by the fact that the newly formed prosecution service
wished to be independent of the police. It thus required an independent source of information, such as the
probation service, on which to make bail requests. The probation service was similarly keen to establish
links with the new prosecution agency. Second, the penal system experienced a seemingly relentless rise
in the prison population which created severe overcrowding in remand prisons in particular.
45 These schemes dealt with defendants over 17 years of age. During the pilot phase, the schemes did not
consider cases that had been summonsed or bailed by the police, or most of the defendants for whom the
police had asked the prosecution to request conditional bail.
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cases they interviewed, and recorded the prosecution and defence requests and the court
decisions on all cases (including those they didn't provide information on). A technique
of statistical prediction was used to predict the number of cases dealt with by the BISs
that would have been bailed in the absence of the BISs. Multivariate statistical models
were constructed for each of the eight courts using data from cases appearing in the
court during the pilot period, but which were not dealt with by the BISs. 46 The models
were validated on cases appearing at the court prior to the pilot period and were
adjusted for the two types of error, so that they would err on over predicting bail, thus
providing a conservative estimate of the impact of the BISs. The results indicated that of
the 1,367 cases dealt with by the BISs in the eight courts, 36% were remanded in
custody, 35% were bailed and would have been bailed in the absence of the BISs, and
29% were bailed because of the schemes. There were variations in the effectiveness of
the schemes among courts (e.g., from approximately 10 to 90 defendants were diverted
from custody at first court appearance). Data from four of the schemes also indicated
that the use of bail hostels as a condition of bail was large. Other evidence supports this
finding (Burrows, 1994).
Stone (1988) also assessed the effectiveness of BISs with respect to subsequent
bail breaches. This is because it could be argued that BISs would result in more of the
"wrong" defendants being released. Cases were followed up until their first re-
appearance at court, after being arrested and charged with an alleged breach of bail
conditions or for offences committed while on bail. Defendants who were subsequently
re-bailed were distinguished from those were then remanded in custody. Data was only
available for three schemes. The results revealed that for two schemes, defendants
granted bail after the intervention of a BIS (hereafter called BIS defendants) were
slightly less likely to be arrested for a new offence while on bail (i.e., 14% and 9% in
Ipswich and Newcastle courts, respectively) than those bailed in the absence of a BIS
(hereafter referred to as no BIS defendants) (i.e., 17% in Ipswich and 12% in Newcastle,
respectively). However, for the Leicester scheme, the reverse was true. The rate of
arrest due to failure to appear was very low overall and slightly less for bailed BIS
defendants than bailed no BIS defendants in the Leicester and Newcastle courts. In
Ipswich court, none of the bailed BIS defendants failed to appear, compared to 7% of
the bailed no BIS defendants. Finally, the rate of arrest for breach of bail conditions was
46 The predictors (cues) included offence, alleged bail breach, offence already on bail for, number and
type of previous convictions, year of most recent one, age, nature of address as recorded by police, police
objections to bail, and bail decision. These predictors were not all significant for all models. Stone (1988)
gave no more details of the statistical modelling technique.
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slightly lower for bailed BIS defendants than for bailed no BIS defendants in Newcastle
court, but was higher in the other two courts. Stone (1988) concluded that the provision
of bail information "can avoid the apparent necessity of a substantial number of
custodial remands" (p. 61).
Consequently, Stone (1988) and the Vera Institute recommended that BISs be
established in magistrates' courts throughout England and Wales, and this
recommendation was agreed upon by the ACOP, the CPS, the police and the Home
Office.'" Prison based schemes were also developed (Mair, 1988). Such schemes target
defendants remanded in custody by magistrates at their first appearance, and are
intended to help a new application for bail at the next hearing. Information is often
given to the defence. Prison based schemes have the advantage of having more time to
collect and verify information, but they are isolated from the court. Since 1988, several
further evaluations of the effectiveness of BISs have been conducted (Fiddes & Lloyd,
1990; Godson & Mitchell, 1991; HM Inspectorate of Probation, 1993; Lloyd, 1992;
Mair, 1988). The results of these evaluations shall be presented before a review of the
methods involved.
Lloyd (1992) evaluated BISs operating in three courts in England and one prison
based scheme, with the aim of assessing their affect on the decisions made by the
prosecution, the defence and the magistrates. In the court based schemes, monitoring
forms were completed for 1,581 defendants held in police custody overnight and where
the police were objecting to bail, from May to October 1990. Of these, 1,270 defendants
were interviewed. The BISs provided information to the court on around 60% of these
defendants, and although information was collected for the other 40% it was not
provided to the court for various reasons. Therefore, Lloyd (1992) compared these two
groups (which he called the "information present" and the "information absent" groups)
(p. 37). Here, these will be referred to as the BIS and no BIS groups, respectively. Both
groups were matched on factors such as age, sex, offence and reason for arrest. The BIS
and no BIS groups at Hull and Manchester courts were comparable, but not at
Blackpool court. The reasons for not providing bail information for cases were
ascertained to discover if they could affect the remand decision. Across the three courts,
in the majority of cases information was not provided after the defendant was
47 The report also recommended the development of a national set of guidelines to govern BISs and
special training for bail information officers (Stone, 1988). In 1988, two national committees were set up
to promote BISs (HM Inspectorate of Probation, 1993). The National Steering Committee advised on
policy and strategy matters and the ACOP Bail Practice Committee advised on professional matters. The
latter committee produced a statement of principles and good practice in 1991 to provide guidance to
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interviewed because it could not be verified. However, for Hull, in around half of the
cases where information was not provided the reason was that negative information was
uncovered. Thus, defendants who were in the no BIS group and for whom information
was not provided for remand related reasons were excluded from analyses.
It was found that in all of the three courts, magistrates were less likely to remand
BIS defendants in custody (i.e., 21% in Blackpool, 29% in Hull and 28% in
Manchester) than no BIS defendants (i.e., 28%, 56% and 45%, respectively). Because
the two groups were considered comparable the effect of the BIS on the number of
defendants diverted from custody was calculated by taking the proportion of bailed no
BIS defendants as the baseline and subtracting this from the proportion of bailed BIS
defendants. This procedure showed that in total 175 defendants, who would otherwise
have been remanded in custody, were bailed because of the intervention of the BISs
(Lloyd, 1992).
Lloyd (1992) also measured the success of BISs in bailing the "right" defendants
(i.e., those who don't breach bail). His assessment was more stringent than Stone's
(1988) because he included both defendants who were subsequently bailed after re-
arrest and those that were subsequently remanded in custody. It is clear that even those
re-bailed create a burden for the justice system. Defendants from the Manchester
scheme were excluded due to insufficient data. There was no significant difference
between the BIS and no BIS groups regarding the percentage of defendants who re-
appeared for a new offence (i.e., 11% and 10%, respectively) and those who re-
appeared for breaching bail conditions (i.e., 6% and 8%, respectively). "Thus, of those
defendants bailed despite police objections to bail, there is no indication that cases
bailed with bail information are any more likely to offend on bail or breach bail
conditions than those bailed without bail information" (Lloyd, 1992, p. 56).
In Lloyd's (1992) evaluation of the BIS based at Lincoln prison, information
was gathered on 123 defendants over four months. The BIS provided information in
63% of the cases interviewed. The reasons for not providing information in the
remaining cases included that information could not be verified, there were no hostel
places available, or there was a warrant out for the defendant's arrest. For 32% of the
BIS defendants, the bail information sheets were sent by mail to the probation officer in
the court, but in the majority of cases it was telephoned through. Applications for bail
had been made at the previous court appearance for a significantly greater number of
areas wanting to set up a BIS (ACOP, 1993). Schemes were "approved" by this committee. BISs are now
overseen by only one national committee (Burrows, 1994).
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BIS defendants than for no BIS defendants. It was found that magistrates remanded in
custody fewer BIS defendants (i.e., 47%) than no BIS defendants (i.e., 58%). Thus, 21
out of 75 defendants were granted bail due to the intervention of the BIS. Lloyd (1992)
concluded that "bail information does seem to be having a considerable effect on the
proportion of cases given bail" (p. 60).
The first evaluation of a prison based scheme was in fact conducted by Mair
(1988). The "temporary bail action project" was set up in 1987 in Wormwood Scrubs
prison by the Inner London Probation Service, for a four week period. Here, the BIS
interviewed 48% or 323 of the men remanded into prison during that period. Mair
(1988) referred to the interviewed men as the "experimental group" and the 52% of men
who were not interviewed as the "control group" (p. 18). Although cases were not
randomly assigned to each group, both groups were similar in age. Seventeen percent of
the BIS group was bailed compared to only 3% of the no BIS group. However, the
situation is more complicated than it appears because as Mair (1988) points out, the
outcome of 29 cases in the BIS group could be due to other factors such as the work
done by the defence solicitor. In addition, eight cases, although bailed, resulted in bail
failures as men absconded from bail hostels, for example. Nevertheless, other
evaluations have reported that prison based schemes were effective in bailing
defendants who were originally remanded in custody (Williams, 1992; Wilkinson,
1990; Mitchell, 1991 all cited in Cavadino & Gibson, 1993).
It has been argued that rather than directly influencing magistrates' decisions,
the information provided by BISs may influence the prosecution request, the defence
request or both, and may thus only indirectly affect magistrates' decisions (Fiddes &
Lloyd, 1990; Godson & Mitchell, 1991; Stone, 1998; Lloyd, 1992). Past research had
demonstrated that magistrates tended to agree with the prosecution request (Doherty &
East, 1985; East & Doherty, 1984; Hucklesby, 1996, 1997a; Morgan, 1994; Morgan &
Henderson, 1998; Zander, 1979), and that defendants were more likely to be bailed in
the face of prosecution objections, if the defence applied for bail (Doherty & East, 1985;
Zander, 1979). Data from three of Stone's (1988) courts suggested that the prosecution
requested a remand in custody, following a police recommendation to do so, less
frequently for BIS defendants than no BIS defendants. Qualitative data from interviews
with the prosecution indicated that the prosecution was responsive to the BIS when
making a request (Stone, 1988). Lloyd (1992) similarly reported that BISs had an effect
on the prosecution request. For instance, the prosecution was less likely to request a
remand in custody for BIS defendants (i.e., 56% in Hull and 39% in Manchester) than
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no BIS defendants (i.e., 77% in Hull and 54% in Manchester). However, the opposite
was true for Blackpool. The proportion of no BIS defendants for whom the prosecution
did not request a remand in custody was subtracted from the proportion of BIS
defendants for whom the prosecution did not request a remand in custody. It was
discovered that due to the intervention of the BIS, the prosecution did not request a
remand in custody for a total of 94 defendants. Lloyd (1992) also found that the defence
applied for bail in the face of prosecution objections more often for BIS defendants than
for no BIS defendants in all three courts, and for a total of 83 defendants, this was due
to the intervention of the BIS. Interviews with defence solicitors revealed that the
information provided by the BIS was useful in bolstering the defence's arguments for
bail. Finally, the bench bailed defendants in 99% of the cases the prosecution requested
bail and in 70% of cases that the defence applied for bail.
Fiddes and Lloyd (1990) monitored BISs in a number of courts from April 1989
to March 1990. 48 They reported that the prosecution was less likely to request a remand
in custody for BIS defendants (i.e., 45%) than no BIS defendants (i.e., 54%). Moreover,
the former group (i.e., 26%) were less likely to be subsequently remanded in custody
than the latter group (i.e., 41%). The fact that the disparity was greater in the former
group led Fiddes and Lloyd (1990) to conclude that "although bail information has its
major effect on CPS recommendations, it also has an independent effect on magistrates'
decisions — either directly or indirectly through the defence solicitor" (p. 26). In
addition, Fiddes and Lloyd (1990) discovered that at second court appearance, there was
a bail rate of 52% in court based BIS cases and 48% in prison based BIS cases, and
although there was no comparable no BIS group, court statistics prior to the
introduction of the BIS indicated lower bail rates at second court appearance (Fiddes &
Lloyd, 1990). "The basic monitoring statistics suggest that providing bail information
on defendants increases their chances of being bailed" (Fiddes & Lloyd, 1990, p. 27). In
fact, they attributed the reduction in the prison remand population over that period to the
effectiveness of the schemes.
In their study, Godson and Mitchell (1991) evaluated the effect that BISs had on
the prosecution request in seven courts in England. Data was collected on 4,665
defendants at first court appearance. The BIS and no BIS defendants were similar in
terms of age, gender, type of residence, and the prosecution request. It was found that
the BISs seemed to have an impact on the prosecution a request for remand in custody,
48 They reported that the monitoring began with nine courts and ended with 46 courts and four prison
based schemes (Fiddes & Lloyd, 1990).
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where the police had objected to bail. The prosecution requested a remand in custody
for a greater number of no BIS defendants (i.e., 73%) than for BIS defendants (i.e.,
51%). Furthermore, Godson and Mitchell (1991) discovered that magistrates agreed
with a prosecution request for a remanded in custody in 79% of cases, and they granted
bail in 98% of cases where the prosecution did not oppose bail. 49 The defence applied
for bail more often where BIS information was provided (i.e., for 74% of BIS
defendants and 52% of no BIS defendants), and where there was evidence of a stable
address. This suggests that providing the defence with information from the BIS can
improve applications for bail. However, it is evident that although the magistrates
agreed with the defence and disagreed with the prosecution, the impact of BISs on this
was rather small (the defence was successful against prosecution objections in 6% more
cases when bail information was provided). Godson and Mitchell (1991) concluded that
the BIS had an impact on the prosecution request.
The HM Inspectorate of Probation (1993) visited BISs in eight probation areas
throughout England and Wales (which may include many court based BISs) and BISs in
six prisons. Two probation areas with no BISs were also visited. Interviews were
conducted with those running the schemes. The prosecution claimed that the BISs were
useful. It was therefore concluded that "bail information schemes have been a
significant influence on the CPS's recommendations on the use of bail and are cost
effective" (HM Inspectorate of Probation, 1993, p. 16). Finally, more recently, Morgan
and Henderson (1998) asked the prosecution to rate how "important" the information
provided by the BIS was to their request (p. 75). Around two thirds rated it as "very
important" and approximately two fifths rated it as either "not very important" or "of no
value" (p. 76).
In his evaluation, Stone (1988) had noted how the BISs gathered information
specific to the needs of the individual case. For example, in 33% of the 1,949 cases, a
private address was verified, in 22% of cases the availability of a hostel or other
supported accommodation was considered and in 10% of cases the services available
were considered. Bail information officers also verified community ties, employment or
other sources of reliability, good supervision history, and other local support. Lloyd
(1992) found that the detail and sometimes the type and amount of information
collected varied among BISs. For two courts, the information was more detailed and
49 It should be noted that the defence applied for bail in 62% of the cases that the prosecution objected to
bail, and that magistrates agreed with the defence request in 34% of these cases (conditional bail was
usually sought), thus accounting for virtually all of the cases where the magistrates disagreed with the
prosecution request for a remand in custody (Godson & Mitchell, 1991).
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concerned a wide range of factors such as external sources of support for the defendant,
while in one court information was concise and often only concerned the defendant's
address. Residence (including the availability of a bail hostel) was the most common
type of information provided by the Lincoln prison based scheme.
The ACOP guidelines state that bail information should be "verified", "factual",
"favourable", and there should be "no discussion or comment on the alleged offence",
"no opinion expressed" and "no recommendation" (cited in Lloyd, 1992, p. 51). The
HM Inspectorate of Probation (1993) investigated the quality of the information
provided on the bail information sheets by examining the last 60 sheets in each prison
and court based scheme. Seventy-seven percent satisfied the criteria that the sheets
should include verified, factual, favourable data and 20% were considered "acceptable"
(HM Inspectorate of Probation, 1993, p. 39). However, 3% were deemed poor. In fact,
many sheets were "one liners" that included information pertaining solely to the
defendants living arrangements (HM Inspectorate of Probation, 1993, p. 39). Others
have made similar comments (e.g., Lloyd, 1992).
Criticisms of past research on BISs. According to the research reviewed
above, the BISs constitute a policy initiative that so far has been effective in diverting
defendants from custody, with no adverse affect on the number of defendants who
breach bail. In fact, the evaluations have also reported that BISs are cost effective (e.g.,
HM Inspectorate of Probation, 1993; Lloyd, 1992). For example, Stone (1998) claimed
that the annual cost of a BIS, plus the cost of bail hostel places, was less than the cost of
a prison cell and legal aid to defendants remanded in custody. Mair (1988) subtracted
the actual time spent in custody by defendants in the BIS group who were bailed as a
results of the intervention of the BIS, from the average time spent in custody, and
multiplied this by the cost of custody per day. There were savings. Hedderman (1991)
argues that BISs are also likely to be cost effective in that a remand in custody is more
likely to lead to a custodial sentence.
Despite the seemingly consistent findings of the effects of BISs reported above,
the findings should not be taken to be conclusive. For instance, Stone (1988) conceded
that "the results of the first year cannot support any large claims that might be made for
the schemes: they will not, on their own, stop the growth in the numbers of defendants
remanded in custody" (p. 68). Lloyd (1992) warned that "any attempt to produce actual
figures of defendants diverted from a custodial remand due to bail information must be
undertaken cautiously: ultimately, definitive figures cannot be produced on complex
issues such as this" (p. 44).
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Indeed, the reliability and validity of the findings may be limited for a number of
reasons. Although the studies comment on the "cause-effect" relationship between BISs
and magistrates' remand decisions, they lacked experimental control. In contrast to the
evaluation of the Manhattan scheme (Ares et al., 1963), cases were not randomly
assigned to the BIS and no BIS groups. In fact, Mair (1988) misleadingly referred to the
BIS and no BIS groups in his study as the "experimental" and "control" groups. The
lack of experimental control implies that there may be confounding variables such as
differences in the characteristics of the cases (e.g., differences in the seriousness of the
offence) in the two groups that may account for differences in the bail and custody rates
between the groups. For instance, Lloyd (1992) revealed that for one of the three court
based schemes in his study, the BIS and no BIS groups were not comparable in terms of
age, offence, reason for arrest and known to probation service. In addition, the two
groups in his evaluation of the prison based scheme were not comparable in terms of
previous applications for bail. The lack of previous bail applications in the no BIS group
may reflect the fact that these cases stood little chance of gaining bail. Stone (1988) did
not distinguish between the two groups in terms of the reasons for why bail information
was not provided. There may have been cases in the no BIS group for whom these
reasons may have affected the remand decision. Stone (1988) also did not provide any
details of the demographic characteristics of the cases in the BIS and no BIS groups,
and he did not examine whether the prosecution requests, which have an important
effect on magistrates' decisions, varied for both groups. Finally, the fact that BISs have
been reported to also affect the prosecution and defence requests (Fiddes & Lloyd,
1990; Godson & Mitchell, 1991; Lloyd, 1992; Stone, 1988) means that their direct
impact on magistrates' remand decisions is unclear in the above studies which do not
disentangle these variables.
Not only does the lack of experimental control create problems with
confounding variables, but it also implies that the independent variable, namely the BIS,
may vary among cases. Studies have revealed that the type and amount of information
provided varied among cases and courts, and in some cases in the BIS group, the
information provided was sparse (HM Inspectorate of Probation, 1993; Lloyd, 1992).
Furthermore, studies have shown that community ties information was absent in some,
but not all cases (e.g., Hucklesby, 1996). Defence solicitors often provide such
information to the court (Hucklesby, 1996). As Mair (1988) discovered the remand
decision may be affected by the information provided by the defence solicitor rather
than the BIS. This also suggests that magistrates may receive information pertaining to
65
the community ties of defendants for whom bail information was not provided. Thus,
although Lloyd (1992) referred to his no BIS group as the "information absent" group,
information may not in fact have been absent for these defendants. In a recent survey,
Morgan and Henderson (1998) found that negative information came to light in 12% in
their sample of 1,081 cases, and that in 62% of these cases, it was provided to the
prosecution. Here, a BIS group may be disadvantaged and so the scheme would appear
less successful in diverting defendants from custody. Finally, evaluations of the prison
based schemes also lack control over whether information was actually supplied to the
prosecution, defence or the court, after it was sent to the probation officer in the
courthouse (e.g., Lloyd, 1992; Mair, 1988).
The method used by studies such as Stone (1988) and Lloyd (1992) to
investigate bail failures (i.e., defendants who breached bail) is limited. This is because
the defendant may after re-arrest appear in another area, or after the duration of the
study.
Although Stone (1988) claims that the use of bail hostels was large, there was no
pre-BIS comparison made and so it cannot be determined if BISs were responsible for
any increase in this condition of bail.
All of the evaluations suffer from problems associated with missing data. For
instance, Fiddes and Lloyd (1990) conceded that there was a significant amount of
missing information in their data set. In Mair's (1988) study, data was missing
regarding charge for around half of the no BIS. These cases could have been charged
with more serious offences and so less likely to have been granted bail.
Another concern with the findings of the above studies is that they may be
biased. Some of the evaluations are examples of "action research" (Robertson, 1993).
For example, Stone (1988) stated that the interim results of the studies were reported
back to the schemes thus affecting their operation and the final results. Some studies
were conduced by those operating the schemes (e.g., Mair, 1988). These studies may
lack objectivity, and the researchers may have a vested interest in the continuation of
the schemes, especially in the face of a lack of alternatives.
Studies may be over-reporting the effect of BISs on magistrates' remand
decisions. The results aggregating over courts hide differences in the success of
individual schemes (HM Inspectorate of Probation, 1993; Lloyd, 1992; Stone, 1988).
For example, Stone (1988) reported that in one of his courts, only 10 defendants had
been diverted from custody as a result of the scheme. Finally, although there is evidence
to suggest that magistrates attend to information about the defendant's community ties
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(Doherty & East, 1985; Eaton, 1987; Hucklesby, 1996; Morgan & Henderson, 1998),
studies also reveal that other information, such as the nature and seriousness of the
defendant's offence has an impact on magistrates' decisions, which may be greater than
the impact of community ties information.
In sum, the BISs policy initiative, which was introduced as way of overcoming
the problem of lack of information available to magistrates regarding a defendant's
community ties, has in numerous reports said to have been effective in diverting the
"right" defendants from custody. The methodological shortcomings of these studies
however, imply that their findings may lack validity. A more controlled experimental
approach should be used in future evaluations. Finally, future studies on BISs could
examine the effect of these schemes upon other aspects of magistrates' remand decision
making such as their agreement, consistency, and post-decisional confidence.
1.7. Summary and Proposed Research Questions
In the English criminal justice system, the vast majority of legal decisions are
made by magistrates. The large majority of magistrates are lay people and very few are
legally qualified and a few are stipendiaries. The historical evolution of the magistracy
means that today they are often criticised for not being representative of the general
population, and the defendants who appear before them. It is also assumed that there
may be differences between lay and stipendiary magistrates.
The remand decision is one of the most frequent decisions made by magistrates.
They must decide whether a defendant should be bailed (released) unconditionally,
bailed with conditions, or remanded in custody, each time a case is adjourned, whether
for trial, sentence or appeal. The remand decision is one of the first, and perhaps most
important, steps along the path in the justice process as it may affect other legal
decisions such as the decisions to convict and sentence. A decision to remand a
defendant in custody can have significant adverse consequences for defendants and their
families, as well as placing a burden on the penal system. On the other hand, a decision
to bail a defendant can have significant adverse consequences for the general public.
Therefore, when making a remand decision, magistrates must consider the
ramifications of their decisions for both the individual defendant and for society. In
order to protect the former, magistrates must observe due process. By contrast, in order
to protect the latter, magistrates may operate according to the principles of crime
control. The decision making task is probabilistic, and as with all legal decisions, the
task does not require that magistrates make the objectively "correct" decision. Rather,
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they should aim to minimise either a type I or type II error. Critics have argued that
crime control principles that minimise a type II error, predominate in the law on bail and
consequently, magistrates' remand decisions.
Magistrates' remand decision making is governed and guided by the Bail Act,
which was introduced in 1976. This piece of legislation is however, vague and ill-
defined. Therefore, magistrates have much discretion in its interpretation, and their
subsequent remand decisions. Before the introduction of the Act, researchers had noted
the considerable discretion afforded magistrates when making their remand decisions.
For example, Zander (1967) concluded that "magistrates exercise their discretion to
grant bail according to criteria which are far from clear. Nor do they have any real
guidance as to what weight should be given to the different factors that are allowed to
influence the decision as to bail" (p. 128). After the introduction of the Act, Hayes
(1981) stated that the magistrates' remand decision "involves an intertwining of fact
with opinion, and the whole reasoning process, and linking together of the various
strands of argument, is a highly subjective, evaluative exercise" (p. 22).
In practice, magistrates' decisions may also be affected by other features of the
task, such as the order of information presentation, the availability, quality and
usefulness of information, magistrates' opportunity to learn from the task, and time
pressure.
Research pre-dating the Bail Act 1976, painted a dismal picture of magistrates'
remand decision making, and research conducted after the introduction of the Act, has
demonstrated that nothing seems to have changed. According to these studies, in
addition to legal cues, magistrates attend to extra-legal defendant and crime control
related cues when making their remand decisions. Conditional bail is a popular decision
and magistrates often impose a small range of conditions that may or may not be
effective. Different magistrates make different decisions on alike cases. There may also
be differences in the practices of urban and rural courts. Finally, the research evaluating
BISs, which provide positive information about a defendant's community ties to the
court, has concluded that this policy initiative has been successful in diverting the
"right" defendants from custody.
The past research has been conducted by criminologists and is based on
decisions made on real cases. However, the lack of experimental control over the
variables being measured in these studies creates difficulties in interpretation of their
findings. Thus, conclusive evidence is lacking. Previous researchers have also grouped
the decision to grant unconditional and conditional bail together, and compared these
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decisions with decisions to remand in custody. Although this assumption is compatible
with the reasoning in the law on bail, psychologically it may be more appropriate to
consider unconditional bail separate from decisions to bail conditionally or remand in
custody, because unlike the former, the latter decisions involve behaving in a punitive
manner. Previous researchers have also not meaningfully considered magistrates'
remand decisions in the context of the task constraints under which magistrates work.
The research presented in this thesis investigates magistrates' remand decision
making from a psychological perspective. The aim is to demonstrate how magistrates
exercise their discretion when making remand decisions, with the goal of discovering
whether crime control or due process predominates. The specific questions that have
emerged from the preceding review and which will be pursued in the research presented
in this thesis are listed below:
Decision maker related questions:
(a) What information do magistrates use when making remand decisions? How
do they process this information to form a decision?
(b) How do magistrates respond to cases when some information is unavailable?
Do they make more or less punitive decisions?
(c) What is the extent of disagreement among magistrates in decisions made on
the same cases?
(d) What is the pattern of imposition of bail conditions?
(e) What are the effects of BISs on magistrates' remand decision making?
(f) What are the similarities and differences between lay and stipendiary
magistrates when they make remand decisions?
(g) What are the differences in the remand decision making between magistrates
located in metropolitan and provincial courts?
Decision task related questions:
(a) What information is often unavailable to magistrates in the courtroom when
they make their remand decisions?
(b) How does caseload affect the speed with which magistrates make decisions
in the courtroom?
The psychological theory and methods that will be used in the research
presented in this thesis will be reviewed in the next chapter.
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2. SOCIAL JUDGEMENT THEORY AND SIMPLE HEURISTICS
A myriad of approaches have been developed to investigate human judgement
and decision making (J/DM). These include decision theory (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976),
behavioural decision theory (Edwards, 1954, 1992), the heuristics and biases approach
(Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), information integration theory (Anderson, 1974,
1981), social judgement theory (Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer, & Steinmann, 1975), and
the simple heuristics approach (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group,
1999b). 1 Social judgement theory (SJT) originated in the mid 1970s and has since
inspired hundreds of studies investigating human J/DM using regression models, from
both theoretical and applied perspectives (see Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988). This includes
applications to the legal domain (e.g., Sensibaugh & Allgeier, 1996; York, 1992). The
simple heuristics approach that proposes the use of fast and frugal heuristics is a recent
development in the field of J/DM. Fast and frugal heuristics are simple process models
that have been postulated as psychologically plausible alternatives to the use of
regression models. 2 Both SJT and the simple heuristics approach draw from the
theoretical and methodological ideas presented by the Austro-Hungarian psychologist,
Egon Brunswik (1940, 1943, 1944, 1952, 1955b, 1956). The research presented in this
thesis was the first to use fast and frugal heuristics to describe human J/DM. Thus, the
aim of this thesis is to integrate SJT and the simple heuristics approach.
The present chapter is organised into six sections. In the first section, I review
Brunswik's ideas as presented in his theory of probabilistic functionalism and his
method of representative design. Working mostly in the area of perceptual constancy,
Brunswik argued that psychological research should investigate how people cope with
the probabilistic nature of their environments (e.g., how they use cues that are only
imperfect indicators of a criterion, to predict the criterion). Furthermore, he proposed
that such research should study people individually, in their natural environments, over
a number of trials, and that their behaviour could be captured using correlational
analyses. I then discuss Hammond's (a student of Brunswik) interpretation of
Brunswik's ideas and his application of these ideas to the study of human J/DM. In
particular, I consider Hammond's use of correlational statistics and multiple linear
regression as a model for describing the judgement process. At the end of this section, I
I There are theoretical and methodological similarities and differences among approaches (see Cooksey,
1996a; Doherty, 1993; Goldstein & Hogarth, 1997; Hammond, McClelland, & Mumpower, 1980; Slovic
& Lichtenstein, 1971). However, calls for their integration (e.g., Anderson, 1974; Hammond et al., 1980;
Hastie, 1991) have largely gone unheard.
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present the main goals and methods of SJT, thus highlighting how Hammond and his
colleagues synthesised Brunswik's ideas with their own work on human J/DM. In the
second section, I introduce the technique of judgement analysis. This technique is
employed by social judgement theorists to collect and analyse judgement data. I
describe the single-systems design of studies that look only at information use without
reference to accuracy in its use, as the research presented in this thesis is based on this
design. I then critically examine the findings of past judgement analysis research using
regression models. These findings concern people's consistency in making decisions,
the fit of the multiple linear regression model to their judgement data, the number of
cues they use, their agreement with others, their self-insight according to the regression
model, and their post-decisional confidence. Finally, I review the use of representative
design in judgement analysis research. In the third section, I critically examine social
judgement theorists' use of the static, structural regression model that integrates cues, as
a description of human J/DM. In particular, I refer to the notions of psychological
implausibility, inflexible judgement strategy and incomprehensibility of regression
models, as arguments against the regression model. In the fourth section, I explore
alternative models and methods for describing human J/DM. These include alternative
static, structural models, and complex process models. In the fifth section, I introduce
the simple heuristics approach recently proposed by Gigerenzer and his colleagues.
Unlike the regression model, fast and frugal heuristics are simple process models. Many
of these are also non-compensatory, which means that decisions made on a piece of
information cannot be altered by other information. I analyse the viability of fast and
frugal heuristics as alternatives to the regression model. I then critically evaluate the
research conducted to date that has attested to the descriptive validity of these models.
In the final section, I summarise the key points of the chapter and list some more
research questions that will be empirically examined in this thesis.
2.1. Social Judgement Theory: Origins and Main Tenets
SJT is rooted in Egon Brunswik's (1943, 1952) theory of probabilistic
functionalism and employs the lens model framework (Brunswik, 1952), method of
representative design (Brunswik, 1944, 1955b, 1956) and correlational statistics
(Brunswik, 1940) to investigate human J/DM (Hammond et al., 1975).
2 The terms heuristic and model will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis.
71
2.1.1. Brunswik's psychological theory and method. 3 In his theory of	 .
probabilistic functionalism, Brunswik (1943, 1952) argued that psychological processes
are adapted to the environments in which they function. In this sense, he adopted a
Darwinian perspective. The main tenets of Brunswik's theory of probabilistic
functionalism are illustrated in his lens model as shown in Figure 2.1. According to
Brunswik, an organism's goal is to achieve a distal variable in the environment through
the use of proximal variables (cues). He thus distinguished between proximal and distal
variables. The double convex lens shows a collection of proximal effects diverging from
a distal stimulus in the environment. The former may be used as proximal cues by the
organism for achieving the distal variable, and so converge at the point of a response in
the organism. For example, the magistrates' task is to make a decision as to whether to
release a defendant on bail or to remand him or her in custody, bearing in mind that the
defendant should not abscond and so forth. Thus, implicit in the magistrates' decision is
their judgement of the likelihood that the defendant would abscond, which is a
prediction of the distal variable.
The environment is defined as the "natural-cultural habitat of an individual or
group...the objective, external potential offered to the organism for survival and its
subordinate needs" (Brunswik, 1955b, p. 198) and is a "reference class" which defines a
"population" of stimuli (Brunswik, 1943, p. 257). Stimuli may be considered as sets of
"variate packages" because they comprise a number of cues whose values vary along
their range (Brunswik, 1955b, p. 197). For instance, for a magistrate in a remand
hearing, criminal cases are stimuli that comprise features such as the defendant's age,
offence and community ties. In one case, the defendant may be young, may be charged
with a serious assault and may not have any permanent residence. In another case, the
defendant may be older, may be charged with a minor burglary and may live with his
family.
The environment to which an organism must adapt is not always perfectly
predictable from the cues (Brunswik, 1943). First, a particular distal stimulus does not
always imply specific proximal effects because under some conditions an effect may not
be present. Second, particular proximal effects do not always imply a specific distal
stimulus because under some conditions the same effect may be caused by other distal
3 For a discussion of the intellectual influences on Brunswik see Leary (1987) and for a review of the
development of Brunswik's method see Dhami, Hertwig and Hoffrage (in preparation). Precursors to the
theory of probabilistic functionalism and method of representative that Brunswik developed in the latter
half of his career in Berkeley, may be found in early papers he wrote whilst working in the Buhler's
laboratory in Vienna (e.g., Brunswik, 1934, for a summary and review see Tolman, 1935; Brunswik,
1937, 1939a, 1939b, 1940; Tolman & Brunswik, 1935).
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Inter-cue
correlations
stimuli. Proximal cues are therefore, only probabilistic indicators of a distal variable.
The predictive (or ecological) validity of a cue is measured by the correlation between
the cue and the distal variable (Brunswik, 1940, 1952). For example, the strength of the
defendant's community ties may be a better predictor of whether he or she will abscond
if released on bail than the seriousness of the offence the defendant is charged with.
However, not all defendants without a permanent residence will abscond and in fact,
some defendants with a permanent address may abscond.
Cues
Ecological	 Cue utilisation
validities	 validities
Organism/
Environment/
	 Person's
Criterion	 judgements
ra
Achievement
Figure 2.1. The lens model (adapted from Brunswik, 1952)
The proximal cues are themselves interrelated, thus introducing redundancy (or
intra-ecological correlations) in the environment (Brunswik, 1952). For instance, when
considering the cues that magistrates may use, the defendant's gender may be highly
related to the type of offence he or she is charged with. Male defendants may be more
likely to be charged with committing sexual offences than female defendants.
The ecological validity of cues and their inter-correlations are learned through
experience. In his concepts of vicarious mediation and vicarious functioning, Brunswik
(1952) emphasised the equipotentiality of cues in the environment and the equifinality
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of an organism's responses, respectively. The environment enables the achievement of a
distal variable via alternative proximal cues and an organism must cope with this
uncertainty by learning to alternate between different cues, through the "equivalence
and mutual intersubstitutability" of these cues (Brunswik, 1952, p. 675-676), in
particular, when previously used cues become unreliable or are unavailable (Brunswik,
1934).4 In other words, distal variables can be attained vicariously through proximal
variables, and proximal variables can themselves be used vicariously through other
proximal variables. For instance, in order to predict whether a defendant may abscond if
released on bail, magistrates may consider the strength of the defendant's community
ties. However, in some cases, this information may not be available. In such cases they
may consider the defendant's age, if they believe age to be related to community ties. In
this sense, Brunswik (1957) recognised that the study of cognitive processes included a
study of cue utilisation.
Although achievement (also called functional validity [Brunswik, 1952, p. 681])
can be maximised by using cues according to their ecological validities (Brunswik,
1943, 1955b, 1957), the fact that cues are only probabilistic indicators of the distal
variable means that achievement is at best probabilistic (Brun.swik, 1943, 1952). For
example, there may be no single cue or any combination of cues that allow perfect
prediction of absconding. Brunswik (1940, 1943, 1952) proposed that achievement
should be studied at the level of the individual and be measured over a series of
responses through the correlation between the distal variable and an organism's
responses. For instance, in order to investigate how well magistrates make remand
decisions, the decisions made by an individual bench over a series of cases would be
studied by correlating the decision made and whether or not the defendant later
absconded.
Correlational statistics were therefore used to measure ecological validities of
cues, redundancy among cues, cue utilisation validities and achievement (Brunswik,
1955b, 1956, 1957). Brunswik (1943) chose correlations because they captured
imperfect relations on a fixed scale from -1 to 1, and they provided simple descriptive
statements whose generality was evident. He stated that:
Correlation coefficients are summary statements of results which are descriptive
in the sense that they do not in themselves go beyond the actually observed
evidence. Yet.. .they contain.. .the claim to generality. The degree to which this
claim is justified is usually indicated by an added reference to the standard error
Wolf (1999) more comprehensively defines vicarious functioning as the ability for "accumulating,
checking, weighting, interchanging, questioning, partly utilizing, rejecting, or substituting" proximal cues
in search of alternative pathways to the distal stimulus (p. 6).
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(SE), so that we may anticipate the reasonable limits within which coefficients
from other samples may be expected to lie (Brunswik, 1956, p. 38).
Brunswik's (1940) first application of correlational statistics to stimulus-response
research was conducted at a time when correlation statistics were only employed in the
field of individual differences and heredity (i.e., the Galton-Pearson school of research).
Whereas in the latter field correlations are computed between two variables such as IQ
and race from the same sample of individuals, for Brunswik's stimulus-response
research, correlations were computed between two variables, namely stimulus and
response from the same sample of situations in an individual's environment (Brunswik,
1943).5
In defence of the suitability of correlation statistics for stimulus-response
research, Brunswik (1943) argued that "a correlation coefficient is just as exact,.. .just as
public and palpable in its meaning as a law. And it has,.. .considerably more generality,
and thus possibilities of prediction" (p. 269). Correlational analysis however, required
sets of observations, which must either be ranked or placed on a common scale, and
where pairwise correlations must be computed separately for different aspects of the
study (i.e., between distal stimuli and proximal stimuli, distal stimuli and responses, and
proximal stimuli and responses) (Brunswik, 1940). 6 Gigerenzer and Murray (1987) note
that Brunswik's understanding of statistics was not very sophisticated.
The use of linear models to study multiple cues was demonstrated in another
study (Brunswik, 1944), and in his later writing Brunswik (1956) recommended the use
of multiple correlation, not only as a means of isolating variables, but also as a method
for describing the process of vicarious functioning. To this endeavour, he referred to his
wife, Frenkel-Brunswik's (1951) use of multiple correlation in her analysis of clinical
judgement. He also adopted the metaphor of the perceptual system as an intuitive
statistician. For instance, in his 1956 book, he referred to the individual subject in his
1944 study as behaving like an "intuitive statistician" (p. 143). The intuitive statistician
takes into account means and distributions of variables, for example (Brunswik,
5 In the field of individual differences, the fact that characteristics of individuals could not be isolated and
controlled forced use of the statistical rather than experimental approach, and Bnmswik (1943) argued
that a psychology studying achievement should become "statistical throughout, instead of where it seems
to be hopeless to be otherwise" (p. 262). Interestingly, when Brunswik (1940) originally introduced the
correlation coefficient in his research on perceptual constancy he conducted a between-subjects' analysis.
6 Brunswik (1940) replaced his constancy ratio measure with the correlation coefficient. The former had
the practical advantages which included only requiring one observation, and of relating the distal variable,
proximal variables and responses to one index. However, it was limited for example, to the relationship
between two variables, and it did not have a fixed scale.
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1955a). 7 Although Brunswik referred to cue substitution (Brunswik, 1952), he	 .
concluded that achievement of perceptual constancy and social perception was due to a
statistical integration of cues (Brunswik, 1952, 1956). Therefore, Brunswik equated
cognitive processes with statistical inference, and specifically inference that involved
compensatory, cue integration. Finally, when discussing the metaphor of the intuitive
statistician, Brunswik (1952) also introduced the concept of ratiomorphism, which
refers to the issue of modelling cognitive processes.
For Brunswik (1943), the primary aim of psychological research is to discover
probabilistic laws that describe an organism's adaptation to the causal texture of its
environment in terms of distal achievement. The questions to be answered are: How is
an organism perceiving and responding to its probabilistic environment in order to
achieve a distal variable? Can the findings of such a study be used to predict future
achievement? The first question refers to the study of vicarious functioning and the
second question refers to the generalisability of research findings.
In order to achieve these two aims, Brunswik (1955b) contended that the
experimenter "must resist the temptation...to interfere" with the environment and
instead strive to retain its natural causal texture in the stimuli presented to participants
(p. 198). The stimuli should be representative in terms of the number of variables, the
distribution of their values and their co-variation (Brunswik, 1956). Rather than
disentangling variables at the design stage of research, as is done in systematic design,
Brunswik (1943, 1944, 1952, 1955b, 1956) proposed that co-variation can be dealt with
at the analysis stage of research through partial correlation, or by leaving out data.
Brunswik (1955b, 1956) proposed the method of representative design as an
alternative to the popular method of systematic design. 8 In systematic design, the
experimenter selects and isolates one or a few independent variables, then
systematically varies them while holding all other variables constant and observes the
resulting changes in the dependent variable(s). The logic of this design lies in the search
for perfect, one-to-one, cause-effect relationships. Brunswik (1944, 1955b, 1956)
argued that in the most sophisticated variant of systematic design, namely the factorial
design, variables are artificially untied. Here, the range of the variables is arbitrary and
is divided up into k levels, and levels of one variable are combined with levels of the
7 Earlier, Helmholtz (1856-66/1962) had stated that depth and space perception involved inductive
"unconscious inferences" where individuals must learn to interpret sensory information in an adaptive
way through past experience (cited in Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987). Gigerenzer and Murray (1987) state
that Brunswik "transformed the meaning of Helmholtz' unconscious inferences into unconscious multiple
regression statistics" (p. 61).
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other variable, exhausting all possible combinations. All combinations have equal •
frequency and the natural co-variation among variables is eliminated by means of
experimental control. Factorial designs may thus yield artificial combinations that are
impossible in the real world. Systematic design and its policy of isolating and
controlling selected variables destroys the naturally existing causal texture of the
environment to which an organism has adapted (Brunswik, 1944). Brunswik (1952)
argued that "In controlling vicarious mediation, care must be exercised not to interfere
with naturally established mediation patterns.. .Channeling of mediation leaves no room
for vicarious functioning" (p. 684-685). Furthermore, he stated that the:
Generalizability of results concerning the relative weights of the variables
involved must remain limited unless at least the range, but better also the
distribution of the 'levels of strength' employed for each variable, has been
made representative of a carefully defined universe of conditions. (Brunswik,
1956, p. 55).
In principle, Brunswik (1955b) suggested three ways of achieving a
representative design. The first is by random sampling (which he also referred to as
situational, representative, and natural sampling) of stimuli from a defined population of
stimuli (reference class) to which the experimenter wants to generalise the findings.9
Brunswik (1944) attempted this form of sampling in his study of size constancy. The
second way is through what Brunswik (1955b, p. 204, 1956) called "canvassing" of
stimuli, namely stratified, quota, proportionate or accidental sampling. These only
provide a "primitive type of coverage of the ecology" (Brunswik, 1955b, p. 204) and
they do not permit statistical generalisations. Third, representative design could
theoretically be achieved by a complete coverage of the whole population of stimuli,
although Bnmswik (1955b) recognised that this may be unfeasible.
Brunswik's conception of representative design had some major difficulties
however. 10 First, there are practical problems in terms of the lack of experimental
control, and the time consuming and cumbersome nature of research conducted outside
the laboratory (Brunswik, 1944, 1955b, 1956). Second, there are theoretical problems in
defining the appropriate reference class (Brunswik, 1956). It is not surprising therefore,
Brunswik (1944) however did recognise the usefulness of systematic design in explanation based
research.
9 By stressing the need to sample situations as well as participants, Brunswik (1943) pointed to the
"double-standard" in the practice of sampling in psychological research (p. 262). He had noted that
whereas care is taken to obtain a representative sample of participants to ensure generalisation to a subject
population, the stimuli presented to these participants are not sampled as such, although generalisation to
the object population is assumed. This practice was particularly bemusing in the study of social
perception, where although the perceivers were sampled, the people they were perceiving were not.
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to learn that Brunswik (1944) also suggested that it is "generally possible" and •
"practically often very desirable" to use a hybrid design in which the researcher
introduces certain elements of systematic design into a study employing representative
design (p. 42). For instance, in a study by Holaday (1933) an exemplary stimulus was
systematically stripped of its complexity through "successive omission" of cues (cited
in Brunswik, 1955b). In this sense, experiments lie on a continuum from systematic to
representative design (Brunswik, 1956).
It should be noted that in order to overcome the practical difficulties encountered
in conducting representatively designed experiments, Hammond (1966) later
differentiated between the concept of substantive situational sampling and formal
situational sampling. Substantive situational sampling focuses on the content of the task
(e.g., size constancy) with its inherent formal informational properties, and is analogous
to Brunswik's original definition of representative design. Formal situational sampling,
focuses on the formal properties of the task (i.e., number of cues, their values,
distribution, inter-correlations and ecological validities), irrespective of its content.
Hammond (1966) advocated that until technological advances allowed substantive
situational sampling, researchers should employ formal situational sampling. Here, the
tasks presented to participants in the laboratory experiments should be representative of
the formal properties of the tasks as they exist in the world outside the laboratory. Note
that whereas Brunswik (1944) had taken the researcher outside the laboratory, formal
situational sampling brings the researcher back into the laboratory.
The formal properties define the universe of situation populations. For instance,
the number of cues ranges from zero to infinity, the ecological validities of the cues and
the inter-cue correlations range from —1 to +1. Any population of situations lies within
these boundaries. Note that Brunswik (1955b) believed that "there will be a limited
range and a characteristic distribution of conditions and condition combinations" (p.
199). A researcher who employs formal situational sampling can now sample various
combinations of formal properties (i.e., various number of cues, ecological validities
and inter-cue correlations). In order to identify the formal properties of the task to be
represented in the study, it is clear that researchers should firstly familiarise themselves
with the task by conducting some form of task analysis (Cooksey, 1996a; Hammond,
1966; Hammond et al., 1975; Petrinovich, 1979). It should be noted however, that
formal situational sampling is in Brehmer's (1979) terms "no easy road to success"
I ° Others have pointed to the difficulties associated with designing studies to meet Brunswik's criteria for
representativeness (Gibson, 1957; Tolman, 1955).
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because the number of all possible combinations may be extremely large and so the
researcher needs to know which are the "important combinations" to study (p. 198).
Here, if "important" is used to mean representative, and researchers are interested in
sampling from an existing population of situations, then the problem of defining a
reference class or sampling frame remains.
In sum, Brunswik (1943) called for a paradigm shift in the theory and method of
psychology. He insisted that before conducting explanatory research, psychologists
should describe how people adapt to their probabilistic environments, by studying
people individually, in their natural environments, over a number of trials, using
correlational analyses. At the time however, his "revolutionary" ideas (Gibson, 1957, p.
34) were ignored, misunderstood, treated with scepticism and even hostility (e.g., Hull,
1943; Lewin, 1943; Fiegl, 1955; Hilgard, 1955; Krech, 1955; Postman, 1955). On the
7th of July 1955, at the age of 52, Brunswik committed suicide.
2.1.2. Hammond's extension of Brunswik's ideas to the study of judgement
and decision making. Although Brunswik's ideas were predominantly based in the
area of perceptual constancy, towards the end of his career he studied higher cognitive
processes such as interpersonal perception, learning and thinking (see e.g., Brunswik,
1956). However, it was not until after his death that research in J/DM was influenced by
his ideas. Kenneth R. Hammond, a student of Brunswik, applied Brunswik's ideas to the
study of clinical judgement (Hammond, 1955), multiple cue probability learning
(Hammond & Summers, 1965), cognitive feedback (Todd & Hammond, 1965),
interpersonal conflict (Hammond, 1965, 1973; Hammond, Todd, Wilkins, & Mitchell,
1966a) and interpersonal learning (Hammond, 1972; Hammond, Wilkins, & Todd,
1966b). These will be discussed in turn.
In a landmark paper, which set the framework for SJT, Hammond (1955) shifted
attention away from the practice of solely studying the accuracy of clinical judgement to
also explaining how clinicians achieve their level of accuracy. 11 Using Brunswik's
(1952) lens model as a framework, Hammond argued that the clinician and the patient
are two different, but interacting systems that should be considered as a whole, and so
studies should focus on the relations between a clinician and his or her environment
(i.e., patients). He pointed out that the clinician's judgement process is often "quasi-
rational" and difficult to communicate because it is a result of the process of vicarious
functioning. Vicarious functioning is essential because clients may present a set of
1 1 A year earlier, Meehl (1954) had published an influential book comparing clinical versus actuarial
prediction.
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symptoms that may change over time or may present symptoms different from those
presented by another client who is suffering the same problem. Hammond argued that
an individual clinician's capacity for dealing with the intersubstitutability of cues, over
encounters with a series of patients, should be studied using representative design.
Finally, he advocated the use of multiple linear regression to capture the process of
vicarious functioning.
Hammond illustrated his points by referring to two studies conducted by Todd
(1954) and Herring (1954) (both cited in Hammond, 1955). In the first study, Todd
(1954) asked 10 clinicians to judge the intelligence (as measured by an IQ test) of 78
patients using a Rorschach test. The IQ test score was the objective outcome criterion.
Achievement was measured in terms of the correlation between the clinician's
judgements made over a set of clients and their IQ test scores. Hammond noted that the
clinicians' performance improved when they were provided access to more information
because the median correlation between judgements and IQ scores which was originally
0.47, rose to 0.64 when clinicians had access to the verbal protocol data from the
Rorschach. Then, using the four most valid cues as predictors, a multiple regression
equation was computed for the environment (i.e., capturing the relations between the
patients' IQ scores and the four Rorschach cues) and separate equations were computed
for each clinician (i.e., capturing the relations between each clinician's judgements of
IQ and the four Rorschach cues). Each model revealed the relative weights attached to
the cues. The model of the environment was then compared to each clinician's mode1.12
The match between the two models explained how the clinicians attained their level of
achievement. The multiple R for the model of the environment was 0.479 and the
median correlation between the clinicians' judgements of IQ and the IQ test score was
0.470. The ecological validities of the four cues in the environment, the utilisation
validities of the four cues by the clinicians, and the inter-correlations among the four
cues in the environment and as used by the clinician, were also elicited. There were
variations between the clinicians in terms of the cues they used. "Certain clinicians were
found to be using invalid cues, others neglected the valid ones" (Hammond, 1955, p.
261).
Hammond also demonstrated that the multiple linear regression model proved
good at predicting the clinicians' judgements. A model was developed for each clinician
on 39 patients and cross-validated on a further 39 patients (i.e., it made predictions of
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the clinicians' judgements on a set of new cases). I3
 The median correlation between the
models' predictions and the clinicians' judgements on the new cases was 0.85.
Hammond concluded that "evidently the multiple correlation model which predicts that
the clinician combines the data from the Rorschach in a linear, additive fashion is a
good one — it predicts quite successfully in comparison with most psychological efforts"
(p. 261).
In the second study, Herring (1954) asked clinicians to judge patients' responses
to surgical anaesthesia, on the basis of their psychological test results. Here, no
objective outcome criterion was available. Thus, analysis of the environment side of the
lens model and consequently analysis of achievement was abandoned, and instead
Hammond illustrated how the correspondence or agreement between the judgements of
two clinicians (a medic and a psychologist) could be studied. Simply, the match
between their regression models could explain their level of agreement. Earlier,
Brunswik (1956) had also noted that correlations could be used to measure "agreement
among judges" (p. 30).14
Hammond's (1955) use of multiple linear regression however, only enabled him
to capture the linear component of achievement. It was not until he developed the lens
model equation, that researchers were also able to relate non-linear aspects of the
environment (or another person's judgements) to an individual's judgements. The
original formulation by Hursch, Hammond and Hursch (1964) was simplified by Tucker
(1964), whose version is shown in Equation 2.1. The first part of the equation represents
the relations between linear patterns in the environment and the individual's responses,
and the second part represents the relations between their respective non-linear patterns.
Achievement is explained in terms of an individual's ability to detect and utilise both
the linear and non-linear patterns in the environment. Optimal performance is where r =
Re. If Re is less than 1, then researchers should not expect participants to demonstrate
perfect accuracy. Cooksey (1996b) states that:
The LME [lens model equation] is an elegant, precise mathematical formulation
of a simple truth. That is, a person's ability to make correct judgements about
reality is a function of three things: (1) how predictable the world is (Re), (2)
how well the person knows the world (G and C), and (3) how consistently the
person can apply his or her knowledge (Rs) (p. 165, words in brackets added).
12 Whereas Meehl (1954), a year earlier, had compared the clinician with a statistical model of the
environment, Hammond (1955), compared a statistical model of the clinician with a statistical model of
the environment.
13 Brunswik (1955b) said that experimental replication in a representatively designed study involved
selecting another sample from the population of stimuli.
14 For Brunswik (1956) the study of agreement was the only time when more than one individual was
"brought into the picture" (p. 35).
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In the first application of the lens model equation, Hammond et al. (1964)
reanalysed data from a study by Grebstein (1963), who compared naive, semi-
sophisticated and sophisticated clinicians' predictions of 30 patients' IQ test scores,
using 10 cues from patients' Rorschach tests. Grebstein had concluded that performance
did not improve with experience and that there was room for improvement. Hammond
et al. (1964) used the lens model equation to determine the upper limit of achievement
for this task and found that Re2 was 0.79. They also demonstrated that the three groups
of clinicians did not differ in terms of Rs, or C as all groups were highly linear. The three
groups did however, differ in terms of G as there was a greater match between the
ecological validities and utilisation validities of the more sophisticated groups.
ra = GReRs + C	 Re 2	R:
Equation 2.1. Lens model equation
ra represents achievement, and is measured by the correlation between the
judgements and the criterion.
Re represents the predictability of the environment and thus the upper limit of
achievement, and is measured by the linear multiple correlation between the cues and
the criterion.
Rs represents an individual's ability to utilise his or her knowledge of the task in
a consistent manner, and is measured by the linear multiple correlation between the cues
and the judgements.
G represents the match of the linear components of the two models, namely the
model of the environment and of the individual, and is measured by the correlation
between the linearly predictable variance in the environment and the individual's
judgements.
C represents the non-linear component of achievement, and is measured by the
correlation between the residuals from the linear regressions of the environment and the
individual.
The similarity between the multiple linear regression of the environment and of
the clinician's judgements, led Hammond et al. (1964) to conclude that "The clinicians'
inferential processes were nearly identical with the multiple-regression procedure both
in function and in content" (p. 444). Finally, when proposing further studies, they stated
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that "We are confident that...such studies will find small differences between the
cognitive processes of the clinician, or any human subject, and the multiple-regression
equation" (p. 452).
The lens model was also used to study multiple cue probability learning
(Hammond & Summers, 1965). 15 Research in this paradigm investigates how people
learn to use cues that are probabilistically related to a distal variable. Participants, who
are novices at the task, are presented with a set of cues that they use to make judgements
about a criterion and they then receive outcome feedback of the criterion value. Studies
examine how over a series of trials, participants acquire knowledge of the formal
properties of the task (e.g., ecological validities of cues) and then apply that knowledge
when making judgements about the criterion. Hammond and Summers (1965) gave
three groups different amounts of information about the task in addition to the outcome
feedback (i.e., no information, information that the task contained linear and non-linear
cue-criterion function forms, and information that in addition identified the linear and
non-linear cues). They asked individuals to predict a criterion value from two cues, one
linearly related to the criterion and one non-linearly related. All groups showed learning
over five blocks of 20 trials and all groups were able to more efficiently learn to use the
linear cue. However individuals in the group given the most information showed a
higher degree of achievement and were more likely to learn to use the non-linear cue.
The two groups given information about the task were also better at learning the
ecological validities of the cues. Other studies conducted in this paradigm have found
that people can learn positive relations quicker than negative ones; they can slowly learn
to track changes in relative cue weights over time; they can learn to use cues quicker
than learning function forms; and they do not use cue redundancies effectively (see
Klayman, 1988; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971). Therefore, the findings from the multiple
cue probability learning paradigm indicate that individuals can learn about the formal
properties of the task and adapt to it.
It was clear from Hammond and Summers' (1965) study that the provision of
information about the properties of the task in addition to traditional outcome feedback
improved learning. Thus, Todd and Hammond (1965) developed the procedure of
cognitive feedback (sometimes also known as lens model feedback). 16
 This involves
providing information about the formal properties of the task (i.e., ecological validities,
15 Earlier, Smedslund (1955) had investigated how people learn to use cues of limited predictive validity,
to infer a criterion. Research on this topic however, did not flourish until Hammond and Summers' (1965)
study.
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inter-cue correlations, predictability and cue-criterion function forms), the individual's
judgement policy (i.e., utilisation validities, Rs, consistency and cue-judgement function
forms), and the match between properties of the environment and the individual's
judgement policy (i.e., achievement, G and C) (see Balzer, Doherty, & O'Connor, 1989;
Doherty & Balzer, 1988). 17 Todd and Hammond (1965) provided participants with
feedback of their degree of achievement, cue utilisation validities and the ecological
validities of the cues, for each of eight blocks of 25 trials. They found that cognitive
feedback led to significantly higher achievement than outcome feedback. 18 Other
research has found that providing both outcome and cognitive feedback may even
impair performance; that cognitive feedback is superior to no feedback at all (see
Doherty & Balzer, 1988); and that learning is slow and difficult with outcome feedback
alone (see Brehmer, 1980; Klayman, 1988). 19 It is suggested that in stable
environments, unlike cognitive feedback, outcome feedback does not provide
information useful for making future judgements. Todd and Hammond (1965) believed
that cognitive feedback enables people to compare their understanding of the task and
discover where they were not using the cues appropriately. However, as Brehmer (1979)
points out, in real world conditions feedback isn't always available and people aren't
consciously trying to learn the task.
Hammond (1965) applied the multiple cue probability learning paradigm and the
technique of cognitive feedback to judgement in social situations, namely in conflict
situations. Further research by Brehmer investigated how task conditions may aid or
prevent conflict resolution (see Brehmer, 1976). Whereas the study of multiple-cue
probability learning involves the use of the traditional lens model as shown in Figure
2.1, the study of interpersonal conflict and learning involve the use of a modified
version, as shown in Figure 2.2 (Hammond, 1965). Two individuals, acting
independently, make judgements on the same task.
16 Cognitive feedback is the term used when information about past events is provided and cognitive
feedforward refers to information about future events (Doherty & Balzer, 1988).
17 The information may be represented in a variety of ways, including graphical form (e.g., Hammond,
1971).
18 Earlier, Newton (1963) had demonstrated that the sole provision of cognitive feedback could
significantly improve performance, in a study where 99 sophomore students used 4 cues (i.e., IQ, College
Board Score, high school rank, a personality rating by the high school principal) to predict the grade
averages of 53 freshman students. Feedback was provided in four conditions and performance improved
significantly in the condition involving feedback of ecological validities of cues and their utilisation
validities.
19 Unfortunately, this latter situation reflects how learning takes place in the real world (Anderson, Deane,
Hammond, McClelland, & Shanteau, 1981).
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Figure 2.2. Lens model for study of interpersonal conflict and interpersonal
learning (adapted from Hammond [1965] and Hammond et al., [1966b])
In a standard interpersonal conflict experiment (Brehmer, 1976; Cooksey,
1996a; Hammond, 1965; 1973), participants may be selected either because they
already have conflicting policies or they may be trained to develop conflicting
judgement policies. Unaware that they have different policies, participants are brought
together and asked to co-operate on solving a set of problems that they are told are real.
Essentially, they are required to deal with an artificial judgement task where cues are
probabilistically related to the criterion, as they are in the real world. On each trial they
study the available information and make judgements of the criterion variable alone and
then to communicate these to one another. If they disagree they must discuss the
problem until they reach an acceptable joint response. They are then asked to reconsider
their original decisions, and these revisions remain private. Finally, they are presented
with the correct solution. Conflict or agreement is therefore defined objectively as the
actual differences in the judgements made by the two individuals.
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Conflict may be due to systematic and non-systematic cognitive differences in
the way people perform the task. Systematic differences refer to features of judgement
policies such as the relative cue weights and non-systematic differences refer to the idea
that people may be inconsistent in the application of their policies (Mumpower &
Stewart, 1996). Research has shown that although over a series of trials participants
unlearned their conflicting policies and developed similar ones, conflict persisted
because individuals simultaneously become more inconsistent in applying their revised
policies, and these non-systematic differences accounted for more conflict than did
systematic differences in policies (see Brehmer, 1976). 2° These findings have been
replicated using different types of participants and task conditions (see Hammond &
Brehmer, 1973).21
 Brehmer's (1976) research has shown how the degree and nature of
conflict (i.e., whether it is due to systematic or non-systematic differences) is affected
by task conditions. For example, he has demonstrated that policy consistency is lower in
less predictable tasks leading to less agreement; that non-linear cues lead to lower
consistency but do not affect policy similarity; that when the task contains linear cues
and people only have to use one cue they are more consistent but their policy similarity
is unaffected; that when the task contains both linear and non-linear cues and people
only have to use one cue their policy similarity and consistency is higher; and finally
that inter-cue correlations lead to less policy similarity (see Brehmer, 1976). Hammond
and Brehmer (1973) applied the technique of cognitive feedback and developed a
cognitive aid to conflict resolution called POLICY (originally called
COGNOGRAPH). 22 This is an interactive computer program that enables people to
express their policies, compare them, change them, and discover the effects of such
changes on conflict. The emphasis was on teaching consistent new policies. It has been
found that cognitive feedback helps to speed conflict reduction (Balke, Hammond, &
Meyer, 1973). In sum, research in the interpersonal conflict paradigm has demonstrated
that agreement could be studied in the same way as achievement. As will be discussed
below, the study of two cognitive systems has become popular.
The issues of learning and cognitive feedback have also been studied in the
social domains of interpersonal learning (Earle, 1973; Hammond et al., 1966b;
20 Thus, cognitive conflicts may actually be the basis for emotional and motivational conflicts (Brehmer,
1976).
21 Much of the early studies were laboratory based, however, cognitive conflict has been studied in many
important domains such as nuclear safeguards (Brady & Rappoport, 1973) and selection of police
ammunition (Hammond & Adelman, 1976).
22 Brehmer and Brehmer (1988) note however, that the effectiveness of this aid has never been
empirically tested.
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Hammond, 1972). 23 Furthermore, this research is linked to research on interpersonal
conflict because an individual's ability to learn to predict another person's behaviour is
central to conflict resolution (Hammond et al., 1966b). The research on interpersonal
conflict therefore, is also conducted within the lens model shown in Figure 2.2. Studies
examine how individuals learn from and about the judgement processes of another
person. Here, instead of making a joint decision, as would be done in a study on
interpersonal conflict, participants are asked to predict the other person's response
(Hammond et al., 1966b). Comparison of the prediction with the other person's actual
response provides a measure of interpersonal knowledge.
Hammond et al. (1966b) found that on average, paired participants were able to
predict one another's responses quite well, and were able to predict one another's
differential cue weights, linear (although not to the extent hypothesised) and non-linear
cue use. Participants were also more likely to learn about the other person if the other
person was more reliable and through interaction each pair became more similar in their
policies. In addition, Hammond (1972) found that function forms affected cue
utilisation validities where for instance, after interpersonal learning, individuals trained
to use a non-linear cue could give up reliance on that cue and learn to use a linear cue
quicker than individuals trained to use a linear cue. In a set of three experiments, Earle
(1973) reported that participants taught to use linear rules required interpersonal
learning from participants using non-linear rules in order to switch to using non-linear
rules, but not vice versa. Interpersonal learning was also necessary for learning of
negative linear or non-linear titles. The other person must convey relevant information
about the task for interpersonal learning to be better than individual only task learning.
Research has also investigated the effects of task characteristics on interpersonal
learning and found the effects to be similar to those found in the above paradigms, with
the exception that non-linear policies are easier to learn through interpersonal learning
(see Hammond et al., 1975). Finally, it has also been claimed that cognitive feedback is
useful in interpersonal learning tasks (Balke et al., 1973; Miller, 1973).
In sum, after Brunswik's death, Hammond employed the lens model framework
and correlational analysis to study achievement and agreement in human J/DM. He also
extended this analysis to social situations, namely to the study of interpersonal conflict
and learning, and developed the technique of cognitive feedback to improve J/DM. In
23 This paradigm has been applied for example, to the study of psychoactive drugs (see Hammond &
Joyce, 1975).
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doing all this, like Brunswik, Hammond equated cognitive processes with the features
of the multiple regression model.
2.1.3. Main tenets of social judgement theory. In 1975, Hammond et al.
synthesised the Brunswikian approach to psychological theory and method, with
research extending these ideas to the study of clinical judgement, multiple cue
probability learning, cognitive feedback, interpersonal conflict and interpersonal
learning. They developed what they called SJT.
SJT is not a theory providing any testable hypotheses about the nature of human
J/DM, but is a meta-theory that provides a framework to guide research to this
endeavour. There are four basic goals of SJT research: (a) to analyse judgement tasks
and processes, (b) analyse the structure of achievement and agreement, (c) to understand
how humans learn to achieve and agree, and (d) to find methods for improving
achievement and agreement (Brehmer & Joyce, 1988; Hammond et al., 1975). SJT
research aims to describe behaviour before prescribing changes to improve it. The
model of the environment serves as a benchmark, indicating how judgement can be
improved (Brehmer & Joyce, 1988; Hammond et al., 1964). Performance may be
enhanced by cognitive feedback and cognitive (decision) aids (Hammond et al., 1975).
Social judgement theorists study "life relevant" issues (Hammond et al., 1975, p. 276).
In this sense, much of SJT research is applied.
Four types of judgement situations are distinguished in SJT research. These are
the double-systems design, single-systems design, triple-systems design, the N-systems
design and the hierarchical design (see also Hammond, 1972; Hammond et al., 1975).
The first refers to Brunswik's (1952) original lens model as shown in Figure 2.1, and
involves an analysis of the interaction between an individual and a task. As discussed
above, this framework is used to study achievement and multiple cue probability
learning. The other three judgement situations represent modifications to the original
model.
In the single-systems design, as shown in Figure 2.3 (the dotted line indicates
absent analysis), there is no outcome criterion and so researchers simply describe an
individual's judgement policy. They may also compare policies among individuals.
Herring's (1954) study could be classified as an example of the single-systems design.
Much of SJT research uses this design (Dhami et al., in preparation) and the research
presented in this thesis does too. This design may be appropriate because often an
outcome criterion is unavailable, and usually for quite valid reasons. First, an outcome
criterion may not be useful because there is no correct answer, as, for example, in the
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diagnoses of a mental illness (Doherty, 1995 personal communication cited in Cooksey,
1996a). Second, an outcome criterion may be difficult to obtain due to concerns with
confidentiality, ethics or legality. 24
 Third, an outcome criterion may be unavailable
during the study period. Fourth, studies using hypothetical cases or cases that represent
future situations, by their very nature preclude the use of an outcome criterion. Finally,
an outcome criterion may not be included because it is irrelevant to the research goal as
researchers wish solely to study agreement.
Cues
ra
Achievement
Figure 2.3. Lens model for single-systems design
Many of the above reasons for not collecting outcome data and thus for solely
studying agreement apply to research conducted in the legal domain, and the research
presented in this thesis. It is theoretically impossible to measure overall achievement
(which includes both type I and type II errors). For instance, consider a magistrate who
remanded a defendant in custody based on the belief that the defendant was at high risk
of offending if bailed. It would never be known if this defendant would actually have
24 
In order to overcome problems in obtaining an outcome criterion, some studies have used expert
judgements to provide environmental criterion measures (see e.g., Adelman & Mumpower, 1979;
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offended if, instead he or she had been bailed. In fact, a valid and reliable measure of
the outcome of cases that were bailed is difficult to obtain because although it is
relatively easy to discover if a bailed defendant failed to surrender to custody, it is more
difficult to ascertain if he or she offended while on bail, or interfered with
witnesses/obstructed justice. If self-reports did provide details of crimes and
obstructions of justice while on bail, the researcher would be in an awkward position in
not being able to report them to the police. The fact that defendants may be bailed for
long periods of time also means that outcome data may be difficult to collect for all
cases, during the time frame of the study. Finally, there is no objectively correct
solution to whether a defendant will or will not abscond, offend or obstruct justice if
released on bail, as these have not and theoretically cannot be determined, and so
rendering it problematic to elicit expert opinions as substitutes for outcome data.
The triple-systems design, as mentioned earlier, involves one task and two
individuals. It is used to study interpersonal conflict and learning. The N-systems design
involves more than one person and may or may not include an analysis of the task.
Research on policy formation is conducted within this framework (e.g., Adelman,
Stewart, & Hammond, 1975; Stewart & Gelberd, 1976). Finally, there are judgement
situations in which the cues themselves may be judgements made at earlier stages of the
judgement process either by the same or different judges. Hammond et al. (1975) refer
to such situations as "hierarchical judgment models" (p. 286). Here, an outcome
criterion is often unavailable. Each stage is analysed separately. Smith (1975) presented
the first application of this design (cited in Cooksey, 1996a).
For all SJT research, judgement data is elicited over a series of trials and is
analysed at the level of the individual (Hammond et al., 1975). Hammond et al. (1975)
note that "the judgment data are analyzed in terms of multiple regression statistics" (p.
278). Thus, correlational statistics and models such as multiple linear regression are
used to describe and explain performance. SJT is also committed to representative
design as defined in terms of formal situational sampling (Brehmer, 1979; Cooksey,
1996a, 1996b; Hammond et al., 1975; Hammond & Wascoe, 1980; Hastie & Hammond,
1991, p. 498). For instance, Hastie and Hammond (1991) claim that "the Lens model
researchers' commitment to 'representative design' is explicit (and enthusiastic)" (p.
498). Similarly, Cooksey (1996a) states that:
The critical dimension of Judgment Analysis [or SJT] research which
distinguishes it from nearly all other research endeavors in the social and
behavioral sciences is its insistence upon applying the principle of
Hammond & Adelman, 1976; Mumpower & Adelman, 1980).
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representative design to guide the structure of specific investigations (p. 98,
words in brackets added).
Hammond et al. (1975) recognised that under representative conditions, the presence of
inter-cue correlations may make it difficult to ascertain the relative independent effects
of each cue upon judgements. Thus, they recommended multi-method analyses where
techniques such as predicting each cue from the others and successive omission of cues
may be used.
2.2. Judgement Analysis: A Technique Used by Social Judgement Theorists
2.2.1. Judgement analysis: Procedures. SJT studies employ the techniques of
JA or policy capturing. The term policy capturing was coined by Bottenberg and
Christal (1961), and refers to the analysis of judgement data using multiple regression
techniques. 25 According to Dudycha (1970) "Capturing' the policy of a rater (or judge)
can be defined as the extent to which one is able to predict the behavior or actions of
that rater from the known characteristics of the stimuli he is being required to evaluate"
(p. 501). JA (originally called JAN) was coined by Christal (1963), and refers to the
combined use of policy capturing and policy clustering methods. Both techniques were
developed and so have also been used outside of the neo-Brunswikian or SJT traditions
(e.g., Dudycha & Naylor, 1966; Madden, 1963; Naylor, Dudycha, & Schenck, 1967;
Naylor & Wherry, 1964, 1965). Nevertheless, the terms SJT, JA and policy capturing
are often used interchangeably, and recently Cooksey (1996a) used the term JA to refer
to SJT research in order to "deliberately...integrate these two somewhat divergent
branches of judgment research" (p. 58). I will do the same.
JA has been fully explicated in a number of publications (Cooksey, 1996a,
1996b; Hammond et al. 1975; Stewart, 1988) and in order to exemplify the main
features and the findings that emerge, a study by Sensibaugh and Allgeier (1996) will be
referred to here. They used policy capturing to study Ohio juvenile court judges' judicial
bypass decisions. Through a postal survey, nine judges were presented with a set of 48
hypothetical cases. The cases were described in terms of a combination of six cues. The
cues were selected after a review of the literature and the legal guidelines. The six cues
were age, overall intelligence, ability to accept responsibility, future impact of present
choices, personal decision/forced decision, and understanding of benefits and risks. The
cues themselves varied. For example, age varied from 14 to 17 years, whereas personal
25 Wallace (1923) is often credited with the first use of policy capturing, as it is now called, in his study of
corn judges.
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decision/forced decision was dichotomous. Other cues were held constant and provided
background information to the cases. For instance, all the adolescents were described as
being in their first trimester of pregnancy. In order to allow assessment of the relative
importance of each cue on the judgements, the values of the six cues were combined so
that there were low inter-cue correlations in the set of cases. The resulting cases were
then checked to ensure they represented "real-life situations" (Sensibaugh & Allgeier,
1996, p. 38). The judges were first asked to make a dichotomous decision on each case
(i.e., decide if the teenager was "mature" or "not mature") (Sensibaugh & Allgeier,
1996, p. 39). They were then asked to indicate how confident they were in their decision
on a 7-point scale that they later converted to 14 points (1 to 7 represented "not mature"
decisions and 8 to 14 represented "mature" decisions). The judges were also asked to
rate how important each cue was on their decisions, so that all self-reported weights
summed to 100. In addition to the features of JA illustrated in Sensibaugh and
Allgeier's (1996) study, participants may sometimes be presented with a small subset of
duplicate cases, in order to measure test-retest consistency in decisions. Finally, studies
interested in achievement will also document the outcome (or criterion) for each case.
Once the judgement data has been collected, judgement policies are captured for
each individual.26
 Traditionally, policies are captured for each individual using multiple
linear regression statistics (Cooksey, 1996a, 1996b; Hammond et al., 1975; Stewart,
1988). The dependent variable is the judgement and the cues are the independent
variables. An individual's judgements are regressed on the cues. This procedure yields a
weighted linear model that describes an individual's judgement policy in terms of
statistically significant cues in the model, relative cue weights, the form of the function
relating the cues to the judgements (e.g., linear), the rule used to integrate the cues into a
judgment (i.e., additive), and an individual's predictability as measured by the model
(e.g., R2). Achievement may be measured and explained by correlating the individual's
judgements with the criterion values and comparing the individuals' model with the
model of the task, respectively. Inter-individual differences (or agreement) in decisions
and policies may then be examined. Participants' insight into their decision making
policies may also be examined by comparing their self-reported policies with their
mode1.27 Finally, intra-individual inconsistency in making decisions may be studied by
comparing the decisions made in the test-retest situation.
26 As will be discussed later, in some studies, aggregate or composite policies may be captured
(Hammond et al., 1975).
27 This procedure for measuring self-insight has been criticised however (e.g., Reilly & Doherty, 1992),
and these criticisms will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
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2.2.2. Judgement analysis: Findings. JA has been used to study judgement in a
variety of applied domains including medicine (see e.g., Wigton, 1988; 1996),
education (see e.g., Cooksey, 1988; Heald, 1991), social work (see e.g., Dalgleish,
1988) and accounting (see e.g., Libby & Lewis, 1982; Waller, 1988). However, it has
only rarely been applied to the legal domain (e.g., Sensibaugh & Allgeier, 1996; York,
1992). Reviews of JA research (Brehmer, 1994; Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988; Cooksey,
1996a; Libby & Lewis, 1982; Hammond et al., 1975; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971) have
generally concluded that the studies yielded consistent findings, which are discussed
below, irrespective of the number and type of decision makers sampled and the nature
and content of the judgement tasks studied. 28 However, as Brehmer and Brehmer (1988)
point out, there are exceptions.
Fit of regression model to judgement data. Studies have typically found that
the multiple linear regression model is a descriptively valid model as it provides an
adequate fit to individuals' judgement data. Some studies have reported R2s of over 0.80
for at least some (e.g., Beatty, McCune, & Beatty, 1988; Deshpande & Schoderbek,
1993; Klaas & Dell'omo, 1991; Pablo, 1994; Klaas & Wheeler, 1990; Sherer, Schwab,
& Heneman, 1987; Ullman & Doherty, 1984), if not all (e.g., Gonzalez-Vallejo, Sorum,
Stewart, Chessare, & Mumpower, 1998; Kirwan, Chaput de Saintonge, Joyce, &
Currey, 1983; Kline & Sulsky, 1995), of their participants, indicating that over 80% of
the variation in an individual's judgements could be explained by the model.
Nevertheless, some studies have also reported that the linear regression model
accounted for much less variance in some (e.g., Deshpande & Schoderbek, 1993; Klaas
& Dell'omo, 1991; Klaas & Wheeler, 1990; Pablo, 1994; Sherer et al., 1987; Ullman &
Doherty, 1984), if not all (e.g., Al-Tabtabai, 1998; Westenberg, Koele, & Kools, 1998;
Zedeck & Kafry, 1977), of their participants' judgements. Indeed, the R 2 for the nine
judges in Sensibaugh and Allgeier's (1996) study ranged from 0.25 to 0.56, indicating
that much variance remained unexplained.
Researchers have suggested that a high R 2 implies that judgements are the result
of a linear additive process (Hammond et al., 1964; Hoffman, 1960). Here, each cue is
related to the judgement in a (positive or negative) linear way, so the effect of one
additional value of a cue on the judgement remains the same as the effect of the other
28 Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971) reviewed studies conducted in what they called the correlational and
analysis of variance paradigms. Hammond et al. (1975) reviewed experimental studies in the multiple cue
probability learning, and the interpersonal conflict and learning paradigms. Libby and Lewis (1982)
reviewed studies conducted in the domains of accounting and auditing. The reviews by Brehmer and
Brehmer (1988) and Brehmer (1994) focused on studies involving participants experienced with the
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values of the cue. 29 Cues are combined by an additive rule, so that the effects of one cue
on the judgement do not depend on the value of another cue. In the regression model,
the additive rule often implies compensatory behaviour, where a low weight attached to
one cue can be compensated for by a high weight attached to another cue so that the
judgement is high, for example. Hammond et al. (1975) emphasised that "although a
linear model is used for the initial fit, it is critically evaluated by the following criteria
before being accepted as a representation of a cognitive system" (p. 280). These criteria
are that if researchers find the linear model is not "useful", there is a low R, or there are
correlations among the residuals (Hammond et al., 1975, p. 280). They suggested that in
such situations, the descriptive validity of non-linear models should be explored.
In the study of achievement, the lens model equation (see Equation 2.1)
incorporates a non-linear component (i.e., C) (Hursch et al., 1964). A high value of C
suggests that there is residual variance that may be systematic rather than random, and
which is largely unaccounted for by a linear model. However, as Cooksey (1996b)
warns, C does not always represent configurality. For instance, C may be high because
the judge may rely on cues that were not included in the models and in the environment,
or there may be a chance match. Configurality may be due to cue function forms being
non-linear and thus unmodelled, or similar cue interactions in the environment and the
judge (these can be separated out statistically see e.g., Cooksey and Freebody [1985]
and Stewart [1976]). A low value of C also carries different interpretations. It may be
that both models are in fact linear and the residuals for one or both models is random, or
the two models may have systematic residual variance which is different in each model
(Hammond et al., 1975; Stewart, 1988). Critics have thus argued that C is not adequate
for studying configurality as it is not specific enough (e.g., Einhorn, 1970; Slovic &
Lichtenstein, 1971). 3° Finally, although C may indicate that non-linearity exists in the
judgements, it does not specify the nature of this non-linearity.
Cues may be related to judgements in a non-linear way, and these can be
included in the regression model using for example, exponential, cubic or quadratic
functions. 31
 The polynomial model has additive quadratic function forms (Cohen &
judgement task being studied. Finally, Cooksey (1996a) reviewed studies employing the single-systems,
double-systems, triple-systems, N-systems and hierarchical designs.
29 A positive linear function form indicates that higher values on a cue lead to higher values on the
judgement scale, and a negative linear function form indicates that higher values on a cue lead to lower
values on the judgement scale.
3° The lens model equation has also been criticised by others (e.g., Groner, 1972; Rozeboom, 1972). And
Castellan (1992) criticised the comparison of G with other components.
3 1 Hammond (1972) identified two quadratic function forms, namely a U-shaped and inverted U-shaped.
In the former, the judgement decreases with increases in the cue value until a point when it begins to
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Cohen, 1983). Non-linear models may also include non-additive models. Einhom's
(1970, 1971) conjunctive model portrays a cue as being used only when the value of
another cue is high. For instance, in the conjunctive model all cue values must be high
for a high judgement. Non-additive models such as Einhom's (1970, 1971) conjunctive
and disjunctive models are also non-compensatory, so that for example, once a high
judgement is formed on the basis of cue(s) with high values, the judgement will not be
altered on the basis of cue(s) with low values.
Hammond and Summers (1965) found that people could learn to utilise non-
linear aspects of the task. In fact, participants often report using non-linear or configural
processes (e.g., Summers, Dale, Taliaferro, & Fletcher, 1970). Some tasks such as
clinical judgment may require configural cue use (Goldberg, 1968; Slovic &
Lichtenstein, 1971). There is evidence from studies involving experts to support this
(e.g., Hoffman, Slovic, & Rorer, 1968; Rorer, Hoffman, Dickman, & Slovic, 1967;
Wiggins & Hoffman, 1968). Wills and Moore (1993) also reported configural cue use in
the policies of novices making clinical judgements. The fact that non-linearity may not
be a characteristic of those most experienced with the task was also found by Wiggins
and Hoffman (1968). Some of the studies which have examined non-linearity, have
reported that there were no interactions (e.g., Al-Tabtabai, 1998; Deshpande &
Schoderbek, 1993; Pablo, 1994; Powell & Mainiero, 1999; Scherer et al., 1987), while a
few studies have found evidence of significant interaction effects (e.g., Graves &
Karren, 1992; Kline & Sulsky, 1995; Slovic, 1969; Wills & Moore, 1993).
Nevertheless, studies using both regression analysis and analysis of variance that have
reported configural policies, have found that the interactions usually account for a very
small proportion of the variance in judgements (e.g., Summers et al., 1970; Wiggins &
Hoffman, 1968).
One possible explanation for the good fit of linear models to human judgment
data is that non-linearity may be designed out of the judgment task (Brehmer, 1969;
Hammond & Summers, 1965). Another, more commonly cited explanation for the
remarkable ability of the linear regression model in fitting human judgement data is that
it is powerful enough to fit also non-linear processes (Dawes & Corrigan, 1974;
Goldberg, 1968; Yntema & Torgerson, 1961). According to Dawes and Corrigan (1974)
linear models do particularly well when (a) predictor variables are monotonically
related to the dependent variable; (b) there is measurement error in the predictor
increase as the cue value increases. In the latter, the judgement increases with increases in the cue value
until a point when it begins to decrease as the cue value increases.
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variables; (c) relative weights are unaffected by error in the dependent variables; and (d)
little is lost if weights deviate from optimal weights.
Most studies (including Sensibaugh & Allgeier, 1996), do not examine the
degree of non-linearity in judgement policies, and they do not explore non-additive,
non-compensatory models. Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971) concluded that "the evidence
to date seems to indicate that subjects are processing information in ways fundamentally
different from.. .regression models. Thus, if we are to pursue this line of research we
will have to develop new models and different methods of experimentation" (p. 729).
Similarly, Brehmer and Brehmer (1988) concluded that "Reports of an adequate test of
the linear model are few" (p. 93). The fact that the regression model, characterised by
linear additive (compensatory) processing, does not fit some participants' judgement
data well, that participants often report using non-linear processes and that linear
models may hide non-linear processes suggests that further research needs to be
conducted on the issue of the descriptive validity of the regression model. In particular,
the descriptive validity of other non-linear and non-additive (non-compensatory) models
should be investigated.
Number of cues used. Studies vary in the number of cues presented to
participants. For example, Dhami et al. (in preparation) found that in their review of 143
JA studies, the number of cues presented ranged from 3 to 38. Stewart (1988) observed
a similar range of cue number. The regression model indicates the number of cues used
by an individual (i.e., those that have statistically significant beta weights), the relative
weights of the cues (e.g., beta weights) and the direction in which cues were used (i.e.,
the sign of the beta weight).
It has typically been found that regression models contain on average three cues
(Brehmer, 1994; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971). Indeed, most studies have reported that
participants do not use all of the cues presented (e.g., Deshpande & Schoderbek, 1993;
Gonzalez-Vallejo et al., 1998; Graves & Karren, 1992; Kirwan et al., 1983; Kline &
Sulsky, 1995; Klaas & Wheeler, 1990; Sherer et al., 1987; Ullman & Doherty, 1984;
Westenberg et al., 1998; Zedeck & Kafry, 1977). Some studies have reported that some
participants used only one cue (e.g., Deshpande & Schoderbek, 1993; Gonzalez-Vallejo
et al., 1998; Klaas & Wheeler, 1990). According to the regression models, the relative
importance of cues is very rarely equally distributed. Rather, the above studies have
often found that a few cues are weighted more heavily than the others. In addition,
while some studies have found individual differences in the direction of cue use (e.g.,
Klaas & Wheeler, 1990), others have reported agreement in direction of cue use (e.g.,
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Al-Tabtabai, 1998). In their study, Sensibaugh and Allgeier (1996) found that there
were from two to four (out of a possible six) statistically significant cues in their nine
judges' policies. Furthermore, although the judges tended to use the same cues in the
same direction, they weighted them differently.
There are three points to bear in mind when examining the issue of cue use.
First, there are many ways of measuring relative cue weights such as through beta
weights and usefulness coefficients. Although all of these measures provide similar
results when cues are uncorrelated, they however, provide different rank orders of cue
importance when cues are inter-correlated, thus rendering their interpretation difficult
and even meaningless (Darlington, 1968; Schmitt & Levine, 1977; Ward, 1962). Thus,
contrary to Brunswik's (1956) notion of representative design, it is implied that
researchers interested in estimating cue use in terms of relative weights should use
orthogonal cue sets. Recently however, Stewart (1988) has argued that moderate inter-
cue correlations should not cause too great a problem, and Cooksey (1996a) concluded
that usefulness coefficients may be the best.32
Second, as stated earlier, Dawes and Corrigan (1974) demonstrated that there is
little loss in the predictive validity of the linear regression model when weights deviate
from optimal weights. In fact, unit or equal weights can replace regression weights
(optimal weights) with very little loss in predictive power of the model. In their classic
paper, Dawes and Corrigan (1974) compared the ability of linear models containing
different weights (i.e., optimal regression weights, participants' reported weights,
randomly chosen weights and unit or equal weights) to predict a criterion, over four
judgement tasks (which included experts performing a clinical judgement task). 33 They
found that although the optimally weighted regression model outperformed all other
models over the four tasks, when it was cross-validated, the equal weighted model
(called Dawes' rule by Gigerenzer and Goldstein [1996]) outperformed it on two
tasks. 34 The random weighted model performed quite well too, and better than the
participants' models. Moreover, the average correlations between the predictions of the
equal weighted model and the optimally weighted regression model (before cross-
validation) was over 0.70. The average correlations between the latter model and the
32 Lane, Murphy and Marques (1982) demonstrated that raw-score regression weights were more reliable
estimates of cue importance under both conditions of orthogonal and correlated cue sets, than four other
measures.
33 The equal weighted model is a more general class of unit weighted models, although the correlation
between the predictions of both models is perfect (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975).
34 When the optimal weights in a regression model are cross validated (i.e., used to make predictions on a
new equally sized sample as that used to develop the models) the predictive validity of the model may be
reduced because the weights may have overfit the peculiarities of the original sample.
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randomly weighted model were also quite high, whereas the predictions from the
participants' models and the optimally weighted regression model were slightly lower.
Choosing weights in a linear model involves the problem of "flat maximum" where
there is more than one solution (von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986). The efficacy of
equal or unit weighted models has been demonstrated in other studies (e.g., Claudy,
1972; Davis & Sauser, 1991; Dorans & Drasgow, 1978; Einhom & Hogarth, 1975;
Schmidt, 1971; 1972). These findings suggest that JA studies may be providing a rather
more complex picture of judgement processes by attributing relative weights to
judgment policies. A unit or equal weighted model is cognitively less computationally
complex and may prove as descriptively valid as the traditionally used optimally
weighted models, when predicting participants' judgements.
Finally, often studies present participants with only a subset of the relevant cues
(Dhami et al., in preparation), and they study use of individual cues rather than chunks
of cues. Miller (1956) estimated that people can store seven, plus or minus two, chunks
of information in their working memory, although Simon (1974) later argued that this
capacity was smaller (i.e., four or five chunks). Indeed, experts are often distinguished
from novices in terms of their greater ability to chunk or relate large amounts of
information together (Simon, 1974), although Shanteau (1992) found otherwise. This
means that in JA studies, the limits of participants' ability to use cues has not been fully
examined, and the researchers' choice of only the "relevant" cues means that use of
"irrelevant" cues has not been fully explored. 35 On the other hand, the fact that studies
rarely cross-validate regression weights, implies that more cues are seen as significant
than they would be. The few studies that do include a large number of cues and do
cross-validate cue weights have found that few cues are used (e.g., Roose & Doherty,
1976).
In sum, although JA studies report that people use relatively few cues, which is
compatible with the capacity of working memory, they also suggest complex weighting
procedures are used. These are incompatible with the limitations of computational
processing. There are also many problems with how cue use is defined and measured.
Brehmer and Brehmer (1988) concluded that "Unfortunately, the number of adequate
studies are too few to support any firm decision about the typical number of cues used
by an individual" (p. 103).
35 Presenting participants with only the "relevant" cues may be considered a form of demand
characteristic.
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Intra-individual consistency in decisions. The ability of a model to describe
and predict an individual's judgment data is limited by his or her consistency in making
decisions because it is assumed that an inconsistent individual will be difficult to
describe and predict. Hammond et al. (1975) state that consistency is "the upper bound
for control with respect to any model" (p. 279). Contrary to popular belief however, R2
is not a reliable measure of consistency. This is because a low value may not imply that
the individual is inconsistent, but rather that the linear model is not a good fit to the
judgment data. And, as mentioned above, researchers rarely consider the fit of
alternative models. Unfortunately, researchers have often used the R 2 as a measure of
consistency (e.g., Pablo, 1994; Zedeck & Kafry, 1977).
Hammond et al. (1975) propose that consistency should be measured in terms of
the variance of judgements made in a test-retest situation. Studies using such test-retest
measures of consistency have often correlated the two sets of decisions, although
indexes of agreement may also be used (e.g., Gillis, Lipkin, & Moran, 1981). It has
generally been found that correlations are moderate for the majority of participants in a
study (e.g., Deshpande & Schoderbek, 1993; Doyle & Thomas, 1995; Kirwan et al.,
1983; Kline & Sulsky, 1995; Sherer et al., 1987). However, some studies have reported
correlations of over 0.80 for some of their participants, indicating high consistency (e.g.,
Doyle & Thomas, 1995; Kline & Sulsky, 1995; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998). In their
study, Senisbaugh and Allgeier (1996) did not include a measure of test-retest
consistency.
People may be inconsistent in their decisions for a number of reasons, including
fatigue, shifts in attention, boredom and the fact that the task is highly unpredictable.36
Nevertheless, inconsistency implies inaccuracy.
Achievement. Once individuals' judgement policies have been captured, they
can be compared with the model of the task, in order to examine individual
achievement. Most studies however, (including Sensibaugh & Allgeier, 1996) do not
examine achievement for some of the reasons outlined earlier when the prevalence of
the single-systems design was discussed.
The upper limit of achievement is dependent upon that afforded by the task.
Libby and Lewis (1982) concluded that studies in accounting (in particular prediction of
business failure and prediction of security return) have reported high levels of
achievement in their participants. Nevertheless, while some studies have found that
36 Goldberg (1970) refers to such explanations for the phenomenon of bootstrapping, where the model of
the individual outperforms the individual.
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achievement is quite high (e.g., Cooksey & Freebody, 1987), others have reported low
levels of achievement (e.g., Cooper & Werner, 1990).
Where an outcome criterion is unavailable and achievement cannot be measured,
intra-individual inconsistency and disagreement in decisions may provide indirect
evidence for inaccuracy or low achievement.
Inter-individual agreement in decisions and policies. Agreement among
individuals may be measured at two levels. First, individuals may agree or disagree in
their decisions. Often, researchers have used correlations or indexes of agreement such
as Cohen's Kappa to measure agreement in decisions. While some studies have reported
low correlations (e.g., Westenberg et al., 1998), others have reported moderate (e.g.,
Deshpande & Schoderbek, 1993; Gonzalez-Vallejo et al., 1998; Ullman & Doherty,
1984) to high correlations (e.g., Graves & Karren, 1992). A few researchers have
measured agreement in decisions in terms of consensus in the decisions made on each
case (e.g., Brown, Brown, Saunders, Castelaz, & Papasouliotis, 1997; Strauss, Chassin,
& Lock, 1995). Sensibaugh and Allgeier (1996) found that their judges agreed as to the
decision to be made in one third of the cases, and the median correlation was 0.39
among their nine judges' decisions over the cases.
Second, agreement may be considered at the level of the decision making
policies, by comparing relative cue weights through computing correlations or a cluster
analysis (Hammond et al., 1975). Studies using correlational analyses have found
individual differences in cue weights (e.g., Al-Tabtabai, 1998; Westenberg et al., 1998).
Cluster analysis often reveals several clusters or subgroups of individuals with similar
policies (i.e., cue weights) (e.g., Beatty et al., 1988; Graves & Karren, 1992; Klaas &
Dell'omo, 1991; Powell & Mainiero, 1990). Sensibaugh and Allgeier (1996) found that
two subgroups of policies emerged, which they termed "conservative" and
"nonconservative" (p. 40).
Alternatively, judgement policies may be compared with a priori or post hoc
defined groups on demographic variables such as experience and training (e.g., Beatty
et al., 1988; Cooper & Werner, 1990; Klaas & Dell'omo, 1991; Pablo, 1994; Powell &
Mainiero, 1999). Here, aggregate or composite policies may be computed.37
Interestingly, Shanteau (1992) found that experts' policies differed from the policies of
novices in that the former were more likely to use the relevant cues. Sensibaugh and
Allgeier (1996) computed a composite policy too. They found that this policy had a
37 In order to overcome the problem of autocorrelation in the regression analyses, researchers calculate
the mean judgement across participants for each case.
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higher R2 than the nine judges' individual policies, although the number of cues that
were significant was similarly small.
In sum, there are inter-individual differences in the judgements and the
judgment policies of individuals experienced at performing the same task. As Brehmer
(1994) points out, disagreement in policies may not be something to be concerned
about, if people are using alternative means to reach the same goal. By contrast,
disagreement in the decisions made indicates inaccuracy in some peoples' decisions.
Self-reported policies. Researchers have also compared the captured policies
with individuals' own statement of their policies, as elicited by a direct report method.38
Subjective weights may be compared with statistical weights derived from the
regression model, the fit of models containing each set of weights may be compared, or
the predictions made by the two sets of weights may be compared (Reilly & Doherty,
1992). According to social judgement theorists, this provides a measure of an
individual's insight into his or her decision making policy (e.g., Ullman & Doherty,
1984).
One of the earliest studies measuring self-insight was conducted by Summers et
al. (1970) and involved participants (i.e., students) who were performing an unfamiliar
task. Summers et al. (1970) found that the cues were weighted roughly equally in their
participants' self-reported policies, whereas their captured policies indicated that they
relied heavily on one cue and ignored one other. Participants also reported using
significantly more cues than as indicated by their captured policies, and their self-
reported policies were also more complex (i.e., non-linear) than their captured policies.
Indeed, the linear model was worse in fitting the judgements of those participants who
reported non-linear cue use, than the judgements of those who reported linear policies,
although, when non-linear terms were added, the model fit was not much greater for the
former group. Finally, participants' judgements could be better predicted by the
captured cue weights than the self-reported cue weights. Earlier, Todd (1954 as cited in
Hammond, 1955) had found that his participants were not able to accurately articulate
the weights they attached to the cues, and Hoffman (1960) had found discrepancies
between regression weights and subjective weights. Studies involving experts that
compute correlations between reported and captured policies have similarly found only
moderately sized correlations between the two (e.g., Deshpande & Schoderbek, 1993;
Sherer et al., 1987). Brehmer and Brehmer (1987) asked participants to simply indicate
38 The policy captured by the regression model is also referred to as a tacit, implicit or objective policy,
and the individual's own statement of policy is also called his or her explicit or subjective policy.
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the most important cue, and they found that this did not correspond to the most
important cue as indicated by the regression weights in the objective policy
(unpublished manuscript cited in Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988). Sensibaugh and Allgeier
(1996) found that although there were individual differences in self-insight, their nine
judges reported using all of the six cues weighted equally, which did not correspond to
the pattern of their captured policies. Therefore, researchers have generally concluded
that people lack insight into their judgement processes.
The techniques of measuring self-insight through comparing self-reported and
captured policies has been criticised for a number of reasons. First, as mentioned earlier
it is difficult to determine the true objective model against which to measure subjective
policies, especially when researchers do not explore the fit of models other than the
linear regression model. Second, for a number of reasons, the method by which
subjective policies are elicited may also be inadequate. When being asked to report the
cues that have an impact on their judgements, people may interpret importance
differently from the way it is represented in the regression weights (Goldstein, 1990;
Goldstein & Beattie, 1991). Broolthouse, Guion, and Doherty (1986) found that unlike
regression weights, subjective weights are affected by social desirability response bias.
Shepard (1964) argues that people may recall attending to all of the cues at some point
but not realising that only a few were used at each point. Indeed, evidence suggests that
decision makers attend to more information than they use (e.g., Biggs & Mock, 1980
working paper cited in Libby & Lewis, 1982). Due to the difficulties in communicating
cognitive processes, people may report policies that they should be using, rather than
those they are using (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Finally, researchers may not have
accurately interpreted the verbal protocol data provided by participants' verbal
descriptions of their policies.
Valenzi and Andrews (1971) found no significant difference between the
measure of insight indicated by the simple rank order methods and the more complex
method of distributing 100 points among cues. Cook and Stewart (1975) compared
seven different direct report procedures, namely distributing 100 points among cues,
rating cues on a 100 point scale, paired comparison ratings of cues, ratio comparison
ratings of cues, the number of times cues were influential, aggregation of judgements
made using each cue one at a time on each case, and aggregation of ratings of each
cue's contribution to the judgement of each case. The seven procedures did not differ,
and in fact, they all corresponded fairly closely to the objective weights, when the
subjective and objective weights were used to predict the participants' judgements. The
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correspondence was particularly close when the judgment task involved only three cues,
than when it involved seven cues. This suggests that insight may be a function of the
demands of the task.
Nevertheless, it has been argued that direct methods provide an unreliable and
invalid method for demonstrating self-insight because of the difficulties in introspection
and articulating policies. Thus, subjective weights should not be directly compared to
statistical weights (Cook & Stewart, 1975; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Reilly & Doherty,
1989, 1992; Schmitt & Levine, 1977). As an alternative, Reilly and Doherty (1989,
1992) used a policy recognition method, whereby participants were asked to identify
their own policy, defined in terms of cue weights, from a set of other policies. They
found that this method indicated a greater degree of insight as participants were quite
successful in recognising their policies. Sensibaugh and Allgeier (1996) lamented that
this was not possible in their study because participation was anonymous.
Thus, people report using more cues, weighing them more equally, and using
them in a less linear manner than as indicated by their captured policies. A number of
other possible explanations for the lack of correspondence between reported and
captured policies have been postulated, and many of these bear upon the difficulty in
obtaining valid repotted policies. "It is not possible to draw any general conclusions
about insight from these results" (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988, p. 98). In the research
presented in this thesis a policy captured via such direct methods will be considered to
be a statement of an individual's explicit policy; that which he or she is consciously
willing and able to express to others, rather than as an expression of insight. Legal
decision makers, like other professional groups, are often required to make such public
statements of policy, and as in the case of magistrates' remand decisions, reasons for
decisions are requested in the courtroom.
Post-decisional confidence. Finally, often one of the goals of SJT research is to
improve existing judgement policies by providing cognitive feedback and/or decision
aids (Hammond et al., 1975). One way of determining whether individuals will be
amenable to such intervention is to measure their feelings of confidence in their
judgements. According to Zakay (1997) post-decisional confidence can affect behaviour
because "Ongoing feelings of confidence may determine whether or not the execution
of an ongoing activity will be continued, and, if it is continued, whether any change in
strategy will take place" (p. 233). Thus, high confidence in a policy may imply an
unwillingness to change it (Zakay, 1997).
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In fact, social judgement theorists only rarely elicit confidence ratings from
participants (e.g., Ullman & Doherty, 1984). Often, such ratings are used as a
continuous scale to map onto a categorical judgement (e.g., Sensibaugh & Allgeier,
1996). In Sensibaugh and Allgeier's (1996) study, five of the nine judges demonstrated
similarly high mean levels of post-decisional confidence. Research that has compared
confidence in judgement with accuracy of judgement has found that high and unrealistic
confidence levels are related to suboptimal strategies (e.g., Zakay, 1985; Zakay &
Glickshon, 1992). Often, people (including experts) are either under or over-confident
as they under or over estimate the accuracy of their judgements, respectively (see
Zakay, 1997). If feelings of confidence are not matched to accuracy of judgement, then
individuals may be misled into using ineffective strategies. There are debiasing methods
that aim to reduce overconfidence (Granhag, 1996 unpublished doctoral thesis cited in
Zakay, 1997; Trafimow & Sniezek, 1994), but as Zakay (1997) argues, they are
ineffective because they do not take account of the many factors that influence
confidence. There is a large body of research on confidence that has been conducted in
the field of J/DM generally, which is not pertinent to the present discussion and so will
not be reviewed here (see Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977; Gigerenzer,
Hoffrage, & Kleinbolting, 1991). Suffice it to say that overconfidence may not be due to
a cognitive bias (e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Juslin, 1994).
Confidence is related to features of the decision task. For example, it has been
found that confidence may increase with the amount of available information (e.g.,
Russo & Schoemaker, 1989), consistency of information (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky,
1973), and the use of non-compensatory strategies (Zakay, 1985). Professionals such as
meteorologists who receive unambiguous feedback soon after they make their
judgements have been found to be better calibrated (Murphy & Winkler, 1977). Finally,
it has also been found that the rapidity of decisions is related to greater feelings of
confidence (Zakay & Yaaron, 1996 unpublished manuscript cited in Zakay, 1997).
Post-decisional confidence has also been reported to be related to personality
traits such as personal balance and adaptiveness (Block & Peterson, 1955) and
dogmatism (Long & Ziller, 1965), level of internal conflict when performing the task
(e.g., Zakay, 1985), motivation (e.g., Fischhoff & Beyth Marom, 1983), perceived
expertise (Trafimow & Sniezek, 1994), and post-decisional factors such as familiarity of
strategy and perceived investment of cognitive effort (Zakay & Tsal, 1993). Zakay
(1997) reported that post-decisional confidence is not related to accuracy, but rather, is
affected by prospective feelings of confidence prior to the task. Allwood and Grahag
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(1999) argue that confidence, like other cognitive processes, is affected by social
factors, which may explain why certain professional groups may have to act confident.
Therefore, the fact that feelings of confidence may be influenced by factors unrelated to
the decision process may explain why confidence does not reflect accuracy (Allwood &
Grahag, 1999; Zakay, 1997).
To summarise the review of JA, it is clear that studies using JA typically involve
participants who are experienced (or at least familiar [Cooksey, 1996* with the
judgement task. Inexperienced participants will not have any developed policy that can
be captured (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988). Participants are each presented with a set of
cases that may either real or hypothetical, on which they must make a judgement. The
judgement process is inferred from judgement behaviour. This avoids the pitfalls of
direct report methods such as interviews and questionnaires that are susceptible to social
desirability response bias (Arnold & Feldman, 1981; Brookhouse et al., 1986; Madden
& Martin, 1979), inaccuracy due to forgetting, difficulty in introspecting (Wilson &
Stone, 1985) and complexity in process (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986 cited in Benbenishty,
1992). Over the past 40 years researchers have alluded to a stable body of evidence
emerging from JA studies. This states that: (a) judgements are the result of a linear,
additive process, (b) where few differentially weighted cues are used. (c) People show
some degree of inconsistency in their decisions, and (d) there are inter-individual
differences or disagreement among their judgment policies for the same task. (e) People
lack insight into their own judgment policies, (f) although they are highly confident in
their judgement abilities. However, it is clear from the preceding review that there are
numerous wide variations from these findings. Moreover, the stability and validity of
these findings is threatened by the limitations of the methods often employed by
researchers and by the fact that researchers have rarely tested alternative explanations
for their findings. Finally, another threat to these findings may come from whether or
not researchers employed a representative design in their studies.
2.2.3. Representative design in judgement analysis research. In JA, the cases
or stimuli comprise a combination of cues. Real cases may be past cases that have been
sampled from records or present cases that are studied via observations. Their sampling
should follow the procedures of random or probability sampling advocated by
Brunswik (1955b). Where the cases are hypothetical, their construction should adhere to
the notion of formal situational sampling as proposed by Hammond (1966). Here, all of
the relevant cues, cue values, cue distributions, inter-cue correlations and ecological
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validities of cues should be representative of those that exist naturally in the real world
version of the task.
In order to discover what the formal properties of the task are, it is often
necessary to conduct a task analysis prior to the study. This may involve interviews with
individuals who are familiar or experienced with the task, observations of individuals
performing the task, document analyses of past case records and a review of the
previous research on the task. The face validity and construct validity of the task is
important because experienced participants will be sensitive to deviations from
representativeness which may affect their ability to express their judgement policies
(Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988; Shanteau & Stewart, 1992) and their motivation to
complete the task (Brehmer, 1979).
Although the importance of, and commitment to, representative design is stated
in SJT and in texts describing JA (Cooksey, 1996a, 1996b; Hammond et al., 1975;
Stewart, 1988), in practice representative design is rarely achieved (Dhami et al., in
preparation). Dhami et al. (in preparation) conducted an analysis of the design of 143
published JA studies. The studies were identified after an exhaustive literature search on
four databases, using six keywords. A coding scheme was used to analyse the method
section of each study. They found that approximately half of the studies were conducted
in the SJT tradition and half in the tradition in which the JA and policy capturing
techniques were first developed (Christal, 1963; Dudycha, 1970). Most studies involved
experienced participants making judgements in professional domains. Approximately
one third of studies presented participants with real cases. Here, only 13% of studies
used cases that were randomly sampled, 38% used some form of time sampling, one
study used stratified sampling and one study sampled the whole population of cases.
However, 44% of studies did not provide any details of the sampling procedure
employed so it was impossible to determine if the cases were representative. An
analysis of the two thirds of studies using hypothetical cases revealed that 16% did not
conduct any form of task analysis, and of the remainder that did, usually the only
information elicited concerned identification of the relevant cues and their values. No
information was gathered regarding the cue distributions, inter-correlations and
validities. In fact, the majority of studies combined the cues to form cases using a
factorial design where inter-cue correlations were zero and cues had rectangular
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distributions. 39 Thus, Dhami et al. (in preparation) found very little evidence of SJT
researchers fulfilling the criteria for formal situational sampling.
In anticipation of such results, Cooksey (1996a) stated that:
Close adherence to the principle of representative design is often difficult to
achieve in practice. Realistically, it must be said that many Judgment Analysis
researchers have probably fallen short of Brunswik's ideal vision for the
application of his principle, partly because specific techniques one could or
should use to translate the principle into practice have either not been developed
until recently or have been spread far and wide through a diverse multi-
disciplinary literature and thus are not well known (p. 98).
Dhami et al. (in preparation) found that the authors of the studies in their sample of 143
studies explained their deviations from representativeness in terms of their concern with
the later analysis of data. For example, multiple linear regression analysis requires a
high case to cue ratio to establish stable beta weights (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996) and
so researchers often chose to include only a small number of the relevant cues."
Furthermore, in order to establish the effect of each cue upon the judgements,
independent of the effect of other cues, researchers often reduced or eliminated inter-
cue correlations. Little attention was paid to the fact that co-variation may be removed
at the analysis stage, using partial correlations for example, as proposed by Brunswik
(1943, 1944, 1952, 1955b, 1956). In an effort to deal with any obviously
unrepresentative cases, some researchers removed unrealistic cases from the set, while
others told participants that they would be dealing with a selected and not a random
sample of cases (Dhami et al., in preparation).4I
More recently, in a paper reviewing his own contribution to SJT and the
Brunswikian approach, Hammond (1996b) confessed that one of the "sins of omission"
on his part was to fraction Brunswik's theory from his method (p. 245). He feared that
otherwise, like Brunswik, he "would become isolated and ostracised" (Hammond,
1996b, p. 245). The fact that systematic design is so prevalent in psychological research
may explain the neglect of representative design by social judgement theorists.
Earlier, Brunswik (1955b, 1956) had argued that representative design was
necessary for studying the process of vicarious functioning and for obtaining results
39 Cases were also often statistically generated (e.g., Executive Decision Services Inc., 1991; Wherry,
Naylor, Wherry, & Fallis, 1965).
49 Stewart (1988) recommends that the number of cues presented "should be kept as small as possible" (p.
43). Cooksey (1996a) argues that the use of a small number of cues is justified on the grounds that people
have limited short term memory capacity. However, this disregards the fact that people can chunk large
amounts of cues (Miller, 1956). Also, research has shown that people often use different cues. A small
number of cues may preclude analysis of individual differences in cue use (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988).
41 The practice of removing unrealistic cases is advocated by Cooksey (1996a) and Stewart (1988).
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generalisable beyond the experimental situation. In a similar vein, Cooksey (1996a)
warns that design choices may affect the internal and external validity of the policies
captured. A number of reviews have been conducted on this issue (Brehmer & Brehmer,
1988; Cooksey, 1996a; Dhami et al., in preparation; Ebbesen & Konecni, 1980; Jones,
Gerrit, & Earp, 1990; Levin, Louviere, Schepanski, & Norman, 1983; Louviere, 1988).
While three of the reviews (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988; Levin et al., 1983; Louviere,
1988) concluded that judgement policies captured under unrepresentative and
representative conditions have internal and external validity, Ebbesen and Konecni
(1980) came to the opposite conclusion. Cooksey (1996a) and Jones et al. (1990) stated
that a conclusion could not be drawn. However, none of the above can be classified as
comprehensive reviews. For instance, Ebbesen and Konecni (1980) largely refer to their
own research in the legal domain. Levin et al. (1983) and Louviere (1988) mostly refer
to studies that did not involve professional judgment but people's judgements about
their transport or local amenities, for example. Moreover, some of these reviews
confound the issue of the use of written descriptions of cases (called paper-people by
Brehmer and Brehmer [1988]), with the issue of representing the formal properties of
the task in these cases. Paper-people can be representative people.
In their review, Dhami et al. (in preparation) noted that very few studies have
tested the effects of design upon captured policies through systematically manipulating
the representativeness of formal properties of the task such as inter-cue correlations.
Moreover, the small sample of studies is difficult to compare because while some have
captured policies at the individual level, others have captured aggregate policies, and
while some studies have correlated the judgements obtained under representative and
unrepresentative conditions, others have used the judgements obtained in the
unrepresentative conditions to predict behaviour in the representative conditions.
Nevertheless, they report that there are studies showing that judgement behaviour (e.g.,
cues used) demonstrated under representative and unrepresentative conditions differs,
and studies demonstrating no difference. Dhami et al. (in preparation) conclude that the
issue of the effect of representative design has not been adequately studied and so its
importance remains untested.
Therefore, to date, the majority of studies using JA do not adopt a representative
design, often for practical reasons. The lack of empirical tests of the effects of design on
the judgement behaviour observed, means that the consequences of the use of
unrepresentative stimuli on the validity and generalisability of the findings obtained
cannot yet be discerned. It is up to the individual researcher to err on the side of caution.
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2.3. Critique of Social Judgement Theorists' Reliance on Regression Models
2.3.1. Regression models as metaphors of mind. While Hammond and his
colleagues were applying multiple linear regression to the study of achievement and
agreement in clinical judgement, Hoffman (1960) wrote a classic paper on the
usefulness and the meaningfulness of such mathematical representations of human
judgement. 42 Regarding usefulness, he proposed that mathematical models allow the
researcher to test alternative functional relations and combination rules between the
cues and the individual's judgements. The researcher can compare the adequacy of
description of different models, where adequate description is defined in terms of the
ability of the model to correctly predict the individual's judgements. Furthermore,
researchers may compare individuals with respect to their models, examine the
correspondence between self-reported policies and the models, and discover whether
individual differences are related to demographic characteristics such as training and
personality.
When considering the meaningfulness of regression models, Hoffman (1960)
warned that using these models, "one cannot conclude that the mental process has been
'discovered' (p. 124). Different models can be used for different levels of description,
for example, at the structural and process levels. Algebraically equivalent models may
indicate different underlying processes, and algebraically different models may be
equally predictive. Using an analogy from mineralogy, where two substances may have
the same chemical structure but have a different molecular structure, Hoffman (1960)
stated that just as the chemical structure can explain some, but not all, of the properties
of a substance, a mathematical model is a "paramorphic representation" of the
judgement process (p. 125). It has little psychological reality.
It is clear that although the use of regression models by social judgement
theorists has proved fruitful in investigating human judgement and decision making, in
many theoretical and applied domains, researchers have not tested alternative models.
Moreover, they have at times considered the regression model to be an isomorphic
representation of the human judgement process.
In their "tools-to-theories" hypothesis, Gigerenzer and Murray (1987) pointed
out that a "scientist 's tools, which are considered to be indispensible and prestigious,
lend themselves to transformation into metaphors of mind" (p. 3, see also Gigerenzer,
42 Hoffman (1960) focused on the model of the human and unlike Hammond (1955), did not discuss the
model of the environment or achievement.
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1991a).43 Brunswik (1956) originally had used the analogy of the perceptual system as
an intuitive statistician calculating correlations. Subsequently, Hammond and his
colleagues likened the clinician's judgement processes to the multiple regression
procedure (e.g., Hammond, 1955; Hammond et al., 1964). Later, this is evident in
Hammond and Summer's (1972) distinction between cognitive control as represented
by Rs in the lens model equation and knowledge as represented by G, so an individual
may have knowledge of the task but applies it inconsistently. Reilly and Doherty (1989,
1992) argue that regression models represent some form of psychological reality
because people show insight in being able to recognise their policies as captured by
statistically derived weights. Finally, it has been suggested that the fact that researchers
use statistical weights for feedback purposes implies that they are true psychological
representations of the judgements made (Cooksey, 1996a; Schmitt & Levine, 1977).
Furthermore, in comparison, subjective weights are treated as "pseudophenomena" with
little relation to psychological processes (Schmitt & Levine, 1977, p. 26).
However, social judgment theorists have concurrently argued that they do not
consider the regression model as representing the judgment process. For instance, after
examining the best way of statistically deriving cue weights, Lane et al. (1982) stated
that:
This does not necessarily mean that judges mentally multiply weights and cue
values when making decisions. It does mean that raw-score regression weights
reflect the relative importance of the cues in determining judgements, regardless
of the process used by the judge in aggregating information (p. 238).
Brehmer (1979) said that:
A common misunderstanding is that SJT holds that the judgment process itself
operates according to the principles of multiple regression... .just because they
use these methods for investigating the judgment process....Instead, the methods
are used to test a series of hypotheses about the nature of the judgment process,
hypotheses about the nature of cue weights, function forms, combination rules,
and predictability (p. 199).
Indeed, in his first successful application of the regression model to clinical judgement,
Hammond (1955) was also cautious in noting that this was just one of "some probability
model" (p. 261). The confusion over the status of regression models in JA studies was
recently resolved by Hammond (1996b) when he confessed that:
a...sin of commission on my part was to overemphasise the role of the multiple
regression (MR) technique as a model for organising information from multiple
43 In recent times, the advent of the computer led to descriptions of the mind as an information processor
(e.g., Newell & Simon, 1972).
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fallible indicators into a judgement. There is nothing within the framework of
the lens model that demands that MR be the one and only model of that
organising process (p. 244-245).
Regression models are structural, mathematical models. They provide a static
description of judgement behaviour, where the same cues are used in the same way
when deciding on each case. 44 Regression models embody weighting and combination
rules. Although cue weights may be non-compensatory and non-linear terms may be
included, it is generally assumed that judgements are the product of a linear,
compensatory integration of multiple cues that are weighted optimally. This is because
social judgement theorists do not consider alternative weighting and combination rules.
In their review of social judgement theorists' use of regression models, Dhami and
Harries (2001) propose that models should be chosen with respect to their psychological
plausibility, flexibility and adaptability, and their ease of understanding.
2.3.2. Psychological plausibility, flexibility and adaptability. For a number of
reasons, critics have questioned whether regression models are capable of providing a
psychologically valid description of judgment behaviour (e.g., Armelius & Armelius,
1973; Dhami & Harries, 2001; Einhorn, 1970, 1971; Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, &
Kleinmuntz, 1979; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer et al., 1999b; Zeleny,
1976). First, the judgement process characterised by the regression model is not easily
reconciled with what we know about human psychological abilities. According to the
regression model, multiple cues are differentially weighted and integrated in a
compensatory way, to form a judgement. However, the human mind is characterised by
limited attention, memory and cognitive processing capacity (e.g., Kahneman, 1973;
Miller, 1956). Selective perception, sequential processing, limited computational ability
and limited memory all have implications for judgement behaviour (Hogarth, 1980), so
that people often use heuristics (rules of thumb or cognitive shortcuts) when making
judgements under uncertainty (see Kahneman et al., 1982). In fact, people may choose
strategies that reduce cognitive effort (see Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993).
Second, the regression model portrays humans as inflexible. In his concept of
vicarious functioning, Brunswik (1952) argued that, in addition to the fact that distal
variables can be attained vicariously through proximal variables, proximal variables can
themselves be used vicariously through other proximal variables. However, the static
regression model does not allow for cues to be substituted for each other when deciding
44 Rare cases are therefore treated as random error or noise. Benbenishty (1992) points out that such cases
are often those that distinguish expert from novice judgement.
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on different cases. In fact, in JA studies the same cues are available in every case. As
Brehmer (1988) points out, Hammond's (1955) use of the regression model meant that
"the clinician's capacity for vicarious functioning...could not be examined as such. To
do so, it would have been necessary to vary the cues from patient to patient and to
examine the clinician's ability to use different subsets of cues for making the same
kinds of inferences" (p. 20-21).
Third, related to the notion of vicarious functioning is that judgement processes
are adapted to the structure and demands of the task (Brunswik, 1952). Regarding the
former, multiple cue probability learning studies have demonstrated that people can
learn about inter-cue correlations, function forms and validities, and use cues
accordingly (e.g., Hammond & Summers, 1965; Hammond, 1972). Other empirical
research has reported that certain cognitive strategies are more descriptively and
predictively valid under particular task structures (e.g., Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, &
Goldstein, 1999; Einhorn, 1971; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975; see Libby & Lewis, 1982;
Martignon & Hoffrage, 1999; Mertz & Doherty, 1974; Schmidt, 1971; see Slovic &
Lichtenstein, 1971). For example, Mertz and Doherty (1974) compared the descriptive
validity of different models under different conditions of inter-cue correlations. They
found that under a condition where cues were inter-correlated, the conjunctive and
disjunctive models better described their participants' judgement policies than the linear
model. The findings of other studies will be reported in more detail later.
Empirical research has also shown how judgement behaviour is affected by the
demands of the task. For instance, in Chapter 1, it was highlighted that when making
their remand decisions, magistrates do not always have all of the relevant information
available to them, that information may be presented in any order, and that they may
feel under time pressure. There is evidence to suggest that missing information leads to
negative decisions. For example, in a study on personnel decision making, Jagacinski
(1994) found that on average, missing information which was considered of average
importance to the decision led participants to rate a candidate less favourably than
comparable candidates with complete information. Johnson and Levin (1985) found that
in consumer decision making, less favourable evaluations were made of products as the
amount of missing information increased. There is also evidence for primacy effects
(e.g., Adelman, Bresnick, Black, Marvin, & Sak, 1996) and recency effects (e.g.,
Highhouse & Gallo, 1997; Kerstholt & Jackson, 1998) for the cues used. Moreover,
these order effects are moderated by the amount of information that is provided, the
complexity of information and whether the response is made after each piece of
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information is presented or not (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). Rhiel and Crouch (1993)
found that policies changed when the order of cues changed randomly from case to
case, and that people used more cues when cues were presented in the same order on
each case. Finally, studies have revealed that under time pressure people place
disproportionately heavy weights on negative cues (e.g., Wright, 1974) although there
also is evidence that people attach increased importance to positive cues (e.g., Edland,
1993), people use less cues (e.g., Edland, 1979; Rothstein, 1986; Wright, 1974), they
switch to simple non-compensatory strategies (e.g., Billings & Marcus, 1983; Edland,
1979, 1994; Ford, Schmitt, Schechtman, HuIts, & Doherty, 1989; Johnson & Meyer,
1984; Payne et al., 1990, 1993; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999; Shields, 1983;
Timmermans, 1993), and they are less consistent (e.g., Davis & Davis, 1996; Rothstein,
1986).
The relationship between characteristics of the task and modes of cognition have
been explicated in Hammond's (1996a) cognitive continuum theory. 45 This theory states
that cognition can be placed on a continuum from the intuitive to the analytic, although
the most common type incorporates elements of both and is called quasirationality.
Tasks can induce certain modes of cognition. Successful performance on a task inhibits
movement along the continuum while failure stimulates transition to other modes of
cognition. It has been suggested that certain task characteristics such as having more
than five cues, inter-cue correlations, normally distributed cues, many decision
alternatives, linear function forms, linear integration rule, no outcome feedback,
familiarity with the task and time pressure all induce an intuitive mode of cognition.
The reverse of these induces an analytic mode of cognition. A combination of the two
types of task characteristics will induce quasirationality. Similarly, the features of
intuitive and analytic cognition are listed. The few direct empirical tests of this theory
that have been conducted to date have found varying degrees of evidence to support the
predictions made (Dunwoody, Haarbauer, Mahan, Marino, & Tang, 2000; Hammond,
Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987).
Despite the fact that judgement processes may change as a result of the structure
and demands of the task, social judgement theorists have been content with the
conclusion that the judgement behaviour, as portrayed by the regression model, is the
same across the variety of task domains that they have studied.
45 In fact, this theory was developed over a number of publications spanning many years (Hammond,
1978, 1980, 1981, 1986, 1990).
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2.3.3. Ease of understanding. Judgment policies may be communicated to
individuals in order to aid and train them to make consistent, accurate decisions, or
reduce discrepancy between individuals. The ease with which a model is understood is
thus an important consideration. In a paper aimed at prospective researchers, Stewart
(1988) warns that "The reader who is not familiar with multiple regression analysis will
find some parts of this paper rough going and will probably require statistical help in
applying judgment analysis" (p. 41). It would therefore, not be surprising that recipients
of JA feedback, who may be professionals unfamiliar with statistical techniques, would
find it even more difficult to understand the outputs of a regression analysis.
The regression model however, has proved a very useful aid. Studies have
demonstrated higher achievement in conditions with cognitive feedback than in
conditions with either no feedback or solely outcome feedback (see Balzer et al., 1989;
Doherty & Balzer, 1988). Nevertheless, the regression model may be considered to be
an obscure mathematical model that an individual may have difficulty applying without
the aid of a computer. Regression models are also difficult to apply to a new data set
because they are based on variations in the cues and judgements across the data set.
Standardised weights are usually calculated by researchers and application of these
weights to a new case requires identification of where that case's cue values fit in the
range of cue values that were used in the original data set on which the model was
formed. Others have similarly argued that regression models are difficult to understand
and communicate (e.g., Benbenishty, 1992; Schmitt & Levine, 1977).
2.3.4. Over-reliance-on regression models. The pervasive use of regression
models as a description of human judgement processes is surprising. As Doherty and
Kurz (1996) note, Brunswik (1955b, 1956) did not rule out the use of other models.
Similarly, neither did Hammond (1955).
Social judgement theorists have generally not considered alternative models,
such as process models, and models that imply non-compensatory and/or non-linear
processing of cues. There are many reasons cited for this. For instance, Brehmer (1994)
pointed out that the multiple regression linear model captured the essence of Brunswik's
concepts of vicarious mediation and vicarious functioning quite well. Others point out
that the regression model has proved to be a good fit to judgement data (Brehmer &
Brehmer, 1988; Hammond et al., 1975), so can predict judgements well (Hammond,
1955), is widely understood and is useful as a cognitive aid (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988;
Hammond et al., 1975; Stewart, 1988), is mathematically simpler than other models
(Hammond et al., 1975; Stewart, 1988), and can describe non-linear processes (Stewart,
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1988). Alternative models are not sought because in most studies the non-linear
component is negligible, and the linear component can adequately explain agreement or
achievement (Stewart, 1988). Indeed, as Hammond et al. (1975) state, "the social
judgment theorist places less emphasis on mathematical precision in cognitive modeling
and more emphasis on empirically demonstrating the usefulness of a given model with
regard to a given problem" (p. 284).
There is reluctance in abandoning the regression model. Doherty and Brehmer
(1997) recently take the fact that Hoffman (1960) argued that regression models
provided at least some level of description (i.e., in his analogy with the chemical level
of minerals) of the judgment process, to imply that regression models should not be
discarded. They continue that "all scientific models are paramorphic representations.
All models of judgment are paramorphic representations" (Doherty & Brehmer, 1997,
p. 546). Finally, concerning the combination rule, they argue that:
The conception of human judgment emerging from regression studies of human
judgment can be refuted only by evidence that shows that judgment is something
other than a matter of combining pieces of information that are weighted
according to their importance. So far, such evidence has failed to materialize (p.
547).
In sum, social judgement theorists have tended to consider the regression model
as an isomorphic description of human judgment processes despite that the fact that its
characterisation of the human judgement process is incompatible with the theory and
empirical evidence showing that humans have limited cognitive capacity and that they
may select strategies that are appropriate for the structure and demands of the task. The
regression model may also be considered to be difficult for non-researchers to
understand and apply. Although social judgement theory is not synonymous with the
use of regression models, researchers using JA have rarely considered alternative
models of the judgement process. Researchers studying judgement behaviour outside
the framework of social judgement theory have however, explored the descriptive
validity of other types of model.
2.4. Alternative Models and Methods
2.4.1. Alternative static, structural models. The regression model is a static,
structural mathematical model. Some researchers have proposed alternative static,
structural, mathematical models that unlike the regression model are non-linear and
non-compensatory. For instance, Einhorn (1970, 1971) developed two models that
approximated conjunctive and disjunctive processes (Coombs, 1964; Dawes, 1964). In
115
the conjunctive model, all cue values must pass a specific threshold or cut-off point
before a judgment is made at a specific level, thus cue sums are not important. A high
judgement is made if all cue values are high. In the disjunctive model, the cue values of
only one cue need to pass a cut-off point before a judgment is made at a specific level.
A high judgement is made if only one cue value is high. Einhorn (1970) compared the
predictive validity of the conjunctive and disjunctive models with the linear regression
model, in a judgement task where four university faculty ranked 20 hypothetical
applicants for graduate school on the basis of three cues. He found that predictions from
the disjunctive model correlated more highly with two of his participants' judgements,
than predictions from a multiple linear regression model or the conjunctive mode1.46
The conjunctive model better predicted the judgements of one participant and the three
models failed to predict the judgements of the fourth participant. These findings indicate
individual differences in processes. In another study, Einhorn (1971) compared the
validity of these models as a function of the type of judgment task performed (i.e., job
preference and graduate selection) and the number of cues presented (i.e., 2, 4 and 6). In
sum, all models fitted quite well (even after double cross validation). 47
 For most
participants, the conjunctive model performed best over all of the cue conditions on the
job preference task. Participants' self-reports were also compatible with the conjunctive
model. The results were less clear for the graduate selection task, although the
disjunctive model fared better than in the previous task.
Another static, structural mathematical model is the scatter model. Brannick and
Brannick (1989) proposed a version of this model. In a choice task, their model, in
addition to taking into account the weighted sum of the cue values, also takes into
account the dispersion of cue values for each alternative. Thus, the pattern of cue values
is considered to be more influential in making a judgement than solely the weighted
sum of the values. Over two policy capturing studies, Brannick and Brannick (1989)
reported that most participants were better described by a non-linear, non-compensatory
strategy than a linear one, although the scatter model did not do much better than the
other non-linear models with which it was compared. Other researchers have also found
that for at least some, if not all, of the individuals in their samples, non-linear, non-
compensatory models provided a better fit to judgment data than linear, compensatory
models such as the regression model (e.g., Ganzach, 1995; Lukasiak-Goszczynska,
1977; Park, 1978).
46 Einhorn was one of the four participants, and he used a disjunctive strategy.
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As stated, the above alternative models are all non-compensatory. 48 Shepard
(1967) stated that people use few cues and do not integrate information, and are non-
linear. Cooksey (1996a) however, points out that these models are not as parsimonious
as the multiple linear regression model and so do not cross-validate wel1.49 Indeed, some
studies have not found empirical evidence to support the superior descriptive and
predictive validity of Einhorn's (1970) conjunctive and disjunctive models over the
linear model (e.g., Goldberg, 1971; Ogilvie & Schmitt, 1979). Nevertheless, these
alternative mathematical models are also considered difficult for participants to interpret
in studies aiming to improve judgment through cognitive feedback of policies (Dhami
& Harries, 2001). Stewart (1988) states that:
experienced judgment analysts regard nonadditive models with suspicion and
have not used them extensively. Additive models explain most of the systematic
variance in many types of judgements. They are adequate for most applications,
and the descriptions of judgment provided by additive models are easily
understood. Furthermore, the procedures for fitting additive models are well
developed and widely available (p. 67).
He describes the search for nonadditive models as a "fishing expedition" (Stewart,
1988, p. 67). As such, these models have attracted relatively little attention from
researchers using JA, and will not be considered further in the research presented in this
thesis.
2.4.2. Alternative process-tracing methods. Regression analysis involves
inferring information use from the judgements made over a set of cases. Process-tracing
on the other hand, involves either elicitation of self-reported descriptions of information
use either by think-aloud (e.g., Timmermans, 1993) or written techniques (e.g.,
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995), or identification of the information to which people
attend by study of eye movement (e.g., Russo & Dosher, 1983), information selection
or reaction time (e.g., Payne et al., 1993), while the person is performing the task. The
resulting process models provide a step-by-step description of predecisional behaviour
such as information search, and cue use, that may be presented in terms of a tree
47 In double cross validation, after the model is used to make predictions on a new sample, it is then used
to make predictions on the original sample.
48 Two other well known non-compensatory models are Tversky's (1972) elimination by aspects model,
and the lexicographic model. The latter is a process model. The cues are ordered in terms of importance
and the options are compared on the most important cue first. If this is sufficient in differentiating
between the two options, then select the option with the cue value of interest (e.g., high aptitude). If the
options are equal on the first cue, then go to the second cue and so forth. In Tversky's (1972) model, all
options are eliminated if they don't have a particular cue value (aspect). Cue values or aspects are chosen
according a probability that is proportional to its weight. This process continues until only one option
remains.
49 Note however, that mathematical complexity does not equate cognitive complexity (Einhorn, 1971).
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diagram or computer program, and that are easy to understand (Payne, Braunstein, &
Carroll, 1978; Benbenishty, 1992). These models describe how judgements are formed
over time, from when the cues are presented to when the judgment is made. Process-
tracing techniques have proved a popular alternative to regression analysis in the study
of human J/DM (see Juslin & Montgomery, 1999), and they are endorsed by many
researchers (e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Montgomery & Svenson, 1989; Payne et al.,
1978). 5° Payne et al. (1988, 1990, 1993) used process-tracing techniques (and
simulations) and found that people switched to simple, non-compensatory judgement
strategies under conditions of time pressure. Billings and Marcus (1983) found that
process-tracing techniques were better able to detect the use of non-linear and non-
compensatory strategies than the static, structural modelling approach.
It has been pointed out that some researchers consider process models as
isomorphic (Benbenishty, 1992; Doherty & Brehmer, 1997; Einhorn et al., 1979). Libby
and Lewis (1982) however, warn that "The greater level of detail provided by the
resulting models should not be interpreted as indicating that they represent mental
processes" (p. 280). Protocol data may merely highlight what is in short-term memory,
and this may be an incomplete account of the process. Interpreting verbal protocol data
may be difficult and subjective, and is time consuming. Protocol analysis is also costly
in terms of time and effort for both the participant and the researcher. Thus, researchers
focus on either modelling only one participant (Einhorn et al., 1979) or only particular
tasks (Billings & Marcus, 1983). The process models may also be criticised for
involving artificial methods to assess what information is searched for, and for being
vulnerable to the limitations of think aloud methods (e.g., socially desirable responses
and difficulty in retrieving information from memory). Verbal reports and judgements
may not be perfectly correlated (Brehmer & Kuylenstierna, 1978; Brehmer,
Kuylenstierna, & Liljergren, 1974). These concerns raise doubts about the reliability
and validity of the description of judgment behaviour provided by process-tracing
techniques (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Finally, tests of the fit of the model are weak as
often they do not require prediction of protocols or choices, but simply that the models
conform to the utterances on which they were based. Also, the resulting models are not
compared against other models (but for an exception see Einhorn et al., 1979).
Einhorn et al. (1979) have argued for a multi-method approach. The fact that on
the surface regression models and process models do not look alike does not necessarily
50 Process-tracing is a popular approach in studying the process of problem solving (e.g., Newell &
Simon, 1972).
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mean that they are presenting a dissimilar view of human judgement. Researchers
should not think the choice between the use of regression modelling and process-tracing
is either or. Rather, both approaches offer complimentary views of human judgement at
different levels of description, with the former focusing on a higher level of generality.
Process models provide data on information search and regression models provide data
on the combination rule. The complimentary strengths and weaknesses of both
approaches implies that they should be used in conjunction with one another.
Brehmer and Brehmer (1988) concluded that structural models were "sufficient"
for the aims of SJT (i.e., explaining and improving achievement and agreement) (p.
105). They argue that "Attempts at developing process models.. .have not led to better
explanations of achievement or agreement, because they do not account for more of the
variance than do structural models. For the purposes of SJT, regression models are
therefore more useful than process models" (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988, p. 105). In
view of the criticisms outlined above, process-tracing techniques will not be used in the
research conducted in the present thesis.
In sum, although researchers have explored alternative static, structural models
and process models, these have not proved very popular for a number of reasons.
Recently, Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) have proposed the use of simple process
models, which they call fast and frugal, and which, like regression models, are formed
on the basis of the structural relationships between the cues and judgment. Thus, they
are not reliant on verbal protocols or artificial methods for data collection.
2.5. Simple Heuristics51
2.5.1. Origins and overview. The term simple heuristics refers specifically to
fast and frugal heuristics. The inspiration for these heuristics came from Brunswik's
(1943, 1952, 1955b, 1956, 1957) ideas on the adaptive nature of human cognition, and
the ideas on satisficing and bounded rationality expressed by Herbert Simon (1947,
1955, 1956, 1959, 1982, 1987, 1990, 1991). In his critique of the rational choice model
espoused by economics, Simon (1956) argued that organisms satisfice, rather than
optimise (subjective) expected utility, when making choices. People are boundedly
rational as they must perform under conditions of limited time, information and
cognitive abilities (Simon, 1987, 1990). Moreover, people satisfice, so that they have an
expectation or aspiration level of a reasonable solution for a task and they cease to
51 Originally they were called algorithms (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996), and now they are referred to as
heuristics (Gigerenzer et al., 1999b).
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search for solutions as soon as one is found that meets their aspiration level (Simon,
1956, 1990). Simon (1956) warned that "we should be skeptical in postulating for
humans, or other organisms, elaborate mechanisms for choosing among diverse needs"
(p. 137). Like Brunswik, Simon (1956, 1990) believed that organisms are adapted to the
structure of their environments. 52
 "Human rational behavior is shaped by a scissors
whose two blades are the structure of task environments and the computational
capabilities of the actor" (Simon, 1990, p. 7). Therefore, models of human J/DM should
be compatible with evidence of limited cognitive abilities in attention, memory and
computational power, and with the demands of the task such as a finite amount of time
and resources to search for information. The models should also be adapted to the
structure of the task in which they must function in order to perform well.
The program of research conducted by Gigerenzer and his colleagues aims to
develop precisely specified step-by-step process models of human J/DM and
demonstrate how they are matched to the structure of the environment and the demands
of the task in which they function (Gigerenzer et al., 1999b). Furthermore, it examines
how learning and evolution can explain this match (Gigerenzer et al., 1999b). 53 As the
magistrates' remand decision making task is unlikely to be one they have evolutionarily
adapted to, the concept of evolution will not be discussed in this thesis. The fast and
frugal heuristics that have been developed comprise basic inter-related features such as
an information search rule, stop rule and a decision rule. For example, search through
cues may be internal (based on memory) or external (e.g., based on literature), and may
be random, ordered according to their validities, or based on the memory of the last cue
used. Search may be stopped as soon as the first cue that favours an alternative in a
choice task is found, for example. Finally, a decision can be made on only one cue, thus
there is no need to weight or combine cues. The heuristics are considered to be fast and
frugal because they do not search for all of the available and relevant information and
they do not require much computation because they base a decision on one or few cues.
Fast and frugal heuristics may be classified according to the type of task they
can perform (i.e., two-alternative choice tasks, estimation or classification), by the
content of the task (e.g., adaptive tasks such as mate choice), or by the rules for
information search, stopping and decision making that they embody (i.e., ignorance-
based decision making, one-reason decision making, elimination heuristics or satisficing
heuristics) (Todd & Gigerenzer, 1999). The heuristics are domain-specific because they
52 Others have made similar points (e.g., Anderson, 1990; Shepard, 1990).
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work in a category of task environments in which they are ecologically rational (i.e.,
accurate). Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) draw the analogy between simple heuristics and
a Swiss army knife. Of course, the idea that all sorts of heuristics would be needed for
all sorts of tasks seems unrealisable. The fact that fast and frugal heuristics are robust,
however, means that they can adapt well to new environments. Thus, simple heuristics
are neither too specific, nor too general.
2.5.2. The fast and frugal heuristics. To date, a number of fast and frugal
heuristics have been developed. The first, and perhaps the most well known and
researched is called Take The Best, which embodies another simpler heuristic, namely
the recognition heuristic (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1998
unpublished manuscript cited in Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999). 54 Both these heuristics
were designed to make choices in a two alternative choice task, where the cues
(information) about the alternatives are binary, and knowledge of, and about, the
alternatives is from memory, rather than given. These two heuristics are illustrated in
Figure 2.4.55
An individual may have limited knowledge in terms of not knowing the
alternatives in the reference class, not knowing the cue values, or both, to varying
degrees. The first step in the choice process involves the recognition heuristic. This is
considered the simplest of all the heuristics developed to date. It is called ignorance
based decision making as it relies on a lack of knowledge of the alternatives, and only
on recognition memory. Thus, the recognition heuristic would not work if every
alternative were recognised (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999). In Bnuiswikian terms,
recognition is a predictor of the distal variable. The recognition heuristic is domain
specific, in that it only works in environments where recognition is correlated with the
criterion. 56
 This correlation may either be genetically coded or learned through
experience. Recognition validity is the proportion of correct inferences across all pairs
where one object is recognised and the other is not. Search is limited to recognition
memory, and is stopped as soon as recognition of both alternatives is examined, and the
53 To this end, they study J/DM in natural domains such as mate and food choice (e.g., Davis & Todd,
1999; Todd & Miller, 1999).
54 Originally, the recognition heuristic was simply referred to as the first step in the Take the Best
heuristic (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996), and only later was it considered a separate heuristic (Goldstein
& Gigerenzer, 1999).
55 In an earlier version (Gigerenzer et al., 1991) search was terminated if one alternative had a positive
value and the other a negative value on the cue. This was more complex and empirical evidence supports
the current discrimination rule (Hoffrage, 1994 unpublished doctoral dissertation cited in Gigerenzer &
Goldstein, 1996).
56 In many situations, the criterion may be accessible only through cues (as depicted in the lens model).
For instance, people can predict a profitable company from its regular advertising campaigns.
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decision is based on recognition alone. Recognition is a powerful advertising tool. It can
be seen in Figure 2.4 that according to the recognition heuristic, if one of the two
alternatives is recognised it is chosen. If neither alternative is recognised one is chosen
at random. However, if both alternatives are recognised, the process continues to the
second step, namely a search through the cue values.
Search through cues is ordered. 57 The cues are ordered according to their
ecological validities. The Take The Best heuristic retrieves, from memory, the values of
the first rank ordered cue for the two alternatives. If the cue discriminates (i.e., for a
binary cue, it has a positive value for one alternative and a negative or unknown value
for the other), then the search for values of other cues is stopped and the alternative with
the positive cue value is chosen. If not, or if one alternative has a negative value and the
value of the other alternative is unknown, the search process continues. If after all of the
cues have been searched and no cue discriminates, an alternative is chosen randomly.
The ecological validity of a cue is defined in terms of the proportion of correct
inferences for that cue alone, when one alternative has a positive value and the other
does not. However, an ecologically valid cue may not be useful if it does not
discriminate between a pair of alternatives. The discrimination rate of a cue is the
relative frequency with which the cue discriminates between any two alternatives from
the reference class. This is a function of the distribution of the cue values and the
number of alternatives (see Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996 for details of the
computation). Cues with higher ecological validities are better able to correctly predict
the criterion, and cues with higher discrimination rates are more likely to be used for
making a choice.
57 This fact makes Take The Best a variant of a lexicographic strategy,
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If neither is
recognised then
choose one randomly.
Are either of the
alternatives recognised?STEP ONE
If only one is
recognised then
choose that one.
If both are
recognised then go to
step two.
If only one has a
positive value then
choose that one.
If both or neither have a
positive value then
search the values of the
2"d rank ordered cue.
STEP TWO
Do either of the
alternatives have a
positive value on the
I m rank ordered cue?
If only one has a
positive value then
choose that one.
V
If both or neither have a
positive value then
search the values of the
3" rank ordered cue.
Do either of the
alternatives have a
positive value on the
2"d rank ordered cue?
This process continues until all the cues have
been search. If at this point no cue discriminates
then choose an alternative randomly.
Figure 2.4. The Take The Best heuristic embodying the recognition heuristic
(adapted from Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996)
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Therefore, in the Take The Best heuristic, search is limited and is stopped either
when only one of the alternatives is recognised, or when a cue discriminates between
alternatives, cues are not weighted but are ordered (according to their weights), and cue
values are substituted rather than integrated. In this sense, this heuristic does not use all
of the available information, it is non-compensatory because the choice is based on the
first discriminating cue and no other cues can override this, and is also non-linear. The
amount of information searched depends on the task (i.e., pair of alternatives), and so
the heuristic is flexible in its depiction of cue use. The stopping rule has a "positive
bias" because search is not stopped if one alternative has a negative value and the other
has an unknown value, but it is stopped if one alternative has a positive value and the
other has an unknown value (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999, p. 91). In research on
hypothesis testing and causal reasoning, there is evidence that people use various types
of positive biases (e.g., Klayman & Ha, 1987; Mandel & Lehman, 1998). The
ecological validity of a cue is not computed in an optimal way, like beta weights are in
multiple linear regression, for example (Martignon & Hoffrage, 1999). Finally, there are
simpler variants of Take The Best, namely Take The Last and Minimalist (Gigerenzer &
Goldstein, 1996). In the latter, cues are not searched in order of their validities but are
searched randomly, and so no knowledge or computation of validities and
discrimination rates is required. In the former, the cue that discriminated between the
alternatives in the previous trial is searched first, and if this does not discriminate in the
present trial, then the cue that discriminated the time before last is searched, and so
forth. On the first trial cues are searched randomly. Unlike Take The Best which needs
to know the cue validities, both these heuristics only need to know the direction in
which the cue points.
At the time when the research presented in this thesis was conducted, the only
published fast and frugal heuristics were those reviewed above for choice tasks. During
the writing of this thesis two more heuristics have been developed and published,
namely Categorisation by Elimination (Berretty, Todd, & Martignon, 1999) and
QuickEst (Hertwig, Hoffrage, & Martignon, 1999), for categorisation and estimation
tasks, respectively. The former will be considered in more detail in Chapter 6 of the
thesis, and suffice it to say that the latter is a relative of Take The Best that estimates
quantities.
2.5.3. Tests of the descriptive and predictive validity of fast and frugal
heuristics. The heuristics have been largely tested through computer simulation and
mathematical analysis, although a handful of behavioural studies have now been
124
published. Together, the studies have yielded a consistent body of findings to support
the notion that these simple heuristics are descriptively and predictively valid.
The two alternative choice task typically used to describe how the recognition
heuristic and the Take The Best heuristic work, involves predicting which of a pair of
German cities has the highest population. In this task, it is assumed that an individual
has knowledge of the alternatives (i.e., pairs of all German cities with a population of
over 100,000), and has knowledge about the alternatives or the cue values of nine binary
cues (e.g., whether or not a city is the national capital, or has a soccer team). Indeed,
many of the studies require participants to work on tasks concerning a geographical
topic, where the correct answers are recorded in an almanac.
Support for the recognition heuristic has come from studies which have shown,
for example, that German students performed better than American students when
predicting which of pairs of American cities had the highest population, because the
former relied on the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999). Similar
results have been found by Ayton and Onkal (1997 unpublished manuscript cited in
Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999) when they asked Turkish and English students to predict
which of pairs of English soccer teams would win a cup match. The less-is-more effect
is an interesting phenomenon to emerge from studies. Here, as knowledge increases
from an intermediate state of knowledge of a domain, the accuracy of prediction
decreases. For example, American students were better at predicting which of pairs of
German cities had the greater population than at predicting this criterion for American
cities (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1998). This effect has been demonstrated between
groups of people, within-groups across domains, and within-groups over time
(Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999). In a field experiment involving stock market
investment, the recognition heuristic was pitted against five more complex models for
stock selection (e.g., mutual funds), and in six out of eight tests it outperformed these
models in terms of returns (Borges, Goldstein, Ortmann, & Gigerenzer, 1999). Research
has also shown that people relied on the recognition heuristic to make choices, despite
being given contrary information about a recognised alternative (Goldstein &
Gigerenzer, 1999). Recognition was a good predictor in the above studies because there
was a correlation between recognition of cities and city population (Goldstein &
Gigerenzer, 1998), and the same probably holds true for soccer teams and profitable
companies.
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996, 1999) compared Take The Best with several
linear, compensatory models, such as multiple linear regression, Franklin's rule (a
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differentially weighted linear model) and Dawes' rule (a unit-weighted linear model).58
Dawes' rule was described earlier. Franklin's rule picks up on the differential weights
attached to cues but not on the dependencies between cues, which are included in
multiple linear regression. 59 In their study, Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996, 1999)
simulated individuals performing the German cities choice task under different
conditions of knowledge of the cue values. The frugality and speed of Take The Best
was measured by the amount of information (cue values) searched for. On average, it
searched for 5.9 cue values (not cues) whereas the integration models integrated values
of all nine cues. As the number of objects recognised increased, the number of cue
values searched increased, and as the percentage of cue values known increased, the
number of cue values searched decreased. (Note that the recognition principle was just
one more cue in Take The Best, and in multiple linear regression, missing values due to
limited knowledge were replaced by averages.) In terms of the number of correct
choices, it was found that when there was a lack of knowledge, Take The Best
performed equal to, or better than, the integration models. When there was complete
knowledge, multiple linear regression outperformed all of the other models, although
Take The Best was not far behind. On average, over the different conditions of
knowledge, the performance of Take The Best (i.e., 64.5% accuracy) was good
compared to multiple linear regression (i.e., 65.7% accuracy), Franklin's rule (i.e.,
62.3% accuracy) and Dawes' rule (i.e., 62.1% accuracy). The variants of Take The Best
(i.e. Minimalist and Take The Last) searched for less cue values on average even though
they did not lose much in terms of accuracy, and they actually outperformed Dawes'
rule and Franklin's rule. However, in this study the models were only compared in
terms of their ability to correctly predict the choices on the set of data used to form the
models, thus testing their descriptive validity. Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996, 1999)
did not compare the predictive validity of the models (i.e., their ability to correctly
predict the choices on a new data set).
Gigerenzer, Czerlinski and Martignon (1999a, see also Czerlinski et al., 1999)
studied both the descriptive and predictive validity of different models. The data was
divided randomly into a modelling set (which they refer to as the training set) and a set
for cross-validation. This procedure was repeated 1,000 times. All alternatives were
58 The other models compared were tallying and weighted tallying.
59 In a letter, Benjamin Franklin (1772/1987) described his process of making a decision, which he called
"Moral or prudential Algebra" (p. 878). He divides a piece of paper into two columns, one labelled "pro"
and the other labelled "con". Then, over a few days, he makes a list of "Motives" for and against the
"Measure", and estimates the respective importance of these reasons, and finally he finds "where the
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recognised by the simulations so the recognition heuristic did not operate in Take The
Best. Take The Best, Minimalist, Dawes' rule and multiple linear regression were
compared on a range of task domains such as predicting city population, homelessness,
house prices, amount of rainfall and school drop out rates, which also ranged in the
number of alternatives and cues. It was found that on average, across the 20 tasks,
multiple linear regression used six cues, as did Dawes' rule, while Take The Best used
2.4 cues, and Minimalist used 2.1 cues. In terms of accuracy, Take The Best (i.e., 75%
accuracy) was not far behind multiple linear regression (i.e., 77% accuracy) on the
modelling set, and was more accurate on the cross-validation set (i.e., 71% accuracy for
Take The Best and 68% for multiple linear regression). All models showed reduced fit
on the cross-validation set, but the fit of multiple linear regression fell more than the
other models. Take The Best is very robust (i.e., generalises well to a new data set)
because it uses only a few of the highly valid cues, which remain highly valid across
samples of the population. Multiple linear regression on the other hand, estimates a
number of parameters equal to (or more than) the number of cues, and it takes into
account the inter-cue correlations, thus it suffers from overfitting the peculiarities of the
modelling set, especially when the modelling set is small.
Simulation studies comparing the QuicIcEst heuristic with multiple linear
regression have also demonstrated a similar pattern of results relating to the number of
cues searched and the accuracy of inferences in modelling and cross-validation
conditions (Hertwig et al., 1999). Similarly, the Categorisation by Elimination was
tested against Dawes' rule and Franklin's rule, amongst other models on tasks such as
categorisation of intentional actions, wine, flowers and mushrooms (Berretty et al.,
1999). It was found to be more frugal, and equally as accurate, as the more complex
models.6°
The studies using simulations were, in Brunswikian terms, modelling the
environment. In doing so, Gigerenzer and his colleagues argue that an adapted
individual would pick up and exploit the structure of the environment and so would
perform quite well using a cognitively simple process. In addition to the studies
presented in this thesis, there are a few others that have investigated the ability of fast
and frugal models to describe and predict human judgement data (Dhami & Harries,
2001; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999; Slegers, Brake, & Doherty, 2000). The study by
balance lies" by adding up the weights in the two columns (p. 878). This is the earliest use of the linear
model in decision making.
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Dhami and Harries (2001) will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, suffice it to say that
it also found support for the validity of fast and frugal heuristics as models of human
judgement.
Rieskamp and Hoffrage (1999) studied eight strategies including Franldin's rule,
Dawes' rule, and LEX, which they say is a general version of Take The Best. 61 Student
participants were required to choose which of four companies (out of a population of 70
companies) was the one with the highest annual profit, both under conditions of low and
high time pressure for each choice. First, a process-tracing approach was used where the
task was presented on a computerised information board. It was found that under high
time pressure, individuals searched for less information, searched for the most important
cues, spent less time looking at information, and demonstrated a cue-wise rather than
alternative-wise information search pattern. Although these results indicated that
participants were using one of the non-compensatory strategies, the results did not
distinguish LEX from the other non-compensatory strategies. Indeed, different
strategies may make the same prediction. Therefore, a choice set was specifically
selected which distinguished between the strategies, so that different models made
different predictions. Participants performed this task. The models were developed on
the environment, and their ability to correctly predict the choices of participants was
compared. All models performed better than chance level (i.e., 25%), and there were
individual differences in terms of the models that best predicted participants' choices.
For some participants two or more models were equally good at predicting their
choices. LEX and a compensatory strategy called Weighted Pros both correctly
predicted 66% of participants' choices. Nevertheless, overall, participants switched
from Weighted Pros which fit 21% of participants, to LEX which fit 23% of
participants, under conditions of low and high time pressure, respectively. 62 In addition,
the process-tracing data for each participant was compatible with the best fit strategy for
that individual.
Although Rieskamp and Hoffrage's (1999) study generalised the application of
Take The Best to conditions of information from givens, their findings are limited to
judgements made under time pressure, and their study involved novices. By contrast,
most SJT research is conducted on people who are at least familiar, if not experienced
60 The fast and frugal heuristics have also been compared against Bayesian networks (e.g., Gigerenzer et
al., 1999a; Martignon & Laskey, 1999), and found to do equally well on cross-validation, but this will not
be discussed here.
61 The other strategies studied were Good Features, Weighted Pros, Lex-Semi, Elimination By Aspects
and Lex-ADD (Rieskamp & Hoffi-age, 1999).
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with the task, and so they would have a developed policy that can be captured (Brehmer
& Brehmer, 1988; Cooksey, 1996a). Recently, Slegers et al. (2000) asked participants
who were familiar with the domain of baseball, to make a binary prediction followed by
a subjective probability of which team would win 150 randomly selected games, based
on five cues. There were no time limits. Four of the cues were polytomous cues and one
was binary, and although one of the aims of their study was to extend the Take The Best
heuristic to polytomous cues, it is evident that there were considerable difficulties in
•	 63doing so. Slegers et al. (2000) called their variant of Take The Best, "7 ± 2" (p. 106).
In comparison with a logistic regression model, which correctly predicted 87% of the
outcomes in modelling the environment, the 7 ± 2 model provided a fit (which they call
hit rate) of 84%. 64 On average, the participants predicted the outcome of the games with
81% accuracy. Both models of the environment did equally well when predicting the
participants' choices (i.e. 84%), and both models did equally well in fitting the
participants' choices (i.e. 87%). 65
 There were individual differences, however. Finally,
although the 7 ± 2 model was good at making binary predictions, it was very poor at
predicting participants' subjective probability judgements. This suggests that fast and
frugal models may not be valid descriptions of tasks requiring probability judgements.
Although behavioural studies are necessary to prove the validity of fast and
frugal heuristics, simulations and mathematical analysis has proved fruitful in
delineating the conditions under which particular strategies will be more valid, thus
providing predictions for future behavioural studies. Previous research suggests that
there are number of conditions under which multiple linear regression or Dawes' rule
will do better. Multiple linear regression will outperform Dawes' rule when there is a
high number of objects per cue (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975; Schmidt, 1971). Dawes' rule
is expected to do as equally well as multiple linear regression when the data is only low
to moderately linearly predictable (i.e., as measured by the R 2), and when cues are inter-
correlated (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975). Czerlinski et al. (1999) however, found that
although Take The Best performs better than multiple linear regression when there were
62 Weighted Pros indicated use of a simple strategy as only a subset of the cues were integrated
(Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999).
63 A logistic regression model of game outcomes was computed for each cue separately. The cues were
dummy coded. The predicted probability of a target team (selected randomly) winning was then used to
group the individual values of a cue. These grouped values were then treated in the model as a separate
binary cue. These cues were ranked according to the median predicted probabilities of their individual cue
values. A value of the cue above the median indicated that the cue discriminated between the teams. Note
that this binary choice also has associated with it a continuous judgment, namely the sum of the predicted
probabilities of the individual values of the cue.
64 As a simpler alternative called the "median-split" model, Slegers et al. (2000) divided each polytomous
cue according to split at the median value. This model provided a fit of 81% to the environment.
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fewer alternatives per cue, there was no effect of the size of the R 2, and the inter-cue
correlations. Martignon and Hoffrage (1999) found that Take The Best performs well
when the environment is structured in specific ways. For instance, if cue weights are
non-compensatory in an environment, then the performance of Take The Best will be
equal to a differentially weighted linear model (e.g., Franklin's rule and multiple linear
regression) with a non-compensatory set of weights. 66 Indeed, three of the 20 data sets
studied by Czerlinski et al. (1999) had non-compensatory cue weights. In Dawes' rule,
the cue weights are equal and so it does not perform as well. In environments with a few
number of cues and a great number of alternatives, Take The Best is more accurate than
Dawes' rule, because the latter model cannot compensate for errors in the few cues by
integrating other cues. When all valid cues are available or information is abundant,
Dawes' rule and Franklin's rule outperform Take The Best. 67 The QuickEst heuristic is
designed to perform well in an environment where objects are distributed according to a
J-shape, so that many alternatives have a small criterion value and a few have a high
value on the criterion (Hertwig et al., 1999). The concept of flat maxima refers to the
finding that many different cue weights and combinations can account equally well for
the data (von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986). Martignon and Hoffrage (1999) therefore,
have highlighted some conditions under which this phenomena will occur.
2.5.4. Criticisms of past research on fast and frugal heuristics. For various
reasons, the concept of simple, fast and frugal heuristics has received a relatively hostile
response from judgment and decision making researchers (see commentaries in reply to
a Behavioral and Brain Sciences article by Todd and Gigerenzer, 2000). It is clear that
this program of research critically evaluates the longstanding traditions or "status quo"
in many fields of psychological enquiry, such as J/DM, learning, categorisation, and
evolutionary psychology. Below, a number of the methodological concerns with the
studies using fast and frugal heuristics will be considered (Dhami & Harries, 2001;
Harries & Dhami, 2000), and in Chapter 6 some of the criticisms of the theoretical
implications of these heuristics will be discussed.
First, the dependent variables used in different models are not always
comparable. Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996), for example, compared a multiple
regression model that utilises a continuous measure of judgment with a fast and frugal
heuristic that uses a binary measure of judgment. They could have used a logistic
65 The median-split model managed to predict 80% of participants' choices.
66 The cue weights in a linear model are non-compensatory if each weight is larger than the sum of all the
successive weights. An example of a set of non-compensatory weights is 1, 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16.
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regression model, as used by Slegers et al. (2000) on a similar task. Second, the cues
used are not always comparable. For example, Slegers et al. (2000) created continuous
and binary cues for the logistic regression model and categorical cues for the fast and
frugal heuristic.
Third, in contrast to standard practice (see Cooksey, 1996a; Tabachnick &
Fide11, 1996), most of the findings reported are based on regression models that retain
non-significant cue weights. This procedure depicts the regression models as complex
(viz, multiple cues are identified as being used). This contrasts with the literature
showing that, on average, three cues are usually statistically significant (Brehmer, 1994;
Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971). Gigerenzer and his colleagues also did not report how
many cue weights were statistically significant (Czerlinski et al., 1999; Gigerenzer &
Goldstein, 1996, 1999; Gigerenzer et al., 1999a).
Fourth, Slegers et al. (2000) used a non-flexible fast and frugal heuristic that was
forced to use the same one cue, which is not clearly identified in the paper, at a
particular level for each choice. In fact, the ecological validities of the cues were
estimated via logistic regression analysis. Despite their claims, this renders their 7 ± 2
model psychologically implausible.
Fifth, the process of computing cue validities in Gigerenzer and Goldstein's
(1996) Take The Best also involves a cognitively complex learning strategy. With a
binary cue and two alternatives, computation of the ecological validity of the cue takes
account of data in all four cells. By contrast, there is considerable evidence from studies
of covariation and causation, to suggest that people are selective and may use simple
learning strategies (e.g., Nisbett & Ross, 1980). In an attempt to counteract this
criticism, it is argued that "The result of the preprocessing phase are intuitions about
which cues are the most important to predict a criterion, which can be obtained by
individual learning or other forms of adaptation to environments, such as cultural
transmission" (Gigerenzer, Martignon, Hoffrage, Rieskamp, Czerlinski, & Goldstein, in
press, p. 2). It is unclear to what extent "intuitions" involve computation of precise
validities. In addition, the fact that in a choice task, all the alternatives may not be
immediately available, and the parameters of the population to which they belong may
not be known, makes it difficult to consider how cue validities are computed.
Unfortunately, relatively little research has been conducted on how simple heuristics are
learned.
67 A preliminary finding shows that at the fitting stage, multiple linear regression performs better than
Take The Best in environments characterised by scarce information (Martignon & Hoffrage, 1999).
131
Sixth, with the exception of Hertwig et al. (1999), Gigerenzer and his
colleagues, and Slegers et al. (2000) evaluate the models solely in terms of global
accuracy. In many applied domains such as the legal domain however, global accuracy
is not the first concern: the two types of errors (type I and type II) are differentially
weighted (Hammond, 1996a). The trade off between both types of error when making
remand decisions was discussed in Chapter 1.
Seventh, although accuracy may be an appropriate criteria by which to evaluate
the prescriptive utility of fast and frugal heuristics in environmental domains such as the
German cities task, in social domains decision makers have to achieve other goals and
so there may be other criteria that are more appropriate. Tetlock (1985) refers to goals
such as accountability, transparency and fairness. In the legal domain, the compatibility
of different models with the requirements of due process is important in considering the
prescriptive value of a model.
Finally, the research conducted to date demonstrates that simple heuristics can
describe the environment well (via modelling the environment), and that human
judgment data can be described well by such heuristics (via modelling the individual).
Whether people actually use fast and frugal heuristics to achieve in their environments
has not yet been tested. This would require a full lens model analysis as advocated by
Brunswik (1952) and depicted in Figure 2.1. Unfortunately, the inaccessibility of an
outcome criterion in the legal domain means that this important issue was not examined
by the research presented in this thesis. The studies by Rieskamp and Hoffrage (1999)
and Slegers et al. (2000) only investigated the descriptive validity of fast and frugal
heuristics. They did not assess how such heuristics perform when predicting
individuals' decisions on a new set of data.
Although not a criticism, it should be pointed out that the use of simple
heuristics is not a new discovery in the field of Al, where computer scientists modelling
the environment have been using Classification and Regression Trees (CART) for the
past 15 years (Breiman, Friedman, Olshen, & Stone, 1984; Dutton & Conroy, 1996).
The Take The Best heuristic proposed by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) for example,
is like a simple classification tree (Martignon & Hoffrage, 1999). Williams (1993) used
CART when modelling bail decisions in the American criminal justice system.
In sum, simple, fast and frugal heuristics provide a psychologically plausible
alternative to the regression model, as descriptions of human judgement. There is
evidence to suggest that people use these simple, non-linear, non-compensatory
strategies. Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) remarked that fast and frugal heuristics
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could be used as an alternative to the regression model in research based on Brunswik's
(1952) lens model. "In a one-reason decision making lens, the first discriminating cue
that passes through inhibits any other rays passing through and determines judgment"
(p. 665). Indeed, through his reference to the work of Hull and Frenkel-Brunswik,
Brunswik (1956) himself had earlier considered a notion of non-compensatory cue use.
Therefore, in the research presented in this thesis, a non-linear, non-compensatory fast
and frugal heuristic will be compared with two linear, compensatory models, in terms of
their ability to describe and predict English magistrates' remand decision making
policies.
2.6. Summary and More Research Questions
SJT represents a Bnmswikian approach to the study of human J/DM. Social
judgement theorists attempt to study the process of vicarious functioning, namely how
people cope with the imperfect cause-effect relations between multiple cues and a
criterion, and the redundancy among cues, in order to predict a criterion. Following
Brunswiki they use correlational statistics, and mostly regression analysis, to describe
both the process of vicarious functioning at the individual level, and the probabilistic
nature of the environment to which the individual must adapt.
Researchers have employed the established techniques of JA or policy capturing.
In addition to studying the accuracy of an individual's decisions, social judgement
theorists have also tended to study inter-individual agreement in decisions and policies,
intra-individual consistency in decisions and self-insight into decision making policies.
The findings of this body of research however, are varied, and subject to numerous
methodological criticisms.
As Brehmer (1994) notes, the multiple linear regression model has proved to be
a good fit to judgement data, leading social judgement theorists to generally conclude
that the judgement process is characterised by a linear, compensatory integration of
multiple, differentially weighted cues. In these static, structural models the same cues
are used in the same way on each case. However, other researchers have found evidence
that non-linear and non-compensatory models describe judgement data well, especially
under specific task conditions. Recently, Gigerenzer and his colleagues have found that
simple process models called fast and frugal heuristics that are non-linear, non-
compensatory and can use different cues on different cases, describe both the task
environment and the individual as equally well, and sometimes better than regression
models. However, there are some methodological concerns with these studies.
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Fast and frugal heuristics are easier to understand and are psychologically more
plausible than regression models because they are more compatible with peoples'
cognitive limitations and flexible use of information. Furthermore, the fact that humans
adapt to their environments means that they employ appropriate judgment strategies
given the informational structure and demands of the task. This implies that researchers
must similarly choose models of judgement. However, social judgement theorists have
not compared regression models to alternative models. The pervasive use of regression
models by social judgment theorists is surprising as neither Brunswik nor Hammond
ruled out the use of other models. SJT is not synonymous with the use of regression
models and fast and frugal heuristics present a viable alternative. The research presented
in this thesis aims to integrate the use of fast and frugal heuristics with SJT, in
investigating English magistrates' remand decision making. In doing so, it aims to
overcome some of the methodological limitations of past SJT research and research on
simple heuristics.
In chapter 1, the main aims of the research presented in this thesis were listed,
and the specific questions that arose from a review of English magistrates' remand
decision making. Below are specific questions that have emerged from the review of
SJT and simple heuristics that will be pursued in the research presented in this thesis:
Decision maker related questions:
(a) What is the relative validity of fast and frugal heuristics and regression
models, in describing and predicting magistrates' remand decisions? Are magistrates
basing their decisions on many cues integrated in a linear, compensatory way or are
they using one cue in a non-compensatory way?
(b) How consistent are individual magistrates in their remand decisions?
(c) What are the similarities and differences among different magistrates'
remand decision making policies?
(d) What is the concordance between individual magistrates' self-reported
policies and their policies as inferred from their behaviour (captured by a model)?
(e) How confident are individual magistrates in their remand decisions?
Decision task related questions:
(a) What is the prescriptive utility of fast and frugal heuristics for magistrates'
remand decision making?
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(b) What are the formal properties of the remand decision making task? What
cues are available, what are their values, distributions, and inter-correlations?
(c) Do magistrates' remand decision making policies differ under conditions
where they are presented with representative and unrepresentative cases?
In the next three chapters, three empirical studies are presented that aim to
answer the research questions proposed above and in Chapter 1.
135
3. STUDY ONE'
3.1. Introduction
3.1.1. Background to present study. Although magistrates' remand decision
making is guided by the Bail Act 1976, they are afforded considerable discretion. First,
even when an exception to the right to bail applies, magistrates can nevertheless decide
to grant bail at their discretion. Second, although the law explicitly refers to information
that magistrates could use, it is silent on exactly what information magistrates should
use and how that information should be weighted and integrated, when making remand
decisions. Third, magistrates have discretion as to what conditions they attach to bail.
Criminological research has reported that when making remand decisions,
magistrates use both legal cues, as explicitly referred to in the Bail Act 1976, and extra-
legal cues related to the defendant or the principle of crime control. They rely on the
nature and seriousness of the offence the defendant is charged with, the defendant's
previous convictions, past bail record and the strength of his or her community ties
(Doherty & East, 1985; Jones, 1985; Hucklesby, 1996; Morgan & Henderson, 1998).
Magistrates also rely on the defendant's race (Fitzgerald, 1993; Hood, 1992; Walker,
1989), defendant's gender (Doherty & East, 1985; Eaton, 1987; Hucklesby, 1996;
Jones, 1985; Morgan & Henderson, 1998), the police remand decision (Hucklesby,
1997a; Morgan, 1994; Morgan & Henderson, 1998), and the prosecution request
(Doherty & East, 1985; East & Doherty, 1984; Hucklesby, 1996; 1997a; Morgan &
Henderson, 1998; Zander, 1979). However, the reliability and validity of these findings
is questionable because researchers do not control for the inter-correlations that may
exist between the variables. They also do not control for the information presented to
magistrates, which means that they do not know exactly what information was available
to magistrates at the time the decision was made. Finally, these studies differentiate a
decision to bail (unconditional and conditional) from a decision to remand in custody.
Although this distinction reflects the tone of the Bail Act 1976, it is clear that imposing
conditions or remanding a defendant in custody are punitive measures, which can be
distinguished from releasing a defendant unconditionally. It may be reasonable to
assume that cue use would reflect this distinction.
According to the Bail Act 1976, before a defendant is remanded in custody,
magistrates should consider whether conditions could be attached to bail instead.
I The main findings presented in this chapter are in press (Dhami & Ayton) in the Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making.
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Criminological research has shown that the nature of the conditions imposed is limited
to around eight types including reporting to the police station, residing at a specified
address or hostel, abiding curfew, not contacting specific people or entering a specific
area, and producing a surety (Block, 1990; Raine & Willson, 1994, 1995b). Although
there is no general pattern in the use of such conditions, the most commonly imposed is
residence (Morgan & Henderson, 1998; Raine & Willson, 1994, 1995b). Furthermore,
magistrates attach more than one condition on average (East & Doherty, 1984; Morgan
& Henderson, 1998; Raine & Willson, 1994, 1995b; Zander, 1979). Although
conditional bail is a relatively common decision made by magistrates, relatively little
research has been conducted on the nature and number of conditions attached.
Criminologists have also found variations in the bail and custody rates among
courts that cannot be fully explained by the differences in the cases presented (Jones,
1985; Home Office, 1987; Hucklesby, 1996, 1997a; Morgan & Henderson, 1998; Raine
& Willson, 1994, 1995b). This suggests that there is disagreement among magistrates
working in different courts. In addition, some research prior to the introduction of the
Bail Act 1976 reported that the remand decision making practices of urban and rural
courts were markedly different, with the former being more punitive, for example
(Bottomley, 1970). The above studies are based on an analysis of decisions made on
real cases, which are considered to be similar. The fact that the cases are not exactly the
same means that magistrates may be attending to cues that do distinguish between cases,
and which may explain the apparent disagreement. Finally, no research has investigated
the extent of disagreement among magistrates working within the same court.
It is generally believed that lay and stipendiary magistrates differ in their remand
decision making (e.g., Sanders, 2000; Winfield, 1974). The little evidence that exists
reveals that lay magistrates are more lenient when making remand decisions
(Hucklesby, 1997b), that stipendiary magistrates seek out more information from the
court before making their decisions (e.g., Burrows, 1994), and they are more likely to
disagree with the prosecution request in remand cases (Hucklesby, 1997b). These
findings may however, be partly due to the fact that stipendiary magistrates deal with
more serious and complicated cases. Some studies have failed to find a significant
difference in the remand decisions made by the two types of magistrate (Doherty &
East, 1985; King, 1971). The fact that lay magistrates work on a sporadic basis means
that they may be more inconsistent than stipendiary magistrates who work on a full-time
basis, although this has not been investigated. The differences in the performance of lay
and stipendiary magistrates has not been adequately studied. Indeed, most of the above
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criminological studies do not differentiate between the two type of magistrates (with the
exception of Doherty & East, 1985; East & Doherty, 1984; Hucklesby, 1997b).
Magistrates do not know how useful different information is in predicting
whether a defendant if bailed unconditionally will abscond, offend or interfere with
witnesses. In the English system, there is no formal procedure for providing magistrates
with outcome feedback. These characteristics of the magistrates' remand decision
making task, may prevent them from learning. Therefore, it is likely that there may not
be any differences in the performance of more and less experienced magistrates.
All of the past research on magistrates' remand decision making has been
conducted by criminologists. To date, there is no psychological research on the topic.
Social judgement theory represents a popular psychological approach to the study of
human J/DM in both theoretical and applied contexts (Hammond et al., 1975).
Researchers have however, conducted very few studies of judgement in the legal
domain (with the exceptions of Senisbaugh & Allgeier, 1996; York, 1992). Social
judgement theorists use the method of JA to study psychological issues concerning what
information people use and how they use it when making judgements, intra-individual
consistency in judgements, differences in judgements between people, and peoples'
insight into their judgement policies (Cooksey, 1996a, 1996b; Stewart, 1988). Reviews
of the emergent research have concluded that judgements are the result of a few
differentially weighted cues combined in a linear, additive (compensatory) way; that
people are often inconsistent in their decisions; there are inter-individual differences or
disagreement among their judgment policies for the same task; and they lack insight
into their own judgment policies (Brehmer, 1994; Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988; Cooksey,
1996a; Libby & Lewis, 1982; Hammond et al., 1975; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971). In
addition, research on post-decisional confidence has revealed that despite their
inaccuracy people are highly confident in their judgement abilities (Zakay, 1997).
However, there are numerous exceptions to these findings, and for many
reasons, these findings may lack internal and external validity. First, social judgement
theorists' understanding of the judgement process has been dominated by their
traditional use of the multiple linear regression model. They have rarely studied the
descriptive and predictive validity of other non-linear and/or non-compensatory models.
Their use of the regression model has been criticised on the grounds that it is not
psychologically plausible, flexible and adaptive (Dhami & Harries, 2001). Recently,
"fast and frugal" models, which are simple process models that often represent non-
compensatory behaviour, have been proposed as alternatives to the regression model
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(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer et al., 1999b). In what have mostly been
simulation studies, it has been found that fast and frugal heuristics are as relatively
equally good as multiple linear regression models when predicting an outcome criterion
on the data used to form the models, and are better when predicting an outcome
criterion on a new set of data. In addition, these heuristics use markedly less information
than the multiple linear regression models. However, most studies only compared the
models with regard to their overall fit and did not analyse their relative proneness to
making type I and type II errors. In some studies the measures of the dependent variable
(i.e., judgements) were not the same across the models (Czerlinski et al., 1999;
Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996, 1999; Gigerenzer et al., 1999a) and in one study the
measures of the independent variables (i.e., cues) were not the same across the models
(Slegers et al., 2000). Although there are now a handful of studies comparing these
models on behavioral data (Dhami & Harries, 2001; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999;
Slegers et al., 2000), at the time the research presented in this thesis was conducted
there were none, and this was the first to do so.
Second, social judgement theorists rarely cross-validate or test the
generalisability of their models. Third, there are many problems associated with how
cue use is defined and measured when using regression models (Dawes & Corrigan,
1974) and when using inter-correlated cues (Darlington, 1968), leading to cue use being
depicted as more cognitively complex and less plausible under certain task conditions.
Fourth, the lack of correspondence between an individual's judgement policy as
captured by the regression model and his or her self-reported policy, which researchers
interpret as a lack of insight, may be explained by other factors. These include the fact
that the regression model may not be a true description of an individual's policy, and
that the method used to capture self-reported policies may be inadequate in yielding a
true description (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Reilly & Doherty, 1989, 1992). Thus, it
may be more meaningful to compare an individual's private policy as captured by a
model against his or her self-reported public statement of policy. Finally, although one
of the aims of SJT research is to improve judgement, researchers rarely elicit peoples'
confidence in their decisions. According to Zakay (1997), post-decisional confidence
may be an indicator of willingness to change judgement behaviour.
3.1.2. Rationale for present study. One rationale for the first empirical study
presented in this thesis was to examine the validity of the concerns raised by
criminologists regarding the cues magistrates use, the conditions they attach to bail and
the disagreement they demonstrate when making remand decisions. Another rationale
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was to extend our understanding of magistrates' remand decision making to the
psychological issues typically investigated by social judgement theorists, namely
information processing, intra-individual inconsistency in decisions, concordance
between explicit and implicit judgment policies, and post-decisional confidence.
In a similar vein to the past criminological research reviewed above, the present
study investigated the remand decisions made by magistrates sitting in the adult
magistrates' court where defendants are aged 18 and over.2
3.1.3. Aims of present study. The main aims of the present study were to:
(a) Examine the distribution of the remand decisions made by individual
magistrates on a set of hypothetical cases.
(b) Identify the number and type of conditions individual magistrates impose.
(c) Measure individual magistrates' consistency in making remand decisions
using a test-retest situation.
(d) Examine individual magistrates' frequency of disagreement from the modal
remand decisions made by magistrates on the same cases.
(e) Measure individual magistrates' post-decisional confidence.
(f) Investigate how individual magistrates make remand decisions, in terms of
the cues they use and how they weight and combine these cues to form a
decision, by modelling their decision making policies using a compensatory
integration model and a non-compensatory fast and frugal heuristic.
(g) Demonstrate the concordance between individual magistrates' explicit,
publicly stated decision making policies and their implicit, private policies as
captured by the model that best describes and predicts their decisions.
(h) Identify the similarities and differences between lay and stipendiary
magistrates on (a) to (g).
(i) Investigate the relationship between magistrates' experience on the bench
and their performance on (a) to (g).
(j) Examine the similarities and differences between magistrates from
metropolitan and provincial courts on (a) to (g).
Based on the review of the past research presented above, and in Chapters 1 and
2, a number of hypotheses are formulated. It is hypothesised that magistrates will attach
more than one condition to bail on average, with residence as the most frequently
imposed condition. It is hypothesised that magistrates will show some degree of
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inconsistency in their decisions; that they will demonstrate disagreement from the
modal response on at least some cases; and that their post-decisional confidence will be
high. It is also hypothesised that consistency will be the upper bound for the fit of a
model; and that a non-compensatory fast and frugal heuristic will demonstrate greater
descriptive and predictive validity than a linear compensatory model. It is hypothesised
that magistrates will use few cues; that at least some will use "extra-legal" cues, which
magistrates will not report as being important. With regard to lay and stipendiary
differences, it is hypothesised that the former will be less punitive, and more
inconsistent, and stipendiary magistrates will use more cues. It is hypothesised that
post-decisional confidence will increase with experience. It is hypothesised that
magistrates in metropolitan courts will be more punitive than those in provincial courts.
3.2. Method
3.2.1. Design. Magistrates from a random sample of courts throughout the
English criminal justice system individually completed a bail decision making task
followed by a ranking task. The former consisted of 41 hypothetical cases, comprising
an orthogonal combination of nine cues. Magistrates made remand decisions and
provided post-decisional confidence ratings on these cases. Twenty-seven of the cases
were used to capture magistrates' decision making policies, 7 cases were used to cross-
validate the models, and 7 cases, which were duplicated from the set of 27, were used to
measure test-retest consistency of magistrates' decisions. The ranking task was used to
capture magistrates' self-reported (i.e., public) policies. Here, magistrates ranked the
nine cues in order of the importance they had on their decisions.
3.2.2. Participants. Two hundred and seventy booklets were distributed by mail
to practising magistrates sitting in a random sample of 51 courts in England and Wales.
The sampling frame was obtained from Shaw's 1996/97 directory of courts in the
United Kingdom (Morris, 1996). Eighty-one magistrates from 44 courts, fully
completed and returned the materials within the time limit. The 30% response rate is
high for a postal survey involving participants from a "closed group".
The sample of magistrates who participated are considered to be representative
of the magistracy in the English system. Of those who chose to reveal their
demographic characteristics, 70 were lay magistrates and nine were stipendiary
magistrates. Magistrates' mean years of experience on the bench was 13.30 (SD = 8.17,
2 The criminological literature reviewed in this thesis deals with remand decisions made in the adult
magistrates court. It is evident that remand decisions made in these courts are not completely comparable
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N= 79). Forty-six magistrates sat in courts located in metropolitan areas and 32 sat in
courts located in provincial areas.3
3.2.3. Construction of Bail Decision Making Task.
Identification and selection of cues. In the present study, nine cues were
manipulated in the hypothetical cases. These were treated as the predictors in the
models of magistrates' decision making policies. Eleven cues were held constant and
used to provide background information to the cases. All of the cues were identified on
the basis of a task analysis which involved: (a) a review of the law on bail; (b) a review
of the literature on remand decision making; (c) an analysis of a bail decision making
training package for lay magistrates; (d) observations of 35 bail hearings in both lay and
stipendiary magistrates' courtrooms in two courts; and (e) semi-structured individual
interviews with six lay magistrates, one stipendiary magistrate and two clerks to the
justices. Table 3.1 presents the cues identified on the basis of this task analysis.
Details of the reviews of the law on bail and of the literature were provided
above and in Chapter 1, but for a summary see columns three and four in Table 3.1. The
"Bail Risk Exercise" was produced by the Magistrates' Association (Miles & Thomson,
1992). This training involves two sessions, together lasting 2 and a 1/2 hours. In the first
session, magistrates learn about the key features of the law on bail, which includes a list
of the information that they should search for and consider. In the second session,
magistrates are presented with three hypothetical cases on which they must make a
remand decision. Two of the cases were relatively short and the other was more
detailed. Although this training package was produced by the Magistrates' Association,
it is common for training to be organised by the clerks' to the justices of individual
courts. An examination of a training package developed and used by a clerk to the
justices in an inner London court revealed no differences in the content of the
hypothetical cases used by the Magistrates' Association. Therefore, the package
developed by the Magistrates' Association is considered representative of the training
materials used in individual courts. The fifth column in Table 3.1 presents the cues that
were identified on the basis of an analysis of this training package.
The observations were conducted in one week in November 1996 at a court
located in the West Midlands and one week in May 1997 at a London court. Data was
gathered on the nature of the verbal and non-verbal information available to magistrates
with the decisions made by magistrates in the youth courts (see e.g., Cavadino & Gibson, 1993).
3 Courts were classified as metropolitan or provincial according to the list of cities and towns provided by
the internet site: http://dir.yahoo.com/Regional/Countries/United_Kingdom/England/Cities_and  _Towns.
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during bail hearings and the information provided in the courtsheet. The cues that were
identified via the observational analysis are presented in the sixth column of Table 3.1.
The order of the proceedings and the source of the information was also noted
because it would be used to help make the cases realistic. Although there are no
statutory rules of procedure governing remand proceedings in magistrates' courts, it was
found that in the two courts, the proceedings generally began with the case number
being called out by the clerk. At which point magistrates turned to their courtsheet, and
the defendant entered the witness box. The clerk then asked the defendant to verify his
or her name, address and date of birth, and then announced the offence the defendant
was charged with and the defendant's plea. Adjournments were then requested by the
court, the prosecution or the defence, for a number of reasons. Then, if the defence was
applying for bail, it put forward it's request and reasons. This was followed by the
prosecution's remand request and reasons. Finally, the magistrates made their remand
decision. It should be noted that in the large majority of cases the information provided
was scant. Rarely did the magistrates consult with the clerk on matters pertaining to the
law and rarely did they address the defendant directly. Magistrates were often faced
with a caseload of over 30 cases in a morning session. The pace of the bail hearings was
also timed from when the defendant entered the courtroom to when the decision was
announced. It was found that in one session magistrates made their decisions in on
average 3.23 minutes (SD = 1.54, N= 20).
The experience of the lay and stipendiary magistrates who were interviewed
ranged from 6 to 25 years. The interviews were conducted in the interviewees'
respective courts. They lasted from 30 minutes to 2 hours. Interviewees were told that
the information provided would be used to develop a set of hypothetical cases that may
be heard in the courtroom, and which require a remand decision to be made.
Confidentiality was assured. Written records of the interviews were taken during the
interview as interviewees were not comfortable with tape-recording. Interviewees were
first asked to list the information that is available and that they consider important for
making a remand decision. The findings are presented in final column of Table 3.1,
where an "X" denotes the identification of a cue. They were then presented with a
hypothetical case (see Appendix C) and asked to comment on its content validity, and
how it could be improved. Three of the interviewees (two lay magistrates and one
stipendiary) said that they would need more information before they could make a
remand decision, and the others said that there was sufficient information on which to
base a decision. All of the interviewees said that the case was realistic.
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Looking at Table 3.1 it is clear that the task analysis yielded a long list of cues
that may be available to magistrates in the courtroom when they make their remand
decisions. Many of the cues that were frequently identified have been studied in the past
by criminologists. These cues were therefore, selected to be manipulated and studied in
the present study, thus enabling comparison with past research. The nine cues and their
values are listed in the first two columns of Table 3.2. Although some of these cues may
not always be available to magistrates in the courtroom as mentioned earlier, their
inclusion in the present study will provide evidence of their use when they are available.
Eleven of the other frequently identified cues were used to provide background
information to the cases. These cues were therefore held constant. They are: how the
defendant came to court, the number of charges against the defendant, the defendant's
plea, whether the defendant was present in court, the defendant's legal representation,
circumstances of the adjournment, length of the adjournment, who requested the
adjournment, the number of previous adjournments and bail applications, defence
application for bail, and the availability of a surety. See Appendix D for the background
information provided to the cases in the present study.
Construction of cases. The aim was to examine the effects of each cue on the
decisions independently of the effects of other cues. This can be achieved at either the
design stage using an orthogonal design or the analysis stage using partial correlations,
for example. Correlation based analysis such as hierarchical logistic regression requires
a large case:cue ratio to establish stable beta weights (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996),
implying that in the present study at least 122 cases would be needed to study the nine
cues. A pilot study on 20 postgraduate law students from City University, revealed that
participants would be willing to complete a maximum number of about 40 cases.4
Magistrates are also unlikely to complete a time consuming task. The low response rate
in other SJT studies was partly explained by the time consuming nature of the task (e.g.,
Sensibaugh & Allgeier, 1996). Therefore, inter-cue correlations were eliminated at the
design stage. The fact that little is known about the inter-cue correlations in the
courtroom during bail hearings means that for now, little can be said about how this
may affect the representativeness of the cases (Brunswik, 1956). Indeed, orthogonal
designs are common in research using JA (Dhami et al., in preparation).
4 These students were presented with 48 hypothetical cases similar to the one used in the interviews
during the task analysis and subsequently the study. They were asked to make remand decisions on them.
All of the students stated that they knew what a remand decision was. They were told that the main aim of
the pilot was to ascertain the optimum number of cases that should be presented to magistrates, and so
they should stop completing the task when they felt bored or tired.
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A complete combination of the cue values would have yielded an unmanageable
number of cases (i.e., 2x3 x2x3 x3 x3 x 6x2x2= 7,776). Therefore, a fractional
factorial design was used. The cues were combined using the orthogonal design option
in SPSS version 7.5 for windows to elicit the smallest subset of possible cases whilst
simultaneously retaining the orthogonality of the cues. This yielded a set of 27 cases
(i.e., the modelling set) and created a main effects design. In similar circumstances other
studies have taken advantage of techniques that reduce the number of cases selected
without comprising the orthogonality of the cues (e.g., Brown & Allgeier, 1996;
Rothert, 1982; Wigton, Poses, Collings, & Cebul, 1990). The values of the nine cues
and the distribution of their values in the modelling set are shown in Table 3.2. In
addition, the program was used to select a further seven cases (i.e., the holdout set) that
would be used to validate the models fitted on the modelling set. Finally, seven cases
were randomly selected from the modelling set and duplicated (although the names of
the defendants were changed) to measure test-retest consistency. 5 Altogether that makes
41 cases - about the maximum that had been established respondents would be prepared
to complete. The cases in the modelling set, holdout set and duplicate set are presented
in Appendix D, with the cue values as coded in Table 3.2.
5 A change in the name did not alter the race or gender of the defendant.
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As can be seen in Table 3.2, the cue values were equally distributed among the
set of 27 cases for the tripartite cues. The unequal distributions of the dichotomous cues
namely gender, age, proscase and comties, and the pcbr cue which had six levels,
reflected their general real world distributions, as established by the courtroom
observations conducted during the task analysis. For example, there were more males
than females in the set of 27 cases.
The cues were placed in the order as shown in Table 3.2 and were in the same
order in each case for ease of reading. Despite the lack of procedural rules for bail
hearings, the courtroom observations suggested that there was a general order for most
of the cues that are being studied here. For example, as cases aren't always heard in the
order they are presented on the courtsheet, magistrates generally see the defendant's
gender and race upon his or her entrance into the courtroom when a case is called,
before they learn of the offence he or she is charged with which is on the courtsheet.
Although the inter-cue correlations may not be representative (Brunswik, 1955b, 1956),
the construct and face validity of the task were assessed by two magistrates. They
compared the hypothetical cases to those presented in court and concluded that they
were plausible. See Appendix D for a copy of a hypothetical case used in the study.
The cases were presented in a random order to eliminate any order effects due to
unfamiliarity with the task and shifts in attention.6 The holdout cases were randomly
intermixed with the cases in the modelling set. The duplicate cases were placed at the
end to restrict the probability of two identical cases being presented one after another.
Participants were insfructed to respond to the hypothetical cases by firstly
choosing a remand decision. The decision options were: unconditional bail, conditional
bail (with the conditions specified) or remand in custody. Participants were then asked
to indicate how certain they were that they had made the appropriate decision, based on
the information provided, on an 11-point scale. Zero on the scale represented
"absolutely uncertain" and 10 represented "absolutely certain". Studies of confidence
usually ask participants if they made the correct decision, however this is not suitable
for the present study as accuracy cannot be measured. Post-decisional confidence
ratings were requested for each decision individually rather than for the set of decisions
overall because cases differed in terms of the information provided (i.e., on the cue
values) and magistrates may feel more confident deciding on one case than on another.
6 Although analysis will be conducted at the individual level, comparisons will be conducted over
individuals too and so it is appropriate to randomise the cases.
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3.2.4. Ranking Task. A direct ranking task was used to capture magistrates'
explicit remand decision making policies. Participants were asked to rank order the nine
cues according to the relative importance they attached to them when making remand
decisions on the hypothetical cases presented in the bail decision making task. A rank
order of one indicated the most important cue. This ranking method is simpler than the
rating methods that are commonly used in JA studies (see Cook & Stewart, 1975).
3.2.5. Procedure. The bail decision making task was followed by the ranking
task in a booklet format. The booklet also contained instructions that listed the nine cues
and described the two tasks. Participants were instructed to complete the tasks
individually, to complete them in the order presented, not to spend too much time on
each case, and not to return to cases which had been completed. Participants were also
asked to specify what further information, if any, they would have liked in order to
make decisions in the bail decision making task. Participants' demographic details,
namely type of magistrate, location of court and number of years of experience on the
bench were also requested. The extent of magistrates' experience in making remand
decisions was not requested as their sporadic work pattern may prevent accurate recall.
A handful of booklets were sent to each court, addressed to the court manager,
who was informed of the study and asked to distribute them to magistrates in their
courthouse. Magistrates' names and addresses are not made public. The Magistrates'
Association had advised me to gain access to magistrates in individual courts via their
managers (Bracey, personal communication, 1997). A covering letter was included in
the booklet for magistrates that introduced the study, guaranteed respondents anonymity
and requested volunteers to participate in the study. Magistrates were provided with a
stamped, self-addressed envelope, and told to return the completed materials with three
weeks.
3.3. Analysis and Results7
3.3.1. Remand decisions made. Magistrates made from 2 to 23 unconditional
bail decisions (M= 12.07, SD = 4.86), 2 to 25 conditional bail decisions (M = 12.09, SD
= 4.20) and 0 to 9 remand in custody decisions (M= 2.84, SD = 2.52), on cases in the
modelling set.
Contrary to the prediction, there was no significant difference between lay and
stipendiary magistrates in terms of the decision made on the 27 cases (U= 301.00, 1-
tailed p> 0.025). The median was conditional bail for both groups (N = 9, N = 70). As
7 Note that the level of significance for 2-tailed tests was 0.05, and 0.025 for 1-tailed tests.
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predicted, there was a significant difference in the median decision made on the 27
cases between magistrates located in metropolitan and provincial courts (U 530.00, 1-
tailed p < 0.025). The median decision was unconditional bail for provincial courts (N --
32) and conditional bail for metropolitan courts (N = 46). There was a significant
Kendall's tau-b correlation of-0.19 between magistrates' years of experience on the
bench and the median decision they made over the 27 cases (2-tailedp < 0.05, N = 79).
3.3.2. Conditions attached to bail. For each magistrate, the mean number of
conditions imposed in the modelling set was calculated. Across the whole sample, the
grand mean number of conditions imposed in cases where defendants were granted
conditional bail in the modelling set was 1.58 (SD = 0.34, N= 81). The grand mean
number of conditions imposed by lay magistrates was 1.54 (SD = 0.30, N = 70) and by
stipendiary magistrates was 1.87 (SD = 0.50, N = 9). Magistrates located in metropolitan
courts imposed a significantly greater grand mean number of conditions (M =
 
1.65, SD
= 0.36) than did magistrates from provincial courts (M = 1.48, SD = 0.29) (t[76] = 2.25,
1-tailed p < 0.025). There was no significant correlation between magistrates'
experience on the bench and the mean number of conditions they imposed (r = -0.14, 2-
tailed p> 0.05, N = 79). Across the whole sample, a total of 1,527 conditions were
imposed in the modelling set. Figure 3.1 illustrates the nature of the conditions imposed
in the cases granted conditional bail.
other
Figure 3.1. Nature of conditions attached to bail by whole sample on modelling set
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3.3.3. Intra-magistrate consistency. Each magistrate's consistency in making
remand decisions was measured by computing a Cohen's Kappa value which corrects
for chance. The decisions made on the set of seven duplicate cases were compared with
those made on their original counterparts in the modelling set. The Kappa value ranges
from 0 (indicating that agreement or consistency is no better than chance) to 1
(indicating perfect agreement or consistency). For the whole sample, Kappa ranged
from 0 to 1 (M= 0.69, SD = 0.28). Fleiss (1981) suggests that a value of 0.40 to 0.60 is
"fair", 0.60 to 0.75 is "good" and a value above 0.75 is "excellent". The value of Kappa
was below 0.40 for 12 magistrates, it was "fair" for 18 magistrates, "good" for 20
magistrates, and "excellent" for 31 (perfect for 29) magistrates.
The consistency of lay and stipendiary magistrates was also compared. For the
70 lay magistrates, Kappa ranged from 0 to 1 (M= 0.68, SD = 0.28). For the 9
stipendiary magistrates, Kappa ranged from 0.09 to 1 (M= 0.74, SD = 0.31). There was
no significant difference in the Kappa value of magistrates located in metropolitan and
provincial courts (t[76] = 0.61, 2-tailed p> 0.05). There was no significant correlation
between the magistrates' Kappa value or consistency and their experience on the bench
(r = 0.11, 2-tailed p > 0.05, N= 79).
3.3.4. Disagreement among magistrates. Two or more magistrates responded
from 19 of the courts, and it was found that magistrates from within these courts made
different decisions on some of the 27 cases.
In the present study, disagreement was defined by whether different magistrates
made the same decision on the same case, the percentage of magistrates who disagreed
with the modal response on each case was calculated. There was some disagreement
among magistrates as to the decision to be made on each of the 27 cases in the
modelling set. This figure ranged from 4.90% to 50.00% of magistrates (M= 31.40%,
SD = 14.43). A Kendall's tau-b correlation was computed to examine the relationship
between the extent of disagreement shown on a case and the modal decision on that
case. A nonsignificant correlation of 0.25 was found (2-tailed p> 0.05, N = 27).
Magistrates disagreed with the modal response on from 4 to 25 cases (M=
14.95, SD = 4.80). Lay magistrates disagreed from the modal response on from 4 to 25
cases (M= 14.96, SD = 4.90) and stipendiary magistrates disagreed on from 7 to 22
cases (M= 14.89, SD = 4.94). Magistrates from metropolitan courts disagreed
significantly more often from the modal response (M = 16.17, SD = 4.82) than did
magistrates from provincial courts (M = 13.31, SD = 4.42) (t[76] = 2.67, 2-tailed p <
0.05). There was a significant Pearson's correlation of-0.31 between the number of
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cases on which magistrates disagreed from the modal response and their experience on
the bench (2-tailed p < 0.05, N = 79).
There was no significant correlation between the number of cases magistrates
disagreed with the modal response and their consistency in decisions as measured by
Cohen's Kappa (r = -0.08, 2-tailed p > 0.05, N = 81).
3.3.5. Magistrates' post-decisional confidence. For each magistrate, a
Kendall's tau-b correlation was computed to examine the relationship between the
decisions made on the cases in the modelling set and the confidence ratings provided for
these decisions. For the whole sample, the correlations ranged from -0.68 to 0.51 (M= -
0.23, SD = 0.25). The correlation was statistically significant for 29 magistrates, and it
was negative for 27 of these magistrates (2-tailed p < 0.05, N= 27, n = 75). 8
Mean post-decisional confidence ratings in decisions made over the cases in the
modelling set were then calculated for each magistrate. For the whole sample, these
ranged from 6.22 to 10 (M = 8.31, SD= 0.96). For the lay magistrates, mean post-
decisional confidence ratings ranged from 6.22 to 10 (M= 8.27, SD = 0.94). The
stipendiary magistrates' mean post-decisional confidence ratings ranged from 7.22 to 10
(M = 8.87, SD = 0.95). Contrary to the prediction, there was no significant difference in
the grand mean post-decisional confidence ratings of magistrates located in
metropolitan and provincial courts (t[74] --= 0.19, 2-tailed p > 0.05). 9 There was also no
significant correlation between magistrates' mean post-decisional confidence ratings and
their experience on the bench (r = 0.10, 1-tailed p > 0.025, N = 79).
In order to examine the relationship between magistrates' mean post-decisional
confidence ratings and their consistency in decisions (as measured by Cohen's Kappa),
a Pearson's correlation was computed between these two variables. No statistically
significant correlation was found (r = 0.00, 2-tailed p > 0.05, N= 81). There was also no
significant correlation between magistrates' mean post-decisional confidence ratings
and their extent of disagreement as measured by the number of cases each magistrate
disagreed from the modal response (r = -0.09, 2-tailed p> 0.05, N= 81).
3.3.6. Modelling magistrates' remand decision making policies. The
polytomous cues were dichotomised for ease of analysis and for each cue, all non-
italicised values were coded as 0 and italicised values were coded as 1 (see notes to
Table 3.2). The dichotomisation was based on the findings of the interviews conducted
8 Here, n refers to the number of correlations computed, while N refers to the size of the sample on which
the correlation was computed.
9 A Levene's test for homogeneity of variance was significant (p < 0.05) and so a Mest for unequal
variances was used.
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for the task analysis, and so should reflect how magistrates may simplify the.
information presented in the courtroom. The inter-cue correlations remained zero. The
three decision options were also simplified into a binary decision, where unconditional
bail represented a non-punitive decision and conditional bail or remand in custody
together represented a punitive decision. Analysis of the frequency of the decisions
made by each magistrate on the modelling set revealed that magistrates made a
relatively equal number of punitive and non-punitive decisions. The remand decision
making policy of each magistrate was modelled on the set of 27 cases.
Although the aim was to compare the ability of a non-compensatory fast and
frugal heuristic with a regression model such as logistic regression, this was not
possible because of the low case to cue ratio (i.e., 3:1). Instead, two of the other models
used by Gigerenzer and his colleagues, namely Franklin's rule and Dawes' rule were
used in the present study. These models were discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Suffice it
to say that both models provide characterisations of judgment behaviour similar to that
provided by a regression model in that they involve a linear, compensatory integration
of multiple cues. Moreover, although both models do not weight the cues optimally in
the way the least squares method does in a regression model for example, studies have
demonstrated that both models are excellent approximations to regression models in
terms of descriptive and predictive validity (e.g., Claudy, 1972; Czerlinksi et al., 1999;
Dawes & Corrigan, 1974; Dorans & Drasgow, 1978; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975;
Gigerenzer et al., 1999a; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Schmidt, 1971, 1972).
At the time this study was conducted the only fast and frugal heuristics
published were for binary choice tasks (see Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). There were
none for categorisation tasks like the remand decision making task studied here. For the
research presented in this thesis, a new fast and frugal heuristic for binary categorisation
tasks, called the Matching Heuristic, was developed. 10
 This model bears all the
hallmarks of a fast and frugal heuristic. It has a precisely specified step-by-step process
that comprises principles for information search, stop, and decision making. It is fast
and frugal because it does not search for all of the available and relevant information
and does not require much computation because it bases a decision on one cue alone.
The procedure for modelling magistrates' remand decision making policies using
each of the three models (Franklin's rule, Dawes' rule and the Matching Heuristic) will
be described below. All of the models were developed so that they aimed to predict a
I ° This model was first presented in a poster at the annual meeting of the Society for Judgment and
Decision Making, 1998, November 21-23, Dallas, Texas.
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punitive decision and only predicted a non-punitive decision by default. This is the
procedure followed by the law on bail. Then, the results of the three models' ability to
describe and predict magistrates' decisions made on the modelling set, followed by the
holdout set, will be presented. The model that proved the best on average across
magistrates was accepted as the description of magistrates' remand decision making
policies.
Franklin's rule." In this model each cue was weighted according to its
influence on the decision. Then, for each case, this model multiplied the cue values by
their weights and then summed them. (Where a case is made up of binary cues, the cues
can be coded 0 and 1 and so the sum is the sum of the weights alone for all cues taking a
value of 1 in the case.) If the sum was equal or greater than the threshold value then a
punitive decision was predicted. If not, then a non-punitive decision was predicted.
In order to compute a cue weight, the proportions of the values on a cue that
were treated punitively in the set of 27 cases were calculated separately. The greater
proportion was taken as the weight for the whole cue. For example, if the proportion of
males treated punitively was greater than the proportion of females treated punitively,
then the former proportion would have been the weight for the gender cue. (See step 1
below.) Cue weights could alternatively have been calculated using methods such as the
likelihood ratio, phi coefficient and chi square. These methods take into account all of
the information (i.e., number of males treated punitively or non-punitively and number
of females treated punitively or non-punitively). The method used in the present study
also does this because column totals for each cue are the same for all cues as each
magistrate made a specific number of punitive and non-punitive decisions.12
The threshold valuL was calculated by first taking the sum of the cue weights for
each of the 27 cases, then totalling these 27 sums, and then dividing the total by the
number of cases (i.e., 27). Hence, the threshold value was defined as the mean of the
sums across the cases in the modelling set. This is a reasonable method for calculating
the threshold value because each magistrate made roughly an equal number of punitive
and non-punitive decisions.
11 When Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) used Franklin's rule for a two alternative choice task, the model
calculated a sum for each alternative, and the alternative with the highest sum was chosen. The same was
true for Dawes' rule. Thus, there was no need for a threshold. I would like to thank Laura Martignon and
Torsten Morhbach for their advice on how to make these models amenable for a categorisation task such
as that studied here.
12 Although the weights could be optimised through various techniques and the goodness of fit could be
recalculated, the model would overfit the data and so would do worse at generalising to the holdout set.
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Step 1: Calculation of cue weight for gender cue as used by hypothetical magistrate is
14/18 = 0.78 versus 3/9 = 0.33. Therefore weight of gender is 0.78.
Treated	 Treated
non-	 punitively
punitively
Gender cue Total
Male 14 18
Female 6 3 9
Total 10	 17 27
To provide a different example taken from the modelling set, magistrate-i's
remand decision making policy as described by Franklin's rule is used to predict this
magistrates' decision on case three. In this case the defendant was male, Asian, aged 18,
charged with a triable-either way offence, the prosecution requested conditions be
attached to bail, he had no previous convictions and a good bail record, the prosecution
case was strong, he had strong community ties, and the police bailed him with a surety.
The weights attached to the cues were as follows: gender(0)(0.72) + race(1)(0.67) +
age(0)(0.67) + offence(1)(0.78) + prosreq(1)(0.72) + pcbr(0)(0.73) + proscase(0)(0.78)
+ comties(0)(0.67) + polbail(1)(0.67)
The sum is 2.84, which is less than the 3.52 threshold value calculated for this
magistrate. Thus, in this case, Franklin's rule would incorrectly predict that magistrate-1
made a non-punitive decision.
Dawes' rule. For each case, this model counted how many cues pointed in a
positive direction, and if the unit sum of these was greater than or equal to the threshold
value, it predicted a punitive decision. If not, it predicted a non-punitive decision.
The positive direction of a cue was defined as the value of that cue with the
greatest proportion that had been treated punitively in the set of 27 cases. For example,
if the proportion of males in the set of 27 cases treated punitively was greater than the
proportion females treated punitively, then the value male on the gender cue would
point in a positive direction. The value of a cue that pointed in a positive direction was
then given a weight of 1, while the any other value was given a weight of 0. The
threshold was determined as in Franklin's rule, namely by taking the mean of the sums
across the cases in the modelling set.
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If yes, then predict a
punitive decision.
If yes, then predict a
punitive decision.
If not, then predict a
non-punitive
decision.
Does the I rank
ordered cue have a
critical value?
If not, then does the
2nd rank ordered cue
have a critical value?
As an example, on case three, magistrate-l's Dawes' rule sums to 4, which is
less than the 5.89 threshold value calculated for this magistrate. Thus, Dawes' rule
would also incorrectly predict that magistrate-1 made a non-punitive decision.
Matching Heuristic. This heuristic searched through K of the available cues in
rank order of importance, looking for a critical value on each cue that indicated a
punitive decision. If a critical value was found the heuristic stopped searching and
predicted a punitive decision. Otherwise, the heuristic searched through the value of the
next rank ordered cue. The heuristic continued this procedure until K cues had been
searched. If by this time no critical value had been found the heuristic predicted a non-
punitive decision. For illustrative purposes, Figure 3.2 shows the remand decision
making process by a Matching Heuristic where K = 2.
Figure 3.2. Flowchart of Matching Heuristic (K = 2)
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Where K> 1, the performance of the Matching Heuristic is not equivalent to a
linear model because once the cues are ranked, the first cue is checked as to whether it
attains a critical value. If it does not, the second cue is checked, and so forth. This
process cannot be rendered by a linear model. Any linear model would assign fixed
coefficients to the cues and take the product of the coefficient multiplied by the cue
value, independent of what this value is (Martignon, personal communication, 1999).
Once a decision is made on the basis of a cue that attains a critical value, the values of
other cues cannot alter it. Binary cues are related to the judgements in a linear way,
however, polytomous cues are related to the judgements in a non-linear when the
critical cue value is a midrange value.
The following three steps describe how the critical values on the cues, the rank
ordering of cues and K are determined for each magistrate. First, a critical value was
defined as the value on a cue that was most frequently treated punitively in the set of 27
cases. For example, for magistrate-1, the critical value for the gender cue was male
because this magistrate made a punitive decision on more male defendants than female
defendants. (See step 1 below.) Therefore, despite no explicit inclusion of base rates, the
critical value was affected by the fact that there were actually more males than females
in the modelling set. If the absolute frequencies of the number of cases treated
punitively were equal among the values of a cue, then the value with the lowest absolute
frequency treated non-punitively was chosen. The lowest absolute frequency in this
situation would result in choosing the cue value with the highest ratio of punitive to not
non-punitive decisions. Note that where the cue is polytomous, the values with the
lowest frequency treated non-punitively are only checked for the values with the equal
frequencies treated punitively. Where the absolute frequencies of the number of cases
treated non-punitively were also equal, a critical cue value was chosen randomly.
Step 1: The critical cue value for gender cue as used by hypothetical magistrate is male.
Treated
	 Treated
non-	 punitively
punitively
Gender cue Total
Male 4 14 18
Female 6 3 9
Total 10	 17 27
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Second, a cue utilisation validity was calculated for each cue and was defined as
the proportion of cases with the critical value that were treated punitively in the
modelling set. For magistrate-1, for example, the validity of the gender cue was defined
as the proportion of male defendants who were treated punitively. See step 2 below. The
validities were then used to rank order the nine cues, where the first rank was assigned
to the largest validity. This rank order indicated the order in which the heuristic
searched through the cues. Cues with a tied rank order were placed in the order they
were presented in the judgment task.
Step 2: Calculation of cue utilisation validity of gender cue as used by hypothetical
magistrate is 14/18 = 0.78.
Treated	 Treated
non-	 punitively
punitively
Gender cue Total
Male 4 14 18
Female 6 3 9
Total 10	 17 27
Finally, in order to choose the maximum number of cues for the heuristic to
search (K), the overall fit of the heuristic with all nine possible maxima was
systematically tested on the modelling set. 13 The heuristic with the best overall fit in
terms of percentage of correct predictions was chosen as the heuristic of the magistrates'
remand decision making policy and where two or more heuristics had the same fit, the
more parsimonious heuristic (i.e., searching the fewest cues) was chosen. Parsimony is
the hallmark of the fast and frugal approach, which emphasises simplicity. As Figure
3.3 illustrates, a heuristic that looked at only 1 cue was the best overall fit for
magistrate-1. The Matching Heuristic stated that this magistrate only used the offence
cue to make a decision; where a serious offence (triable-either way or indictable)
predicted a punitive decision and a summary offence predicted a non-punitive decision.
13 The procedure of obtaining the maximum number of cues searched is similar to that used for CART
known as "growing" and "pruning" trees (see Breiman et al., 1984).
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Thus, for case three, magistrate-l's Matching Heuristic would only search for
information regarding the offence and would correctly predict a punitive decision.
A Matching Heuristic which searched through 1 cue only (out of a possible 9
cues) (K = 1) proved to be the best overall fit for 75.30% of the sample. K = 2 for 21%
of magistrates and K = 3 for the remaining 3.70% of magistrates.
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Figure 3.3. Overall fit of Matching Heuristic on modelling set as a function of the
number of cues searched for magistrate-1
Comparison of models. In the Matching Heuristic, the critical cue value refers
to the positive direction of a cue as used in Dawes' rule, and the cue utilisation validity
refers to the unit weights in Dawes' rule and the cue weights in Franklin's rule. The
three models differ in their calculation of these. Although in the hypothetical example
given above, all models arrived at the same conclusion, namely that for the gender cue,
males should be treated more punitively than females, there are situations in which the
models would arrive at different conclusions. For instance, in a situation where the
number of males and females treated non-punitively and punitively by the hypothetical
magistrate are reversed, Franklin's rule would weight the gender cue based on the
proportion of females treated punitively. Dawes' rule would conclude that females point
in a positive direction and so are given a weight of 1. However, in the Matching
Heuristic the critical cue value would remain male and the cue utilisation validity would
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be based on the proportion of males treated punitively. It is also clear, that the. Matching
Heuristic does not take account of all of the information in the 2 x 2 table, when
calculating the cue utilisation validities.
The Matching Heuristic is a disjunctive rule. It is non-compensatory. Franklin's
rule and Dawes' rule are linear models that integrate the cues in a compensatory way.
Franklin's rule weights cues differentially, the Matching Heuristic searches cues in
order of their utilisation validities, and Dawes' rule looks at the direction in which the
cue points.
3.3.7. Describing and predicting magistrates' remand decisions. In the
present study, the fit of a model is defined in terms of its ability to correctly describe
(predict on the modelling set) or predict (predict on the holdout set) the individual
magistrates' remand decisions. Fit is measured in terms of the percentage of decisions
correctly predicted by the models. Although they did not use the term fit, Gigerenzer
and his colleagues used this method for measuring the validity of their models (see
Gigerenzer et al., 1999b). Other studies have measured the descriptive and predictive
validity of a model by correlating the model's predictions with the individual's
decisions (e.g., Einhorn, 1970). This will not be done here.
Each of the three models was used to make a prediction firstly on the 27 cases in
the modelling set used to develop the models and then on the set of seven holdout cases
used to validate the models. Magistrates made a relatively equal number of punitive and
non-punitive decisions, and the binary nature of the decision to be described and
predicted, implies that any valid model should be expected to perform better than
chance (i.e., predict more than 50% of decisions).
Figure 3.4 provides an illustration of the percentage of magistrates for whom
each of the three models proved the best fit overall decisions (i.e., bail unconditionally,
conditionally and remand in custody) on the cases in the modelling set and the holdout
set, respectively. It can be seen that for 38.27% of magistrates Franklin's rule was the
best fit on the modelling set, compared to the 9.87% of magistrates for whom Dawes'
rule was the best fit, and the 32.10% of magistrates for whom the Matching Heuristic
was the best fit. The best fit model on the holdout set was the Matching Heuristic for
33.33% of magistrates, compared to the 14.81% of magistrates for whom Dawes' rule
and the 19.75% of magistrates for whom Franklin's rule was the best fit. For 57
magistrates, the best fit model on the holdout set was different from that on the
modelling set.
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Figure 3.4. Percentage of magistrates for whom each model provided the best
overall fit on modelling set and holdout set
Figure 3.5 presents the results of the average overall fit of the models across the
sample (note that the boxplot shows the median). As predicted, a repeated-measures
analysis of variance revealed that there were significant differences in the mean fit of
the models across magistrates on the modelling set (F[2,80] = 7.73,p < 0.05).14
Although a paired samples (-test indicated that there was no significant difference in the
mean fit of the Matching Heuristic (M = 73.98%, SD = 8.61) and Franklin's rule (M =
73.57%, SD = 9.20) (([80] = 0.27, 1-tailed p> 0.025), the mean overall fit of the
Matching Heuristic was however significantly greater than that of Dawes' rule (M=
69.36%, SD = 7.43) (480] = 4.06, 1-tailed p < 0.025). The mean overall fit of Franklin's
rule was also significantly greater than that of Dawes' rule (480] = -3.44, 1-tailed p <
0.025). Contrary to the prediction, according to the analysis of variance there were no
significant differences in the mean fit of the models across magistrates on the holdout
set (F[2,80] = 2.64, p> 0.05). However, a paired samples (-test revealed that the
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Matching Heuristic provided a significantly greater mean fit (M= 65.61%, SD = 22.22)
than Franklin's rule (M= 59.26%, SD = 17.22) (480] = 2.05, 1-tailedp < 0.025). The
mean fit of Dawes' rule was 62.96% (SD = 14.60).
As the Matching Heuristic did better on average across magistrates on both the
modelling set and the holdout set, it was considered that this model best captured
magistrates' remand decision making policies.
Fran klin's
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Mat ching
Heuristic
N =	 81	 81	 81	 81	 81	 81
modelling set	 holdout set
magistrates
Figure 3.5. Overall fit of Franklin's rule, Dawes' rule and Matching Heuristic on
modelling set and holdout set
When comparing the fit of the models on the non-punitive decisions alone, it
was found that there were significant differences among their mean fit across
magistrates on the modelling set (F[2,80] = 55.88,p < 0.05).
	 rule (M =
78.82%, SD = 13.89) provided a significantly greater mean fit than either the Matching
Heuristic (M = 59.05%, SD = 16.56) (([80] = -8.26,p < 0.05), or Dawes' rule (M =
14 Mauchly's test of sphericity was statistically significant (p < 0.05), indicating a heterogeneity of
covariance and so the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used, and the degrees of freedom are rounded
off.
15 The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used.
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59.90%, SD = 13.49) (480] = -10.11,p < 0.05). There were also significant differences
in the mean fit of the models on the non-punitive decisions across magistrates on the
holdout set (F[2,73] = 30.17,p < 0.05). Here, Dawes' rule (M= 88.87%, SD = 19.87)
provided a significantly greater fit than either the Matching Heuristic (M= 50.50%, SD
= 40.37) (t[73] = -8.09,p < 0.05), or Franklin's rule (M = 65.33%, SD = 35.80) (([74] =
5.32,p <0.05).
Regarding the fit of the models solely on the punitive decisions, it was found
that there were significant differences among their the mean fit across magistrates on
the modelling set (F[2,80] = 5.46,p < 0.05). 16
 The Matching Heuristic (M = 82.86%,
SD = 14.53) provided a significantly greater mean fit than either Franklin's rule (M=
75.76%, SD = 15.00) (([80] = 2.68,p < 0.05), or Dawes' rule (M= 78.53%, SD = 10.70)
(t[80] = 2.18, p < 0.05). There were also significant differences in the mean fit of the
models on the punitive decisions across magistrates on the holdout set (F[2,80] = 13.27,
p < 0.05). 17 Once again, the Matching Heuristic (M = 71.61%, SD = 25.79) provided a
significantly greater fit than Franklin's rule (M= 60.53%, SD = 24.54) (480] = -3.01,p
<0.05), or Dawes' rule (M = 55.75%, SD = 15.34) (([80] = 5.35,p < 0.05).
Table 3.3 presents the overall fit of the three models on the modelling and
holdout sets for lay and stipendiary magistrates, respectively. Table 3.4 presents the
overall fit of the three models on the modelling and holdout sets for magistrates from
metropolitan and provincial courts, respectively.
An independent samples (-test revealed that the Matching Heuristic provided a
significantly better overall fif on the modelling set for magistrates from metropolitan
courts than for magistrates from provincial courts (t[76] = 2.27, 2-tailed p < 0.05).
There was however, no significant difference between the two groups in the overall fit
of Franklin's rule (t[76] = 0.49, 2-tailed p> 0.05) and Dawes' rule (t[76] = 0.14, 2-
tailed p> 0.05). The overall fit of the Matching Heuristic on the holdout set was also
significantly greater for magistrates located in metropolitan courts than for magistrates
located in provincial courts (([76] = 3.05, 2-tailed p < 0.05). Once again, there was
however, no significant difference between the two groups in the overall fit of
Franklin's rule (([76] = 0.28, 2-tailed p> 0.05) and Dawes' rule (t[76] = 0.63, 2-tailed p
> 0.05).
16 The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used.
17 The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used.
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% fit on modelling set 	 % fit on holdout set
Lay	 Stipendiary	 Lay	 Stipendiary
(N = 70)	 (N = 9)	 (N = 70)	 (N= 9)
Model	 M SD M SD M SD M SD
Franklin's rule 73.44 8.80	 74.90	 12.39 58.98	 16.84 60.32 22.33
Dawes' rule	 69.15 7.74	 69.96 5.38	 62.86	 15.27 66.67 7.15
Matching
Heuristic	 73.81	 9.04	 74.90 5.79	 64.90 22.51	 66.67 20.20
Table 3.3. Overall fit of Franklin's rule, Dawes' rule and Matching Heuristic on
modelling set and holdout set for lay and stipendiary magistrates
% fit on modelling set 	 % fit on holdout set
Metropolitan	 Provincial	 Metropolitan	 Provincial
(N = 46)	 (N = 32)	 (N = 46)	 (N = 32)
Model	 M SD M SD M SD M SD
Franldin's rule 73.27 9.90	 74.31	 8.25	 59.63	 18.39 58.48	 16.37
Dawes' rule	 69.56	 13.70	 69.33	 6.93	 63.66	 13.70	 61.61	 14.71
Matching
Heuristic	 75.85	 8.58	 71.41	 8.37	 71.12	 16.35	 56.25	 26.65
Table 3.4. Overall fit of Franklin's rule, Dawes' rule and Matching Heuristic on
modelling set and holdout set for magistrates in metropolitan and provincial courts
There was a significant Pearson's correlation of-0.34 between the overall fit of
the Matching Heuristic on the modelling set and magistrates' experience (2-tailed p <
0.05, N = 79). However, no significant correlation was found between magistrates'
experience and the overall fit of Franklin's rule (r = -0.06, 2-tailedp > 0.05, N = 79) and
between experience and the overall fit of Dawes' rule (r = -0.06, 2-tailedp > 0.05, N=
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79), on the modelling set. There were no significant correlations between magistrates'
experience and the overall fit of any of the three models on the holdout set (2-tailed p>
0.05).
As predicted, there was a significant correlation between the overall fit of the
Matching Heuristic on the modelling set and intra-magistrate consistency as measured
by Cohen's Kappa (r = -0.23, 1-tailed p < 0.025, N = 81). There was however, no
significant correlation between intra-magistrate consistency and the overall fit on the
holdout set (r = 0.05, 1-tailed p > 0.025, N= 81). There was no statistically significant
correlation between the overall fit on the cases in the modelling set for Franklin's rule
and intra-magistrate consistency, and for Dawes' rule and intra-magistrate consistency
(1-tailed p> 0.025).
There was a significant correlation between disagreement, as measured by the
number of cases in the modelling set each magistrate disagreed from the modal
response, and the overall fit of the Matching Heuristic on the modelling set (r = 0.74, 2-
tailed p < 0.05, N = 81). There was also a significant correlation between disagreement
and the overall fit of the Matching Heuristic on the holdout set (r = 0.45, 2-tailed p <
0.05, N= 81).
3.3.8. Cue use. The Matching Heuristic was used to elicit magistrates' cue use
when making remand decisions. Cue use is defined broadly as the number of cues
searched (including the cue on which the decision is based) and so this number may
vary from case to case where K> 1. The mean number of cues used over the cases in
the modelling set was calculated for each magistrate. Across magistrates, the mean
number of cues used ranged from 1 to 1.67 (M = 1.10, SD = 0.18).
The grand mean number of cues used in the Matching Heuristic was 1.04 (SD =
0.19) for lay magistrates and 1.07 (SD = 0.15) for stipendiary magistrates. The
correlation between magistrates' experience and the mean number of cues used was —
0.17 (2-tailed p > 0.05, N = 79). There was no significant difference in the grand mean
number of cues used between magistrates located in metropolitan and provincial courts
(t[76] = 1.13, 2-tailed p > 0.05).
Across the whole sample, it was found that magistrates differed in terms of the
cues they used to make their remand decisions. Figure 3.6 illustrates the percentage of
magistrates in the whole sample who used each cue according to the Matching
Heuristic.
When comparing the cue use of lay and stipendiary magistrates, it was found
that none of the stipendiary magistrates used pcbr, proscase, and polbail. A greater
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proportion of lay magistrates used gender, offence, prosreq, and comties, than
stipendiary magistrates. A greater proportion of stipendiary magistrates used race and
age, than lay magistrates. It is important to note however, that these proportions are
based on very small samples, and so should not be taken to be conclusive.
A Chi-Square test showed that the use of offence was non-independent of the
location of court (x2 [1, N= 78] = 4.91, 2-tailed p < 0.05). Magistrates in metropolitan
courts were more likely to use offence than were magistrates in provincial courts.
Gender was independent of the location of court (x2 [1, N = 78] = 2.71, 2-tailed p>
0.05), as was prosreq (x2 [1, N= 78] = 2.71, 2-tailed p> 0.05), pcbr (x2 [1, N = 78] =
0.93, 2-tailed p> 0.05), and polbail (x2 [1, N= 78] = 2.71, 2-tailed p > 0.05). The
expected frequencies in the cells were below 5 for race, age, proscase and comties,
therefore, a Chi-Square analysis was abandoned for these variables.
Finally, for each cue, a Spearman's rank order correlation was computed
between its use and magistrates' experience. The only significant correlation was that
between the use of polbail and experience (rho = -0.23, 2-tailed p < 0.05, N = 79).
Figure 3.6. Nature of the cues used by magistrates according to Matching Heuristic
Across the whole sample, analysis of the critical value on the cues used revealed
that for 7 of the 9 cues, those magistrates using the cues, used them in the same
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direction. Here, the legal cues were used in the direction expected, and the "extra-legal"
cues were used in the direction reported by previous research. However, 4 of the 5
magistrates who used the race cue made a punitive decision when the race of the
defendant was described as white. Seven of the 10 magistrates who used the strength of
community ties cue made a punitive decision when the defendant was described as
having weak ties.
3.3.9. Requests for further information. A total of 144 requests were made by
magistrates for more information in response to the question of what further information
they would have liked in the set of hypothetical cases which would help them to make
their remand decisions. Figure 3.7 illustrates the type of further information requested
by magistrates. The "offence" category includes requests for information about the time
of the alleged offence. The "current bail" category includes requests for information on
the availability of bail hostels, and the "defendant" category includes requests for
information on the defendant's lifestyle. The "other" category includes requests for
information regarding the defendant's bail record and court related factors such as the
clerk's advice.
Figure 3.7. Magistrates' requests for further information
3.3.10. Comparison between policies according to Matching Heuristic and
magistrates' explicit statements of policy. Although according to the Matching
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Heuristic none of the magistrates used all of the cues, the aim was to assess magistrates'
explicit consideration of cue importance for each of the nine cues. Therefore, the rank
ordering of the nine cues as described by the Matching Heuristic were compared with
the rank ordering of cues explicitly provided by magistrates in the ranking task. Any
tied ranks in explicit policies were converted into sequential unique values. Kendall's
tau-b correlations were computed between each magistrates' implicit and explicit rank
order of cues. As expected, the correlations were low. They ranged from —0.39 to 0.67
(M= 0.09, SD = 0.22). Only one was statistically significant (1-tailed p < 0.025, N= 9,
n = 81).
For the lay magistrates, these correlations ranged from —0.39 to 0.56 (M— 0.08,
SD = 0.22), and for the stipendiary magistrates these correlations ranged from —0.22 to
0.67 (M = 0.13, SD = 0.27). In order to examine the relation between the degree of
concordance between magistrates' implicit and explicit policies and their experience on
the bench, a Pearson's correlation was computed between concordance and experience.
No statistically significant correlation was found (r = 0.10, 2-tailed p > 0.05, N= 78).
There was no significant difference in the concordance of implicit and explicit policies
between magistrates located in metropolitan and provincial courts (475] = 0.91, 2-tailed
p> 0.05).
There was no statistically significant correlation between concordance and intra-
magistrate consistency as measured by Cohen's Kappa (r = 0.06, 2-tailed p > 0.05, N=
80), and between concordance and disagreement as measured by the number of cases in
the modelling set which each-magistrate disagreed with the modal response (r = -0.08,
2-tailed p > 0.05, N = 81).
It was thought that greater correspondence between public and private policies
may be found if the rank order of only the actually cues used by each magistrate,
according to his or her Matching Heuristic (i.e., the maximum number of cues searched
by the Matching Heuristic [K] which ranged from 1 to 3 cues, out of 9) was compared
with magistrates' explicit rank order of importance of these cues in the ranking task.
There was no correspondence between these two variables for the majority of
magistrates. Of the 61 magistrates for whom K = 1, only 13 reported that cue as being
most important. Of the remaining magistrates for whom K= 2 or 3, two magistrates
reported one of the cues as being similarly important in their explicit policies.
For an indication of the cues that were ranked differently in magistrates' implicit
and explicit policies, the median rank order of each cue in both types of policies was
calculated, across magistrates. Figure 3.8 illustrates the concordance between
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magistrates' implicit and explicit rank ordering of cues summarised across all.
magistrates. Note that the rank order of importance was reversed for ease of illustration,
so a rank order of nine represents the most important cue. As predicted, the legal cues
are ranked as more important in magistrates' explicit policies than as indicated by their
implicit policies captured by the Matching Heuristic. Furthermore, although the extra-
legal cues are ranked as important in magistrates' implicit policies, they explicitly report
that these cues are not important in their remand decision making.
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Figure 3.8. Comparison between magistrates' implicit and explicit remand decision
making policies
3.4. Discussion
The present study was the first psychological investigation into English
magistrates' remand decision making. Furthermore, it was the first behavioural test of
the descriptive and predictive validity of a fast and frugal heuristic for categorisation
tasks.
3.4.1. Summary of main findings. On average, the distribution of magistrates'
unconditional bail, conditional bail and remand in custody decisions reflected the real
world distribution of the remand decisions made in the English criminal justice system
(Home Office, 1999a). All magistrates exhibited high levels of post-decisional
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confidence in their decisions. However, many magistrates also demonstrated some
degree of inconsistency in their decisions, and all magistrates demonstrated
disagreement from the modal response on at least some of the cases presented. On
average, magistrates attached more than one condition to bail, the most popular being
residence. Although there were individual differences, on average, magistrates' remand
decision making policies were better described and predicted by a fast and frugal
heuristic, called the Matching Heuristic than by either Franldin's rule and Dawes' rule.
According to the Matching Heuristic, most magistrates used one cue (out of a possible
nine). While most magistrates used legal cues, some used defendant and crime control
related cues, and most cues were used in the expected direction. However, magistrates
tended not to report these "extra-legal" cues as being important in their decision
making. Finally, there were few differences in the performance of lay and stipendiary
magistrates, and more and less experienced magistrates. Greater differences emerged
between magistrates from metropolitan and provincial courts. The above findings will
be discussed in more detail in the remainder of this chapter.
3.4.2. Discussion of main findings. As predicted, the overall fit of the models
on the modelling set was related to magistrates' consistency in their decisions. As
hypothesised, the fast and frugal heuristic proved more descriptively and predictively
valid than the two linear, compensatory models. In the Matching Heuristic, all available
information is not searched, cues are not weighted in an optimal way, cues are not
integrated, and a decision is based on only one cue. It is thus non-compensatory. In
addition, the remand decision making policies for around a third of the magistrates
whose Matching Heuristic models contained more than one cue, can be considered non-
linear. The present study differed from other SJT studies because it tested the use of
alternative models as descriptions of judgment behaviour. The fit of the Matching
Heuristic was similar to the R2 found in past SJT studies (e.g., Ullman & Doherty, 1984)
and better than some studies (e.g., Sensibaugh & Allgeier, 1996).
Most studies testing the relative validity of different models find individual
differences (e.g., Einhorn, 1970; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999). Although the difference
in the fit of the Matching Heuristic for lay and stipendiary magistrates could not be
tested statistically, the Matching Heuristic proved a significantly better fit for
magistrates located in metropolitan courts. Magistrates in such courts often face a
heavier caseload than those working in provincial courts, and so they may be more
likely to be "fast and frugal". The fit of the Matching Heuristic was also found to
decrease significantly as the magistrates' experience increased. The idea that
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magistrates' policies may become more complex as they become more experienced is
compatible with some past research on expert judgement (e.g., Greer, Kenneth, & Lynn,
1989), but incompatible with the large body of evidence showing that experts search
and use less information (see Camerer & Johnson, 1991).
The past behavioural studies of simple heuristics have demonstrated that novices
use such judgment strategies under time pressure (Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999), and
that individuals familiar with a domain use them in the absence of time pressure
(Slegers et al., 2000). The present study extends support for the use of fast and frugal
heuristics to experienced individuals working in the legal domain. People often use non-
compensatory strategies under conditions of time pressure (e.g., Payne et al., 1988,
1990, 1993). The fact that in the courtroom magistrates are faced with a heavy caseload,
that may lead to implicit feelings of time pressure, thus requiring them to make
decisions rapidly, suggests that simple heuristics may prove even better descriptors and
predictors of magistrates' remand decisions in the courtroom. This however, needs to be
investigated.
Not only did the Matching Heuristic prove superior in its overall descriptive and
predictive validity, it also proved better than either Franklin's rule and Dawes' rule with
regard to only the punitive decisions. However, the other models provided a better fit to
the non-punitive decisions. These findings suggest that being fast and frugal would lead
to more type I errors or false positives. This is compatible with the crime control, rather
than due process conception of ideal practice in the criminal justice system (Packer,
1968). Although, the presenrstudy did not examine accuracy, it is likely that models
will differ in their ability to minimise type I and type II errors. Most of the past studies
on simple heuristics have not compared the fit of the models in terms of their relative
ability in reducing these two errors (e.g., Czerlinslci et al., 1999; Gigerenzer et al.,
1999a; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). In many domains such as the legal domain these
two errors are not weighted equally, and so this should be an important consideration
when considering the prescriptive utility of a particular model.
According to the Matching Heuristic, most magistrates only used one cue. This
is compatible with past SJT studies using regression models which have typically
shown that few cues are used (Brehmer, 1994). Indeed, some studies have reported that
only one cue is statistically significant in the regression models (e.g., Deshpande &
Schoderbek, 1993). By controlling the information available to magistrates and using an
orthogonal design, the present study examined the influence of each cue upon
magistrates' remand decisions independently of the effects of other cues. In doing so,
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the present study has to some extent, confirmed criminologists' claims that, at least
some magistrates, are influenced by defendant and crime control related cues (Doherty
& East, 1985; East & Doherty, 1984; Hucklesby, 1996, 1997a; Jones, 1985; Morgan,
1994; Morgan & Henderson, 1998; Zander, 1979). At first sight, the findings of the
present study may seem discrepant with the findings of some studies detailed in Chapter
1. For example, in Chapter 1, it was stated that Hucklesby (1996) reported that
magistrates agreed with the prosecution request 95% of the time, and in the present
study it is reported that 19.75% of magistrates used the prosecution request cue. The
criminologists' studies involved aggregated data from magistrates located in a relatively
small sample of courts in England and Wales, and the results they reported are
consistent with the results reported here for a small sample of individual magistrates
from a much larger sample of courts.
There were however, a couple of findings relating to cue use that differed
somewhat from those reported by criminologists. First, there was evidence in the
present study that a few magistrates relied on the defendant's age when making their
remand decisions. Past studies have not found this (Brown & Hullin, 1993; Doherty &
East, 1985; Morgan & Henderson, 1998). Second, only a small minority of magistrates
used the race cue and they mostly used it in the opposite direction to that reported by
criminologists. Although this is compatible with some past research (Brown & Hullin,
1993; Voakes & Fowler, 1989). One possible explanation is that magistrates were
sensitive to the research aims and so consciously avoided using this cue. A letter
received from the chairman Of a bench of magistrates during the design stage of the
study stated "it worries me that you are bringing race into it. What does the colour of a
defendant's skin have to do with...the bail decision...? I do hope you are not trying to
prove that whites are given bail more frequently."
Interestingly, although magistrates were provided with information regarding a
defendant's community ties, only a handful of magistrates used this cue, and most used
it in the direction expected. Past observational studies have concluded that BISs, which
provide community ties information to the court, have an affect on magistrates'
decisions (e.g., Lloyd, 1992; Stone, 1988). The present study suggests that the effect of
these schemes may not be as widespread as has previously been thought. Future
research employing an experimental approach may yield more reliable and valid results
on this issue.
In the present study, cue use was defined broadly as both the information
magistrates searched through and the information that influenced their decision. This is
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compatible with evidence showing that people report "using" cues they have searched,
or attended to, but which have not necessarily influenced their decisions (Shepard,
1967). In addition, the present study examined how cues are used when making a
punitive (i.e., conditional bail or remand in custody) versus non-punitive (i.e.,
unconditional bail) decision. This separation is considered more useful if policy-makers
are interested in reducing the punishing nature of magistrates' pre-trial decisions.
There were some aspects of cue use however, that were not examined in the
present study, despite their importance as highlighted in Chapter 1. First the fact that
individual values of cues were combined for ease of analysis, precluded an investigation
of how magistrates treat Asian defendants in comparison to defendants of other ethnic
groups. In retrospect, this probably would not have been fruitful in light of the fact that
some magistrates were aware of this aim of the research. Second, the use of a fractional
factorial design meant that only the main effects of the cues could be studied. How
magistrates treat rare cases, such as females charged with serious offences, could not be
examined. It may also be argued that the main effects design prevented magistrates from
displaying configural cue use. This may not be a serious limitation, however. Previous
research suggests that, though people may claim to use configural cues, incorporating
such terms into models of judgment policies adds little, if anything, to their descriptive
validity (e.g., Summers et al., 1970; Wiggins & Hoffman, 1968). Furthermore, in the
interviews conducted with magistrates for the task analysis, they did not report anything
to suggest configural cue use. Nevertheless, this issue remains to be studied.
Some, but certainly not all, magistrates used the legal cues explicitly referred to
in the Bail Act 1976, namely previous convictions and bail record, seriousness of
offence, strength of community ties, and strength of prosecution case. The use of cues
such as gender, age, race, prosecution request and police remand decision, together with
the requests for further information, reveal how magistrates interpret the catch-all
clause, any factors that "appear to be relevant", contained in the Bail Act 1976. Perhaps
not surprisingly, factors which are considered to be both socially and professionally
undesirable for making a remand decision such as defendant and crime control related
cues, were ranked lower in magistrates' explicit statements of policies, than in the
Matching Heuristic models describing their behavior. Self-reported policies tend to
indicate greater agreement (Chaput de Saintonge & Hattersley, 1985). Statements made
by magistrates and court managers during the data collection phase of the study
confirms cue use as depicted by the Matching Heuristic. For example, a clerk to the
justices stated that "the physical appearance and the presence of the defendant.. .do
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make a difference". Furthermore, contrary to their Matching Heuristic models, which
contained few cues, magistrates reported all of the cues as being important in their
decision making.
The present study distinguished between what magistrates publicly state they do
and what they actually do. Konecni and Ebbesen (1984) suggest that these should also
be distinguished from what legal decision makers privately think they do, which refers
to the concept of self-insight. In fact, there was a discrepancy in the publicly stated and
privately used policy of magistrates who used the legal cues as contained in the Bail Act
1976. In line with most of the past JA research on self-insight (e.g., Ullman & Doherty,
1984), this suggests that magistrates may lack insight into their decision making
policies. Nevertheless, future research could investigate magistrates' insight into their
policies by using policy recognition methods like those advocated by Reilly and
Doherty (1989, 1992). This would also be a useful technique for further investigating
the descriptive validity of the fast and frugal heuristics, as people may better recognise
their fast and frugal policy, than their policy as captured by a regression model. Self-
insight is important if magistrates are required to justify or alter their decision making
policies.
As a punitive decision, conditional bail is a popular alternative to a remand in
custody. Although the Bail Act 1976 affords magistrates discretion as to the number and
type of conditions they attach to bail, there does seem to be a pattern. Similar to the past
criminological research (Morgan, 1994; Morgan & Henderson, 1998; Raine & Willson,
1994, 1995b), magistrates in the present study attached more than one condition and this
was often residence. In theory, residence is imposed to prevent absconding. Although
on the surface this suggests that magistrates consider reducing the risk of absconding as
more important than the risk of offending or interfering with witnesses/obstructing
justice, this may not be true. Rather, it may be that magistrates prefer to remand in
custody defendants who show a high risk of doing the latter two. Conditions such as
surety and bail hostel usually divert defendants from a remand in custody because
magistrates assume they will reduce the likelihood of a defendant absconding or
offending. However, in line with past research (Morgan, 1989; Raine & Willson, 1994,
1995b; Zander, 1979), the present study found that little use was made of these two
conditions. It may be that magistrates are aware of the lack of bail hostel places
currently available, and so they tend not to use this condition. Some conditions such as
boundary and curfew may seem particularly punishing to a defendant, and
criminologists have complained of magistrates punishing the defendant (e.g., Block,
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1990; Raine & Willson, 1994, 1995b). There was little evidence however, of a
widespread use of these conditions. Finally, some past research has investigated the
affect of case characteristics on the number and type of conditions imposed, and on
agreement in the conditions imposed (Raine & Willson, 1994, 1995b), however a
thorough investigation is lacking. This may be an avenue for future psychological
research.
Unlike most JA studies, the present study did not use correlations to measure
disagreement. The consensus based approach used here is less cumbersome and is more
sensitive to the extent of disagreement that may be elicited by "easy" or "hard" cases. In
their study on legal decision making, Sensibaugh and Allgeier (1996) found that their
nine judges, making dichotomous decisions, disagreed on a third of the cases. The fact
that every case elicited disagreement from the modal response in some magistrates in
the present study, is probably a function of the greater size of the sample and the greater
number of decision categories (i.e., three). In support of the criminologists' claims (e.g.,
Home Office, 1987; Hucklesby, 1996), it was found that different magistrates disagree
as to the decisions to be made on the same cases. Unlike the criminological studies, the
present study can safely say that this disagreement is not due to any differences in the
nature of the cases presented, as they were identical for all magistrates.
Furthermore, in the present study, magistrates from the same court made
different decisions on some of the same cases. This finding cannot be explained by the
differences in the "court culture", that criminologists often refer to when explaining
disagreement (Hucklesby, 1997a). Rather, social judgment theorists' research in the
domain of interpersonal conflict suggests that disagreement may be explained by the
differences in the systematic and non-systematic differences in cue use, namely the
actual cues used and intra-individual inconsistencies (Brehmer, 1976; Mumpower &
Stewart, 1996). Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 1, different magistrates may not use the
same information, and individual magistrates may use information differently on two
separate occasions because they do not know the objective usefulness of the cues and
they have no adequate way of learning this information from outcome feedback. In the
present study, there were individual differences in the cues used by magistrates, and in
magistrates' consistency in their decisions. In the present study, consistency and
disagreement were not related. Future research should study disagreement in
magistrates' decisions from the perspective of the interpersonal conflict paradigm. If it
is true that cue use and inconsistencies account for disagreement among magistrates,
then simple cognitive feedback techniques could be used to reduce disagreement
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(Hammond & Brehmer, 1973). People can learn to predict others' behaviour
(Hammond, 1972; Hammond et al., 1966b).
The present study also extended our understanding of magistrates' remand
decision making to include a measure of their individual consistency in their decisions
and their post-decisional confidence. The findings regarding consistency are compatible
with past studies (e.g., Kline & Sulsky, 1995; see Zakay, 1997). In most studies, the
duplicate cases are presented at the end, and so it is not known to what extent boredom
and fatigue explain the inconsistency. The fact that the majority of magistrates
demonstrated some degree of inconsistency on the simple test-retest measure used in the
present study was nevertheless surprising. Consistency may be affected by the
"easiness" of cases, although the cases were not considered on this dimension in the
present study. Future research could investigate how consistency increases or declines
as a function of the characteristics of the case. This could be helpful in determining
which cases may need more effort in deciding upon.
The extent of intra-magistrate inconsistency and disagreement among
magistrates found in the present study is surprising considering that magistrates were
performing a structured judgment task, where they were presented with the same
information, but unsurprising in the light of other JA studies. It is likely that there will
be greater inconsistency and disagreement in the courtroom, where there are no rules of
procedure, a lack of information, time pressure, and an erratic work pattern. These
hypotheses however, need to be tested.
All magistrates regardless of type, experience and location of court, were on
average highly confident in their decisions. Confidence is related to the task and
research indicates that confidence increases with the use of a non-compensatory strategy
(Zakay, 1985). There is also evidence that groups are more confident than individuals
(e.g., Sniezek & Henry, 1989). In the present study, it was also found that post-
decisional confidence declined as magistrates made more punitive decisions. This may
reflect the extremity and significance of the decision for the defendant (Allwood &
Grahag, 1999). Nevertheless, explanations for this decline in confidence should be
investigated. It also suggests that magistrates may require more training and guidance
concerning when to remand a defendant in custody. The high level of post-decisional
confidence demonstrated by magistrates is difficult to interpret because it may reflect
their need to gain public support rather than their actual confidence in their decisions
(Allwood & Grahag, 1999). To date, little research has been conducted into such an
interpretation. Finally, although much of the research on confidence comments on how
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it relates to accuracy, this cannot be done in the present study as the cases were
hypothetical.
In the present study, there was no significant correlation between consistency
and post-decisional confidence, or between disagreement and post-decisional
confidence. A high level of post-decisional confidence is arguably inappropriate where
magistrates were in disagreement with one another and where they were inconsistent.
Despite the absence of an outcome criterion, the extent of inconsistency and
disagreement found indicates that magistrates are likely to make errors, for example,
releasing a defendant who would abscond. In the same way that reliability is a pre-
requisite for the validity of a psychometric test, consistency (whether it be within an
individual or between individuals as defined by the measure of disagreement in the
present study) is a pre-requisite for accuracy with respect to an individual's decisions.
Brehmer (1994) points out that disagreement in judgement policies is acceptable if
different people are using different means to the same end. However, disagreement in
the end is not acceptable.
Unlike most of the past criminological research, the practices of lay and
stipendiary magistrates was compared in the present study. Contrary to the findings
reported by Hucklesby (1997b), the present study found that there was no difference
between the two types of magistrates in terms of the remand decisions made. There
were very tiny mean differences on the other issues investigated. The general pattern
was that stipendiary magistrates attached more conditions to bail, were more consistent,
disagreed from the modal response on fewer cases, showed greater post-decisional
confidence, used more cues, and showed greater correspondence between explicit and
implicit policies, than lay magistrates. Although these differences seem compatible with
what we know of the training of stipendiary magistrates, and the findings of other
studies (e.g., Sanders, 2000; Hedderman & Moxon, 1992), the small sample of
stipendiary magistrates precluded computation of any statistical tests of significance on
these differences. The lack of great differences in the present study may be explained by
the fact that both types of magistrates were presented with identical cases, whereas the
observed differences reported in past studies may be due to the fact that stipendiary
magistrates deal with more serious and complicated cases.
In terms of the differences in the practices of more and less experienced
magistrates, it was found that less experienced magistrates made significantly more
punitive decisions, and disagreed more often from the modal response. Therefore, it
seems as though novices are opting for a less risky option for the general public, and
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their disagreement is compatible with their lack of experience with the task.
Unfortunately, it is unclear how the above findings generalise to practice in the
courtroom, because it is common for less experienced magistrates to sit on the bench
and make decisions with more experienced magistrates. However, there was no
significant relationship between experience and factors such as the grand mean number
of conditions attached to bail, consistency, post-decisional confidence, the concordance
between explicit and implicit policies, the mean number of cues used, and the type of
cues used. While some of these findings are compatible with past research showing no
differences between expert-novice judgement (e.g., Ettenson, Shanteau, Krogstad,
1987), it is incompatible with past research reporting differences (e.g., Ashton, 1974;
Einhorn, 1974; Shanteau, 1992). As Brehmer (1980) points out, few differences may
emerge between more and less experienced individuals because the task does not allow
them to learn. Indeed, in the magistrates' remand decision making task, it is not clear
what is the relevant information, and magistrates do not have any formal outcome
feedback enabling them to learn the predictive validities of the cues.
In line with past criminological research (Bottomley, 1970), magistrates from
metropolitan courts in the present study made significantly more punitive decisions than
magistrates from provincial courts, and they attached a greater number of conditions to
bail. In addition, they disagreed significantly more often from the modal response.
There were however, no significant differences between magistrates from metropolitan
and provincial courts in terms of consistency, post-decisional confidence, the mean
number of cues used, the type of cues used, and the concordance between explicit and
implicit policies. Criminologists have tended to explain the differences in the remand
decision making practices of metropolitan and provincial courts in terms of differences
in the characteristics of the cases presented (Bottomley, 1970). This explanation does
not hold here as all magistrates were presented with the same cases.
In the present study, the courts were randomly sampled and so the findings may
be considered to generalise to the magistracy as a whole. Past criminological research
has aggregated the decisions made by different magistrates which may hide differences.
Indeed, there were individual differences among magistrates on all of the issues
investigated in the present study. The idiographic approach proposed by SJT
(Hammond et al., 1975) is useful because it helped identify the characteristics of
magistrates who require different types of training, rather than providing blanket
training, and so is also cost efficient.
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3.4.3. Limitations of present study. Some of the specific limitations of the
present study have already been discussed above, and further research was proposed.
More generally, the present study may be considered to be limited by the nature of the
judgement task used to collect the data, and by the nature with which magistrates'
decisions were analysed.
In past studies on fast and frugal heuristics, researchers have precisely defined a
reference class, and randomly sampled stimuli from that population (e.g., Gigerenzer &
Goldstein, 1996). The internal and external validity of the findings of the present study
may be threatened by the fact that magistrates made remand decisions on hypothetical
cases constructed through a systematic, fractional factorial design (Ebbesen & Konecni,
1980). The judgement task presented to magistrates may not have been representative in
terms of the number of cues manipulated, the distribution of the cue values, and the
inter-cue correlations (Brunswik, 1955b, 1956). The simple heuristics approach is
couched in the belief that psychological processes are adapted to the structure and
demands of the task in which they function (Brunswik, 1952; Simon, 1956). There is
empirical evidence to support this (e.g., Hammond et al., 1987; Payne et al., 1993).
Although there is some evidence to suggest that judgement policies captured using
unrepresentative stimuli differ from those captured using representative stimuli (see
Ebbesen & Konecni, 1980), there is also evidence to suggest that there is no difference
(see Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988). Unfortunately, little is known about the formal
properties of the magistrates' remand decision making task, and so it is difficult to
assess the degree to which the cases used in the present study were unrepresentative.
The task analysis conducted for the study only focused on identifying the cues available
to magistrates and their values. Research should be directed at detailing the nature of
other formal properties of the task.
Although the hypothetical cases are rather scant in terms of the information
provided, this is not considered to be a limitation as past criminological research has
revealed that in the courtroom, magistrates are often presented with very few details.
Hucklesby (1996) for example, found that in only a third of her sample of 1,524 cases
did magistrates have any other information than that provided on the courtsheet.
Another feature of the bail decision making task presented to magistrates was that the
cues were presented in the same order on each case. In fact, there are no statutory rules
of procedure for bail hearings in the magistrates' courts, so information may be
presented in any order (Lydiate, 1987). This is not a limitation of the present study, as
the cues that were manipulated tend to be presented in a specific order, as revealed by
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the observations conducted in the task analysis. Finally, past research has pointed out
that information on some cues may be unavailable on some cases. In the present study,
there was no missing data on any of the cases. Therefore, it is unclear how magistrates
would react in cases with missing information. The Bail Act 1976 stipulates that
magistrates should temporarily remand defendants in custody in a situation where there
is insufficient information on which to base an informed decision. Burrows (1994)
found that stipendiary magistrates do adhere to this.
In the present study, the remand decisions made by individual lay magistrates
were investigated. Although this is compatible with the idiographic approach espoused
by SJT, often however, lay magistrates make decisions as a bench of two or three. Past
research on fast and frugal heuristics has also focused solely on individual decision
making. It is unclear how the use of fast and frugal heuristics generalises to decisions
made by benches of magistrates. There is some empirical evidence to suggest that
people use less cognitive effort, as indicated for example, by the number of cues they
use, when under conditions of shared responsibility (Weldon & Gargano, 1985). Thus,
it is likely that the bench may also be fast and frugal. However, this issue needs to be
investigated.
The second study to be presented in the following chapter aimed to overcome
some of the possible limitations of the present study.
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4. STUDY TWO
4.1. Introduction
4.1.1. Background to present study. According to Brunswik (1956) the stimuli
presented to participants in psychological studies should be representative in terms of
cue number, values, inter-correlations, distributions and ecological validities, of the
stimuli that they may encounter when confronted with the task outside the laboratory.
This is because cognitive processes are adapted to the environments in which they
function. Indeed, there is empirical evidence from the multiple cue probability learning
paradigm showing that people can learn and respond to the structure of the task (see
Klayman, 1988). There is also research demonstrating that the cognitive strategies
which people use to perform a judgment task are suited to the demands of the task (e.g.,
Hammond et al., 1987; Payne et al., 1993). Brunswik (1955b, 1956) argued that the
popular systematic design of research destroys the natural informational structure of the
task. For example, in a factorial design few cues are used, inter-correlations are
eliminated, and distributions of cue values are rectangular. Consequently, stimuli
designed in a systematic way do not leave room for vicarious functioning (i.e.,
substitution of redundant cues), and so the findings may not generalise beyond the
experiment (Brunswik, 1952, 1956). When researching vicarious functioning, Brunswik
(1955b) argued that the experimenter "must resist the temptation.. .to interfere" with the
environment (p. 198). He proposed that a representative design could be achieved by
either probability or non-probability sampling of real stimuli from the environment
(Brunswik, 1944, 1955b). Although SJT recognises the importance of representative
design, Dhami et al. (in preparation) found that few studies using JA actually presented
stimuli to participants with concern for its representativeness. Often, researchers
compromised representativeness in order to collect and analyse data with practical ease.
Moreover, this may threaten the internal and external validity of JA studies as some
studies have found that participants demonstrate different patterns of judgement
behaviour when faced with representative and unrepresentative stimuli (e.g., Ebbesen &
Konecni, 1980).
There were a number of features of the design of study one that were adopted for
their practical advantages, which may render the decision making task presented to
magistrates as unrepresentative of the task they face in the courtroom. This may threaten
the validity of the findings. First, although magistrates based their remand decisions on
one cue, as captured by the fast and frugal Matching Heuristic, only nine cues were
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studied. The task analysis had revealed that in fact a large variety of cues may be
available to magistrates in the courtroom, and so in real life, they may attend to other
cues. Second, information on the cues was available in each of the cases presented
whereas past criminological research has documented the lack of information available
in some cases (Burrows, 1994; Doherty & East, 1985; East & Doherty, 1984;
Hucklesby, 1996; Morgan, 1994; Morgan & Henderson, 1998; Zander, 1979). In
particular, legal cues such as those referred to in the Bail Act 1976 have been found to
be unavailable. Information is particularly sparse in those cases where the defence
applies for bail and the prosecution do not object (e.g., Hucklesby, 1996). Third,
although the distributions of the multi-categorical cues in study one were generally
representative of the real world distributions of these cues, this was not true for the
dichotomous cues. Fourth, any inter-correlations that may exist among the cues were
eliminated in the cases. In fact, although past criminological research is based on real
cases, there has not been any detailed report of the inter-correlations among the legal
and extra-legal cues.
Another way in which study one differed from the past criminological research
is that whereas the latter has based its analyses on decisions made by benches of
magistrates, study one involved analyses of decisions made by individual magistrates. A
study of decisions made by individual magistrates is suitable for stipendiary magistrates
who normally work alone, and it may be considered suitable for lay magistrates too,
who in theory, are allowed to make remand decisions alone. Nevertheless, in practice
they often make remand decisions as a bench of two or three, and so a study of
decisions made by individual lay magistrates may be considered inappropriate.
Past criminological studies have analysed the decisions made by benches at the
level of the courts in which those benches sit. Critics may consider this court level of
analysis as insensitive, and it may be argued that analysis should be conducted at the
level of the bench. This however, is not feasible for two reasons. First, benches do not
exist as stable groups because the same magistrates do not always sit together when
making remand decisions. Rather, magistrates are constantly rotated so that at each
sitting, they work with different magistrates. This is supposed to prevent groupthink
(Skyline, 1979). Second, often when a bench does make remand decisions, these may
be too few to provide sufficient data for meaningful analysis. For instance, the
observations during the task analysis revealed that one bench made 30 decisions. In
study one, a comparison of cue use across individual courts was precluded by the fact
that only a handful of magistrates were selected to participate from the courts that were
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sampled. Instead, the cue use of magistrates from metropolitan and provincial courts
was compared. It could be argued however, that the aggregation of magistrates from
different metropolitan and provincial courts masked some real differences on factors
such as the number and identity of cues used, and so it may be more meaningful to
compare individual courts, as criminologists have done.
Past criminological research has revealed that magistrates make their remand
decisions rapidly, within a few minutes (e.g., Doherty & East, 1985; Zander, 1979),
which may be partly explained the fact that they are often faced with a heavy caseload,
thus leading to implicit time pressure. The relationship between caseload and time
pressure however, has not been examined. Past research has also not compared the time
taken to make punitive and non-punitive remand decisions. According to the Bail Act
1976, defendants have a right to bail except in certain circumstances, where magistrates
must decide whether conditional bail or a remand in custody is appropriate before
deciding to grant unconditional bail. In this sense, it would be hypothesised that
unconditional bail decisions would take longer to make than conditional bail or remand
in custody decisions. Finally, one of the arguments in favour of the use of fast and
frugal heuristics of human judgement rather than regression models, is that the former
are more psychologically plausible, especially under certain task constraints such as
time pressure (e.g., Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999). Although the Matching Heuristic
proved descriptively and predictively valid for magistrates in study one, they were not
explicitly placed under a condition of time pressure when completing the bail decision
making task. It may be reasonable to hypothesise that the Matching Heuristic would
prove an even better descriptor and predictor of magistrates' remand decisions when
tested under the conditions of implicit time pressure faced in the courtroom.
The Bail Act 1976 affords magistrates considerable discretion as to how they
make their remand decisions, and study one explored how magistrates exercised their
discretion. Some features of the law however, seem to afford little discretion. For
example, the Bail Act 1976 states that one of the eight grounds for denying bail to
defendants accused or convicted of imprisonable offences such as theft, is if there has
not been enough time to obtain sufficient information to inform a decision (part 1,
Schedule 1, paragraphs 3 to 7 of the Bail Act 1976). Although the Act does not define
the term "sufficient information", it would be interesting to investigate whether
magistrates adhere to the law in cases where information is unavailable on legal and
extra-legal cues.
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In order to investigate the issues reviewed above, real cases will be sampled in
the present study. Researchers using JA have used real cases either by sampling past
cases from records (e.g., York, 1992) or present cases that are studied via observations
(e.g., Gifford, 1994). In their studies, criminologists have collected data on decisions
made on real cases from a number of sources such as courtroom observations (Doherty
& East, 1985; East & Doherty, 1984; Eaton, 1987; Hucklesby, 1996, 1997a; Morgan,
1994; Zander, 1979), analyses of court registers (Brown & Hullin, 1993; Hood, 1992;
Hucklesby, 1996, 1997a; Raine & Willson, 1994, 1995b) or criminal statistics (Jones,
1985). Each of these methods of data collection has its advantages and limitations. For
instance, courtroom observations can be time consuming and cumbersome. The
courtroom observations conducted for the task analysis in study one also indicated that
observations are often limited to verbal and non-verbal information presented to
magistrates in the courtroom. Therefore, researchers may not have access to the written
information that is sometimes presented. For instance, although the prosecution may
verbally state that the defendant has a previous conviction, the nature and seriousness of
the conviction is likely to be made available to magistrates solely in written form. This
is a limitation of Zander's (1979) study, where the student observers were observing
from the public gallery. It is also a limitation of other criminological studies (e.g.,
Doherty & East, 1985; East & Doherty, 1984; Eaton, 1987; Hucklesby, 1996, 1997a;
Morgan, 1994). Although Hucklesby (1996) collected data via courtroom observations,
she buttressed this data with information from court registers.' The data collected from
court registers and criminal statistics may however also be limited. This is because
information may be missing or not recorded. Indeed, information may be included in the
registers and statistics that may not have been made available to magistrates during the
court hearing. This is also a limitation of other criminological studies (Brown & Hullin,
1993; Hood, 1992; Morgan, 1994; Raine & Willson, 1994, 1995b). Therefore, in the
present study it was decided that data should be collected using courtroom observations
where access is also gained to any written information available to magistrates.
4.1.2. Rationale for present study. One rationale for the second study
presented in this thesis was to discover if the descriptive and predictive validity of the
Matching Heuristic found in study one would generalise to remand decisions made by
benches of magistrates on real cases. Another rationale was to conduct a more detailed
and updated analysis since that provided by past criminological research, on the amount
Hucklesby (1996) also conducted questionnaire and interview surveys of magistrates as well as other
court participants.
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of information available to magistrates during bail hearings, the inter-correlations that
may exist among this information, the time taken for magistrates to make their remand
decisions, and the similarities and differences in practices of individual courts. Finally,
the present study was conducted to examine magistrates' adherence to another feature of
the Bail Act 1976, namely that which states what decision magistrates should make
when there is "insufficient" information.
4.1.3. Aims of present study. The main aims were to:
(a) Identify the cues on which information is often unavailable in the courtroom
during remand hearings.
(b) Measure the inter-correlations among cues presented in the courtroom.
(c) Examine the caseload and time taken to make remand decisions.
(d) Compare the relative descriptive and predictive validity of two versions of
the Matching Heuristic — one that grants bail when there is unavailable
information on the last cue searched and one that either attaches conditions
to bail or remands the defendant in custody in this situation.
(e) Test the relative descriptive and predictive validity of the Matching Heuristic
with Franldin's Rule and Dawes' Rule.
(f) Examine magistrates' self-reported importance of cues with their cue use as
captured by their model.
(g) Compare the remand decision making practices of individual courts.
It is hypothesised that more punitive decisions will have taken longer to decide,
and a greater caseload will be associated with more rapid decision making. A version of
the Matching Heuristic where a punitive decision is made when information on the last
cue searched is missing, is hypothesised to provide a better fit than a version where a
non-punitive decision is made in this situation. Based on the findings of study one, it is
hypothesised the Matching Heuristic will provide a better fit to judgement data than
either Franklin's rule or Dawes' rule. It is also hypothesised that magistrates in a
metropolitan court will make more punitive decisions, and attach more conditions to
bail, than magistrates from a provincial court. It is hypothesised that magistrates will
report extra-legal cues as being less important than legal cues.
4.2. Method
4.2.1. Gaining access and observation period. When conducting an
observational study in the courtroom, data may be gathered without a need to gain
official access because magistrates work in open court where the general public are
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allowed to observe their decision making from the public gallery. However, this
precludes access to any written information that may be made available to magistrates.
Therefore, clerks to the justices in four adult magistrates' courts were contacted by
letter. Two of the courts were located in the outer London area and two in the inner
London area. The letter listed the aims of the study and explained the need to gain full
access to all information available to magistrates. These clerks to the justices were
selected because they had participated in the task analysis in study one and they had
indicated that they would be willing to participate in further research.
One clerk did not reply and one stated that he was busy because the court
Inspectorate would be evaluating the court during the planned period of the study. Two
clerks agreed to allow full access to their courts, the magistrates and the court records.
One court was in outer London (hereafter referred to as court A) and the other was in
inner London (hereafter referred to as court B). Both courts had a number of courtrooms
and observations were conducted in the courtrooms that dealt with bail hearings, as
indicated by the clerks. There was one courtroom in court A that dealt with remand
cases and two courtrooms in court B.2
Observations were made over a four month period from November 1997 to
February 1998. Remand cases are usually dealt with in the morning court sessions and
so observations were conducted in both courts from two to three mornings per week. On
arriving at court, the observers went to the court ushers room to obtain a courtsheet
which listed all of the cases appearing on that morning. A list of the magistrates sitting
on the bench was also obtained. The duty solicitor working in court on that morning
was also identified. Finally, where written information was provided to the magistrates,
the observers asked either the court usher or the clerk for access to that information at
the end of the morning observation session or during court breaks.
4.2.2. The observers. The observations were carried out by myself (observer 1)
and a final year Psychology undergraduate student at City University (observer 2).3
Two observers were seen as being more preferable than one because although one
observer may be consistent in conducting the observations, the observations may
nevertheless be idiosyncratic. There were practical benefits as twice as much data can
be collected in the same time by two observers.
2 In court B, the remand cases were dealt with simultaneously in both courtrooms and so the observer
chose to sit in the courtroom which had the greater number of remand cases scheduled on that morning.
Sometimes, when proceedings were delayed in a courtroom or when magistrates retired for a break or to
discuss matters, or when another type of case (not remand) was being dealt with, the observer asked the
clerk how long he or she anticipated this to last, and then moved to the other courtroom to observe
remand cases for that duration.
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It was considered that court personnel and security would find it easier to
become familiar with only one, rather than both observers attending court alternately.
Thus, each observer was allocated to a court for the full duration of the data collection
phase of the study. Observer 2 sat in court A and I (observer 1) conducted observations
in court B because this required more organisation due to the need to switch between
the two courtrooms dealing with remand cases.
In order to minimise observer effects, both observers assumed roles of other
court participants. Observer 1 sat in the defence benches and observer 2 sat in the press
bench. These assumed roles were compatible with both observers' outward appearances
in terms of dress, and so magistrates were unlikely to have found anyone looking "out-
of-place" in the courtroom. Moreover, throughout the duration of the observational
study, it became clear from talking to the court ushers, that magistrates were largely
unaware that they were being studied.
4.2.3. Observational coding scheme. Observational data was recorded using a
structured observational coding scheme that was developed specifically for the present
study. Development of the coding scheme was informed by the task analysis conducted
for study one (see the Method section in Chapter 3). In particular, the information
gleaned from the 35 observations was useful. In addition, a coding scheme used by
Hood (1992, Appendix 1), for abstracting information from court records in a study on
sentencing in the magistrates' court, was used as a guide for developing the coding
scheme used in the present study.
The scheme was piloted by both observers on 15 bail hearings observed over a
one week period in October 1997, in an outer London court that did not participate in
the data collection phase of the present study. This pilot test resulted in some variables
being excluded, others added, codes of variables being altered and variables being
reorganised to facilitate rapid recording of data. Moreover, the pilot test enabled
observers to familiarise themselves with the coding scheme and the task of observation.
A copy of the coding scheme is provided in Appendix E. The scheme was
divided into five sections. The scheme enabled recording of verbal, non-verbal and
written information available to magistrates during the bail hearing which will be listed
below, their remand decision (including the conditions attached to bail), information
about characteristics of the bench making the decisions such as its lay and stipendiary
component, its gender make-up and its visible ethnic make-up. In addition, the identities
of the individual magistrates making up the bench were noted so that at some later
3 I am very grateful to Michelle Gates who helped me collect the data for the present study.
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point, the court clerk could provide information regarding their years of experience on
the bench. The coding scheme also allowed collection of other information such as
whether the magistrates sought information from the court (i.e., the defendant,
prosecution and defence), whether they sought help from the clerk, how the decision
was communicated to the defendant, and whether reasons for the decision were given in
open court.
Altogether, there were 25 information variables or cues that could be considered
by magistrates when making their remand decisions, and that can be referred to as
predictors when modelling magistrates' remand decision making policies. These cues
are listed in the first column of Table 4.1. The cues can be divided into those referring
to the personal characteristics of the defendant, the offence the defendant is charged
with (e.g., whether there was an identifiable victim involved), the defendant's previous
record (e.g., whether he or she has any previous convictions) and the remand hearing
(e.g., whether the defendant is legally represented).
4.2.4. Timing remand decisions. In addition to the information gathered using
the coding scheme, the observers also recorded the duration of bail hearings using a stop
watch. These were standard stop watches provided by the university. Timing began as
soon as the case was called by the court clerk. At this point, magistrates usually turn to
the case number on their courtsheet for information about the case and then to the
defendant as he or she enters the courtroom.
The method of time keeping used in the present study excluded the time taken
by magistrates when they retired from the courtroom to discuss the case in more detail.
It was clear from interviews with magistrates in the task analysis for study one that
when magistrates retire in the backroom, they may discuss matters unrelated to the case
and they may take a "tea-break." Thus, including this time would not yield a reliable or
valid measure of the time taken to make a decision.
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4.2.5. Inter-observer reliability. The reliability of the observations was also
assessed. It is impossible to evaluate intra-observer reliability because the same cases
would not be presented twice. Although it is not uncommon for more than one remand
decision to be made on a defendant's case as it progresses, it is likely that different
information is available to magistrates on each reappearance, and so the case is not
considered identical.
It was however, feasible to assess inter-observer reliability. This measures the
extent to which the two observers made the same observations when observing the same
case. This is particularly valuable when observations are conducted over a long period
of time. Inter-observer reliability was assessed over a two week period in the middle of
the data collection phase of the present study. Both observers made observations on two
days in court A in one week and two days in court B in the other week. (Both made
observations from the press bench in court A and the defence benches in court B.)
Altogether 26 cases were observed (i.e., 8 in court A and 18 in court B). Inter-observer
reliability was measured for a subset (i.e., 11) of the variables contained in the coding
scheme, plus the timing of the remand decision. The 11 variables were: observed race of
magistrates, racedef, sole, circums, prosreq, defreq, comties, bailrec, victim, whether the
bench sought information from the court, and whether the bench sought help from the
clerk. While piloting the coding scheme it was evident that these variables may be
particularly prone to subjectivity in observation.
Inter-observer reliability was computed on the variables as they were originally
coded as shown in Appendig E. Bakeman and Gottman (1986) recommend using
Cohen's Kappa as a measure of reliability. 4 This corrects for chance agreement. For the
observed race of magistrates, Kappa = 1, indicating perfect agreement in the
observations made by the two observers. Both were coding the race of magistrates
based on visible race. For racedef however, Kappa = 0.38. This was because observer I
was coding the race of defendants by their names while observer 2 based the coding on
visible race. The latter method was deemed more reliable and so observer l's previous
observations were re-coded (this was not difficult as observer 1 had also noted the
visible race of the defendant). There was poor inter-observer agreement for victim
(Kappa = -0.44). Observer 2 coded an offence against a shop or business as one where a
victim was involved while observer 1 only coded a victim if a named person was
4 Fleiss (1981) has proposed some rules of thumb when interpreting the value of Kappa. A value of 0.40
to 0.60 is "fair agreement", 0.60 to 0.75 is "good agreement" and a value of 0.75 or above is "excellent
agreement".
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involved. Due to the fact that crimes against businesses are often viewed as victimless
crimes (Nelken, 1994), observer l's coding method was adopted and observer 2's past
observations were re-coded appropriately. This was not difficult because the courtsheets
contained information regarding the victim. There was perfect agreement for the
observations of sole (Kappa = 1) and for prosreq (Kappa = 1). Kappa = 0.86 for
circums, Kappa = 0.85 defreq, and Kappa = 0.86 for bailrec, thus indicating excellent
agreement on these variables. Agreement for observed comties was considered
separately for the defendant's employment (Kappa = 0.37), marital status (Kappa =
0.78), children (Kappa = 1), and residence (Kappa = 0.24). The poor agreement found
on the latter was due to observer 1 not listing the address on the courtsheet as a fixed
address, while observer 2 did. A court clerk confirmed that magistrates consider this to
be a fixed address, and so observer l's past observations were re-coded appropriately.
Finally, agreement was good for observations of whether the bench sought information
from the court (Kappa = 0.72) and it was excellent for observations of whether the
bench sought help from the clerk (Kappa = 0.78).
The inter-observer reliability of the recorded duration of the remand decisions
was also assessed. There was a significant Pearson's correlation of 0.98 (1-tailed p <
0.025, N= 26) between the duration of the remand decision as recorded by observer 1
and as recorded by observer 2.
4.2.6. Follow-up questionnaire. After the observational study was complete,
the magistrates who had been observed were individually sent a one page questionnaire.
The questionnaire asked than to list the information that they regarded as important
when making their remand decisions. A covering letter was included. This told
magistrates that an observational study had been conducted in their courtrooms as
approved by the court clerk, and that the study investigated cue use in remand decision
making. The letter asked if they could provide further information on this matter. The
questionnaires were sent via the internal mail system of both courts.
4.3. Analysis and Results5
4.3.1. Unavailable information. In court A, 159 remand decisions were
observed and in court B, 183 remand decisions were observed. It is evident from the
third and fourth columns of Table 4.1 that in some cases information was unavailable to
magistrates on 16 of the 25 cues. In particular, details of any previous convictions were
unavailable in three quarters of the cases in both courts. Magistrates had no knowledge
5 Note that the level of significance for 2-tailed tests was 0.05 and 0.025 for 1-tailed tests.
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of the police remand decision in two thirds of the cases in court A, and in three quarters
of the cases in court B. In both courts, magistrates were not presented with any
information regarding the defendant's bail record in fourth fifths of the cases. There was
no indication of the strength of the prosecution evidence against the defendant in a little
over a third of the cases in court A, and in nearly half of the cases in court B. Finally, in
a minority of cases in both courts, magistrates did not have any information regarding
the maximum sentence that the defendant may face if convicted, the strength of the
defendant's community ties, the number of previous adjournments in the case and the
previous court remand decision. In fact, in one case in court A, no details of the offence
(its seriousness, nature and number) and the victim were available to magistrates. This
was probably due to the fact that the case was not listed on their courtsheet, and
magistrates rely heavily on the courtsheet for such information about the case.
4.3.2. Inter-cue correlations. The inter-correlations among the 25 cues were
computed separately for court A and B. The inter-correlations among the 20 binary cues
were measured using the phi coefficient. Kendall's tau-b was then used to measure the
correlations among these cues and the two ordinal cues. Finally, multiple linear
regression was used to measure the correlations among the above cues and the three
nominal cues that were dummy coded for analysis. Only first order correlations were
examined and this procedure yielded a 25 x 25 correlation matrix for each court. Only
73 of the coefficients in court A and 58 in court B were statistically significant (2-tailed
p < 0.05). These correlations are listed in Appendix F. In court A, the inter-cue
correlations ranged from —0:95 to 0.71 (M= 0.16, SD = 0.27) and in court B, the inter-
cue correlations ranged from —0.91 to 0.83 (M= 0.07, SD = 0.26). Therefore, the cues
studied may be considered relatively independent.
4.3.3. The decision makers. In court A, the decisions were made by 25 lay
benches, comprising a combination of 55 lay magistrates. In court B, the decisions were
made by 32 lay benches, comprising a combination of 55 lay magistrates, and one
stipendiary bench (the stipendiary magistrate made 26 of the observed decisions). In
court A, all of the benches comprised a combination of white males and females. In
court B, there were 25 benches comprising all white magistrates, two benches were
made up of white and Asian magistrates, two benches comprised white and black
magistrates, and three benches were made up of white, Asian and black magistrates. 6 In
terms of the gender composition of the benches, in court A, all 25 benches comprised a
combination of males and female. In court B, 26 benches were made up of a mix of
6 These figures refer to magistrates' visible race.
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males and females, and there were three all male and three all female benches. Finally,
an independent samples t-test revealed no significant differences in the experience of
lay magistrates sitting in court A (M= 10.14, SD = 7.75) and in court B (M= 9.52, SD =
7.26) (4107] = -0.43, 2-tailed p> 0.05).7
4.3.4. Remand decisions made. In court A, magistrates granted unconditional
bail in 59.12% of the 159 observed decisions. They attached conditions to bail in
18.24% of cases, and remanded the defendant in custody in 22.64% of cases. In court B,
45.90% of the 183 cases were granted unconditional bail. Conditions were attached to
bail in 30.10% of cases, and 24.00% of cases were remanded in custody. A Chi-Square
analysis revealed that the type of decision made was non-independent of court (x 2[2, N
= 342] = 7.76, 1-tailed p < 0.025).
4.3.5. Conditions attached to bail. Of the cases granted conditional bail,
magistrates in court A attached 1.96 conditions on average. One condition was attached
in 28.57% of cases, two were attached in 46.43% of cases, and three conditions were
attached in 25.00% of cases. In court B, magistrates attached 2.02 conditions on
average. One condition was attached in 40.00% of cases, two were attached in 30.91%
of cases, three were attached in 20.00% of cases, four were attached in 7.27% of cases
and six were attached in one case. An independent samples t-test revealed no significant
differences in the mean number of conditions imposed by the two courts (481] = -0.23,
1-tailed p> 0.025).
Magistrates in both courts attached a small variety of conditions to bail. Figures
4.1a and 4.1b show how often each type of condition was attached to bail in cases
granted conditional bail by courts A and B, respectively. (For ease of comparison the
conditions are placed in the same order in both pies.) The "other" category of bail
conditions included conditions such as a driving ban.
7 This excludes the stipendiary magistrate who had worked as a full-time stipendiary for one year.
Stipendiary magistrates have usually worked on a part-time basis for two years, before attaining full-time
status.
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Figure 4.1a. Percentage of cases granted conditional bail in which each type of
condition was imposed by court A
Figure 4.1b. Percentage of cases granted conditional bail in which each type
of condition was imposed by court B
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4.3.6. Duration of remand decisions. Magistrates retired to the backroom in
22.22% (N= 135) of the cases observed in court A, and in 24.59% (N= 183) of the
cases observed in court B. A Chi-Square analysis revealed that the number of cases in
which magistrates retired and the court were independent (x2 [1, N = 318] = 0.24, 2-
tailed p> 0.05). The time taken to reach a decision in court A ranged from 50 seconds
to 27 minutes (M= 6.67, SD = 5.98, N= 131). 8 In court B, the duration of decisions
ranged from 1 minute to 62 minutes (M = 9.54, SD = 8.39, N=183). There was a
significant difference between the two courts in terms of the duration of the decisions
made (t[312] = -3.54, 2-tailed p < 0.05). 9 A paired samples t-test revealed that in court
A, the mean time taken to make a remand decision was significantly longer for the cases
in which magistrates retired (M= 12.77, SD = 8.07) than cases in which magistrates did
not retire (M= 4.65, SD = 3.37) (t[25] = 4.97, 2-tailed p < 0.05). 1 ° The cases in which
magistrates retired in court B also took significantly longer to decide on (M= 16.87, SD
= 12.19) than the cases in which magistrates did not retire (M = 7.11, SD = 5.44) (t[44]
= 5.39, 2-tailed p < 0.05).
There was a significant Kendall's tau-b correlation of 0.25 between the remand
decision made and the time taken to make the decision in court A (1-tailed p < 0.025, N
= 131). In court B, the correlation between these two variables was 0.27 (1-tailed p <
0.025, N = 182). Finally, there was no significant correlation between the caseload on
the days observed and the mean duration of decisions made on those days, for court A (r
= -0.61, 1-tailed p > 0.025, N= 25), and for court B (r = 0.09, 1-tailedp > 0.025, N =
32). 11
4.3.7. Development of Franklin's rule, Dawes' rule and the Matching
Heuristic. The three models were constructed for court A and court B, separately. A
detailed description of how Franklin's rule, Dawes' rule and the Matching Heuristic are
constructed was provided in study one (see the Analysis and Results section of Chapter
3), and so those details will not be reiterated here. There are some details of the
modelling procedure however, that do differ, and these will be discussed below.
The total number of bail hearings observed in each court were divided into a
"holdout set" of 60 randomly selected cases and a "modelling set" consisting of the
8 The duration was not recorded in 28 of the cases observed in court A because observer 2 forgot to take
the stop watch to court.
9 A Levene's test for homogeneity of variance was significant (p < 0.05) and so the t-test based on
unequal variances was used.
10 A paired samples t-test was used because benches of magistrates retired during some cases and in other
cases they reached a decision without retiring. The two groups of cases could therefore not be considered
independent.
II Caseload was determined from the list of cases on the courtsheets.
204
remaining cases (i.e., the modelling set in court A = 99 cases, and in court B the
modelling set = 123 cases). The models were constructed on the modelling set, and
were then used to predict magistrates' decisions made on the holdout set. This
procedure thus provided a measure of the relative descriptive and predictive validity of
the three models, respectively. In order to avoid selecting a peculiar sample of cases for
either the holdout or modelling set, and rather than only testing the models once, the
cases were divided up 10 times and so the models were tested 10 times. Each time, a
new set of 60 cases was randomly selected from the total number of cases observed in
each court, thus leaving a new modelling set of cases too. Therefore, the models were
compared by analysing their mean fits across the 10 tests.
As in study one, the remand decision was simplified into a binary decision,
where conditional bail and remand in custody together represented a punitive decision
and unconditional bail represented a non-punitive decision. The 25 cues shown in Table
4.1 were also simplified for ease of analysis. (The simplified values are shown in the
second column of Table 4.1 and the original values are shown in the coding scheme in
Appendix E.) These simplifications were based on the results of the task analysis
conducted for study one. As in study one, the three models were constructed so that they
aimed to predict a punitive decision and would only predict a non-punitive decision by
default, because this is the procedure followed by the legislation and guidelines
governing remand decision making.
4.3.8. The Matching Heuristic and insufficient information. Before
comparing the mean fit of the three models however, magistrates' compliance with the
Bail Act 1976's statement that in cases where there is insufficient information, a
defendant should be remanded in custody (until sufficient information is gathered), was
examined using the Matching Heuristic. Does a Matching Heuristic that makes a
punitive decision when the critical value of the last cue being searched is unavailable on
a case (hereafter referred to as unavailable = punitive) prove a better descriptor and
predictor of magistrates' remand decisions, than a version of the Matching Heuristic
that makes a non-punitive decision in this situation (hereafter referred to as unavailable
= non-punitive)? Figure 4.2 illustrates the Matching Heuristic (unavailable = punitive).
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If yes, or if the value
is unavailable, then
predict a punitive
decision.
If not, then predict a
non-punitive decision.
Does the l u rank
ordered cue have a
critical value?
If yes, then predict a
punitive decision.
If not, or if the value
is unavailable, then
does the 2 nd rank
ordered cue have a
critical value?
Figure 4.2. Matching Heuristic that makes a punitive decision when there is
insufficient information (K = 2)
Tables 4.2a and 4.2b present the results of the mean fit of the two versions of the
Matching Heuristic on the modelling and holdout sets for courts A and B, respectively.
Tests of significance were not computed because there were only 10 data points for each
version. It can be seen that for court A, there was no difference between the two
versions of the Matching Heuristic in terms of mean fit overall decisions (i.e.,
unconditional bail, conditional bail and remand in custody) on the modelling set over
the 10 tests. An analysis of the mean overall fit on the holdout set however, indicates
that the Matching Heuristic (unavailable = non-punitive) correctly predicted slightly
more decisions. Therefore, this version was chosen to be tested against Franklin's rule
and Dawes' rule for court A. In court B, the Matching Heuristic (unavailable = punitive)
provided the best mean overall fit on both the modelling and holdout sets, and so this
version was chosen to be tested against Franklin's rule and Dawes' rule for court B.
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Unavailable = punitive 	 Unavailable = non-
.
M (SD) for 10 tests	 punitive
M (SD) for 10 tests
Modelling set:
Maximum cues searched (K)
Cues used
Overall fit
Fit on non-punitive decisions
Fit on punitive decisions
2.90 cues (0.57)
2.27 cues (0.44)
95.38% (2.50)
93.49% (3.19)
97.85% (4.17)
3.00 cues (0.67)
2.37 cues (0.53)
95.38% (1.56)
92.52% (2.18)
99.46% (1.71)
Holdout set:
Cues used
Overall fit
Fit on non-punitive decisions
Fit on punitive decisions
2.34 cues (0.36)
90.76% (10.07)
85.48% (16.65)
98.81% (2.06)
2.35 cues (0.45)
91.77% (3.59)
88.97% (5.07)
95.22% (8.15)
Table 4.2a. Mean fit and cues used by two versions of Matching Heuristic for
insufficient information in court A
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Unavailable = punitive 	 Unavailable = non-
M (SD) for 10 tests	 punitive
M (SD) for 10 tests
Modelling set:
Maximum cues searched (K)
Cues used
Overall fit
Fit on non-punitive decisions
Fit on punitive decisions
2.90 cues (0.57)
2.29 cues (0.50)
95.87% (1.83)
95.11% (2.67)
96.54% (2.77)
2.80 cues (0.42)
2.03 cues (0.43)
91.63% (12.76)
86.12% (28.86)
95.50% (1.53)
Holdout set:
Cues used
Overall fit
Fit on non-punitive decisions
Fit on punitive decisions
2.28 cues (0.32)
86.59% (18.12)
84.59% (29.27)
88.49% (22.29)
1.91 cues (0.29)
85.38% (22.12)
77.89% (37.08)
92.94% (8.82)
Table 4.2b. Mean fit and cues used by two versions of Matching Heuristic for
insufficient information in court B
4.3.9. Relative descriptive and predictive validity of Franklin's rule, Dawes'
rule and the Matching Heuristic. The Matching Heuristic provided a better fit than the
other two models, for both courts on each of the 10 tests on the modelling set, and it
provided the best fit for 7 out of 10 tests on the holdout set. Figures 4.3a and 4.3b show
the mean overall fit of the three models over the 10 tests for court A and B, respectively.
(Note that the boxplots show the median.) Tests of significance were not computed
because there were only 10 data points for each model. For both courts, it can be seen
that all three models have a reduced mean overall fit on the holdout set compared to the
modelling set. This is because the models fit the idiosyncrasies of the cases in the
modelling set, which are not in the holdout set. As would be expected, the shrinkage is
greater for Franklin's rule, followed by Dawes' rule, and is least for the Matching
Heuristic.
For court A, the Matching Heuristic (unavailable = non-punitive) correctly
predicted on average 95.38% (SD = 1.56) of the overall decisions on the modelling set
over the 10 tests. This was greater than the performance of either Dawes' rule (M=
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84.75%, SD = 2.49) or Franklin's rule (M= 89.13%, SD = 3.23) on the modelling set.
On average, the Matching Heuristic was also better able to correctly predict overall
decisions on the holdout set (M= 91.77%, SD = 3.59) than either Dawes' rule (M=
84.75%, SD = 2.49) or Franklin's rule (M = 80.38, SD = 3.06).
For court B, the Matching Heuristic (unavailable = punitive) achieved a mean
overall fit of 95.87% (SD = 1.83) over the 10 tests on the modelling set, compared to a
mean overall fit of 77.61% (SD = 2.90) for Dawes' rule and 82.29% (SD = 3.80) for
Franklin's rule. On the holdout set, the Matching Heuristic achieved a mean overall fit
of 85.59% (SD = 18.12), which was greater than either Dawes' rule (M = 70%, SD =-
3.87) or Franklin's rule (M= 73.41%, SD = 4.88). Thus, for both courts, the Matching
Heuristic demonstrated greater descriptive and predictive validity than either Franklin's
rule or Dawes' rule.
When comparing the fit of the models on the non-punitive decisions alone, it
was found that for court A, the Matching Heuristic (M = 92.52%, SD = 2.18) provided a
better fit than either Franklin's rule (M = 86.41%, SD = 5.16) or Dawes' rule (M=
81.95%, SD = 4.50). In fact, the Matching Heuristic (M = 99.46%, SD = 1.71) also did
better than Franklin's rule (M= 93.48%, SD = 4.25) and Dawes' rule (M= 89.06%, SD
= 4.82) at fitting the punitive decisions. The same pattern emerged for court B. The
Matching Heuristic (M = 95.12%, SD = 2.67), fitted the non-punitive decisions better
than did either Franklin's rule (M = 87.34%, SD = 2.15) or Dawes' rule (M= 80.30%,
SD = 7.13), and the Matching Heuristic (M = 96.54%, SD = 2.77) also fitted the
punitive decisions better than did Franldin's rule (M = 78.34%, SD = 6.67) or Dawes'
rule (M= 75.45%, SD = 6.27).
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Figure 4.3a. Overall fit of Franklin's rule, Dawes' rule and Matching Heuristic on
modelling set and holdout set for court A
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Figure 4.3b. Overall fit of Franklin's rule, Dawes' rule and Matching Heuristic on
modelling set and holdout set for court B
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4.3.10. Cue use. The maximum number of cues searched (K), the number of
cues used, and the rank order of cues differed across the 10 tests of the Matching
Heuristic. (The rank order of cues is affected by the properties of the modelling data set,
which changed over each test.) The test of the Matching Heuristic where K was close to
the mean K over the 10 tests, and that yielded a fit closest to the mean overall fit on the
training set was selected to illustrate cue usage. Alternatively, a Matching Heuristic that
yielded a fit close to the mean overall fit on the holdout set could have been chosen, one
that had the highest overall fit on the holdout or modelling set could have been chosen,
or one could have been chosen randomly. Figures 4.4a and 4.4b illustrate the Matching
Heuristic models for courts A and B, respectively.
For court A, the Matching Heuristic (unavailable = non-punitive) on test two
was chosen. Here, K = 3 and the following cues: prosreq, prevdec and polbail, were
searched and used in that order. The mean overall fit on the modelling set was 96.25%
(M= 93.75% fit for non-punitive decisions and M = 100% fit for punitive decisions).
The mean number of cues used was 2.40. On the holdout set, the mean overall fit was
94.94% (M = 91.84% fit for the non-punitive decisions and M= 100% fit for the
punitive decisions), and the mean number of cues used was 2.42. Information on
prosreq was available on all of the 159 cases in court A, but it was unavailable on
prevdec for 4 cases and polbail for 101 cases. As can be seen in Appendix F, the three
cues in Figure 4.4.a were statistically significantly correlated with each other and with
cues not included in the model, to varying degrees. The mean size of the correlation was
however, only 0.31.
For court B, the Matching Heuristic (unavailable punitive) on test eight was
chosen. Here, K = 3 and the following cues: prevconv, polbail and prevdec were
searched and used in that order. The mean overall fit on the modelling set was 95.65%
(M = 95% fit for non-punitive decisions and M = 96.15% fit for punitive decisions). The
mean number of cues used was 2.68. On the holdout set, the mean overall fit was
92.31% (M = 90.24% for non-punitive decisions and M = 94% for punitive decisions),
and the mean number of cues used was 2.32. Information on prevconv was unavailable
for 136 of the 183 cases in court B, information on polbail was unavailable for 136
cases, and on prevdec information was unavailable for three cases. There were no
statistically significant inter-correlations among the three cues in Figure 4.4b. However,
two of the cues were correlated significantly correlated with other cues not included in
the model, to varying degrees. The mean size of the correlation was however, only 0.18.
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If yes, then make
PUNITIVE decision Did the police decide to either
impose conditions or remand
in custody?
Did the prosecution request
either conditional bail or
oppose bail altogether)
If no, or if the
information is
unavailable, then
If yes, then make
PUNITIVE decision Did the previous court
decide to either impose
conditions or remand in
custody?
If no, or if the
information is
unavailable, then
If yes, then make
PUNITIVE decision
If no, or if the
information is
unavailable, then make
NON-PUNITIVE
decision
Figure 4.4a. Matching Heuristic for court A
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Does the defendant have a
previous conviction for a
similar offence?
If no, or if the
information is
unavailable, then
If yes, then make
PUNITIVE decision Did the police decide to
either impose conditions or
remand in custody?
If no, or if the
information is
unavailable, then
If yes, then make
PUNITIVE decision Did the previous court decide
to either impose conditions or
remand in custody?
If yes, or if the	 If no, then make NON-
information is	 PUNITIVE decision
unavailable, then make
PUNITIVE decision
Figure 4.4b. Matching Heuristic for court B
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13 co urt A
court B
4.3.11. Self-reported cue importance. For court A, 50.91% of magistrates
returned the follow-up questionnaires, and for court B, 44.64% of magistrates did so.
For four questionnaires however, the identity and thus the location of the magistrates
(i.e., court A or court B) were unknown. These were therefore excluded from analysis.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the categories of information which magistrates reported as being
important in their remand decision making. It can be seen that magistrates in both courts
reported cues explicitly referred to in the Bail Act 1976 as being important. However, in
the "defendant" category, one magistrate in court B said that the defendant's "lifestyle"
was important, and two magistrates in court A said that the defendant's age was
important. In the "bail position" category, two magistrates in court A said that the
prosecution request was important, and two said that the previous court decision was
important. No magistrates from court B reported the latter cue as important. However,
nine magistrates from court B reported that the previous convictions were important.
Finally, no magistrates in either court reported the police remand decision as being
important, despite this cue being used according to the Matching Heuristic.
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cues important for making remand decision
Figure 4.5. Self-reported importance of cues in remand decision making by
courts A and B
214
4.3.12. Other findings. It was observed that magistrates sought information
from the court (i.e., the defendant, prosecution or defence) in 59.24% of cases in court
A, and in 69.95% of the cases in court B. Seeking information from the court was non-
independent of court (x2 [1, N= 340] = 4.26, 2-tailed p < 0.05). The defendant was
generally asked to verify his or her name and address. Magistrates tended to ask the
prosecution or the defence for details of the case and for their reasons for requesting an
adjournment. They also asked the defence for details of the defendant's community ties.
It was also observed that magistrates sought help from the clerk in 46.54% of cases in
court A, and in 35.52% of cases in court B. Seeking help from the clerk was non-
independent of court (x2 [1, N= 342] = 4.28, 2-tailed p < 0.05). Generally, magistrates
asked the clerk for details of the law, jurisdiction, and dates of the next hearing.
In court A, the decision was communicated to the defendant verbally in 50.00%
of cases and was communicated both verbally and via a bail sheet in 29.75% of cases. In
20.25% of cases, the decision was not read out in open court. In all of these cases the
defendant was not present. In court B, in one case the decision was not communicated
to the defendant in any observable manner. In 65.57% of cases the decision was
communicated both verbally and via a bail sheet, and in 27.32% of cases it was only
communicated verbally. Finally, the decision was not read out in open court in 6.57% of
cases and the defendant was not present in these cases. The expected frequencies in the
cells were below 5 for race, age, proscase and comties, therefore, a Chi-Square analysis
was not conducted. The reasons for the decision were given in open court in 19.62% of
cases in court A and in 13.11% of cases in court B. The giving of reasons was
independent of court (X2 [ N= 341] = 4.65, 2-tailed p < 0.05). The reasons were mostly
those listed on the bail form (see Appendix A).
4.4. Discussion
4.4.1. Summary of main findings. Courts A and B may be considered to be
representative of provincial and metropolitan courts, respectively. The metropolitan
court made more conditional bail and remand in custody decisions. There was no
significant difference between the two courts in terms of the number of conditions
attached to bail. Both courts most frequently imposed residence as a condition of bail.
In both courts, information was often unavailable to magistrates on cues such as the
defendant's previous convictions and bail record, the police remand decision, and the
strength of the prosecution evidence against the defendant. The inter-correlations among
the cues available to magistrates were generally small. The decisions made in court B
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took significantly longer than those made in court A. There was no relationship between
caseload and duration of decision making in either court. For court A, a version of the
Matching Heuristic that made a non-punitive decision when there was insufficient
information, proved a better fit to the judgement data, than a version that made a
punitive decision. However, the reverse was true for court B. For both courts, the
Matching Heuristic provided a better fit to the data in the modelling and holdout sets
than did either Franklin's rule or Dawes' rule. According to the Matching Heuristic
models, both courts used three cues. However, magistrates did not tend to report these
cues as important for their remand decisions. The above findings will be discussed in
more detail in the remainder of this chapter.
4.4.2. Discussion of main findings. The high inter-observer reliability advances
the validity of the observations. In an improvement over past criminological studies
using observations (e.g., Doherty & East, 1985; East & Doherty, 1984; Eaton, 1987;
Hucklesby, 1996, 1997a; Morgan, 1994; Zander, 1979), the observers here had access to
written information available to magistrates. Unlike most JA studies, the present study
attempted to employ a fully representative design, as Brunswik (1956) had originally
conceived of it. However, whereas Brunswik had advocated the use of random or
probability sampling of stimuli from a defined population, the present study used time
sampling. This is a form of non-probability sampling, and so precludes statistical
generalisations. In their review of the design of past JA studies, Dhami et al. (in
preparation) found that the few studies that use representative design also use this form
of sampling.
In study one, it was not possible to model magistrates' policies using a logistic
regression model because of the low case:cue ratio. Although the ratio was slightly
higher in the present study, a logistic regression analysis could not be conducted
because of the large amount of missing data on some cues. In a regression analysis,
cases with missing values are excluded from analysis thus reducing the data set, and
ultimately the case:cue ratio. Of course, missing values may be replaced with averages
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). However, this distorts the data set.
In the present study, not only did the Matching Heuristic do better at fitting the
overall decisions for both the lay magistrates (and the one stipendiary magistrate)
observed in both courts, it also proved better at fitting the non-punitive and punitive
decisions separately. As in study one, it did better at fitting the punitive decisions.
Therefore, the superior descriptive and predictive validity of the Matching Heuristic
reported in study one, which involved remand decisions made by individual magistrates
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on hypothetical cases, can be generalised to remand decisions made by benches of
magistrates on real cases.
In fact, all three models fit the data quite well. The Matching Heuristic correctly
predicted around 95% of decisions on the modelling set in both courts, and the reduced
fit on the holdout set remained relatively high. This is remarkable performance for such
a simple model, especially if one considers that the data may contain some
inconsistencies that could not be predicted. The fit of the Matching Heuristic was
greater than the R 2 commonly demonstrated by JA studies using regression models (e.g.,
Kline & Sulsky, 1995; Westenberg et al., 1998). It was also greater than the fit of other
fast and frugal heuristics studied using simulations (Czerlinski et al., 1999; Gigerenzer
et al., 1999a; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) and behavioural data (Rieskamp &
Hoffrage, 1999; Slegers et al., 2000).
One possible explanation for the high fit of the Matching Heuristic in the present
study concerns the task. It has been found that as task complexity increases, or as the
number of alternatives and cues increase, people switch to simple non-compensatory
strategies that search few cues (e.g., Billings & Marcus, 1983; Johnson & Meyer, 1984;
Shields, 1983; Timmermans, 1993).
Other possible explanations for the high fit of the Matching Heuristic in the
present study concern the decision makers. First, if consistency is the upper bound for
the fit of a model (Hammond et al., 1975), then it may be magistrates were more
consistent, although the consistency of decisions could not be measured using a test-
retest situation in the present study. Others have found that groups are more consistent
than individuals (e.g., Ogilvie & Schmitt, 1979). Second, group decision making where
there is shared responsibility is particularly simple, as has been suggested by the
phenomena of social and cognitive loafing, for example (e.g., Janis, 1982; Janis &
Mann, 1977; Petty, Harkins, & Williams, 1980; Weldon & Gargano, 1985).
Future research on fast and frugal heuristics should investigate other conditions
under which these heuristics work well. Such studies could be guided by the predictions
of Hammond's (1996a) cognitive continuum theory, which states that people adopt a
particular mode of cognition depending upon the characteristics of the task.
In the present study, the Matching Heuristic was successfully applied to
polytomous cues, without the complexity and difficulty encountered by Slegers et al.
(2000). In the Matching Heuristic, the continuous cues were grouped into discrete
categories, and once the critical value on a cue was identified, the other values were
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simply discarded. It is unlikely that people can store how they react to every value of a
cue in their short-term memory.
According to the representative examples used to illustrate the Matching
Heuristic, both courts based their remand decisions on three cues. The number of cues
used is greater than the one cue used by the majority of magistrates in study one. This
difference may be explained by the fact that there were also more cues available to
magistrates in the present study, and because the unavailability of information on some
cases meant that magistrates had to search for more information. For both courts, two of
these cues were the same, although they were used in a different order. With the
exception of the previous convictions cue that is referred to in the Bail Act, used by
court B, both courts relied on crime control related cues. The use of cues such as the
defendant's previous convictions, the police remand decision, and the prosecution
request, supports the findings of cue use reported in study one and the past
criminological research (Doherty & East, 1985; East & Doherty, 1984; Hucklesby,
1996, 1997a; Jones, 1985; Morgan, 1994; Morgan & Henderson, 1998; Zander, 1979).
There was however, little evidence for the use of cues such as offence, gender, and
community ties, in the present study. Reliance on the decision of the previous bench
may partly be explained by the fact that it implies the defendant has already made a
fully argued bail application. A defendant is only allowed two of these, and any further
applications are heard at the court's discretion. Magistrates' reliance on the previous
benches' decision may also be explained by the idea that the court wants to maintain
consistency (Bottoms & MeClean, 1976). On the other hand, reliance on this cue
implies that there would be little gained in an appeal against a decision made by
magistrates. Indeed, past criminological research has reported that defendants and their
solicitors perceive this to be the case (e.g., King, 1971). Finally, as in study one,
magistrates tended not to report the cues they used as being important for their remand
decisions, in the follow-up questionnaire.
The findings of the present study support the findings of past criminological
research reporting the lack of information available to magistrates when they make their
remand decisions (Burrows, 1994; East & Doherty, 1984; Hucklesby, 1996; Zander,
1979). The fact that details of the defendant's previous convictions and bail record, and
the strength of the prosecution case were often unavailable to magistrates, means that
they could not abide by the requirements of the Bail Act 1976. On the other hand, this
also implies that some of the concerns criminologists raise about magistrates' reliance
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on the police remand decision (Hucklesby, 1997a; Jones, 1985; Morgan, 1994; Morgan
& Henderson, 1998) may not be so widespread.
The fact that there were few sizeable correlations among the cues available to
magistrates suggests that they could not infer the values of cues that were unavailable
on a particular case. For both courts, the average size of the correlation among the cues
included in their Matching Heuristic models was small, as was the average size of the
correlation among these cues and others not included in the model. The fact that there
were few correlations among the cues implies that both the present study and the past
criminological research based on real cases can consider the cues as generally
independent predictors of magistrates' remand decisions. An examination of the
correlation matrices of courts A and B in Appendix F revealed that few of the cues
investigated in study one, were inter-correlated. There were however, quite substantial
positive correlations between the prosecution request and the police remand decision,
between the police remand decision and the defendant's previous convictions and bail
record. Nevertheless, there may be little loss in external validity if future research on
magistrates' remand decisions employs an orthogonal design.
Interestingly, details of the strength of a defendant's community ties were
available to magistrates for the large majority of cases in both courts A and B, although
neither of these courts had a BIS operating. Similar to Hucldesby (1996) however, most
of this information was regarding the defendant's residence. In spite of the availability
of information pertaining to community ties, the Matching Heuristic reveals that neither
court based its decisions orithis cue. This is compatible with the findings of study one,
which revealed that few magistrates used this cue. Therefore, the effectiveness of BISs
should be investigated.
The present study also examined magistrates' adherence to the Bail Act 1976's
stipulation that magistrates should react punitively when there is "insufficient"
information on which to base a remand decision. For each court, a Matching Heuristic
that either reacted non-punitively if there was missing information on the last cue
searched or reacted punitively, was developed and tested. An analysis of the availability
of the cues used by court A indicates that the values of the first two cues searched do
not meet the critical value for the majority of cases, and that around two thirds of the
cases had information unavailable on the last cue searched (i.e., police remand
decision). Therefore, in making a non-punitive decision in such circumstances, court A,
unlike court B, held a presumption of innocence. However, although the law does not
specify what should be considered insufficient information, the definition of insufficient
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information used in the present study was quite narrow. The law could be more specific,
and future research could investigate what magistrates consider to be insufficient
information. Policy initiatives such as BISs have been developed in the past to
counteract the problem of insufficient information on the defendant's community ties.
In addition to the findings relating to the availability of particular information,
magistrates' perceptions of insufficient information may be useful for developing new
BIS type initiatives.
Contrary to the past criminological research which reports that lay magistrates
are not probing and do not seek information from the court (Burrows, 1994; East &
Doherty, 1984; Hucklesby, 1996; Morgan, 1994; Zander, 1979), the present study found
that magistrates in both courts A and B sought information from the court in over half
of the cases. However, the details of the amount of information sought and its source
were not recorded because of the rapidity of the bail hearings. Past research has reported
that additional information is usually of limited breadth (Hucklesby, 1996), and the
rapidity of bail hearings observed in the present study suggests this may be the case
here.
Past criminological research has reported that magistrates make their remand
decisions within a couple of minutes (Doherty & East, 1985; Zander, 1979). However,
in Zander's (1979) study, the observers merely estimated the time taken to discuss the
issue of bail or custody, and in their study, Doherty and East (1985) did not provide
sufficient details of how they timed the decisions. In the present study, the observers
began timing as soon as the. case number was called out. It was found that compared to
past research, magistrates took on average longer to make their decisions. Magistrates in
court B took significantly more time to make their decisions. There were some
differences in the characteristics of the cases presented in both courts. Future research
could investigate how this may explain the rapidity with which decisions are made. The
cases in which magistrates retired took significantly longer in both courts. An analysis
of the characteristics of the cases, and magistrates' reasons for retiring, may be useful
for further developing magistrates' training. In both courts, magistrates took
significantly longer when making a more punitive decision. This is contrary to the
prediction that they should take more time making a less punitive decision as the Bail
Act 1976 requires that magistrates bail only after they have considered whether an
exception to the right to bail applies. However, the cases were not divided into those in
which an exception applies or not, and so it may be that they do take less time to decide
in the latter. Thus, perhaps magistrates are going onto search through more cues to
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justify their punitive decisions. Finally, surprisingly, there was no significant correlation
between caseload and the mean duration of the decisions, for either court. In
experimental studies, time pressure has been operationalised in numerous ways. For
example, participants are instructed that another task awaits after completion of the first
task, that only a fixed amount of time can be spent on each case, or by providing a high
information load relative to the time available (see Maule & Edland, 1997). Although
not as explicit, the situation in the courtroom is not too dissimilar from the first two
procedures. It is however, different from the third procedure, as in the courtroom there
may be little information on some cases, thus enabling quick decisions to be made.
The findings of the present study were similar to study one regarding the number
of conditions attached to bail, and the types of conditions imposed. Residence was
imposed most frequently, and there was relatively little use of surety and bail hostels.
There was however, slightly more indication of the use of punishing conditions such as
curfew and boundary. The distribution of remand decisions made in court A differed
from that made in court B, and does not reflect the distribution made over magistrates'
courts in England and Wales (Home Office, 1999a). Court A was less likely than other
courts to grant conditional bail. Court A was located in a suburb outside London
whereas court B was located in London. Similar to past criminological research
(Bottomley, 1970) and the findings of study one, the metropolitan court reacted more
punitively than the provincial court.
Although there were no great differences in the gender make-up and experience
of magistrates studied in court A and B, the courts differed markedly in terms of the
ethnic make-up of the magistrates. There were more ethnic minority magistrates in the
metropolitan court, and defendants from ethnic minority groups are more likely to
appear in these courts, thus, somewhat counteracting the criticism that magistrates are
unrepresentative of the community they serve and the defendants who appear before
them (e.g., Darbyshire, 1997b).
The observations in the present study also revealed that in many cases, the
decisions were communicated to the defendant verbally. Although this is common (e.g.,
Raine & Willson, 1994), this may be ineffective as past research suggests that
defendants, particularly those new to the criminal justice system, may be in a state of
shock and may not understand what is happening to them (e.g., Brink & Stone, 1988).
Unfortunately, due to the rapidity of the bail hearings the observers did not record the
reasons given for denying bail and the magistrates' exceptions to the right to bail. It was
also not observed if written forms were given to defendants outside the courtroom.
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In conclusion, the findings of study two not only confirm the main findings of
study one, but also extend our understanding of magistrates' remand decisions to issues
such as magistrates' reaction to insufficient information, and to the formal properties of
the remand decision making task. Although Brunswik (1956) was convinced of the
theoretical importance of representative design for obtaining externally valid findings,
the findings of the present study generally confirm the findings of study one, which
employed a systematic design. Similarly, in his first representatively designed study,
Brunswik (1944) himself found that his results merely confirmed those of earlier studies
using systematic design. Nevertheless, Brunswik (1944) argued that a "check-up" of
this kind is necessary (p. 37). Moreover, as Konecni and Ebbesen (1987) point out, one
of the advantages of an externally valid method is that legal decision makers and policy
makers will be less skeptical of the findings. Few studies have investigated the relative
effects of representative and systematic design on the judgement policies captured (see
Dhami et al., in preparation), and while the issue remains unresolved, it would be wrong
to conclude, based on the present study, that design does not matter. One reason for this
is that there were few observed inter-cue correlations among the cues in the courtroom,
and so the orthogonal design of the cases in study one may not have been as
unrepresentative as may have been first thought. Despite this, it is clear that while data
was collected within three weeks and with minimal effort on the part of the researcher
in study one, it took four months to collect and with a lot more effort and expense in the
present study. A representatively designed study by Gifford (1994) took 10 years to
complete. However, as Doherty and Kurz (1996) argue "Nobody said science should be
easy" (p. 127).
Nevertheless, the third, and final, study to be presented in the following chapter
aimed to investigate the effectiveness of the BIS policy initiative, using individual
magistrates and systematically designed cases. Both studies one and two indicate that
these schemes may not be as effective as has been reported in the past (Fiddes & Lloyd,
1990; Godson & Mitchell, 1991; HM Inspectorate of Probation, 1993; Lloyd, 1992;
Mair, 1988; Pearce & Smith, 1976; Stone, 1988).
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5. STUDY THREE
5.1. Introduction
5.1.1. Background to present study. According to the Bail Act 1976,
magistrates should make a punitive decision if they believe that the defendant may
abscond. It is believed that the likelihood of a defendant absconding can be predicted by
the degree and nature of his or her community ties, for example, by whether or not the
defendant has a fixed address, a spouse or dependants, or a job or educational
commitment (Home Office, 1974, 1988). There is some evidence from past
criminological research showing that magistrates may attend to information about the
defendant's community ties. For instance, defendants living outside the geographical
area in which the court was situated (Hucklesby, 1996), and those with no fixed abode
were found to be significantly more likely to be remanded in custody than their
counterparts living in the area and with a fixed address (Doherty & East, 1985;
Hucklesby, 1996; Morgan & Henderson, 1998). Eaton (1987) observed that magistrates
were more likely to bail defendants who had traditional family ties and employment.
However, there was little evidence of the use of information pertaining to community
ties in study one, where, according to the Matching Heuristic, only 12.35% of
magistrates used this cue. Furthermore, in study two, neither court A nor court B used
the community ties cue according to the Matching Heuristic. In fact, this cue was
unrelated to any of the other cues in court A, and for court B it was related to a small
degree to the previous court remand decision (i.e., si) = 0.16, N = 176; p < 0.05).
In order to judge the likelihood of a defendant absconding based on his or her
community ties, this information needs to be available to the court at the time of the bail
hearing. In the courtroom, information may be made available to magistrates from a
variety of sources. The courtsheet which lists the cases to be heard on a particular day,
contains written information such as the defendant's personal details, the nature and
seriousness of the offence, the maximum sentence if convicted, the defendant's plea, the
number of previous adjournments, and the previous court decision if any. Information
on the courtsheet may be supplemented with further information provided by the
prosecution, the defence and the defendant. However, study two and past criminological
research (Burrows, 1994; Doherty & East, 1985; East & Doherty, 1984; Hucklesby,
1996; Morgan & Henderson, 1998; Zander, 1979) have documented the lack of
information available to magistrates in the courtroom. In fact, the situation has changed
little since before the introduction of the Bail Act 1976 (Bottomley, 1970; King, 1971;
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Simon & Weatheritt, 1974; Zander, 1967, 1971). For example, King (1971) found that
information about the defendant's community ties was available in only a third of the
cases, and that this was scant. More recently, Hucklesby (1996) observed that the
information on the courtsheet was the only information available, in two thirds of the
cases, and that information about the defendant's community ties usually concerned
residence. Similarly, although most of the cases observed in study two had information
on community ties available, it was mostly concerning residence. Morgan and
Henderson (1998) found that magistrates were aware of the paucity of the information
presented to them. However, in line with past research (Burrows, 1994; Doherty & East,
1985; East & Doherty, 1984; Hucklesby, 1996; Morgan, 1994; Zander, 1979), study two
revealed that magistrates do not always seek information from the court.
The availability of information is important, first because as shown in study two,
the size of the inter-cue correlations among cues is on average relatively low. The lack
of redundancy means that magistrates must have access to a wide range of cues in order
to make just and defensible decisions. Second, the Bail Act 1976 states that insufficient
information is a ground for a remand in custody (until further information has been
gathered). Empirical research conducted in the field of J/DM has shown that missing
information leads to negative decisions (e.g., Jagacinski, 1994; Johnson & Levin, 1985).
In study two, according to the Matching Heuristic, magistrates in one court made a
punitive decision where the information was unavailable on the last cue searched.
The fact that information pertaining to community ties may be unavailable when
magistrates make their remand decisions, led criminologists and policy makers to
conclude that in such cases magistrates may be unnecessarily remanding defendants in
custody. Therefore, a policy initiative was introduced in 1987 to overcome the problem
of insufficient information regarding community ties (Home Office, 1988; Stone, 1988).
BISs were introduced in both magistrates' courts and prisons. In courts, BISs target
defendants awaiting their first appearance, who are likely to be remanded in custody by
magistrates because the police earlier remanded them in custody. In prisons, BISs target
defendants awaiting their second appearance after having been remanded in custody by
magistrates. Probation officers interview defendants, gathering information on their
community ties. This is then verified (if possible) via telephones and visits, and
recorded on a bail information sheet. A copy of a bail information sheet is presented in
Appendix B. They only provide positive information because BISs aim to divert
defendants from custody. Copies of the sheet are then given to the defence
representative (or the defendant if he or she is not legally represented) and the
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prosecution. The sheet does not contain any recommendation regarding bail. It should
be noted that the probation officers have much discretion when operating a BIS, for
example, in terms of the cases selected, the content of interviews and the information
collected, verified and presented.
BISs originated in America (Ares et al., 1963). The American schemes were
slightly different from the English schemes in that the strength of a defendant's
community ties were scored on an objective scale, and a recommendation for bail was
explicitly made. Ares et al. (1963) evaluated the first American scheme by randomly
assigning defendants either to an experimental group, for whom a recommendation was
conveyed to the court, or to a control group, for whom the recommendation was
suppressed. It was found that 60% of the experimental group were bailed compared to
only 14% of the control group. BISs were originally introduced in the English system in
the mid 1970s and after a short period they ceased to continue operating, although this
was not because they were viewed as ineffective (Pearce & Smith, 1976; Godson &
Mitchell, 1991). Extraordinarily, although no quantitative evaluation of the first English
scheme was attempted, it was concluded to be similarly effective (Pearce & Smith,
1976). Since then however, numerous statistical evaluations have been conducted, most
of which were funded by the Home Office or the probation service, who are responsible
for such schemes (Fiddes & Lloyd, 1990; Godson & Mitchell, 1991; HM Inspectorate
of Probation, 1993; Lloyd, 1992; Mair, 1988; Stone, 1988).
It has been reported that the BISs were effective because magistrates bailed
(unconditionally and conditionally) more defendants for whom the scheme intervened
and remanded in custody more defendants for whom there was no such intervention
(Fiddes & Lloyd, 1990; HM Inspectorate of Probation, 1993; Lloyd, 1992; Mair, 1988;
Stone, 1988). However, there were individual differences among courts (HM
Inspectorate of Probation, 1993; Lloyd, 1992; Stone, 1988). It has also been found that
the use of a bail hostel as a condition of bail was large (Burrows, 1994; Stone, 1988). In
addition, the rate of bail breaches (e.g., offending on bail, absconding and breaching bail
conditions) was no greater among defendants bailed after intervention of the scheme
than among defendants who were otherwise bailed (Lloyd, 1992; Stone, 1988). Finally,
it has been argued that BISs affect the prosecution request, making a request for a
remand in custody is less likely, and that BISs affect the defence request, making an
application for bail more likely (Fiddes & Lloyd, 1990; Godson & Mitchell, 1991;
Lloyd, 1992; Stone, 1998). Thus, BISs affect magistrates' decisions indirectly.
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However, the reliability and validity of the findings of these evaluations may be
limited for a number of reasons. Unlike the study by Ares et al. (1963) the English
studies lack experimental control. Cases were not randomly assigned to the BIS and no
BIS groups. This means that differences in the characteristics of the cases (e.g.,
seriousness of the offence), or differences in the probation officers' reasons for selecting
the cases, between the BIS and no BIS groups, may account for differences in the bail
and custody rates between the two groups. The independent variable, namely the BIS,
may also vary among cases. Indeed, studies have revealed that the type and amount of
information provided by the BIS varied among cases and courts (Lloyd, 1992; Stone,
1988), and in some cases the information provided was sparse (HM Inspectorate of
Probation, 1993; Lloyd, 1992). Furthermore, magistrates may receive information
pertaining to the community ties of defendants for whom bail information was not
provided. For instance, in study two neither of the courts had a BIS in operation, and yet
in only one case in court A and four cases in court B was information pertaining to the
strength of the defendant's community ties unavailable to magistrates. Of course, this
does not imply that in those cases where information was provided, that it was of great
depth. Defence solicitors often provide information regarding community ties to the
court (Hucklesby, 1996; Mair, 1988). Morgan and Henderson (1998) found that BISs
also provided negative information about defendants, implying that a BIS group may be
disadvantaged and so the scheme would appear less successful in diverting defendants
from custody. Finally, evaluations of the prison based schemes also lack control over
whether information was actually supplied to the prosecution, defence or the court, after
it was sent to the probation officer in the courthouse (e.g., Lloyd, 1992; Mair, 1988). All
of the evaluations suffered from problems associated with missing data, and so the no
BIS cases may have been charged with more serious offences thus being less likely to
obtain bail. By aggregating data over courts, studies may have over-reported the
effectiveness of BISs on magistrates' remand decisions. The past evaluations may lack
objectivity because they were conducted and funded by those who may have a vested
interest in the continuation of the schemes, especially in the face of a lack of
alternatives. Finally, the fact that BISs have been reported to also affect the prosecution
and defence requests (Fiddes & Lloyd, 1990; Godson & Mitchell, 1991; Lloyd, 1992;
Stone, 1988) means that their direct impact on magistrates' remand decisions is unclear
in the above studies which do not disentangle these variables.
5.1.2. Rationale for present study. One rationale for the third and final study
presented in this thesis was to measure the affect of BISs on the punitiveness of
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magistrates' remand decisions, using a more rigorous method than that employed by
past research. Another rationale was to extend our understanding of the affect of BISs to
other aspects of magistrates' remand decision making such as their consistency,
agreement, post-decisional confidence, decision making policy, and concordance
between implicit and explicit policies.
5.1.3. Aims of present study. The main aims of the study were to assess the
affects of BISs on:
(a) Magistrates' remand decisions.
(b) The number and nature of the conditions attached to bail.
(c) Magistrates' consistency in their decisions using a test-retest situation.
(d) Magistrates' frequency of disagreement from the modal remand decisions
made by magistrates on the same cases.
(e) Magistrates' post-decisional confidence.
(f) Magistrates' remand decision making policies, in terms of the cues they use
and how they weight and combine these cues to form a decision.
(g) The concordance between magistrates' explicit, publicly stated decision
making policies and their implicit, private policies as captured by the model
that best describes and predicts their decisions.
Based upon the review of the past research on BISs, a number of predictions can
be made. It is hypothesised that magistrates in the BIS group will bail more defendants
than magistrates in the no BIS group. Magistrates in the BIS group will also attach more
conditions to bail, and more-frequently impose bail hostel as a condition of bail, than
magistrates in the no BIS group. The positive community ties information provided to
the BIS group should be used in the same direction by magistrates, therefore it is likely
that magistrates in the BIS group will demonstrate greater consistency in their decisions
than magistrates in the no BIS group, and magistrates in the BIS group will also show
less disagreement among themselves than magistrates in the no BIS group. The fact that
magistrates in the BIS group have more "relevant" information available to them would
imply that they would report feeling more confident in their decisions than magistrates
in the no BIS group. Based on the findings of the first two studies presented in this
thesis, it is hypothesised that the Matching Heuristic will provide a better fit to
magistrates' remand decisions in both groups on the modelling and the holdout sets than
either Franklin's rule and Dawes' rule.
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5.2. Method
5.2.1. Design. Magistrates were randomly allocated to either the BIS
(experimental) group or the no BIS (control) group. Magistrates individually made bail
decisions and provided post-decisional confidence ratings on a set of hypothetical cases,
comprising an orthogonal combination of nine cues. They then ranked the cues in order
of the importance they attached to them when making their decisions. The hypothetical
cases presented to both groups of magistrates were identical except for one piece of
information. On all of the cases, the BIS group was presented with positive information
about the defendants' community ties. The nature and amount of such information was
representative of that provided by a BIS. The information about the defendants'
community ties that was presented to the no BIS group was representative of the nature
and amount of information provided in a court where a BIS does not operate.
5.2.2. Participants. Court managers in 70 randomly selected adult magistrates'
courts in England and Wales were each mailed six booklets. The sampling frame was
obtained from Shaw's 1997/98 directory of courts in the United Kingdom (Morris,
1997). Thirty-five courts were randomly assigned to the BIS group and 35 to the no BIS
group. A total of 210 booklets were sent to courts in each group. Court managers were
informed of the study and asked to distribute the booklets to magistrates sitting in their
courts. Altogether, 132 magistrates, representing a 31.43% response rate, fully
completed and returned the materials within the specified limit.
In the BIS group, there were 77 magistrates from 35 courts, and in the no BIS
group there were 55 magistrates from 31 courts. Of those who provided their
demographic details, in the BIS group, 73 were lay magistrates and three were
stipendiary magistrates. In the no BIS group, there were 50 lay magistrates and three
stipendiary magistrates.' Magistrates in the BIS group reported having been on the
bench from 2 to 35 years (M = 15.58, SD = 8.11), and magistrates in the no BIS group
reported being on the bench from 10 months to 30 years (M= 14.32, SD = 7.98). There
was no significant difference in the experience, in terms of numbers of years on the
bench, between the two groups (4130] = 0.88, 2-tailed p> 0.05). Sixty-two magistrates
in the BIS group sat in courts located in metropolitan areas and 12 sat in provincial
courts, whereas 37 magistrates in the no BIS group sat in metropolitan courts and 18 sat
in provincial courts. 2 Group and location of the court were non-independent (x 2
 = 4.82
l A chi-square test could not be conducted to see if group and type of magistrate were independent
because the expected frequency was less than the minimum of 5 for two of the cells.
2 Courts were classified as metropolitan or provincial using the list of cities and towns provided by:
http://dir.yahoo.com/Regional/Countries/United_Kingdom/England/Cities_and  _Towns.
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[1, N= 129] p < 0.05). Twenty-eight magistrates in the BIS group stated that .BISs
operated in their courts, and 22 magistrates said so in the no BIS group. Group and
operation of a BIS in court were independent (x2 = 0.18 [1, N = 125] p > 0.05).
5.2.3. Construction of hypothetical cases. The design and procedure for
constructing the hypothetical cases mirrored that of study one and to avoid repetition
only new features of the design will be detailed here. In the present study, nine cues
were manipulated in the cases and nine were held constant. The constant cues were:
how the defendant came to court, the number of charges against the defendant, the
defendant's plea, the defence representation, the circumstances of adjournment, whether
the defendant was present in court, the length of the adjournment, who requested the
adjournment, the number of previous adjournments and bail applications. These were
used to provide background information to the hypothetical cases. See Appendix G for a
copy of the background information.
The nine cues that were manipulated are shown in the first column of Table 5.1.
The cues were the same as those used in study one, with the addition of the defence
request cue. Past research on BISs has argued that this cue interacts with the BIS when
affecting magistrates' remand decisions (e.g., Fiddes & Lloyd, 1990). Note that whereas
the community ties cue was manipulated across the 27 cases in the modelling set in
study one, in the present study, it was an additional cue that was manipulated across the
two groups, and not across the cases. This will be discussed in more detail later.
A full factorial combination of the cues would yield an unmanageable number of
cases (i.e., 2 x2 x 3 x 3 x3 x 6 x 2x 3 x 3= 11,664). Therefore, a fractional factorial
design was employed. The orthogonal design option in SPSS version 7.5 for windows
yielded a set of 27 cases, which would be used to model the magistrates' remand
decision making policies (modelling set). In addition, seven holdout cases were
constructed outside this main effects design. These cases would be used to test the
predictive validity of the models (holdout set). Finally, seven cases were randomly
selected from the modelling set and duplicated (although the names of the defendants
were changed) to measure test-retest consistency. This made a total of 41 cases. The
values of the nine cues and the distribution of their values across the cases in the
modelling set are shown in Table 5.1. The cue values were equally distributed amongst
the cases for the tertiary cues, and were distributed according to approximate real world
distributions for the other cues. The cues were placed in the order shown in Table 5.1,
and were in the same order in each case. See Appendix G for the hypothetical cases,
with the cue values as coded in Table 5.1.
229
Except for information regarding the defendant's community ties, the cases were
identical for both groups. In the BIS group, the additional community ties information
was representative of the nature of information presented by a BIS, while in the no BIS
group this information was representative of a courtroom where a BIS does not operate.
In order to discover the nature of information that should be included in the BIS group,
semi-structured individual interviews were conducted over the telephone with four
probation officers. One of the probation officers worked in a court based scheme, two
worked in prison based schemes, and one worked in the headquarters of the probation
service. The probation officers were asked what type of information is collected, on
which defendants, by whom, for whom, and in what format? The standardised forms
used to gather and disseminate the information collected by BISs were also analysed.
See Appendix B for copies of bail information sheets. It was found that a probation
officer may gather information on a wide variety of factors including a defendant's
addictions, language, psychiatric and medical status. However, commonly BISs provide
information on (a) a defendant's residential status, and the availability of a bail hostel
place; (b) a defendant's participation in employment or education; (c) the nature of a
defendant's personal ties such as being married and having children; and (d) the
availability of a surety. One or more of these elements were added to each case.
In order to discover the nature of information that should be included in the no
BIS group, the observational data collected in study two was used as a reference
because neither court had a BIS in operation. It was found that 96.23% of defendants in
court A and 89.07% of defendants in court B had strong community ties. Over the 342
cases observed in both courts, information about the defendants' residence was
available in 96.78% of cases. Information about the defendants' children was presented
in 9.06% of cases, and information pertaining to the defendants' spouses was presented
in 10.82% of cases. Information regarding the defendants' employment or educational
status was available in 12.87% of cases. In a minority of these cases the information
presented was of a negative nature. Therefore, the proportion and nature of the
information collected from the observational data were represented in the set of 27
cases. For example, in two out of the 27 cases, defendants were described as being
married because only 8% of the defendants observed in study two were married.
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Measurement of responses. Participants were asked to respond to the
hypothetical cases by firstly choosing a bail decision. The options were: unconditional
bail, conditional bail (with the conditions specified) or remand in custody.
Participants were then asked to indicate how certain they were that they had
made the appropriate decision based upon the information provided, on an 11-point
scale from 0 to 10. Zero represented "absolutely uncertain" and ten represented
"absolutely certain".
Finally, in order to highlight magistrates' explicit remand decision making
policies, participants were asked to rank the nine cues and the additional community ties
cue according to the relative importance attached to them when magistrates made their
remand decisions. A rank order of one indicated the most important cue.
5.2.4. Procedure. The 41 cases were placed in a booklet. The holdout cases
were randomly intermixed with the cases in the modelling set. The duplicate cases were
placed at the end. The ranking task followed the hypothetical cases.
The booklet also contained instructions that listed the nine cues and described
the tasks. Background information common to all cases was provided. Participants were
instructed to complete the tasks individually, not to spend too much time on each case,
and not to return to cases that had already been completed. Participants were also asked
to specify what further information, if any, they would have liked in order to make their
remand decisions in the bail decision making task. Participants' demographic details,
namely, type of magistrate, years of experience on the bench, location of court, and
operation of BIS in their court, were also requested.
Although the booklets were sent to the court manager, a covering letter was
included for magistrates, which introduced the study, guaranteed respondents
anonymity, and asked for volunteers to participate in the study. The four week time
limit for completion and return was highlighted and a stamped, self-addressed envelope
was provided.
5.3. Analysis and Results3
5.3.1. Effects of BISs on remand decisions made. There was no significant
difference between the two courts in terms of the likelihood of them making punitive
decisions (4130] -0.66, 1-tailed p > 0.013). The difference between the two courts in
terms of the likelihood of them making remand in custody decision was only marginally
significant (t[130] =-- -2.49, 1-tailed p = 0.014). Note that a 2 arcsinus transformation
3 Note that the level of significance for 2-tailed tests was 0.05 and 0.025 for 1-tailed tests.
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was first performed on the proportions, and to guard against a type I error a Bonferroni
correction was applied to the p value. Table 5.2 shows the means and standard
deviations for the within-subjects and between-subjects variables.
Decision	 Group*	 M (SD)
Unconditional bail
	
BIS	 13.73 (5.21)
No BIS	 13.20 (4.24)
Total	 13.51 (4.82)
Conditional bail	 BIS	 10.94 (4.69)
No BIS	 10.60 (4.76)
Total	 10.80 (4.32)
Remand in custody	 BIS	 2.34 (2.00)
No BIS	 3.38 (2.83)
Total	 2.77 (2.43)
Note: *N = 77 for BIS group, N= 55 for no BIS group and N= 132 for total.
Table 5.2. Mean proportions of unconditional bail, conditional bail and remand in
custody decisions made by BIS group and no BIS group
5.3.2. Effects of BISs on conditions attached to bail. For each magistrate the
mean number of conditions attached to bail for cases in the modelling set was
calculated. Contrary to the prediction, an independent samples t-test revealed no
significant differences in the grand mean number of conditions attached to bail by the
BIS group (M= 1.65, SD = 0.52) and no BIS group (M = 1.54, SD = 0.37) (4129]
= 1.42, 1-tailed p > 0.025). 4 Figure 5.1 provides a comparison between the two groups in
terms of the percentage of each type of condition imposed in the cases granted
conditional bail. As predicted, magistrates in the BIS group imposed a significantly
greater mean number of conditions of surety (M= 3.05, SD = 4.30), and bail hostel M=
0.78, SD = 0.60) than did magistrates in the no BIS group (For surety, M = 0.84. SD=
1.62 and for bail hostel, M = 0.15, SD = 0.52) (4102] = -4.11, 1-tailed p < 0.003. t1[1251
= -6.38, 1-tailed p < 0.003). There were no significant differences between the MO
4 A Levene's test for equality of variances was significant (p < 0.05) and so the 1-test based oni
variances was used.
5 The 1-test based on separate variances was used. To guard against a type I error a Bontenrom wit Wino
was applied to the p value.
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Figure 5.1. Conditions imposed in cases granted conditional bail by BIS group and
no BIS group on modelling set
5.3.3. Effects of BISs on intra-magistrate consistency. Each magistrate's
consistency in making remand decisions was measured by computing a Cohen's Kappa
value which corrects for chance. The decisions made on the seven duplicate cases were
compared with those made on their original counterparts in the modelling set. The
Kappa value ranges from 0 (indicating that agreement or consistency is no better than
chance) to 1 (indicating perfect consistency). Fleiss (1981) suggests that a value of 0.40
to 0.60 is "fair", 0.60 to 0.75 is "good" and a value above 0.75 is "excellent".
In the BIS group, 15 magistrates had a Kappa value of less than 0.40, 17 had a
Kappa value of 0.40 to 0.60, 16 had a Kappa value of 0.60 to 0.75, and 29 magistrates
had a Kappa value above 0.75 (this includes 16 magistrates for whom Kappa = I). In
the no BIS group, 12 magistrates had a Kappa value of less than 0.40, 19 had a Kappa
value of 0.40 to 0.60, 7 had a Kappa value of 0.60 to 0.75, and 17 magistrates had a
Kappa value above 0.75 (this includes 9 magistrates for whom Kappa = 1). Contrary to
the prediction, there was no significant difference between the BIS group (M= 0.63, SD
= 0.28) and the no BIS group (M = 0.60, SD = 0.26) in terms of the mean Kappa value
(t[130] = 0.50, 1-tailed p> 0.025).
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5.3.4. Effects of BISs on disagreement among magistrates. The percentage of
magistrates who disagreed with the modal response on each case was calculated. There
was some disagreement among magistrates in both groups as to the decision to be made
on each of the 27 cases in the modelling set. Contrary to the prediction, there was
however, no significant difference between the BIS group (M= 28.36%, SD = 14.85)
and the no BIS group (M = 27.58%, SD = 16.12) in terms of the mean percentage of
magistrates disagreeing with the modal response across the cases in the modelling set
(452] = 0.18, 1-tailed p > 0.025).
There was also no significant difference between magistrates in the BIS group
(M— 7.57, SD = 2.76) and the no BIS group (M = 7.47, SD = 3.52) regarding the mean
number of cases in the modelling set on which they disagreed from the modal response
(t[130] = 0.18, 1-tailed p > 0.025). A Kendall's tau-b correlation was computed to
examine the relationship between the extent of disagreement from the modal response
and the modal decision made, over the set of 27 cases. Although a nonsignificant
correlation of 0.28 was found for the no BIS group (2-tailed p> 0.05, N = 27), there was
a significant correlation of 0.45 for the BIS group (2-tailed p < 0.05, N= 27).
5.3.5. Effects of BISs on magistrates' post-decisional confidence. Kendall's
tau-b correlations were computed to examine the relationship between each magistrates'
post-decisional confidence ratings and his or her remand decisions made over the set of
27 cases. The mean correlation for the BIS group was —0.16 (SD = 0.27). There were 16
statistically significant correlations, and 15 were negative (1-tailed p < 0.025, n= 27, N
= 74). For the no BIS group-, the mean correlation was —0.18 (SD = 0.25). There were 11
significant correlations, and 10 were negative (1-tailed p < 0.025, n = 27, N= 55).
Each magistrates' mean post-decisional confidence ratings in the decisions made
on the 27 cases was calculated. As predicted, magistrates in the BIS group reported
significantly higher post-decisional confidence (M = 8.54, SD = 0.91) than magistrates
in the no BIS group (M = 8.20, SD = 0.94) (t[130] = 2.05, 1-tailed p < 0.025), although
the effect size is very small.
5.3.6. Effects of BISs on magistrates' remand decision making policies. As in
study one and study two, each magistrates' remand decision making policy was
captured using Franklin's rule, Dawes' rule and the Matching Heuristic. The modelling
procedures were the same as those used in study one, and so will not be detailed here.
Suffice it to say, the remand decision making policy of each magistrate was modelled
on the set of 27 cases. The polytomous cues were dichotomised for ease of analysis and
for each cue, all non-italicised values were coded as 0 and italicised values were coded
236
100
95
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
as 1 (see notes to Table 5.1). The inter-cue correlations remained zero. The three
decision options were also simplified into a binary decision, where unconditional bail
represented a non-punitive decision and conditional bail or remand in custody together
represented a punitive decision. Analysis of the frequency of the decisions made by
each magistrate on the modelling set revealed that magistrates made a relatively equal
number of punitive and non-punitive decisions. All of the models were developed so
that they aimed to predict a punitive decision and only predicted a non-punitive decision
by default. Each of the three models was used to make a prediction firstly on the set of
27 cases used to develop the models to test descriptive validity, and then on the set of
seven holdout cases used to validate the models to test predictive validity.
A Matching Heuristic which searched through 1 cue only (out of a possible 9
cues) (K= 1) proved to be the best overall fit for 81.80% of the BIS group and 90.90%
of the no BIS group. K= 2 for the remainder of magistrates in the BIS and no BIS
groups. Figure 5.2 presents the model or models that proved the best fit overall
decisions (i.e., punitive and non punitive) on the cases in the modelling and holdout sets
for magistrates in the BIS and no BIS groups.
BIS	 no BIS	 BIS	 no BIS
modelling set	 holdout set
best fit model
Dawes rule &
Matching Heuristic
Franklin's rule &
Matching Heuristic
Franklin's rule &
Dawes' rule
All three models
IIIIMatching Heuristic
Dawes' rule
Franklin's  rule
Figure 5.2 Best overall fit model for magistrates in BIS group and no BIS group on
modelling set and holdout set
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Figure 5.3 presents the results of the average overall fit of the three models
across the magistrates in the BIS and no BIS groups on the modelling and holdout sets.
To examine the difference in the fit of the three models on both the modelling and
holdout sets, and the differences in fit between the BIS and no BIS groups, a mixed
analysis of variance was conducted with two within-subjects variables and one between-
subjects variable. Model was a within-subjects variable and had three levels (i.e.,
Franklin's rule, Dawes' rule and the Matching Heuristic). Set was the other within-
subjects variable and had two levels (i.e., modelling set and holdout set). Group was the
between-subjects variable and had two levels (i.e., BIS group and no BIS group). As
predicted, there was a significant main effect of model (F[1,164] = 6.11,p < 0.05).6
There was however, no significant main effect of set (F[1,1301 = 0.73,p > 0.05), and no
significant main effect of group (F[1,130] = 1.12,p > 0.05). 7 The interaction between
group and model was non-significant (F[1,164] = 0.40,p > 0.05). The interaction
between model and set was non-significant (F[1,170] = 2.51,p > 0.025). The interaction
between set and group was also non-significant (p > 0.025). The three way interaction
was also non-significant (F[1,170] = 0.31,p > 0.05). Table 5.3 shows the means and
standard deviations for the within-subjects variables and the between-subjects variable.
A paired samples 1-test revealed that for the BIS group, the Matching Heuristic provided
a significantly greater mean overall fit on the modelling set than Dawes' rule (t[76] = -
2.97, 1-tailed p < 0.025). For the BIS group, the Matching Heuristic also provided a
significantly greater mean overall fit on the holdout set than Franklin's rule (t[76] = -
2.30, 1-tailed p < 0.025). Yor the no BIS group, the differences in the mean overall fit of
the Matching Heuristic and the other two models on the modelling and holdout sets
were not statistically significant (1-tailed p> 0.025).
6 Mauchly's test of sphericity was statistically significant (p < 0.05), indicating a heterogeneity of
covariance and so the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used, and the degrees of freedom are rounded
off.
7 The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used.
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Figure 5.3 Overall fit of Franklin's rule, Dawes' rule and Matching
Heuristic on modelling set and holdout set for BIS group and no BIS group
When comparing the fit of the models for both groups on only the non-punitive
decisions on the modelling set, a mixed analysis of variance was conducted with model
as the within-subjects variables and group as the between-subjects variable. The main
effect for model was significant (F[2,159] = 64.25,p < 0.05), the main effect for group
was not (F[2,159] = 0.06,p> 0.05), and neither was the interaction (F[1,130] =
> 0.05). 8 Franklin's rule (M= 74.24, SD = 13.51) provided a significantly greater mean
fit to the non-punitive decisions than either Dawes' rule (M= 71.47, SD = 14.17)
(t[131] = 7.26, 2-tailed p < 0.05) or the Matching Heuristic (M= 53.84, SD = 14.68)
(t[131] = 9.48, 2-tailed p < 0.05). On the holdout set, the main effect for model was
significant (F[2,170] = 53.15,p < 0.05), the main effect for group was not (F[2,170] =
1.22, 2-tailed p > 0.05), and neither was the interaction (F[1,130] = 1.77,p > 0.05).9
Here, Franklin's rule (M = 64.23, SD = 31.33) provided a significantly greater mean fit
than the Matching Heuristic (M = 36.72, SD = 32.64) (t[131] = 7.89, 2-tailed p < 0.05),
as did Dawes' rule (M= 64.18, SD = 34.90) (t[131] = 7.29, 2-tailed p < 0.05).
8 The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used.
9 The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used.
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% fit on modelling set 	 % fit on holdout set
BIS	 No BIS	 Total	 BIS	 No BIS Total
group	 group	 group	 group
(SD)	 (SD)	 (SD)	 (SD)	 (SD)	 (SD)
Franklin's rule	 68.40	 71.38	 69.64	 48.24	 49.87	 48.92
(8.49)	 (7.66)	 (8.26)	 (17.66)	 (19.42)	 (18.35)
77	 55	 132	 77	 55	 132
Dawes' rule	 66.71	 70.6397	 68.35	 49.91	 49.87	 49.89
(8.74)	 (7.19)	 (8.33)	 (19.20)	 (21.27)	 (20.01)
77	 55	 132	 77	 55	 132
Matching Heuristic 70.91	 71.62	 71.20	 55.18	 54.92	 55.07
(10.06)	 (8.86)	 (9.55)	 (19.64)	 (19.51)	 (19.52)
77	 55	 132	 77	 55	 132
Table 5.3. Means and standard deviations of overall fit of models on modelling set
and holdout set for BIS group and no BIS group
When considering the fit on only the punitive decisions on the modelling set,
once again, there was a significant main effect of model (F[1,163] = 29.30,p < 0.05),
but not for group (F[1,163] = 0.05,p > 0.05), or for the interaction between group and
model (F[1,130] = 0.03,p > 0.05). 10 Here, the Matching Heuristic (M = 81.16, SD =
15.68) provided a significantly greater mean fit than either Franklin's rule (M = 70.25,
SD = 12.41) (t[131] = -5.53, 2-tailed p < 0.05) or Dawes' rule (M = 69.96, SD = 12.52)
(t[131] = -5.88, 2-tailed p < 0.05). A similar pattern emerged on the holdout set. The
main effect for model was significant (F[1,158] = 50.49,p < 0.05), but there was no
significant main effect for group (F[1,158] = 1.22,p > 0.05), or the interaction
(F[1,130] = 1.22,p > 0.05)." The Matching Heuristic (M= 63.16, SD = 32.79)
provided a significantly greater mean fit than either Franklin's rule (M = 36.43, SD =
I ° The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used.
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24.15) (t[131] = -7.87, 2-tailed p < 0.05) or Dawes' rule (M 38.44, SD = 25.83)
(t[131] = -6.73, 2-tailed p < 0.05).
There was no significant correlation between the overall fit of the Matching
Heuristic on the modelling set and intra-magistrate consistency as measured by Cohen's
Kappa (r = -0.13, 1-tailed p > 0.025) for the BIS group, but there was a significant
correlation for the no BIS group (r = -0.30, 1-tailed p < 0.025). For the BIS group, there
was a significant correlation between the fit of the Matching Heuristic on the holdout
set and intra-magistrate consistency (r = -0.31, 1-tailed p < 0.025), while no significant
correlation was found for the no BIS group (r = -0.23, 1-tailed p> 0.025).
5.3.7. Effects of BISs on cue use. The Matching Heuristic was used to elicit
magistrates' cue use when making remand decisions. Cue use is defined broadly as the
number of cues searched (including the cue on which the decision is based) and so this
number may vary from case to case where K> 1. The mean number of cues used over
the cases in the modelling set was calculated for each magistrate. There was no
significant difference between the BIS group (M= 1.07, SD = 0.15) and no BIS group
(M = 1.04, SD = 0.12) in terms of the grand mean number of cues used (t[129] = 1.50,
2-tailed p> 0.05).
Magistrates in both groups varied regarding the cues they used to make their
remand decisions. Figure 5.4 illustrates the percentage of magistrates in both groups
who used each cue according to the Matching Heuristic. A Chi-Square test showed that
the use of gender was non-independent of the group (x 2 [1, N = 132] = 7.70, 2-tailed p <
0.006). The use of age was independent of the group (x 2 [1, N = 132] = 0.33, 2-tailed p>
0.006), as was the use of offence (x2 [1, N = 132]=-- 2.17, 2-tailed p> 0.006), polbail
(x2 [1, N= 132] = 0.01, 2-tailed p > 0.006), and pcbr (x 2 [1, N = 132] = 0.60, 2-tailed p >
0.006). To guard against a type I error a Bonferroni correction was applied to the p
values. The expected frequencies in some of the cells were below 5 for race, proscase,
prosreq and defreq, therefore, a Chi-Square analysis was abandoned for these variables.
Analysis of the critical value on the cues used by magistrates in each group revealed
that magistrates in both groups used the polbail, pcbr, proscase, prosreq and defreq cues
in the same direction. There were some differences between the BIS group and no BIS
group regarding the direction of use of the age, gender, race and offence cues. However,
these differences were relatively small.
II The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used.
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each cue according to Matching Heuristic
5.3.8. Effects of BISs on self-reported policies. In order to compare the explicit
policies of magistrates in the BIS group and the no BIS group, the median rank order of
each cue in both types of policies was computed across magistrates. Any tied ranks in
explicit policies were converted into sequential unique values. Figure 5.5 provides a
comparison of the explicit policies of the BIS and no BIS groups. Note that the rank
order of importance was reversed for ease of illustration, so a rank order of nine
represents the most important cue. Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to see if there
were significant differences between the BIS and no BIS groups regarding magistrates'
self-reported rank order of cue importance. There were no significant differences
between the groups in terms of the mean ranks for any of the cues (2-tailed p> 0.05).
For magistrates in each group, the rank ordering of the nine cues as described by
the Matching Heuristic was compared with the rank ordering of cues explicitly provided
by magistrates in the ranking task. Kendall's tau-b correlations were computed between
each magistrates' implicit and explicit rank order of cues. As expected, the correlations
were low. For the BIS group, the correlations ranged from —0.56 to 0.67 (M= 0.12, SD
= 0.27) and for the no BIS group they ranged from —0.34 to 0.61 (M= 0.16, SD = 0.20).
There were only two statistically significant correlations for the BIS group (1-tailed p <
group
BIS
no BIS
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0.025, N = 9, n = 76) and one for the no BIS group (1-tailed p < 0.025, N 9, n = 55).
There was no significant difference in the mean correlation between the two groups
(4129] = 0.95, 1-tailed p < 0.025).
group
ED BIS
no BIS
age
	 race
	
p olbail	 pr oscase	 defreq
gender	 offence	 pcbr	 p rosreq
cues
Figure 5.5. Explicit rank order of cue importance reported by BIS group and no
BIS group
A Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to see if there was a significant
difference between the two groups' rank ordering of community ties. There was no
significant difference (U = 1904.50, 2-tailed p > 0.05). The median rank order of
importance attached to the community ties cue was 4 for both groups.
Figures 5.6a and 5.6b illustrate the concordance between magistrates' implicit
and explicit rank ordering of cues summarised across for the BIS and no BIS groups,
respectively. For both groups, it is evident that the legal cues are ranked as more
important in magistrates' explicit policies than as indicated by their implicit policies
captured by the Matching Heuristic. Furthermore, although the extra-legal cues are
ranked as important in magistrates' implicit policies, they explicitly report that these
cues are not important in their remand decision making.
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Figure 5.6b. Comparison between implicit and explicit remand decision making
policies of no BIS group
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5.4. Discussion
5.4.1. Summary of main findings. No significant differences were found
between magistrates in the BIS group and no BIS group with regard to the median
decision made and the grand mean number of conditions imposed. There was also no
difference between the groups in terms of their mean intra-individual consistency; mean
number of cases on which they disagreed from the modal response; mean number of
cues used; nature of the cues used; their explicit policies; and the concordance between
their implicit and explicit policies. In addition, the Matching Heuristic captured the
policies of magistrates in both groups as equally well as Franklin's rule and Dawes'
rule. However, magistrates in the BIS group demonstrated significantly higher mean
post-decisional confidence than did magistrates in the no BIS group.
5.4.2. Discussion of main findings. Contrary to the prediction that model fit is
related to consistency, in the present study it was found there was either no relationship
between intra-individual consistency and overall model fit, or there was a negative
relationship. No explanation can be offered for this, although the lack of an association
between fit and consistency has been observed in other studies (e.g., Dhami & Harries,
2001). Regardless of group, the pattern of findings concerning intra-individual
consistency, disagreement among magistrates, post-decisional confidence, and
concordance between implicit and explicit policies, found in the present study, was
generally compatible with those reported in study one. Therefore, these findings will not
be discussed further here:Rather, the discussion will focus on the effectiveness of the
BIS initiative.
The present study does not suffer from the problems of missing information and
the demand characteristics involved in "action" research, that were faced by past
studies. The present study was the first to investigate the affect of BISs on magistrates
remand decisions using a controlled experimental design, and so methodologically it is
more rigorous than past research on this topic. It could be argued however, that a
balanced experimental design should also include a condition in which magistrates are
presented with negative information about the defendant's community ties, and a
condition in which information about community ties is entirely absent. This design was
considered and rejected for a number of reasons. First, the present study aimed to test
the effect of BISs, and these generally do not provide negative information. Second,
study two revealed that community ties information was often provided in courts where
a BIS does not operate. Finally, information gathered during the design phase of study
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one suggested that magistrates would be unwilling to participate in a study which they
considered unrealistic.
The frequency with which magistrates in both groups granted unconditional bail,
conditional bail and remanded defendants in custody was representative of the remand
decisions made in the English system (Home Office, 1999a). As predicted, magistrates
in the BIS group imposed significantly more conditions of surety and bail hostel than
magistrates in the no BIS group, although the use of bail hostel was not as large as
reported by Burrows (1994) or Stone (1988). It is believed that strong community ties
reduce the likelihood of a defendant absconding (e.g., Home Office, 1988), and the
rationale for imposing conditions such as surety, residence and reporting is that they
prevent absconding. However, there was no difference between the BIS group and no
BIS group regarding the decisions made, which is contrary to all of the past research
attesting to the effectiveness of BISs (Fiddes & Lloyd, 1990; HM Inspectorate of
Probation, 1993; Lloyd, 1992; Mair, 1988; Pearce & Smith, 1976; Stone, 1988),
although compatible with the variations among courts reported in some studies (Godson
& Mitchell, 1991; Lloyd, 1992; Stone, 1988).
There are several possible explanations for this finding. The first relates to the
amount and nature of information presented in the no BIS group relative to that
presented in the BIS group. The amount and nature of the community ties information
presented to magistrates in the BIS group was designed to be representative of that
provided in a court with a BIS in operation, and the amount and nature of the
community ties information presented to magistrates in the no BIS group was
representative of that available to magistrates in the two courts observed in study two.
There were no BISs in either of these courts. It can be seen that information pertaining
to residence is available in most cases in the no BIS group, and that this is often
positive, thus lessening the comparative effect of BISs. Criminological studies have also
reported that such information is often available to the court (Hucklesby, 1996).
Information pertaining to residence is contained in the courtsheet, and as Hucklesby
(1996) observed, defence solicitors tend to present community ties information to the
court. Past studies evaluating BISs have tended to ignore the fact that positive
community ties information may be available to magistrates sitting in courts where a
BIS is not in operation.
Second, the information pertaining to community ties presented to the BIS group
may be considered somewhat meagre and vague. On returning the questionnaires, some
magistrates commented on the hypothetical cases and the bail decision making task.
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One lay magistrate in the BIS group asked "How fixed is the fixed address?.. .The
defendant may be married, as stated, but is the marriage still intact...?" However, study
two and criminological research (Burrows, 1994; Doherty & East, 1985; East &
Doherty, 1984; Hucklesby, 1996; Morgan & Henderson, 1998; Zander, 1979) have
revealed that information presented in the courtroom is usually sparse, and that
magistrates often do not request further information.
A third explanation concerns the composition of the magistrates in the BIS
group. The magistrates in the BIS group and no BIS group were similar in terms of
type, experience, and operation of BIS in their courts. However, a significantly greater
number of magistrates in the BIS group were from metropolitan courts. Studies one and
two, and some criminological research (Bottomley, 1970) have demonstrated that
magistrates located in metropolitan courts are more punitive than magistrates in
provincial courts. Therefore, this difference in the composition of the two groups may
account for the lack of effectiveness of BISs observed in the present study.
A fourth possible explanation is that the present study lacked the social
dimension in which BISs operate. The probation service provides the completed bail
information sheet to the prosecution and defence rather than directly to the court
(although for an exception see Morgan and Henderson, 1998), and it has been suggested
that BISs work indirectly through the prosecution request or defence request (Fiddes &
Lloyd, 1990; Godson & Mitchell, 1991; Lloyd, 1992; Stone, 1998). In the present study,
the BIS was independent of the prosecution and defence requests. There is evidence
from studies one and two, and past criminological research (Doherty & East, 1985; East
& Doherty, 1984; Hucklesby, 1996; 1997a; Morgan & Henderson, 1998; Zander, 1979),
showing that magistrates are influenced by the prosecution request. A relatively equal
proportion of magistrates in both groups used the prosecution cue according to the
Matching Heuristic.
Finally, the findings may be explained by the fact that magistrates do not base
their remand decisions on the risk of a defendant absconding. Information pertaining to
community ties is aimed to help magistrates assess the likelihood of the defendant
absconding if released on bail, however, this is only one of the risk judgements that
magistrates must make before making a decision. The Bail Act 1976 also requires
magistrates to judge the likelihood of a defendant offending while on bail, and
interfering with witnesses/obstructing justice. The strength of a defendant's community
ties are not viewed as pertinent to judging these latter two risks (Home Office, 1974),
and the Bail Act 1976 does not provide guidance as to whether the three risks are to be
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weighed equally or differentially, and what is considered a high risk. Very little research
has investigated magistrates' bail risk judgments (Morgan & Henderson, 1998). Future
development of BIS type initiatives should target the aims of magistrates' decisions.
It is clear that the lack of effectiveness of BISs demonstrated in the present study
is compatible with the findings of study one and two, which show that magistrates do
not use this information when it is available. Magistrates in both groups in the present
study also did not explicitly report community ties information to be particularly
important to their decisions. This is not surprising considering that magistrates do not
know the predictive validity of this information. The future need and effectiveness of
BISs may rest on the results of research that can provide empirical support for the
theoretical argument regarding the importance of the strength of the defendant's
community ties to the remand decision.
BISs have been reported to be effective in the American system (e.g., Ares et al.,
1963). However, some major differences between BISs in the American and English
systems are that in the former, the BIS provides an objective score pertaining to the
strength of the defendant's community ties on a fixed scale (see Appendix B), a
recommendation for bail is explicitly made, and the information is presented directly to
the court. In the English system, Stone (1998) states that a reason for not submitting the
information directly to magistrates is that the information "does not form a
recommendation for bail nor does it give a complete picture of the defendant... .[and] it
could leave the false impression that the Probation Service had taken an overall view on
bail" (p. 12). The question of how these differences in the operation of BISs impact on
their effectiveness remains to be investigated. If these differences do result in the
desired effect of leading magistrates to remand fewer defendants in custody, then
changes must be made to the current operation of BISs in the English system.
In the present study, although magistrates in the two groups did not differ
significantly in the decisions they made, magistrates in the BIS group demonstrated
significantly greater confidence in their decisions, than did magistrates in the no BIS
group. Research in the field of J/DM has reported that confidence increases with the
amount of available information (e.g., Russo & Schoemaker, 1989). Unlike some of the
past studies (Lloyd, 1992; Stone, 1988), the present study did not investigate the
effectiveness of BISs in leading magistrates to release the "right" defendants on bail as
the cases were hypothetical. Although the relationship between confidence and accuracy
cannot be examined here, a lay magistrate wrote commenting that "You ask also the
certainty of the decision, if magistrates start feeling confident that they are getting
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things right, then the opposite is usually true." As stated earlier, high confidence may
hinder changes in policies.
After a recent examination of magistrates' remand decision making in England
and Wales, Morgan and Henderson (1998) concluded that more BISs should be
established to overcome the problem of a lack of information. BISs are a cost to the
public purse, and the results of the present study indicate that the future investment in
the BISs initiative needs to be reconsidered. The present study also suggests that future
evaluations need to be carefully designed to test the cause-effect relationships which
policy makers believe exist between such initiatives and magistrates' decision making.
Finally, the present study draws attention to the effectiveness of other policy initiatives
designed to affect magistrates' remand decisions such as bail hostels (White, 1978; Prat
& Bray, 1985; Watson, 1994), and electronic tagging (Mair & Mortimer, 1996;
Moritmer & Mair, 1997).
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6. THE WAY AHEAD FOR MAGISTRATES, REMAND DECISIONS, SOCIAL
JUDGEMENT THEORY AND SIMPLE HEURISTICS'
The research presented in this thesis employed the technique of JA and the
simple heuristics approach, within the framework of SJT, to investigate English
magistrates' remand decision making. Both the decisions made by individual
magistrates on hypothetical cases, and the decisions made by benches on real cases,
were examined. In the two studies using hypothetical cases, it was found that the fast
and frugal, non-compensatory Matching Heuristic was better at describing and
predicting magistrates' decisions than either of two linear, compensatory integration
models. These findings support previous research reviewed in Chapter 2 attesting to the
validity of simple heuristics. According to the Matching Heuristic, all magistrates based
their decisions on one cue, and most magistrates only searched through cue of the cues
presented. While some magistrates used legal cues, others used defendant and crime
control related cues, and cues were mostly used in the expected direction, thus
supporting the claims of past criminological research reviewed in Chapter 1.
Magistrates did not report these "extra-legal" cues as being very important in their
decision making. This is compatible with the findings past SJT research reviewed in
Chapter 2, although social judgements theorists would call this a demonstration of a
lack of "insight" in judgment policies.
When granting conditional bail, magistrates typically imposed more than one
condition on average, and this was most frequently one of residence. These findings
confirm those of criminological research reviewed in Chapter 1. Contrary to past
research presented in Chapter 1, BISs did not have a significant effect on magistrates'
decisions or on the grand mean number of conditions they imposed, although they did
lead to significantly greater post-decisional confidence. Some magistrates were
consistent in the decisions they made, however, the majority demonstrated some degree
of inconsistency in a simple test-retest situation. Furthermore, all magistrates
demonstrated disagreement from the modal response on at least some of the cases
presented. Despite this, all magistrates were also highly confident in the decisions they
made. These findings have extended our understanding of magistrates remand decision
making, and are compatible with many other SJT studies investigating J/DM in other
domains, as presented in Chapter 2. Finally, there were few differences in the
I The main findings of study one and two have been presented at various national and international
conferences, which are listed in Appendix H. Study one is in press (Dhami & Ayton), and the other two
250
performance of lay and stipendiary magistrates, and more and less experienced
magistrates. There were however, some differences in the performance of magistrates
from metropolitan and provincial courts.
The findings of the study using real cases confirmed the main findings of the
two studies using hypothetical cases. In addition, the formal properties of the remand
decision making task were identified. For instance, it was revealed that the inter-
correlations among the cues available to magistrates were generally small. Some of the
cues that the Bail Act 1976 explicitly stipulates magistrates should consider were often
unavailable to magistrates. Although there was no relationship between caseload and
duration of decision making, magistrates took on average between 6.5 to 10 minutes,
which was longer than that reported by criminological research reviewed in Chapter 1.
The findings and the limitations of the three studies presented in this thesis were
discussed in detail in Chapters 3 to 5, and so I shall take the opportunity to discuss more
general aspects of magistrates' remand decision making, social judgement theory and
simple heuristics in this chapter. The chapter is organised into five sections. In the first
section, I consider a possible limitation of the research with regard to the manner in
which the Matching Heuristic was tested. Then, I examine the generality of the findings
both to the English magistracy and beyond the English system. In the second section, I
discuss the implications of the findings for the principles of due process, and list
possible ways in which magistrates' remand decision making performance could be
improved. This includes a statement of the further research that could be conducted,
which is in addition to the possibilities for further research noted in Chapters 3 to 5. In
the third section, I compare the simple heuristics approach with the heuristics and biases
approach, which has dominated much J/DM research. Following this, I discuss the
criteria by which models can be chosen and further describe the Matching Heuristic. I
then highlight the implication of the findings of the present research for Brunswik's
(1952) lens model and SJT. I present the main conclusions in the final section.
6.1. Limitations and Generalisability of Present Research
6.1.1. Was the test of the Matching Heuristic limited? Some critics may
consider the fact that the Matching Heuristic was not compared against the regression
model, as a limitation of the present research. Afterall, social judgement theorists use
the regression model, and not simpler linear models such as Franklin's rule and Dawes'
rule. The regression model is considered a benchmark model when fitting data, and
are currently in preparation for publication.
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some SJT studies have reported that it can provide a very good fit to judgement data, so
that over 80% of the variance in judgements is accounted for (e.g., Gonzalez et al.,
1998; Kirwan et al., 1983; Kline & Sulsky, 1995). In studies one and three, the use of
the regression model was precluded by the small case:cue ratio, and in study two it was
impeded by the large amounts of missing (unavailable) data on some of the cues.
However, there are several reasons why the inability to compare the Matching Heuristic
against the regression model is not necessarily a limitation.
First, Dawes and Corrigan (1974) demonstrated the phenomenon of flat
maximum, where many different sets of weights can provide an equally good fit to data.
When models are cross-validated it has been found that non-optimal unit or equal
weights can sometimes fit data better than the benchmark (e.g., Claudy, 1972; Dawes &
Corrigan, 1974; Dorans & Drasgow, 1978; Einhom & Hogarth, 1975; Schmidt, 1971,
1972). In fact, fast and frugal heuristics may outperform the benchmark (Czerlinski et
al., 1999; Gigerenzer et al., 1999a). Second, there are many SJT studies that have found
the regression model to be a poor fit to some individuals' judgement data (e.g., Al-
Tabtabai, 1998; Sensibaugh & Allgeier, 1996; Westenberg et al., 1998; Zedeck &
Kafry, 1977), thus not ruling out this possibility for magistrates' remand decision
making. Third, in their study, Slegers et al. (2000) found that a fast and frugal heuristic
fitted their participants' choices as equally well as a logistic regression model.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, since the present research was conducted,
I have also tested the relative descriptive and predictive validity of the Matching
Heuristic against a logistic regression model that contained only statistically significant
cues (Dhami & Harries, 2001). Thirty-six English doctors made decisions whether or
not to prescribe lipid lowering drugs on a set of 130 hypothetical cases, based on 12
binary and polytomous cues. Their individual decision making policies were modelled
on 100 of the cases (as the other 30 were duplicates used for a measure of test-retest
consistency). It was found that although the logistic regression model only contained a
few cues on average, doctors used significantly fewer cues according to the Matching
Heuristic. The Matching Heuristic also indicated greater disagreement among doctors'
policies. Across the doctors, the logistic regression model (with only significant
weights) provided a mean fit of 73.97% compared to a mean fit of 74.13% provided by
the Matching Heuristic. There was no statistically significant difference in the mean fit
of both models. There was also no difference in the degree of self-insight suggested by
both models. In this sense, the findings of the present research are not considered to be
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especially limited due to the inability to compare the Matching Heuristic with a
regression model.
6.1.2. What is the generality of the findings? The present research investigated
the remand decision making practices of 213 individual magistrates and 58 benches
comprising a combination of 111 magistrates, from a total of 112 adult magistrates'
courts in the English criminal justice system. By contrast, criminological research has
tended to involve a small sample of courts, and researchers have not reported how the
courts and magistrates were sampled (Brown & HuIlin, 1993; Doherty & East, 1985;
East & Doherty, 1984; Eaton 1987; Hucklesby, 1996, 1997b; Morgan, 1994; Morgan &
Henderson, 1998). The courts participating the present research were randomly sampled
from the directory of courts in England and Wales (Morris, 1996, 1997). The
demographic make-up of the magistrates who participated with regard to their type,
experience, and location of court, can be considered representative of the magistracy as
a whole (Darbyshire, 1997b; Lord Chancellor's Department, 1999b). Therefore, the
findings of the present research may be generalised to the English magistracy.
The extent to which the findings concerning magistrates' inconsistency,
disagreement, use of a fast and frugal heuristic and extra-legal cues, and high post-
decisional confidence generalise to magistrates' performance on other decision making
tasks such as the decision to convict and sentence, is unclear. These decisions are made
less frequently and are considered to be more complex in terms of the amount of
information presented, their duration and the legislation on which they hinge.
Nevertheless, the picture painted by past research on these other decisions is not too
dissimilar from that presented here (e.g., Hood, 1992; McKnight, 1981).
Whether the findings of the present research can tell us anything about how
remand decisions are made in other criminal justice systems is also unclear. The
magistracy and the remand decision making task are not exclusive to the English
system. For instance, magistrates work in the American, Australian, and Canadian
systems, and psychological and criminological research has been conducted on remand
decision making in other justice systems including the American (e.g., Ebbesen &
Konecni, 1975, Goldkamp & Gottfredson, 1985; Goldkamp, Gottfredson, Jones, &
Weiland, 1995; Williams, 1993), Australian (e.g., Sarre, King, & Bamford, 1999), and
Scottish systems (e.g., Paterson & Whittaker, 1994, 1995). However, some of the
characteristics of the remand decision makers and the remand decision making task are
peculiar to the English system. For example, In the Scottish system, remand decisions
are made by sheriffs, who differ from English magistrates with regard to their legal
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training. In the American system, the decision refers to a continuous decision about how
much money the defendant should put forward in order to be released on bail, rather
than a categorical decision. In this sense, it may not be safe to generalise the findings of
research from one jurisdiction to others because although the decisions may be common
to different systems, the legal rules and procedures, and the characteristics of the
individuals trained to apply them are often peculiar to a particular jurisdiction.
However, it is also the case that the findings of the past research conducted in other
systems converge with the findings of the present research. For instance, Paterson and
Whittaker (1994, 1995) found evidence of disagreement among three Scottish courts
and reliance on crime control cues. Goldkamp and Gottfredson (1979) found that
information pertaining to community ties did not have a great influence on decisions
made in the American system. Ebbesen and Konecni (1975) used regression models to
capture the policies of five San Diego judges. It was found that judges used few cues
when making decisions and that they mainly followed the prosecution request. Finally,
Williams (1993) found that a CART model, which conveyed a relatively simple
process, could predict the decisions of American courts very well.
From another perspective, the generality of the findings of the present research
can be discussed with regard to the findings of past SJT studies. Although there are
exceptions, as pointed out in Chapter 2, many past SJT studies involving experienced
decision makers in other decision making domains such as medicine (see e.g., Wigton,
1988; 1996), education (see e.g., Cooksey, 1988; Heald, 1991), social work (see e.g.,
Dalgleish, 1988) and accounting (see e.g., Libby & Lewis, 1982; Waller, 1988), have
reported findings similar to those demonstrated here, with regard to intra-individual
consistency, disagreement among decision makers, the number of cues used,
concordance between self-reported cue use and modelled cue use.
6.2. Challenging and Changing the System
6.2.1. Assessing the quality of decisions. Legal decisions, such as the remand
decision, are regularly criticised by organisations supporting victims, groups
representing defendants and professional agencies such as the CPS. Criticism is directed
both at existing legal rules and procedures and the individuals who are formally trained
and entrusted to apply them. The motivation for such scrutiny lies in the belief that
crime and order are socially constructed and so can be reconstructed, and the realisation
that decisions have consequences for both the public purse and the lives of the public.
However, until now, psychologists in general and J/DM researchers in particular, had
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not empirically assessed the quality of English magistrates' remand decisions (Dhami,
1999a, 1999b).
As in past criminological research, the present research revealed that the current
practice of magistrates' remand decision making is far from ideal practice. Due process
principles have been suggested as ways to regulate the remand decision and so
constitute ideal practice (e.g., Galligan, 1987; King, 1981; Packer, 1968). Indeed, our
notion of justice is synonymous with due process (Packer, 1968). Packer (1968) states
that the due process model "...resembles a factory that has to devote a substantial part
of its input to quality control" (J' . 165). Due process principles require that all court
participants follow procedural guidelines. Magistrates adjudicate the formal adversarial
process followed by the prosecution and defence, who present arguments, based on
carefully gathered facts. Magistrates must assess the weight of these arguments and
integrate them. In addition, the defendant should be presumed innocent, receive
equitable treatment, and should have an opportunity to appeal against the decision.
Together, these principles strive to reduce a type I error or a false positive. However, the
present research suggests that due process principles are violated by the lack of
consistency in decisions; the extent of disagreement in decisions; the use of a simple,
fast and frugal, non-compensatory decision making strategy; the use of "extra-legal"
cues related to the defendants personal characteristics, the prosecution request, police
remand decision, and the previous benches' decision; making a punitive decision when
there is insufficient information; and making decisions rapidly. In fact, crime control
principles are predominant ill the remand process not only in practice, but also in theory
viz., the law on bail (e.g., King, 1981; Hucklesby, 1993; Packer, 1968), thus implying
that the law requires reform. Finally, although accuracy is not the main criteria by which
to judge the quality of legal decisions, researchers in other domains have used
inconsistency and disagreement as an indication of incorrect decisions (e.g., Libby &
Lewis, 1982; Lidz, Mulvey, Apperson, Evanczinlc, et al., 1992), as can be done here.
Interestingly, the findings of the present research contradict how magistrates and
their managers believe the remand decision is made. For example, a lay magistrate
stated that "the decisions of Magistrates are indeed complex each case is an 'individual
case'. Another lay magistrate claimed that "the situation.. .depends on an enormous
weight of balancing information, together with our experience and training." The
chairman of the council stated "we are trained to question, and to assess carefully the
evidence we are given." A clerk to the justices commenting on the hypothetical cases
said that "reference is made to defendant's gender, race and age, none of which, save in
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some of the most exceptional circumstances, are going to be appropriate to a decision as
to bail." In Konecni and Ebbesen's (1984) terms, these quotes highlight the "mythology
of legal decision making" (p. 5). Certainly, the reality of magistrates' remand decision
making 25 years after the introduction of the Bail Act 1976 is not dissimilar from that
prior to the Act. Zander's (1967) conclusion that "the present system governing the
determination of bail applications requires reform" (p. 142) still holds.
6.2.2. Improving remand decision making. Unlike criminologists, it is not
common for psychologists researching legal decision making to also strive to change
the system. For example, after a decade of research on various legal decisions made in
the American system, Ebbesen and Konecni (1984) state that "Changes in the system's
structure, accountability, and incentives are too complicated to ponder here, and it is,
frankly, unrealistic to do so, given the system's entrenched vested interests. The best
one can hope for is a greater acceptance of...systematic and continuous data-collection
on decision making" (p. 17). This defeatist viewpoint is convenient. Fortunately, it is
not shared by social judgement theorists. For instance, Hammond et al. (1975) state that
"Social judgment theorists firmly believe that all students of human judgment should
engage in research that will help provide better social policies and thereby increase our
chances for a decent life on earth" (p. 306).
What should be changed? While some critics have questioned the philosophy of
remand decision making altogether (e.g., Ashworth 1994), others have pointed to more
practical changes. Criminologists have tended to focus on fallibilities in the decision
makers, namely the magistrates. The fact that both lay and stipendiary magistrates are
required to have "sound judgement" according to the organisations that recruit and
appoint them (Lord Chancellor's Department, 1999a, 1999d) has to some extent led to a
belief that only particular people can "do the job". Therefore, if these people are not
performing well, they should be replaced (e.g., Brown, 1991; Darbyshire, 1997a, 1997b;
Narey, 1997). In this vein, King (1971) had earlier concluded that:
the solution to the bail problem is not simply a matter of more representation
and more information. Of far greater importance is the attitude of magistrates
and judges, and the preconceptions that they bring to their courts....the
experience of the 1967 Criminal Justice Act has shown that reforms in this field
depend not upon the letter of the law, but upon those administering the law (p.
94).
More recently, it has been proposed that a more representative lay magistracy should be
appointed, through a more open recruitment procedure (e.g., Darbyshire, 1997b; King &
May, 1985). The future of the magistracy is currently being discussed in a report
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commissioned by the Home Office (Sanders, 2000). 2 Early indications are that there
will be proposals to professionalise the lay bench. Lay magistrates could either be
required to sit with stipendiary magistrates or they could be replaced altogether by
stipendiaries. Despite their difference in qualifications and training, however, the
present research revealed that there were few differences in the performance of lay and
stipendiary magistrates. It may be that differences only arise when magistrates are
presented with difficult cases that hinge on complicated legislation. The cases presented
in study one were not classified on this dimension. It has also been proposed, and to
some extent accepted, that the justices' clerks could take over some of the magistrates'
duties (Narey, 1997). Darbyshire (1997b, 1999) however, warns that court clerks lack
the relevant training and appropriate guidance, and that they may face a conflict of
interests. In sum, criminologists have focused on the decision makers and excluded an
in depth analysis of the characteristics of the remand decision making task that
magistrates are expected to perform.
As humans, both lay and stipendiary magistrates have limited cognitive abilities,
with regard to attention, memory and information processing, for example. Therefore
replacing one human with another may not be sufficient to change performance.
Empirical evidence demonstrates that performance is contingent on both human
cognitive limitations and task constraints (see Payne et al., 1993). This was recognised
by Brunswik (1952) and Simon (1956), and influenced the view espoused by SJT
(Hammond et al., 1975) and the simple heuristics approach (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999).
In practice, magistrates' remand decision making may be affected by the law, the order
of information presentation, the availability and quality of information, opportunities to
learn from the task, time pressure, and their work pattern. Although none of the studies
presented in this thesis systematically tested the effects of characteristics of the remand
decision making task on magistrates' performance, research in other domains reviewed
in Chapter 2 (e.g., Jagacinski, 1994; Hammond et al., 1987; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992;
Payne et al., 1993), suggests that these will have predictable effects. Nevertheless,
future research should examine the effects of these task characteristics on magistrates'
remand decision making.
It is clear that interventions should focus on both the characteristics of the
remand decision making task and on the magistrates themselves. Some of the possible
changes that can be made to improve the system are discussed here. First, the lack of
improvement in magistrates' performance after the Bail Act 1976 was introduced, may
2 This report has not yet been published.
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be accounted for by the fact the guidelines contained in the Act do not differ much from
earlier guidelines such as those contained in the Criminal Justice Act 1967 (reproduced
in Simon & Weatheritt, 1974). The law is vague and ill-defined, thus affording
magistrates considerable discretion when judging bail risks and making bail decisions.
For instance, magistrates can exercise discretion as to the cues they use, how they
weight and integrate them, what they perceive to be insufficient information, and what
they consider to be a substantial risk of breaching bail. In an attempt to reduce
inconsistency, disagreement and use of extra-legal cues, efforts could be made to reduce
discretion. The Judicial Studies Board has developed and issued a card "for easy
reference" that provides a summary of the law of bail, in order to structure magistrates'
remand decision making (Judicial Studies Board, 1996). This does not however, reduce
or even guide the discretion afforded by the Bail Act 1976. Others have proposed that
guidelines be developed to reduce discretion, thereby increasing accountability, and
increasing the feelings of procedural fairness (Galligan, 1987). There has been some
success in the introduction of guidelines in the American system (e.g., Goldkamp et al.,
1995). However, guidelines are restrictive and may become immutable (Galligan,
1987). Therefore, the law should be altered directly. The Bail Act 1976 could be better
specified. The catch-all category could be unpacked into its component parts and the
Act could incorporate a weighting scheme for the information that is informed by at
least some objective measures of the relative predictive validities of the factors.
This leads to the second possible improvement, namely the determination of the
important cues, and their objective predictive validities. The magistrates' remand
decision, is for the most part, based on an assessment of the risk that a defendant poses
in absconding, offending, interfering with witnesses/obstructing justice. Magistrates
must strike a balance between protecting the public and the defendant. The judgement
of risk is multidimensional and bail risks may be separated into the cues that predict
failure to surrender, offending while on bail, or interfering with witnesses/obstructing
justice. Risk can refer to the estimated probability of one of these occurring, or more
generally, can refer to the possibility that one of these will occur (Hansson, 1989).
Recently, Morgan and Henderson (1998) asked magistrates and other court officials
from one English court to list the information they would need to judge the three types
of bail risks. Then, via written descriptions of real cases, participants were asked to
identify the most relevant cues for judging bail risks. It was revealed that participants
judged if any one risk was likely, when they made their remand decisions. Although
more information was identified as being relevant for judging the risk of offending
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while on bail, many of the same cues were viewed as necessary for judging all three
types of risks. 3 The study however, failed to yield sufficient information regarding the
cues deemed relevant for judging the risk of interfering with witnesses/obstructing
justice, and it did not distinguish between the factors that were perceived to determine a
high risk and a low risk. Further research is needed on how magistrates' judge bail risks.
Before the introduction of the Bail Act 1976, researchers considered the factors
that may affect the risk of absconding, offending, and interfering with
witnesses/obstructing justice (Home Office, 1974; King, 1971; Simon & Weatheritt,
1974). They stressed the direction in which cues pointed, and the differential importance
of the cues. The Bail Act 1976 is explicit as to some of the factors that should be
considered. According to Sprack (1992), the possible reasons for the inclusion of these
factors are that a defendant accused of a serious offence is more likely to abscond to
avoid facing a lengthy prison sentence if convicted. The nature of the offence may
indicate whether it is one that is likely to be repeated (e.g., shop lifting). Serious
offences are relatively less likely to be repeated. A defendant will have more to lose by
absconding if he or she has strong community ties, so a person with dependants,
permanent employment and a fixed address is considered less likely to abscond. A
defendant's character refers to his or her criminal record and may reveal that he or she is
untrustworthy, and any previous convictions may suggest that he or she is likely to
receive a custodial sentence if convicted because of breaching a suspended sentence, for
example. A defendant's bail record shows whether he or she has been reliable in the
past and if so, whether he or she may be trusted again. An argument for bail will be
stronger if the prosecution case is weak, and a defendant is less likely to abscond if he
or she believes the charge will not be proven. Furthermore, this gives the court an
indication that the defendant is innocent and so it would be an injustice if he or she was
remanded in custody.
Unfortunately, however, all of this is conjecture. The predictive validity of the
cues explicitly referred to in the Bail Act 1976 have not been empirically or statistically
tested. In order to obtain statistical evidence, an outcome criterion is needed. In chapter
1, it was suggested that formal, objective outcome feedback could help magistrates to
develop an appropriate policy. However, as was pointed out, obtaining an outcome
measure is difficult, if not impossible, in the legal domain. Indeed, the lack of an
3 Morgan and Henderson (1998) found that the relevant cues for judging the risk of failing to surrender
were: likely sentence if convicted, current offence and the harm inflicted, housing situation, family ties,
criminal record (related to likely sentence), bail record, employment status, and substance abuse. These
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outcome criterion necessitated a single-systems design to be adopted in the studies
presented in this thesis. Nevertheless, some headway has been made on the
determination of the predictive validities of cues in the American (e.g., Goldkamp &
Gottfredson, 1985; Nussbaum, Lang, Chan, & Riviere, 1994) and Australian systems
(e.g., Weatherburn, Quinn, & Rich, 1987). In the English system to date, few studies
have been conducted on this matter, and there are no plans to launch an official program
of research to do so (Research and Statistics Directorate, personal communication,
2000). Brown (1998) reported that the nature of the offence, the length of time on bail,
and the defendant's previous convictions were associated with offending on bail.4
Morgan and Henderson (1998) found that in addition to these factors, the defendant's
bail record and community ties were related to offending on bail. Gender was not
related to offending on bail. 5 Further research is needed before these findings are
considered conclusive.
When attempting to discover the cues that predict bail risks, researchers can
learn from the studies that have investigated the predictors of dangerousness (see
Monahan, 1982; Monahan & Steadman, 1994). First, a wide range of cues should be
selected for study on theoretical grounds, including situational, dispositional and
historical cues. Second, defendants should be grouped according to important
demographic factors rather than lumped together. Third, the risk behaviours should also
be separated into meaningful subtypes to make prediction more sensitive. For example,
the cues predicting the commission of violent offences on bail may be different from
those predicting the commission of property offences on bail. Fourth, the difficulty in
reliably measuring offending while on bail and interfering with witnesses/obstructing
justice using official records can be somewhat overcome by using self-report
techniques. Such techniques have proved successful in revealing hidden crimes
(Maguire, 1994). Fifth, the problem posed by the fact that high bail risks are likely to be
remanded in custody where their opportunity to abscond is limited for example, can be
dealt with by discovering how these defendants differ from those who are bailed. Thus,
defendants remanded in custody can be matched with a sample who were bailed, and
the extent to which the cues predicting bail risks in the bailed sample can be generalised
to the custody sample. The fact that magistrates are inconsistent and show disagreement
suggests that this matching procedure may not be too difficult.
cues, plus the defendant's community or criminal ties were also considered as the most relevant for
judging the risk of offending while on bail.
4 Brown (1998) analysed offending on police bail and court bail together.
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Future research needs to be directed at measuring cue validities. In the
meantime, cues could be weighted equally. As noted above, past research, as well as the
present research, have shown that unit or equal weighted models fair well against
differentially weighted models. Dawes and Corrigan (1974) concluded that "The whole
trick is to decide what variables to look at and then to know how to add" (p. 105).
Third, if the relevant cues (and their weights) could be collected and a decision
rule could be formulated, it is conceivable that magistrates could be replaced by an
automated system. There is a considerable literature attesting to the efficacy of actuarial
prediction (e.g., Dawes, 1971; Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Meehl, 1954; Sawyer,
1966). As Goldberg (1970) pointed out, such models eliminate the random error in
people' judgements which arise through "boredom, fatigue, illness, situational and
interpersonal distraction" (p. 423). Actuarial models are already in place in other aspects
of the criminal justice system (e.g., Copas, Marshall, & Tarling, 1996; Ditchfield,
1997). However, there is also great resistance to statistical prediction (e.g., Kleinmuntz,
1990; Meehl, 1986), which not only reduces discretion, but also is a form of generalised
decision making. In a recent discussion of the future development of the magistrates'
remand decision making task, the Law Commission (1999) recommended that
discretion should be allowed, and generalised decision making should be proscribed.
Fourth, magistrates' cognitive processing limitations could be overcome by
providing them with a cognitive aid that helps them implement the law. Cognitive aids
have been recommended in other judgment domains such as psychiatry (Erdman, 1988),
and are not a new concept in-the legal domain (e.g., Larsen, Yelon, & Irving, 1997).
Fifth, just and defensible decisions can only be made when there is sufficient
information, and so the availability of information should be addressed. In the past, the
BIS policy initiative was developed to counteract the problem of insufficient
information pertaining to a defendant's community ties. However, as study three
revealed, this did not affect magistrates' decisions. Any new initiative needs to first
consider just how "unavailable" the information is, and its relevance to the decision.
Sixth, magistrates' consistency and disagreement could be improved by
providing them with cognitive feedback of their own and other magistrates' bail
decision making policies, respectively. The efficacy of cognitive feedback using the
regression model has been widely demonstrated (see e.g., Doherty & Balzer, 1988;
Hammond & Brehmer, 1973). Research needs to be conducted on the effectiveness of
5 Morgan and Henderson's (1998) study however, was an example of "action research" where the
changes were made to the bail practices of the courts they were studying during the period of the study.
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fast and frugal heuristics as cognitive feedback devices. Note that in the single systems
design only cognitive information can be provided, and information about the task
cannot be conveyed. However, in a domain where the objectively correct decision is
difficult to reliably determine, feedback of one's own policy may result in consistent
use of an inaccurate policy, and feedback of one individual's policy to others, may
result in the use of an "agreed" upon, but inaccurate policy.
Seventh, statutory rules of procedure for bail hearings could be introduced in
order to improve consistency. Lydiate (1987) proposes that the clerk can structure the
proceedings and gathering of information by magistrates.
Finally, the fact that the remand decision arises as a result of a need for an
adjournment in a case because magistrates are busy, means that efforts could be made to
reduce magistrates' caseloads and so reduce delays. To this end, several initiatives have
already been introduced such as delegating greater powers to the court clerk in
extending police bail and enlarging court bail, for example (Magistrates' Association,
1993 cited in Whittaker et al., 1997). Whittaker et al. (1997) found that the reasons for
adjournments included the need to gather further information such as a pre-sentence
report in 17% of their sample of cases. In 6% the case was remitted to another court
(e.g., to be heard with other charges), and in 5% of cases there were other reasons for an
adjournment request (e.g., an interpreter was required). These delays could be avoided.
However, as Whittaker et al (1997) also point out, approximately half of the delays were
considered to be unavoidable because for example, the case was proceeding to trial.
Any attempts to improve magistrates' decision making need to take into
consideration a number of factors. First, the interdependency and interrelatedness of the
criminal justice agencies such as the police, CPS, courts, legal representatives and the
probation service, amongst whom magistrates operate, should be taken into account.
These agencies may have goals that compete with those of the magistracy (Pullinger,
1985). Second, the criminal justice system does not operate in a vacuum. It is greatly
influenced by the political, economic and social climate of the time (Hucklesby, 1997a;
Jones, 1988; Robertshaw, 1983). The psychological research presented in this thesis
was conducted from a cognitive perspective. There is also a social psychological
dimension which is important (see Konecni & Ebbesen, 1987; Konecni & Ebbesen,
1988; Saks & Hastie, 1978). Finally, magistrates may be reluctant to change, and their
resistance may be indicated by their high degree of post-decisional confidence in their
abilities. In fact, as I experienced, magistrates and their managers can be quite resistant
to research into their decision making.
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Nevertheless, an awareness of the magnitude and significance of the.
magistrates' remand decision as discussed in Chapter 1, highlights the urgency with
which practice needs to be improved. The remand prison population in 1998 represents
a continuing rise since 1995, and a general increase over the past decade (Home Office,
1999b). It is projected to increase (Home Office, 2000c). In addition, there are historical
changes to the English system that affect the magistracy, which have recently either
been implemented or have been proposed. First, on 2" d October 2000, the Human Rights
Act 1998 required that legal policy and practice in the English criminal justice system
comply with the European Convention on Human Rights (Law Commission, 1999;
Uglow et al., 1998). Article 5 of the Convention, which guarantees the right to "liberty
and security of person" save certain exceptions, is particularly pertinent of the remand
decision. The Law Commission (1999) recently completed a consultation paper in
which it identified aspects of the Bail Act 1976 that are incompatible with Convention
rights, either in theory or in practice. Some of the present research was included in the
Commission's report. The Commission recommended that some parts of the Act be
repealed or amended and that guidance and training be given to magistrates, so that they
can apply the law appropriately. However, the Commission did not discuss factors,
other than the law, that may affect application of the law and consequently lead to
remand decisions violating Convention rights in practice. Second, the Government has
recently publicised plans in its Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) (No. 2) Bill, to reduce
jury trials, thereby increasing trials in magistrates' courts (Home Office, 2000a). This
proposal places great faith in magistrates' judgement abilities.
6.3. Theoretical Implications and Integration
At the outset of Chapter 2, it was stated that the field of J/DM includes many
theoretical and methodological approaches (for overviews see Cooksey, 1996a;
Doherty, 1993; Goldstein & Hogarth, 1997; Hammond et al., 1980; Slovic &
Lichtenstein, 1971). Although some of these are complementary, there has been little
integration among approaches, despite calls for a union (e.g., Anderson, 1974;
Hammond et al., 1980; Hastie, 1991). The research presented in this thesis has made an
attempt to integrate the simple heuristics approach with SJT. As discussed in Chapter 2,
SJT appeared as a coherent framework for J/DM research in the mid 1970s. At the same
time, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) introduced the heuristics and biases approach,
which has since proved very popular among researchers. To date, research employing
the heuristic and biases approach and SJT have been conducted in parallel, with no
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meeting of the two (Hammond, 1990). Although the heuristics and biases approach and
the simple heuristics approach both emphasise the psychological reality of heuristic
processing, they differ in some important ways which may preclude their integration
(Gigerenzer, 1991b, 1996; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996).
6.3.1. Simple heuristics and the heuristics and biases approach. The
heuristics and biases approach borrowed its ideal vision of human behaviour from
economics. According to Edwards (1954), "economic man is assumed to know not only
what all the courses of action open to him are, but also what the outcome of any action
will be... .[He] is infinitely sensitive...He can weakly order the states into which he can
get, and he makes his choices so as to maximize something" (p. 381, word in brackets
added). It was argued that in order to choose so as to achieve the highest (in some cases,
subjective) expected utility, behaviour should follow axioms such as transitivity and
independence (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947; Savage, 1954). Formal
computations involving probability theory, for example, were viewed as roots to
axiomatic behaviour.° Kahneman et al. (1982) tested whether descriptively, people used
these formal roots to axiomatic behaviour. Their experimental method involved a
between-subjects design where participants, were presented with systematically selected
concrete hypothetical problems that could be either correctly solved using probability
theory or could be incorrectly solved by using one of three heuristic strategies, namely
representativeness, availability and anchor-and-adjust. Lopes (1991) classified this
method as a test of strong inference. 7 It was found that rather than using probability
theory to conform to axioms, people rely on informal "rules of thumb" when making
decisions. Moreover, it was demonstrated that these heuristics sometimes lead to
systematic cognitive biases. For example, the reliance on availability can explain the
concept of illusory correlation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Changes to behaviour
were therefore prescribed, so that people were required to abandon heuristic processing
in favour of learning to use formal computations in order to conform to utility theory
(Bell, Raiffa, & Tversky, 1988).
The simple heuristics approach and the heuristics and biases approach differ
with regard to how the heuristics are specified, the method by which heuristic
processing is determined, their view of heuristic processing, and their prescriptions for
6 However, not everyone agrees as to what probability theory to apply, the norms are content and context
blind, and they make unrealistic demands of cognitive processing (e.g., Chase, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer,
1998; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981).
7 It has been found that violations of rational norms may not occur when stimuli presented to participants
are representatively sampled (e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Juslin, 1994; Sedlemeier, Hertwig, &
Gigerenzer, 1998).
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behavioural change. Kahneman et al. (1982) proposed a small number of cognitive
heuristics namely, representativeness, availability, and anchoring-and-adjustment.8
These were only verbally described. For instance, the anchor-and-adjust heuristic was
described as follows:
In many situations, people make estimates by starting from an initial value that
is adjusted to yield the final answer. The initial value, or starting point, may be
suggested by the formulation of the problem, or it may be the result of a partial
computation....We call this phenomenon anchoring (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974, p. 1131).
Furthermore, in their statement of how people use the representative heuristic to solve
the probability that a person has a particular occupation, Tversky and Kahneman (1974)
stated that "In the representativeness heuristic, the probability that Steve is a librarian,
for example, is assessed by the degree to which he is representative of or similar to, the
stereotype of a librarian" (p. 1124). Psychological processes such as information search,
stopping and decision making, are not clearly defined in these heuristics. This is in
contrast to the fast and frugal heuristics whose processes are clearly specified step-by-
step. In this sense, Kahneman et al.'s (1982) heuristics are not amenable to
mathematical analysis or analysis by simulations, in the way the fast and frugal
heuristics are. This has also meant that Kahneman et al.'s (1982) heuristics face the
danger of seemingly being able to account for all sorts of behaviour (Gigerenzer &
Todd, 1999).
Whereas researchers in the heuristics and biases approach use systematic design
(Lopes, 1991), researchers in the simple heuristics approach strive for a representative
design. They aim to randomly sample real stimuli from a defined population to which
they can then generalise. They use a within-subjects design, and investigate the fit or
accuracy of a heuristic, rather than its internal coherence. Access to an outcome
criterion enables assessment of the accuracy of heuristic processing.
In the heuristics and biases approach, the value of heuristic processing is judged
in terms of coherence criteria, namely the normative benchmarks that underlie
probability and classical decision theory. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) concluded that
"In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and
systematic errors" (p. 1124). When discussing the use of the representativeness
heuristic, they pointed to peoples' "insensitivity" to prior probabilities and their
8 In fact, Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1999) point out there has been some confusion over whether their
recognition heuristic is actually the availability heuristic. This is not the case because the latter model
refers to recall, not recognition.
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"misconceptions" of random events, for example (p. 1125). They concluded by
emphasising that "several of the severe errors of judgment reported earlier occurred
despite the fact that subjects were encouraged to be accurate and were rewarded for the
correct answers" (p. 1130). When referring to the use of the representativeness heuristic
they stated that "What is surprising is the failure of people to infer from lifelong
experience such fundamental statistical rules as regression toward the mean..." (p.
1130). Lopes (1991) argues that this depicts heuristic processing as negative, people as
cognitively lazy, and has led to a pessimistic view of human abilities. Gigerenzer and
Goldstein (1996) pointed out that some fast and frugal heuristics may violate axioms
such as transitivity. 9 The simple heuristics approach however, uses correspondence
rather than coherence criteria to judge the value of a heuristic. The correspondence view
was espoused by the likes of Brunswik (1952), Hammond (1986, 1990), and Simon
(1956), and refers to the match between the structure of the environment and the
heuristic. The closer the correspondence between the two, the more likely the heuristic
will yield accurate responses. Unlike the heuristics and biases approach, the simple
heuristics approach therefore also investigates the adaptive nature of heuristic
processing, and simple heuristics are viewed in a positive light (Gigerenzer & Todd,
1999).
Finally, whereas the heuristics and biases approach prescribes behaviour which
is normatively rational, the simple heuristics approach prescribes ecologically rational
behaviour. Bell et al. (1988) note that when discussing prescriptive issues researchers
may focus one of the following two questions: how should "idealized, rational, super-
intelligent" people behave? How should real people change to improve their
performance? (p. 16). The heuristics and biases approach focuses on the former, while
the simple heuristics approach focuses on the latter. Unlike the heuristics and biases
approach, which prescribes abandoning heuristic processing, the simple heuristics
approach recognises the adaptive value (i.e., through the accuracy) of fast and frugal
heuristics, and at least implicitly, prescribes their use.
6.3.2. Choosing a model. The research presented in this thesis compared the
relative descriptive and predictive validity of three different models. The evidence
supports past research reviewed in Chapter 2, demonstrating that the unit weighted
model performs relatively well compared to a differentially weighted model, and that
fast and frugal heuristics can outperform these two models. When choosing among
models of human J/DM, it is standard practice to choose the one that provides the best
9 Lexicographic strategies, for example, have been considered irrational (e.g., Keeney & Raiffa, 1976).
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fit to the judgement data, as was done in the present research. Whereas in the present
research, the Matching Heuristic outperformed the other two models when modelling
magistrates' remand decisions, in their study, Dhami and Harries (2001) found that the
fit of the Matching Heuristic was not significantly different from the logistic regression
model. This is a demonstration of the phenomenon of flat maximum, where different
sets of weights (von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986) or different strategies (Gigerenzer &
Goldstein, 1999) yield the same performance. This phenomena has also been observed
in other studies (e.g., Dawes & Corrigan, 1974; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).
Hammond et al. (1975) recognised that different models can achieve the same
fit, although they advocated the use of the multiple linear regression model. Einhorn
(1970) stated that "different models may be equally powerful with respect to describing
the process. It therefore seems that accurately describing the process is at least
necessary although not sufficient for describing the underlying cognitive process" (p.
222). Goldberg (1968) stated that the linear model is adequate if the aim is simply to
reproduce or predict judgements. For Hoffman (1960), models were only required to
test hypotheses about the judgement process. Therefore, he argued that "It is not
required of models that they bear any semblance of some 'actual' state of affairs, either
within the organism or elsewhere" (p. 124). Recently, Dhami and Harries (in press)
have suggested alternative criteria for choosing between models. These are
psychological plausibility, flexibility and adaptability, and ease of understanding. In
addition, social judgement theorists' use of the regression model has often been based
on the fact that the analytic-tools are readily available and simple to use (Cooksey,
1996a; Stewart, 1988), which may be considered another criterion.
Psychological criteria. Fast and frugal heuristics in general, and the Matching
Heuristic in particular, meet these criteria. First, as Payne et al. (1993) have pointed out,
people chose strategies depending on the cognitive effort required. They argue that
"strategy selection is the result of a compromise between the desire to make the most
accurate decision and the desire to minimise effort" (p. 114). Simple heuristics meet this
compromise.
Second, simple heuristics are non-optimal in their development and
implementation. Although Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) assumed that an optimal
learning strategy is involved in the development of the Take The Best heuristic, the
Matching Heuristic does not. It is more compatible, than earlier fast and frugal
heuristics and integration models such as Franklin's rule, Dawes' rule and multiple
linear regression, with evidence that people are selective and use frequencies when they
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learn relations between cues and an outcome. The Matching Heuristic uses frequencies
when determining the critical cue value. It is claimed that this is a natural form of
processing (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). The way in
which the Matching Heuristic defines the critical cue values and the cue utilisation
validities is compatible with research showing how people learn about and judge
causation and covariation from direct experience (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Evidence
suggests that when people learn about the relations between cues and an outcome, they
look at only a subsection of the available information. (For example, see Steps 1 and 2
of the Matching Heuristic in the method section of Chapter 3.) Furthermore, the
definition of the critical cue value indicates a type of positive bias, and there is evidence
to suggest that people behave in this way (e.g., Klayman & Ha, 1987). Finally, unlike
the static structural models, the Matching Heuristic, like other simple heuristics is
capable of using different cues to make decisions on different cases.
Third, simple heuristics actualise behaviour which has been empirically
demonstrated in other areas of psychology. Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) pointed
out how their simple heuristics conformed to other psychological phenomena. For
instance, the Take The Last heuristic is compatible with evidence of functional
fixedness or the Einstellung effect (Luchins & Luchins, 1994 cited in Gigerenzer &
Goldstein, 1996). The Matching Heuristic embodies the principle of matching
characteristics of individual cases with a prototype. This behaviour is consistent with
evidence from the field of categorisation (see Estes, 1994). In fact, the Matching
Heuristic differs from many -of the models that have been proposed for human
categorisation such as exemplar models (e.g., Estes, 1986). These models search, and
most integrate, all available information, and they do not contain explicitly specified
information search or stopping rules. They are more complex than the Matching
Heuristic. For instance, in exemplar models, all of the cues are used to compute the
similarity between an object and all of the exemplars of every possible category to
which the object may belong.
It should be noted that at the time the present research was conducted, there
were no published fast and frugal heuristics for categorisation tasks, and the Matching
Heuristic was developed specifically for this purpose. Recently, Berretty et al., (1999)
have developed a fast and frugal heuristic called Categorization By Elimination. Like
the Matching Heuristic, it is non-compensatory; it looks at the direction in which cue
values point (i.e., called critical cue value in the Matching Heuristic); it searches
through cues in order of their usefulness; and it is flexible in the cues used. As each cue
268
is processed, the number of possible categories to which an object may belong is
reduced, and processing stops either when only one category remains or when all cues
have been exhausted, whereby a choice is made randomly. This heuristic has fared
relatively well against more complex models such as neural networks and exemplar
models when categorising flowers, wines and mushrooms (Berretty et al., 1999), and
against Dawes' rule and Franklin's rule when predicting peoples' judgements of
intention based on motion (Blythe, Todd, & Miller, 1999). However, this heuristic is
more complex than the Matching Heuristic, in terms of how cue order and direction of
values are determined.
Ease of understanding. One of the goals of SJT is to improve judgment
(Hammond et al, 1975). Judgment policies may be communicated to individuals in
order to aid and train them to make consistent, accurate decisions, or reduce
disagreement among individuals. The ease with which a model is understood is thus an
important consideration. As discussed in Chapter 2, although the regression model has
proved a very useful aid (Balzer et al., 1989; Doherty & Balzer, 1988), it is difficult to
apply without the aid of a computer, and without knowledge of the parameters of the
data set on which the model was based. In addition, practitioners with little knowledge
of the statistical analysis may find it to understand. By contrast, fast and frugal
heuristics such as the Matching Heuristic, provide a transparent, non-mathematical
description of judgment behaviour in terms of a flowchart. The Matching Heuristic is
simple to apply, and although the properties of the data set are essential for its
construction, knowledge of the properties are not essential for its application. For
example, knowledge of the natural variance of gender in the remand decision making
task is unnecessary for the heuristic to predict a punitive decision if the defendant is
male when the defendant in this case is male. On the other hand, if a standardised
weight was to be applied (as in a regression model), this knowledge is required.
Ease of construction. The multiple linear regression model is a parametric
model which contains certain assumptions regarding the data. These are normality,
linearity, homoscedasticity and independence of residuals (Cohen & Cohen, 1983;
Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Violations of these assumptions will undermine the
validity of these tests. Cooksey (1996a) points out that the assumptions of
homoscedasticity and independence of residuals are often violated in JA studies. In
addition, as has been discussed in Chapter 2, regression based techniques may require a
large data set if many cues are being studied, and inter-cue correlations may lead to
difficulties in interpretation of the beta weights. Finally, the fact that the cues are to be
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weighted and combined in a regression model, means that they need to be converted to a
common currency. These restrictions prevented the use of a regression model on the
data set in the present research. Like other simple heuristics, the Matching Heuristic, is
a non-parametric technique, and so is less restrictive with regard to the assumptions
underlying the data. It does however, require that the dependent variable is discrete and
non-overlapping.
In sum, there are many reasons for choosing simple heuristics as models of
human judgement behaviour. In fact, according to scientific principles, researchers
should choose simple heuristics over the more complex regression model, because they
meet the criteria of parsimony.
6.3.3. A fast and frugal lens model. Through using regression models, social
judgement theorists have painted a complex picture of human judgement. Not only have
they done this in the face of evidence from the heuristics and biases approach which
indicated that people use heuristic processing (see Kahneman et al., 1982), but they also
seemed to have overlooked an indication that individuals may be using simple strategies
from the regression models themselves. This is the finding that usually only a handful of
cues are statistically significant (Brehmer, 1994; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971).
The use of regression models has led social judgment theorists to test certain
hypotheses about the nature of the judgement process such as linearity, and to neglect
others (Brehmer, 1979; Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988). In Chapter 2, it was pointed out
that social judgment theorists have generally neglected to test alternative hypotheses
regarding the combination rule; relying instead on the idea that people integrate cues in
an additive way (Brehmer, 1979; Doherty & Brehmer, 1997). The present research has
done this and has shown that people such as magistrates can be better described using a
non-compensatory non-additive rule. In addition, social judgment theorists do not
consider information search and selection. These hypotheses, among with others, would
come to light using the simple heuristics approach. However, in order to avoid a similar
situation regarding the future use of simple heuristics, researchers should compare the
relative descriptive and predictive validity of these heuristics and other non-
compensatory models.
As discussed in Chapter 2, one major reason for SJT's reliance on the regression
model is its intellectual roots in Brunswikian theory. Brunswik (1952) advocated the use
of the correlation coefficient when capturing the process of vicarious functioning.
Although Brunswik (1952) mentioned the process of cue substitution, he emphasised
compensatory behaviour. For example, in 1943 he wrote "Survival and its sub-units,
270
Ecological
validitie
Cue searched
which may be defined as the establishment of stable interrelationships with the
environment, are possible only if the organism is able to establish compensatory balance
in the face of comparative chaos within the physical environment" (p. 257). In 1952 he
continued "the use of cues and the taking into account of several variables at the same
time injects an element of reasoning into stablization mechanisms" (p. 681). Later,
Brunswik (1956) used the analogy of the perceptual system as an intuitive statistician
calculating correlations. Subsequently, Hammond and his colleagues likened the human
judgement process to the multiple regression procedure (e.g., Cooksey, 1996a;
Hammond, 1955; Hammond et al., 1964; Hammond & Summers, 1972; Reilly &
Doherty, 1989, 1992; Schmitt & Levine, 1977), although they have concurrently argued
that they do not consider the regression model as representing the judgment process
(e.g., Brehmer, 1979; Lane et al., 1982). Researchers using JA have rarely considered
alternative models of the judgement process. Hammond's (1996b) recent confession of
the over-reliance on the regression model has paved the way for change. SJT is not
synonymous with the use of regression models and fast and frugal heuristics present a
viable alternative. Figure 6.1 illustrates how Brunswik's (1952) original lens model
would be revised if vicarious functioning was described in terms of a fast and frugal
heuristic such as the Matching Heuristic.
Cues
Environment/	 Person's
Criterion	 judger"
ra
Achievement
Figure 6.1. Fast and frugal lens model
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Prescriptive utility of simple heuristics. Describing human judgement
behaviour is only the first step for SJT research. The ultimate goal is to prescribe
changes to improve performance (Hammond et al., 1975). Therefore, the prescriptive
utility of simple heuristics should be explicitly examined. Should magistrates be using
fast and frugal methods for making remand decisions? To date, Gigerenzer and his
colleagues have measured the value of simple heuristics in terms of their accuracy,
speed and frugality (see Gigerenzer et al., 1999b). They have focused on overall
accuracy. In fact, although, fast and frugal heuristics have been shown to be accurate
there is, to date, no evidence from human data demonstrating that people can be
accurate using these heuristics. A full lens model analysis is required (Harries & Dhami,
2000). In many domains, overall accuracy is not as important as reducing either a type I
or type II error (Hammond, 1996a). Furthermore, people may have other goals such as
accountability (Tetlock, 1985). Different models may achieve these goals with differing
successes.
10
The Matching Heuristic does not search through all available information; does
not order cues in an optimal way; does not integrate all "relevant" information; and
bases its decision on only one cue. In this sense, although it is descriptively valid, it
lacks prescriptive utility, because magistrates behaving in this fast and frugal manner
are not observing due process requirements as they are currently defined (King, 1981;
Packer, 1968). Due process requirements aim to reduce a type I error. The Matching
Heuristic performed better when predicting punitive decisions, thus if such behaviour
were prescribed there may be an increased risk of making a type II error, which is more
compatible with the crime control model (Packer, 1968). The due process model would
require that magistrates do not use defendant and crime control related cues and they
carefully search through all of the available information and appropriately weight and
then integrate the relevant information. This way of making a decision characterises
how compensatory models such as regression models, portray the judgment process.
However, as mentioned earlier, human cognitive limitations and certain task
characteristics may prevent individuals from using such judgment strategies. In sum, the
prescriptive utility of simple heuristics should be further investigated.
10 Einhorn (1970, 1971) argued that the conjunctive model minimises a false positive.
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6.3. Conclusions
The research presented in this thesis was the first psychological investigation of
magistrates' remand decision making. It was also the first to integrate SJT with the
simple heuristics approach, and it provided the first test of the Matching Heuristic. In
doing so, more questions about magistrates' remand decision making and about the
simple heuristics approach have been raised, than have been answered.
It is clear that if researchers wish to develop psychologically plausible decision
mechanisms, they should attempt to integrate evidence from the broader context of
psychology. They should construct models that are compatible with human cognitive
limitations, and with the idea that the task environment in which people work affects
their behaviour.
It is also clear that magistrates, who are trained and entrusted to apply legal rules
and procedures, must perform a tremendous balancing act when making decisions such
as the remand decision. They must protect the public whilst simultaneously respecting
an individual defendant's right to liberty. The findings of the present research indicate
that due process is not being observed when magistrates make remand decisions.
Fortunately, our conceptions of crime and order are socially constructed and so the
concerns expressed by different groups in society regarding the appropriateness of some
of the legal decisions made, have often led to specific changes in legal rules and
procedures. Unfortunately, judgment and decision making researchers, despite being
equipped with the necessary tools, have tended to neglect legal decision making,
especially in the English crimicial justice system. I propose that they, like
criminologists, should take the opportunity to challenge and change the system.
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APPENDIX A
/1.A4 TI1E INNER LONDON COMMISSION AREA
Co
nitaletw.„,/,,O-6 4_, Magistrates' Court (Code'
Court No.
Accused 	 	 Date of Birth 	
Offences
	
DECISION OF THE COURT
	
DATE OF DECISION
The accused is remanded to appear before the above named 	 Magistrates' Court
at	 am/pm on
The accused is committed to appear before the Crown Court on such day, time and place as may be notified to the accused
by the appropriate officer of that Court
The accused is granted unconditional bail
The accused is granted bail subject to the conditions set out below
The accused is refused bail and committed to custody
The accused has consented to the hearing and determination in his absence of future applications for remands until
and the notice overleaf applies.
N.B.	 Failure to surrender to, bail or comply with bail conditions can result in arrest. 	 Failure to surrender to bail is an offence
punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine.
FOUND
EXCEPTIONS TO RIGHT TO UNCONDITIONAL
BY THE COURT. SCHEDULE 1
BAIL
Pt.lp Pt.11p
REASONS
UNCONDITIONAL
FOR FINDING EXCEPTIONS TO RIGHT TO
BAIL
Belief would fail to surrender 2(a) Nature and gravity of the offence
Belief would commit offence on bail 2(b) Accused's previous record
Belief would obstruct justice 2(c) Lack of community ties
Custody for own protection/welfare 3 3 Failure to answer bail in the past
Serving custodial sentence 4 4 Failure to comply with bail conditions in past
Insufficient information for bail decision 5 Accused's demeanour in court
Arrested under S.7 Bail Act 1976 6 5 To secure preparation of reports
Otherwise impracticable complete enquiries 7
Previous failure to surrender 2
CONDITIONS TO BE COMPLIED WITH BEFORE/AND/OR AFTER RELEASE ON BAIL
To provide	 sureties in the sum of E	 each
To live and sleep each night at
To give prior notice to police of any change of address
To observe a curfew between the hours of
To report to
	 Police Station each	 between
Passport to be surrendered to/retained by police
Not to contact directly or indirectly any person whose name is supplied to the accused by police in writing
Not to come within 	 of	 except to see Solicitor by prior written appointment
To make himself available as and when required to enable inquiries or report to be made
To provide a security in the sum of E 	 to be deposited with the court
to be deposited with the accused's Solicitors to be held unconditionally and irrevocably to the order of the Chief Clerk of the
Magistrates' Court.
CERTIFICATE AS.TO HEARING OF FULL ARGUMENT ON APPLICATION FOR BAIL
(This certificate should accompany any application made for bail to the Crown Court under S.81(1)(g) Supreme Court Act 1981'
It is hereby certified that today the court heard full argument on an application for bail made by or on behalf of the accused,
before refusing the application and remanding the accused in custody.
The court has not previously heard full argument on an application for bail by or on behalf of the accused in thesi
proceedings.
The court has previously heard full argument from the accused on an application for bail, but is satisfied (that there has beer
.'the following change in his circumstances:) (That the following new considerations have been placed before it,
Distribution
White — Accused
Blue — File
Maize — Charge Sheet
Pink — Fourth copy
Clerk of the Court present during these proceedings
ACCUSED PERSON CONSENTING TO REMAND IN HIS ABSENCE
You have today consented to the hearing and determination in your absence of application for remands.
If you wish to withdraw your consent you should let the court know immediately. You may do this either by asking your legal
representative to inform the court, or by writing to the court yourself. You should tell the prison governor what you have done. You
will then be brought to court at, or as soon as possible after, the next remand hearing in your case.
Remand hearings can only take place in your absence while you are legally represented (although your legal advisor does not have
to be present in court at the hearing.) If you cease to be legally represented at any time you should immediatley write to the court,
and inform the prison governor that you have done so. You will then be brought to court at, or as soon as possible after, the next
remand hearing in your case.
If three remand hearings have taken place in your absence you will in any event be brought to court at the next hearing.
MCA 5A
149/50
151/151A
Bail Notice
Certificate of
hearing full
argument on
application
Notice to
Accused
M.P.85
IN THE MIDDLESEX AREA OF GREATER LONDON — PETTY SESSIONAL DIVISION OF HARINGEY
Haringey Magistrates' Court (2742)
Accused:	 Date of Birth:
Offence:
DECISION
THE ACCUSED IS:-
O Remanded to appear before the Haringey Court sitting at the HIGHGATE/TOTTENHAM
Court House at 9.45a.m./1.45p.m. on
Committed to appear before the Crown Court as notified.
0	 Granted un/conditional bail.0	 Refused bail.
Exception(s) to bail Reason(s) for applying exception(s)
Para 2 a) Fail smurrit eondeenr.
offence.
.
2 b) Commit 
2c) Interfere with etc.
3	 Own protection/Welfare.
4	 Serving sentence.
5	 Insufficient info.
6	 Current bail breach.
7	 Cannot complete report/enquiries.
Nature & grav•gravity of offence '& probable
sentence.
Character/antecedents,	 —
Lack of community ties.
Previously failed to surrender to custody.
Behaviour towards/proximity to
prosecution witnesses.
m
0
• •
CONDMONS TO BE COMPLEED WITH BEFORE RELEASE ON BAIL
To provide	 surety(ies) in the sum of f	 (each) to secure the accused's surrender to
custody at the time and place appointed.
O Surrender passport.
O Provide security in the sum of f
CONDITIONS TO BE COMPLIED WITH AFTER RELEASE ON BAIL
O To reside at
O Report to	 Police station between	 Twice/Daily
O Curfew between	 p.m. and	 a.m. daily.
O Not to communicate or interfere with prosecution witnesses.
0
The above conditions were imposed on the grant of bail for the following reasons:-
0	 To ensure surrender to custody.
0	 To prevent the commission of further offences.
O To protect witnesses.
Accused agreed to remands in absence:- YES/NO
I HEREBY CERTIFY that, at a hearing this day, the court heard full argument on an application for bail made
by (on behalf of) the accused, before refusing the application and remanding the accused in custody under
Section	 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980.
O The court has not previously heard full argument on an application for bail by or on behalf of the
accused in these proceedings.
o The court has previously heard full argument from the accused on an application for bail, but is satisfied:
0 that there has been the following change in his circumstances:
0 that the following new considerations have been placed before it:
BY ORDER OF THE COURT
XP29	 CLERK OF THE CnURT. 	 Date:
APPENDIX 13
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OFFICE OF PROBATION
DATE:
REPORT TO COURT	 COUNTY:
Name 	
 Age•	 Charge 	
Expect: Pvt. Att'y. Yes
	 No 	 To Post Bail Yes
	 No 	
RESIDENCE
Docket No
Verified	 Reference
Yes	 No
	 Unreachable
for
for 	
with whom
Name Rd Address
r
iew York Release on Recognizances Project
40.44 Rev. 869
RATING: (ROR) Exclusive of Present Charge	 ROR Investigation Not Made Because:
Information Rated Favorably
Unver
	
for ROR: Yes 	 Ver 	
	
No 	
Comments:
Excludable Case 0
Warrant 0
Insufficient Staff Available
.-...
0
Address When Arrested	 Phone
Prior Address 	
N.Y.C. Resident for
	
FAMILY TIES
Whom
EMPLOYMENT & RESOURCES
(When Arrested) . 	 	  for 	  Salary 	
Na & Address
1. n •••.ton. I thi s lo‘vi	 for	 I a.i Date
ticniplo.cd
	
I a sr Date	 If tinempli.”, ed. how supported?
Where	 Amount
	
Other Resources 	  Specify 	  Amount 	
NA el la re
SCHOOL	 Currently: Yes 	  No  e. 	 Date Left
Hospital/Health 	
PRIOR CONVICTIONS: Felonies 	  Misdemeanors
ea•
On Probation
	
 Parole 	
 Where 	 P.O 	
IfReleased: Will live at 	 ..................................................................... with 	
Identification
	
References 	  Address 	
 Phone
	 Address	
 Phone
	  I have consented to this investigation and
Investigator	 certify that this information is correct.
•
	CRIMINAL COURT ACTION	 County 	
Part 	
PAROLED	 0 BAIL NOT SET
n RELEASED UPON DEPOSITING:
	 SURETY BOND; OR
	 CASH IN LIEU OF BOND
DATED: NEW YORK CITY 	
 X 	
ruscr na ruseice
CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
UPON REVIEW OF THIS REPORT AND OTHER IN-
FORMATION CONCERNING PRE-TRIAL RELEASE OF
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED THAT THE DEFENDANT BE:
New York Release on Recognizances Project
OFFICE OF PROBATION
ROR BRANCH
RATING SHEET
To be recommended, defendant needs:
1. A New York area address where he can be reached,
AND
2. A total of fiye points from the following categories:
Int	 Ver
PRIOR RECORD
	
1	 I	 No convictions.
	
0	 0 One misdemeanor conviction.
—1	 —1 Two misdemeanor or one felony conviction.
—2 —2 Three or more misdemeanor or two or more felony convictions.
FAMILY TIES (In New York area)
3	 3 Lives in established family home AND visits other family members.
(Immediate family only)
2	 2 Lives in established family home. (Immediate Family)
1	 1	 Visits others of immediate family.
EMPLOYMENT OR SCHOOL
3	 3	 Present job one year or more, steadily.
2	 2 Present job 4 months OR present and prior 6 months.
1	 1	 Has present job which is still available.
OR Unemployed 3 months or less and 9 months or more steady prior job.
OR Unemployment Compensation. '
OR Welfare.
3	 3	 Presently in school, attending regularly.
2	 2 Out of school less than 6 months but employed, or in training.
1	 1	 Out of school 3 months or less, unemployed and not in training.
RESIDENCE (In New York Area Steadily)
3	 3	 One year at present residence.
2	 2	 One year at present or last prior residence OR 6 months at present residence.
1	 1	 Six months at present and last prior residence OR in New York City 5 years
or more.
DISCRETION
+1	 +1	 Positive, over 65, attending hospital, appeared on some previous case.
—1	 0	 Negative—intoxicated—intention to leave jurisdiction.
TOTAL INTERVIEW POINTS
NR
TOTAL INTERVIEW POINTS
NR
Reason(s) for discretionary points:
Name	 Address
	
Tel. No. (If any)
8.1
8.2
	 t•
NameRELATIVE, FRIEND OR EMPLOYER
LIKELY TO BE IN COUR?:
Relationship etc.
hAiL
INFORMATION HEARING
CASE NO.
1 DEFENDANT
1.1
NAME
Surname	 First Names Mr/Mrs/Miss
1.2
AGE yrs
1.3
NATIONALITY
1.4 IF BORN ABROAD.
HOW LONG RESIDENT UK mths/yrs
1.5 REPRESENTED BY: 1.6	 LEGAL	 AID
Applying	 Applied I Granted.
1.7 PROBATION OFFICER
(IF ANY):
1.8 ON BAIL IN
ANOTHER CASE
1.9 OTHER
PROCEEDINGS
PENDING
2	 MARITAL STATUS* 3 DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCES*
2.1 UNMARRIED 2.7 CHILDREN	 (No.) 3.1 HOUSE 3.8 SHARING
2.2 MARRIED Living with 3.2 FLAT 3.9 TENANT
Defendant
2.3 SEPARATED 3.3 PARENTS 3.10 OWNER/
Dependent on HOME OCCUPIER
2.4 WIDOWED Defendant
3.4 LODGINGS
2.5 DIVORCED
3.5 BED-SIT
2.6 CO-HABITING
3.6 ROOM(S)
3.11
3.7 CARAVAN HOMELESS
4 ADDRESS(ES) 4.1 PRESENT (How long: 	 1 4.2 PERMANENT (If different) 4.3 OTHER RECENT (If any)
No. and Street 	
District .	 .
Tim n
I	 ••n•• tit an,
5 0( (I P.1 I ION -
• I	 I	 5.2 USUAL (If different)
--- • --
5.3 SELF-EMPLOYEDMA ENIPLOYED15.5 UNEMPLOYED {5.6 HOUSEWIFE _15.7 RETIRED
EMPLOYMENT 6.1 PRESENT (How lon g :	 1 6.2 PREVIOUS (When: 	 )
Name of Firm etc
	 	
No. and Street
	 	
District 	
Town
.	 	 	 .	 	 	 .	 .	 .....
-
.	 ... ......	 .	 	
	 	 .	 	
-	 .
-
Tel. No. or any)
7 INCOME* 7.1 E	 pw 7.2 EARNING 7.3 SICKNESS
•
-, A UNEMPLOYMENT!
'''
7.5 PENSION 7.6 OTHERBENEFIT BENEFIT	 • -
8 POSSIBLE SURETIES
1 9
10 OTHER MATTERS DEFENDANT WISHES TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT (eg Illness. Physical Condition, Employment, Domestic
Difficulties):
*Insert tick (% ) where applicable.
1-	 I	 I
Initials
ill	 I
2 Court
3 Date of Birth
1	 1	 1 
4 Appearance Nate
Non-
	 No	 Current F
Local Hostel Local NFA
	
Client Client
DOLL	 OLD
Male Female
D
141312
NORTHUMBRIA PROBATION SERVICE
	 CONFIDENTIAL
BAIL INFORMATION MONITORING
Surname
I	 1 11111111	 111 11 1	 1	 1	 1
Address
5 Accommodation
	
6 Known to the Probation Service
	
7 Gender
8 Year of Last Contact
	 9 Represented by Solicitor	 Yes	 No
D
Is the Defendant:
10 Alleged to be in breach of Bail
If Yes to 11, specify offence(s)
Yes
DO
11 Cnarged with a new offence today 	 Yes	 No
D
1	 1	 I 1	 I1 
FIRST/SUBSEQUENT APPEARANCE (Delete)
15 Police Recommendation 	 16 Probation Intervention
Uncond. Cond. RIC	 R1PC
. Bail	 Bail
Non. Attempted:
Na;. Info. Other Reasons
Defendant
Declined
Information Oral
Sheet
	 Info.
Ba".
Referral
17 Factors for Bail
Stable	 Where	 Location	 Strong	 Good Comm.	 Good Super. Demonstrated Appropriate
Address	 S aying	 Local Ties	 Support	 History	 Reliability	 Services
LULL _1 El	 D L
Other (Sposify)
18 CPS Request	 19 Defence Request
No Objection to Request	 RIC	 RIPC
Uncond. Bail	 Cond. Bail
No Objection	 No Objection Request
to RIC
	 to RIPC
	
Uncond. Bait
Canz.
3iii
20 Magistra:as Decision
	
Unc and.	 C:rd.	 R::	 RIC?	 Santanced
	
21 Cite of Nast Appoarancs
	
Bail
	
231:
E
3. 'Date of Birth
No 1. Male
Current Client I 2. Female
Former Client
Local
Hostel
13. Non-Local
-14. N.F.A.
1.
2.
3.
15.
IS.
HAMPSHIRE PROBATION SERVICE
BAIL INFORMATION SCHEMES ADVANCED MONITORING 
1. Name 	
Address 	 	 /. Court	 1
4. Date of First Appearance
5. Accommodation	 6. Known to the Probation Service	 7. Gender
8. Year of Last Contact L
9. Solicitor	 Represented
Not Represented
Is the defendant:-
10. Alleged to be in breach of bail
11. yes
,	 12. No
If yes specific offences
Codes (In order of seriousness):
Summary
First Appearance
11. Chsleed with a new offence today
1. Yes
/. No
12. r
 
I
	
13• 	 I	 I	 1	 14.
15. Police Recommendation
I. Unconditional Bail
2. Conditional Bail
3. RIC
4. RIPC
5. None •
17. Factors for Bail
1
 I. Stable Address
2. Strong Local Tics
3. Good Community Support
Probation Intervention
I. None attempted - negadve information
/. None attempted - other reasons
3. Defendant declined assistance
4. Information Sheet
5. Oral Information
4. Good Supervision History
5. Demonso-ated Reliability
6. Appropriate Services
I	  7. Other (Please Specify) 	
19. CPS Request
I. No Objection to Unconditional Bail
2. Request Conditional Bail
3. RIC
.1. RTC
5. None
21. Mazistrates Decision
I. Unconditional Bail
2. Conditional Bail
3. RIC
4. RT C
Sentenced
20. Defence Request
No Objection to RIC
No Objection to RTC
Request Unconditional Ball
Conditional Bail
1 1 . Date of Next Appearance I
23. Appearance Date
LC1 31. LC2 32.30.
LC4 34. LC5 35.33.
LC7 37. LC8 38.36.
LC3
lihsecuent Appearance (Comnlete this section when information is supplied to the CPS r
use at a subsequent aonearancel .
14. Probation Intervention
__1	 1 1.	 1st Information Sheet_
1	 2. 2nd Information Sheet
Li 3. Oral Information
15. Factors for Bail 16.
L	
I. Stable Address 4. Good Supervision History
Stron .a:Local Ties 5. Demonstrated Reliability
3. Good Community Support 6. Appropriate Services
7. Other (Please Specify)
1 7. CPS Request
	 28. Defence Request
I. No Objection to Unconditional Bail 1. No Objection to RIC
2. Request Conditional Bait 2. No Objection to RIPC
3. RIC 3. • Request Unconditional Bail
4. RLPC 4. Conditional Bail
29. Maeistrates Decision
1. Unconditional Bail
1 . Conditional Bail
1 . RIC
4. RIPC
5. Sentenced
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION
1. A form should be completed for all Ca c eS referred to the Bail Information Officer including those where
defendant is sentenced at the remand appearance.
All items cr. the fofm need to be completed. Where information is no available write N/K alon.ts:de the it-
question. NB Forms containing items which are not completed as dcs:ribed will be returned for complt-::,
(See 3 beloq
3. If fomat.i is not provided for use at a subsequent appearance items 21 - 27 may be :eft blank: t
not be necessary to put not known alongside each item.
APPENDIX C
HYPOTHETICAL CASE USED IN INTERVIEWS DURING TASK ANALYSIS
The defendant, Mr Ali Akbar aged 19 has been charged with theft from a shop,
committed yesterday. He is represented by the duty solicitor and has pleaded not guilty
to the charge and consented to summary trial. The prosecution has asked for the case to
be adjourned for 14 days so that they can prepare the case and contact the witnesses.
The prosecution opposes the bail requested by the defence on the grounds that the
defendant presents a risk of absconding because he has no fixed address.
At the end of the interviews, interviewees were presented with this case and asked the
following questions:
- is it realistic?
- does it contain sufficient information for you to make a bail decision?
- if not, then what further information would you need and why?
APPENDIX D
HYPOTHETICAL CASES IN MODELLING AND HOLDOUT SETS FOR
STUDY 1
Cues**
Set* gender race age offence prosreq pcbr proscase comties polbail
M 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 3.00
M 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 6.00 2.00 1.00 2.00
M 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00
M 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 3.00
M 2.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 5.00 1.00 1.00 2.00
M 2.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00
M 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 1.00
M 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00
M 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
M 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
M 1.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 1.00 1.00 3.00
M 1.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 3.00
M 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 2.00
M 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 2.00
M 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00
M 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 1.00 1.00 2.00
M 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
M 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
M 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
M 1.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 6.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
M 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.00 2.00 1.00 3.00
M 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 3.00
M 1.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00
M 2.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 3.00
M 1.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 3.00
M 1.00 3.00 1-.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
M 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
H 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
H 2.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 6.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
H 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 2.00
H 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
H 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
H 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
H 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
D 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 3.00
D 2.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 5.00 1.00 1.00 2.00
D 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
D 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
D 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 2.00
D 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
D 1.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 6.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
Note: *M = modelling set, H = holdout set. **When modelling magistrates' decision
making policies, the binary cues were recoded as 0 for value 1 and 1 for value 2. The
polytomous cues were dichotomised and recoded. For race, offence, polbail, prosreq,
value 1 was recoded as 0 and the other values were recoded as 1. For pcbr, values 1 and
2 were recoded as 0 and the other values were recoded as 1.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND HYPOTHETICAL CASE USED IN
STUDY ONE
Background information presented to cases
In all of the cases presented, it is the defendant's first appearance at court since he/she
was charged by the police. The defendant has pleaded not guilty, and has consented to
trial (at crown court where appropriate). The prosecution has asked for the case to be
adjourned for four weeks so that they can prepare the case. The defendant is at present
represented by the duty solicitor and will obtain his/her own solicitor later. The solicitor
has applied for bail. There is a possibility of a surety. Where a defendant does not have
any previous convictions he/she may still have a past bail record as he/she may have
been tried but not convicted in the past.
Case presented
The defendant James Wilson is male, white and 22 years old. He has been charged with
supplying class B drugs. The police granted him unconditional bail after he was
charged. The prosecution objected to bail. James has one previous conviction for a
dissimilar offence, and has offended on bail in the past. The prosecution case against
him at present seems strong. He is unemployed.
APPENDIX E
MAGISTRATES' BAIL DECISION MAKING:
OBSERVATION CODING SCHEME
CASE NO	 DATE
MAGISTRATES' COURTHOUSE & COURTROOM
1. Court A
2. Court B
2.10. Courtroom 1
2.20. Courtroom 2
DURATION OF HEARING
RETIRE
1. Retire or confer
2. No pause
DECISION
1. Unconditional bail
2. Conditional bail
2.1 Reporting
2.2 Curfew
2.3 Surety
2.4 Residence
2.5 Bail hostel
2.6 Boundaries
2.7 Not interfere with witnesses
2.8 Other
3. Remand in custody
Characteristics of Magistrates
MAGISTRATE ON BENCH
1. Lay
2. Stipendiary
3. Lay and stipendiary
SEX
1. All male
2. All female
3. Male and female
RACE/ETHNIC ORIGIN (by name and physical appearance)
1. All white/European
2. Black and white
3. Asian and white
4. Other
Characteristics of Defendant
DEFENDANT PRESENT IN COURT
1. Yes
2. No
*DATE OF BIRTH (record year only)
SEX
1. Male
2. Female
RACIAL/ETHNIC ORIGIN (by name and physical appearance)
1. White
2. Ethnic
Characteristics of Case
**DEFENCE REPRESENTATION
1. Not represented
2. Duty solicitor
3. Own solicitor
PROSECUTORS
1. CPS
2. Other (specify)
**SERIOUSNESS OF OFFENCE (see court sheet)
1. Summary
2. Either-way
3. Indictable
*CATEGORY OF OFFENCE
1. Violence against person
2. Sexual offences
3. Burglary
4. Robbery
5. Theft and handling
6. Fraud and forgery
7. Criminal damage
8. Drugs offences
9. Driving offences
10. Other
*NUMBER OF OFFENCES
**VICTIM
1. None
2. Victim known or unknown person
3. Business
SOLE INVOLVEMENT IN OFFENCE
1. Yes
2. No
PLEA
1. Guilty
2. Not guilty
3. No plea
PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS
1. None
2. Yes, similar
3. Yes, dissimilar (specify)
**CIRCUMSTANCE OF BAIL DECISION
1. Adjournment for trial
2. Adjournment for sentence
3. Appeal against magistrates' court's decision
4. Other
ADJOURNMENT REQUESTED BY WHOM
1. Defence
2. Prosecution
3. Court
LENGTH OF ADJOURNMENT REQUESTED
*NUMBER OF PREVIOUS ADJOURNMENTS (see court sheet)
**PROSECUTION REQUEST
1. Don't oppose bail
2. Ask for conditions
3. Oppose bail
DEFENCE REQUEST
1. Apply for unconditional bail
2. Suggest conditions (specify)
3. Don't apply for bail
***PREVIOUS COURT BAIL DECISION (see court sheet)
1. None
2. Unconditional bail
3. Conditional bail (specify conditions)
4. Remand in custody
**POLICE BAIL DECISION
1. Unconditional bail
2. Conditional bail (specii5/ conditions)
3. Remand in custody
**BAIL RECORD
I. None
2. Good
3. Poor (specify breaches)
STRENGTH OF PROSECUTION CASE
1. Strong i.e. physical evidence/witnesses
2. Weak
MAXIMUM PENALTY IF CONVICTED (see court sheet)
1. Custodial
2. Non-custodial
***STRENGTH OF COMMUNITY TIES
CTJOB
1. Yes
2. No
3. No information
CTCHILD
1. Yes
2. No
3. No information
CTSPOUSE
1. Yes
2. No
3. No information
CTHOME
1. Yes
2. No
3. No information
CTOTHER
1. Yes
2. No
3. No information
Other Information
MAGISTRATES SEEK INFORMATION FROM COURT (not including from clerk)
1. Yes (specify)
2. No
MAGISTRATES SEEK HELP OF CLERK
1. Yes (specify)
2. No
DECISION COMMUNICATED TO DEFENDANT
1. No
2. No because defendant not in court
3. Yes, verbal
4. Yes, verbal and bail sheet
REASONS FOR DECISION GIVEN IN OPEN COURT
1. None given
2. Yes given (specify)
Note: The asterisks denote the variables that were re-coded for analysis (see Table 4.1
in Chapter 4). *The date of birth was re-coded into 18-21 years and 21+. The category
of the offence was separated into offences against the person, against property, and
other. The number of offences was re-coded as either one or more than one. The number
of previous adjournments was re-coded as zero and one, or more than one. **The
italicised values of these variables were grouped together to form one value. ***The
previous court bail decision was divided into two (i.e., none or unconditional bail versus
conditional bail or remand in custody). For strength of community ties, the yes values of
all sub-variables were grouped together, and all the no values of the sub-variables were
grouped together.
APPENDIX F
Court B
Coefficients Cues Coefficients
-0.20, N= 158 Defcourt x sole 4) = -0.16, N = 183
-0.17, N= 159 Agedef x sole 4) = -0.33, N= 183
0.16, N= 159 Agedef x circums 4) = 0.16, N= 183
0.23, N= 141 sexdef x racedef 4) = -0.20, N= 171
-0.22, N= 159 Sexdef x cicrums 4) = 0.21 N= 183
-0.17, N= 158 Defrep x soffence 4) = 0.24, N= 183
0.16, N= 158 Defrep x victim 4) = 0.27, N= 183
0.16, N= 158 Defrep x sole 4) = 0.15, N= 183
-0.19, N= 127 Defrep x prevdec 4) = 0.22, N= 180
-0.18, N= 127 Soffence x victim 4) = 0.55, N= 183
0.17, N= 156 Soffence x sole 4) = 0.17, N= 183
-0.32, N= 58 Soffence x circums 4) = -0.16, N= 183
0.22, N= 126 Soffence x prevdec 4) = 0.24, N= 180
0.23, N= 157 Noffence x circums 4) = 0.18, N= 183
0.18, N= 157 Soffence x maxpen 4) = 0.29 , N= 181
0.20, N= 157 Noffence x comties 4) = 0.20, N = 179
0.19, N = 158 Victim x sole 4) = 0.19, N = 183
0.21, N = 158 Victim x prosreq 4) = 0.21, N = 183
-0.17, N = 158 Victim x prevdec 4) = 0.20, N = 180
0.27, N = 140 Sole x circums 4) = -0.19, N = 183
0.29, N= 158 Circums x lenadj 4) = -0.91, N = 177
Court A
Cues
Defcourt x noffence 4)
Defcourt x circums 4)
Defcourt x lenadj 4)
Defcourt x noadj 4)
Defcourt x prosreq 4)
Agedef x noffence 4)
Sexdef x soffence 4)
Sexdef x victim 4)
Racedef x noffence 4)
Racedef x victim 4)
Defcourt x maxpen 4)
Sexdef x polbail 4)
Racedef x maxpen 4)
Defrep x soffence 4)
Defrep x noffence 4)
Defrep x victim 4)
Defrep x sole 4)
Defrep x circums 4)
Defrep x lenadj 4)
Defrep x noadj 4)
Defrep x prosreq 4)
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT FIRST ORDER INTER-CUE
CORRELATIONS IN COURTS A AND B
Statistically significant inter-cue correlations (p < 0.05)
Defreq x proscase
Defreq x comties
Defrep x prevdec	 4) = 0.31, N = 158	 Circums x nprevadj 4) = -0.23, N = 177
Soffence x victim	 4) = 0.60, N = 158	 Circums x prevdec 4) = -0.20, N = 180
Soffence x victim	 4) = 0.30, N = 158	 Lenadj x nprevadj	 (I) = 0.25, N = 171
Soffence x nprevadj 4) = 0.22, N = 140	 Lenadj x prevdec	 4) = 0.15,N= 174
Soffence x prosreq	 4) = 0.16, N = 158	 Victim x proscase	 4) = 0.30, N = 93
Soffence x prevdec 4) = 0.19, N = 154	 Victim x maxpen	 4) = -0.32, N = 181
Noffence x circums 4) = 0.17, N = 158 Circums x proscase 4) = -0.23, N = 93
Noffence x prevdec
Defrep x polbail
Soffence x maxpen
4) = 0.28, N = 154 
(i) = 0.41 N= 58
4) = -0.22, N = 156
Nprevadj x prevdec 4) = 0.24, N = 17
r= 0.21, N = 93
r= 0.15,N= 179
Victim x sole	 4) = 0.29, N = 158	 Prevdec x comties	 4) = 0.16, N = 176
Victim x nprevadj	 4) = 0.20, N = 140	 Defi-eq x victim	 K=-0.15,N= 182
Victim x prosreq	 4) = 0.22, N = 158	 Defreq x prosreq	 K = -0.37, N = 182
Victim x prevdec	 4) = 0.24, N = 154	 Defreq x polbail	 K = -0.43, N = 47
Sole x nprevadj	 4) = 0.24, N = 141	 Coffence x agedef R2 = 0.03, N = 182
Sole x prosreq	 4) = 0.17, N = 159	 Coffence x defrep	 R2 = 0.07, N = 182
Sole x prevdec	 4) = 0.24, N = 155	 Coffence x soffence R2 = 0.33, N = 182
Circums x lenadj 	 4) = -0.95, N = 159	 Coffence x victim	 R2 = 0.83, N = 182
Victim x bailrec	 4) = 0.43, N - = 34	 Coffence x sole	 R2 = 0.06, N = 182
Victim x maxpen	 4) = -0.18, N = 156 Coffence x circurns R2 = 0.03, N = 182
Nprevadj x prosreq
Nprevadj x prevdec
Prosreq x prevdec
4) = 0.18, N = 141
4) = 0.45, N = 140
4) = 0.37, N = 155
Coffence x prosreq
Coffence x prevdec
Coffence x proscase
R2 = 0.03, N = 182
R2 = 0.03, N = 179
R2 = 0.14, N = 92
Nprevadj x polbail 4) = 0.45, N = 47	 Coffence x maxpen R2 = 0 . 1 0 , N = 180
Prosreq x polbail	 4) = 0.68, N = 58	 Plea x racedef	 R2 = 0.04, N = 170
Prevdec x polbail	 4) = 0.54, N = 56	 Plea x soffence	 R2 = 0.08, N = 182
Prevdec x bailrec	 4) = 0.39, N = 33	 Plea x noffence	 R2 = 0.03, N = 182
Defcourt x defreq	 K = 0.17, N = 159	 Plea x victim	 R2 = 0.03, N = 182
Defrep x defreq	 K= -0.18, N = 158 Plea x circums	 R2 = 0.41,N= 182
Prosreq x defreq K = -0.21, N = 159 Plea x lenadj R2 = 0.39, N = 176
Prevdec x prevconv K= 0.43, N = 41 Plea x nprevadj R2= 0.12, N = 176
Polbail x prevconv K = 0.53, N = 18 Plea x prevdec R2 = 0.03, N = 179
Coffence x sexdef R2= 0.06 N = 157 Plea x proscase R2 = 0.06, N = 92
Coffence x defrep R2 = 0.06, N= 156 Adjreq x agedef R2 = 0.08, N= 182
Coffence x soffence R2 = 0.59, N = 157 Adjreq x victim R2 = 0.03, N = 182
Coffence x victim R2 = 0.71, N = 157 Adjreq x nprevadj R2 = 0.06, N = 176
Coffence x sole R2 = 0.12, N= 157 Adjreq x prevdec R2= 0.06, N = 179
Coffence x circums R2 = 0.03, N = 157
Coffence x lenadj R2 = 0.05, N = 157
Coffence x nprevadj R2 = 0.09, N = 139
Coffence x prosreq R2 = 0.05, N = 157
Coffence x prevdec R2 = 0.11, N = 153
Coffence x maxpen R2 = 0.03, N = 155
Plea x noffence R2 = 0.04, N = 157
Plea x circums R2= 0.48, N = 158
Plea x lenadj R2 = 0.51, N = 158
Plea x bailrec R-2 = 0.15,N= 33
Adjreq x defcourt R2 = 0.03, N = 158
Adjreq x sole R2 = 0.07, N = 158
Adjreq x circums R2 = 0.05, N = 158
Adjreq x lenadj R2 = 0.03, N = 158
Adjreq x nprevadj R2 = 0.04, N = 140
APPENDIX G
HYPOTHETICAL CASES IN MODELLING AND HOLDOUT SETS FOR
STUDY 3
Cues**
Set* age gender race offence polbail pcbr proscase prosreq defreq
M 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00	 2.00 2.00 3.00
M 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 5.00	 2.00 3.00 2.00
M 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00	 1.00 1.00 2.00
M 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 3.00	 1.00 2.00 3.00
M 2.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 6.00	 1.00 3.00 3.00
M 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 4.00	 1.00 3.00 1.00
M 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00	 1.00 3.00 2.00
M 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 3.00	 1.00 3.00 2.00
M 1.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00	 2.00 3.00 1.00
M 2.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 2.00
	 1.00 3.00 1.00
M 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 6.00	 2.00 2.00 2.00
M 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 1.00
	 2.00 2.00 1.00
M 2.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00	 2.00 1.00 3.00
M 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.00
	 1.00 2.00 2.00
M 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 6.00	 1.00 1.00 1.00
M 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00	 2.00 3.00 3.00
M 1.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 3.00	 1.00 1.00 2.00
M 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 3.00	 1.00 2.00 1.00
M 1.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 2.00	 1.00 3.00 3.00
M 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 5.00
	 1.00 2.00 1.00
M 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 5.00	 1.00 1.00 3.00
M 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00	 2.00 1.00 2.00
M 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00	 1.00 2.00 2.00
M 2.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 2.00	 2.00 1.00 1.00
M 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00	 1.00 1.00 1.00
M 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00	 1.00 1.00 3.00
M 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 4.00	 1.00 2.00 3.00
H 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 5.00	 1.00 1.00 1.00
H 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00	 2.00 1.00 3.00
H 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 4.00	 2.00 1.00 2.00
H 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 3.00	 2.00 2.00 1.00
H 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 1.00	 1.00 2.00 2.00
H 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.00	 2.00 3.00 3.00
H 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 2.00	 1.00 3.00 3.00
Note: *M = modelling set, H = holdout set. **When modelling magistrates' decision
making policies, the binary cues were recoded as 0 for value 1 and 1 for value 2. The
polytomous cues were dichotomised and recoded. For race, offence, polbail, prosreq
and defreq, value 1 was recoded as 0 and the other values were recoded as 1. For pcbr,
values 1 and 2 were recoded as 0 and the other values were recoded as 1.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND HYPOTHETICAL CASES USED IN
STUDY THREE
Background information presented to cases
In all of the cases presented, it is the defendant's first appearance at court since he/she
was arrested and charged by the police. The defendant has pleaded not guilty, and has
consented to trial (at crown court where appropriate). The trial date has been set for six
weeks time. The defendant is represented by his/her own solicitor. Please note that
where a defendant does not have any previous convictions he/she may still have a past
bail record as he/she may have been tried but not convicted.
Case presented to BIS group
The defendant Andrew Fellows is male, white and 19 years old. He has been charged
with robbery. He has one previous conviction for a dissimilar offence, and has a good
past bail record. The police granted him unconditional bail after he was charged. The
prosecution has objected to unconditional bail being granted. The prosecution case
against him at present seems strong. The defence has suggested that conditions may be
attached to bail. He has a fixed address, is attending a part-time vocational course and a
surety is available.
Case presented to no BIS group
The defendant Andrew Fellows is male, white and 19 years old. He has been charged
with robbery. He has one previous conviction for a dissimilar offence, and has a good
past bail record. The police granted him unconditional bail after he was charged. The
prosecution has objected to unconditional bail being granted. The prosecution case
against him at present seems strong. The defence has suggested that conditions may be
attached to bail. He has a fixed address.
APPENDIX H
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS, CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS AND
INTIVITED TALKS
Publications
Dhami, M. K. (1999a). A psychologist on the bench. The Psychologist, 12, 328-329.
Dhami, M. K. (1999b). Who's judging the judges? EDAM Bulletin, September.
Dhami, M. K. & Ayton, P. (in press). Bailing and jailing the fast and frugal way.
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making.
Dhami, M. K. & Harries, C. (2001). Fast and frugal versus regression models of
human judgment. Thinking and Reasoning, 7, 5-27.
Harries, C. & Dhami, M. K. (2000). On the descriptive validity and prescriptive utility
of fast and frugal models [Commentary]. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 753-754.
Conference Presentations and Invited Talks*
*In reverse order.
Dhami, M. K. (October 2000). Models of legal decision making. Psychology
Department Colloquia, University of Hertfordshire, UK.
Discussant, (April 2000). Seminar on the Future of the Magistracy, organised by the
Institute for Public Policy Research, London, UK.
Dhami, M. K. (November 1999). Legal decision making the fast and frugal way.
Psychology Department Colloquia, University of Northumbria, Newcastle, UK.
Dharni, M. K. (August 1999). A psychologist on the bench. Conference on Subjective
Probability, Utility and Decision Making, Mannheim, Germany.
Dhami, M. K. (August 1999). Can justice be fast and frugal? Paper presented at the
Conference on Subjective Probability, Utility and Decision Making, Mannheim,
Germany.
Dhami, M. K. & Ayton, P. (November 1998). Legal decision making the fast and
frugal way. Poster presented at the Meeting of the Society for Judgment and Decision
Making, Dallas, US.
Dharni, M. K. (November 1998). Judgement analysis at the systems level: On the
when, why and how. Paper presented at the Meeting of the Brunswik Society, Dallas,
US.
Dhami, M. K. (December 1998). Legal decision making: How do magistrates make
bail decisions? Paper presented at the London Conference of the British Psychological
Society, London, UK.
Dhami, M. K. & Ayton, P. (September 1998). Applying the law on bail: An assessment
of risk. Paper presented at the Conference of the Division of Criminological and Legal
Psychology, British Psychological Society, Durham, UK.
Dhami, M. K. (April 1998). Magistrates' bail decisions: An exercise in risk
assessment. Paper presented at the Seminar on Risk, Leeds University, Leeds, UK.
Dhami, M. K. & Ayton, P. (November 1997). A policy capturing study of magistrates'
bail decision making. Poster presented at the Meeting of the Society for Judgment and
Decision Making, Philadelphia, US.
Dhami, M. K. (September 1997). A policy capturing study of magistrates' bail decision
making. Poster presented at the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Psychology Section,
British Psychological Society, Bristol, UK.
Dhami, M. K. (August 1997). A study of magistrates' bail decision making. Poster
presented at the Conference on Subjective Probability, Utility and Decision Making,
Leeds, UK.
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